Three Years Behind The Curve Too Late Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) Increases Target Federal Funds Rate to .75-1.0% — Financial Repression of Savers Slowly Continues — Videos

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Yellen Calms Fears Fed’s Policy Trigger Finger Is Getting Itchy

March 15, 2017, 1:00 PM CDT March 15, 2017, 5:02 PM CDT
  • Policy makers still project three total rate hikes for 2017
  • FOMC sticks with ‘gradual’ plan for removing accommodation

Fed Raises Benchmark Lending Rate a Quarter Point

Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen sought to reassure investors that the central bank’s latest interest-rate increase wasn’t a paradigm shift to a trigger-happy policy driven by fears of faster inflation.

Speaking to reporters after the Fed’s quarter percentage-point move on Wednesday, Yellen said the central bank was willing to tolerate inflation temporarily overshootingits 2 percent goal and that it intended to keep its policy accommodative for “some time.”

“The simple message is the economy’s doing well. We have confidence in the robustness of the economy and its resilience to shocks,” she said.

As a result, the Fed is sticking with its policy of gradually raising interest rates, Yellen said. In their first forecasts in three months, Fed policy makers penciled in two more quarter-point rate increases this year and three in 2018, unchanged from their projections in December.

Today’s decision “does not represent a reassessment of the economic outlook or of the appropriate course for monetary policy,” the Fed chief said.

Speculation of a more aggressive Fed had mounted in recent days after a host of central bank officials, including Yellen herself, went out of their way to telegraph to financial markets that a rate hike was imminent. The expectations were further fueled by news of rising inflation.

Stocks Advance

Stocks rose and bond yields fell as investors viewed the statement from the Federal Open Market Committee and Yellen’s remarks afterward as a sign that the Fed isn’t in a hurry to remove monetary stimulus. The FOMC raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 0.75 percent to 1 percent, as expected, but Yellen’s lack of urgency to snuff out inflation was a surprise.

R.J. Gallo, a fixed-income investment manager at Federated Investors in Pittsburgh, said the chorus of Fed speakers before this meeting led investors to expect a move up in the number of projected rate hikes this year, and even upgrades by Fed officials in the levels of inflation and growth they anticipated.

None of that materialized.

“You didn’t get any of those things,” Gallo said, which explains why Treasury yields quickly dropped after the Fed released the FOMC statement and a new set of economic projections. “The expectation that Fed was getting more hawkish had to come out of the market.”

The U.S. economy has mostly met the central bank’s goals of full employment and stable prices, and may get further support if President Donald Trump delivers promised fiscal stimulus. Investor and business confidence has soared since Trump won the presidency in November, buoyed by his vows to cut taxes, lift infrastructure spending and ease regulations.

Still, the data don’t show an economy that’s heating up rapidly — a point Yellen herself made after the third rate hike since the 2007-2009 recession ended. In fact, the economy may have “more room to run,” she said.

Stronger business and consumer confidence hasn’t yet translated into increased investment and spending, said Yellen.

“It’s uncertain just how much sentiment actually impacts spending decisions, and I wouldn’t say at this point that I have seen hard evidence of any change in spending decisions,” said the Fed Chair. “Most of the business people that we’ve talked to also have a wait-and-see attitude.”

Retail sales in February grew at the slowest pace since August, a government report showed earlier Wednesday. The Atlanta Fed’s model for GDP predicts an expansion of 0.9 percent in the first quarter, less than a third the pace Trump is aiming for.

Fiscal Stimulus

Asked about the potential for a fiscal boost, Yellen made clear the Fed is still waiting for more concrete policy plans to emerge from the Trump administration before adapting monetary policy in reaction.

“There is great uncertainty about the timing, the size and the character of policy changes that may be put in place,” Yellen said. “I don’t think that’s a decision or set of decisions that we need to make until we know more about what policy changes will go into effect.”

Yellen disputed suggestions that the Fed was on a collision course with the Trump administration over its plans to foster faster economic growth through tax cuts and deregulation. “We would welcome stronger economic growth in the context of price stability,” she said.

She said she had met Trump briefly and had gotten together a couple of times with Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to discuss the economy and financial regulation.

Further underscoring their lack of urgency, Fed officials repeated a commitment to maintain their balance-sheet reinvestment policy until rate increases were well under way. Yellen said officials had discussed the process of reducing the balance sheet gradually, but had made no decisions and would continue to debate the topic.

Policy makers forecast inflation will reach 1.9 percent in the fourth quarter this year, and 2 percent in both 2018 and 2019, according to quarterly median estimates released with the FOMC statement. The Fed’s preferred measure of inflation rose 1.9 percent in the 12 months through January, just shy of its target.

Yellen pointed out, though, that core inflation continues to run somewhat further below 2 percent. That rate, which strips out food and energy costs, stood at 1.7 percent in January. The Fed’s new forecast for the core rate at the end of this year edged up to 1.9 percent, from 1.8 percent in December.

“The committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal,” the Fed said. Discussing the word symmetric in the statement, Yellen said during her press conference that the Fed was not shooting to push inflation over 2 percent but recognized that it could temporarily go above it. Two percent is a target, she reiterated, not a ceiling.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-15/fed-raises-benchmark-rate-as-inflation-approaches-2-target

Changes in the federal funds rate will always affect the U.S. dollar. When the Federal Reserve increases the federal funds rate, it normally reduces inflationary pressure and works to appreciate the dollar.

Since June 2006, however, the Fed has maintained a federal funds rate of close to 0%. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the federal funds rate fluctuated between 0-0.25%, and is now 0.75%.

The Fed used this monetary policy to help achieve maximum employment and stable prices. Now that the 2008 financial crisis has largely subsided, the Fed will look to increase interest rates to continue to achieve employment and to stabilize prices.

Inflation of the U.S. Dollar

The best way to achieve full employment and stable prices is to set the inflation rate of the dollar at 2%. In 2011, the Fed officially adopted a 2% annual increase in the price index for personal consumption expenditures as its target. When the economy is weak, inflation naturally falls; when the economy is strong, rising wages increase inflation. Keeping inflation at a growth rate of 2% helps the economy grow at a healthy rate.

Adjustments to the federal funds rate can also affect inflation in the United States. The Fed controls the economy by increasing interest rates when the economy is growing too fast. This encourages people to save more and spend less, reducing inflationary pressure. Conversely, when the economy is in a recession or growing too slowly, the Fed reduces interest rates to stimulate spending, which increases inflation.

During the 2008 financial crisis, the low federal funds rate should have increased inflation. Over this period, the federal funds rate was set near 0%, which encouraged spending and would normally increase inflation.

However, inflation is still well below the 2% target, which is contrary to the normal effects of low interest rates. The Fed cites one-off factors, such as falling oil prices and the strengthening dollar, as the reasons why inflation has remained low in a low interest environment.

The Fed believes that these factors will eventually fade and that inflation will increase above the target 2%. To prevent this eventual increase in inflation, hiking the federal funds rate reduces inflationary pressure and cause inflation of the dollar to remain around 2%.

Appreciation of the U.S. Dollar

Increases in the federal funds rate also result in a strengthening of the U.S. dollar. Other ways that the dollar can appreciate include increases in average wages and increases in overall consumption. However, although jobs are being created, wage rates are stagnant.

Without an increase in wage rates to go along with a strengthening job market, consumption won’t increase enough to sustain economic growth. Additionally, consumption remains subdued due to the fact that the labor force participation rate was close to its 35-year low in 2015. The Fed has kept interest rates low because a lower federal funds rate supports business expansions, which leads to more jobs and higher consumption. This has all worked to keep appreciation of the U.S. dollar low.

However, the U.S. is ahead of the other developed markets in terms of its economic recovery. Although the Fed raises rates cautiously, the U.S. could see higher interest rates before the other developed economies.

Overall, under normal economic conditions, increases in the federal funds rate reduce inflation and increase the appreciation of the U.S. dollar.

http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/101215/how-fed-fund-rate-hikes-affect-us-dollar.asp

Financial repression

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Not to be confused with economic repression, a type of political repression.

Financial repression refers to “policies that result in savers earning returns below the rate of inflation” in order to allow banks to “provide cheap loans to companies and governments, reducing the burden of repayments”.[1] It can be particularly effective at liquidating government debt denominated in domestic currency.[2] It can also lead to a large expansions in debt “to levels evoking comparisons with the excesses that generated Japan’s lost decade and the Asian financial crisis” in 1997.[1]

The term was introduced in 1973 by Stanford economists Edward S. Shaw and Ronald I. McKinnon[3][4] in order to “disparage growth-inhibiting policies in emerging markets“.

Mechanism

Financial repression consists of the following:[5]

  1. Explicit or indirect capping of interest rates, such as on government debt and deposit rates (e.g., Regulation Q).
  2. Government ownership or control of domestic banks and financial institutions with barriers that limit other institutions from entering the market.
  3. High reserve requirements.
  4. Creation or maintenance of a captive domestic market for government debt, achieved by requiring banks to hold government debt via capital requirements, or by prohibiting or disincentivising alternatives.
  5. Government restrictions on the transfer of assets abroad through the imposition of capital controls.

These measures allow governments to issue debt at lower interest rates. A low nominal interest rate can reduce debt servicing costs, while negative real interest rates erodes the real value of government debt.[5] Thus, financial repression is most successful in liquidating debts when accompanied by inflation and can be considered a form of taxation,[6] or alternatively a form of debasement.[7]

The size of the financial repression tax for 24 emerging markets from 1974 to 1987. Their results showed that financial repression exceeded 2% of GDP for seven countries, and greater than 3% for five countries. For five countries (India, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe) it represented approximately 20% of tax revenue. In the case of Mexico financial repression was 6% of GDP, or 40% of tax revenue.[8]

Financial repression is categorized as “macroprudential regulation“—i.e., government efforts to “ensure the health of an entire financial system.[2]

Examples

After World War II

Financial repression “played an important role in reducing debt-to-GDP ratios after World War II” by keeping real interest rates for government debt below 1% for two-thirds of the time between 1945 and 1980, the United States was able to “inflate away” the large debt (122% of GDP) left over from the Great Depression and World War II.[2] In the UK, government debt declined from 216% of GDP in 1945 to 138% ten years later in 1955.[9]

China

China‘s economic growth has been attributed to financial repression thanks to “low returns on savings and the cheap loans that it makes possible”. This has allowed China to rely on savings-financed investments for economic growth. However, because low returns also dampens consumer spending, household expenditures account for “a smaller share of GDP in China than in any other major economy”.[1] However, as of December 2014, the People’s Bank of China “started to undo decades of financial repression” and the government now allows Chinese savers to collect up to a 3.3% return on one-year deposits. At China’s 1.6% inflation rate, this is a “high real-interest rate compared to other major economies”.[1]

After the 2008 economic recession

In a 2011 NBER working paper, Carmen Reinhart and Maria Belen Sbrancia speculate on a possible return by governments to this form of debt reduction in order to deal with high debt levels following the 2008 economic crisis.[5]

“To get access to capital, Austria has restricted capital flows to foreign subsidiaries in central and eastern Europe. Select pension funds have also been transferred to governments in France, Portugal, Ireland and Hungary, enabling them to re-allocate toward sovereign bonds.”[10]

Criticism

Critics[who?] argue that if this view was true, investors (i.e., capital-seeking parties) would be inclined to demand capital in large quantities and would be buying capital goods from this capital. This high demand for capital goods would certainly lead to inflation and thus the central banks would be forced to raise interest rates again. As a boom pepped by low interest rates fails to appear these days in industrialized countries, this is a sign that the low interest rates seem to be necessary to ensure an equilibrium on the capital market, thus to balance capital-supply—i.e., savers—on one side and capital-demand—i.e., investors and the government—on the other. This view argues that interest rates would be even lower if it were not for the high government debt ratio (i.e., capital demand from the government).

Free-market economists argue that financial repression crowds out private-sector investment, thus undermining growth. On the other hand, “postwar politicians clearly decided this was a price worth paying to cut debt and avoid outright default or draconian spending cuts. And the longer the gridlock over fiscal reform rumbles on, the greater the chance that ‘repression’ comes to be seen as the least of all evils”.[11]

Also, financial repression has been called a “stealth tax” that “rewards debtors and punishes savers—especially retirees” because their investments will no longer generate the expected return, which is income for retirees.[10][12] “One of the main goals of financial repression is to keep nominal interest rates lower than they would be in more competitive markets. Other things equal, this reduces the government’s interest expenses for a given stock of debt and contributes to deficit reduction. However, when financial repression produces negative real interest rates (nominal rates below the inflation rate), it reduces or liquidates existing debts and becomes the equivalent of a tax—a transfer from creditors (savers) to borrowers, including the government.”[2]

See also

Reform:

General:

References

  1. ^ Jump up to:a b c d “China Savers Prioritized Over Banks by PBOC”. Bloomberg. November 25, 2014.
  2. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Carmen M. Reinhart, Jacob F. Kirkegaard, and M. Belen Sbrancia, “Financial Repression Redux”, IMF Finance and Development, June 2011, p. 22-26
  3. Jump up^ Shaw, Edward S. Financial Deepening in Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973
  4. Jump up^ McKinnon, Ronald I. Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973
  5. ^ Jump up to:a b c Carmen M. Reinhart and M. Belen Sbrancia, “The Liquidation of Government Debt”, IMF, 2011, p. 19
  6. Jump up^ Reinhart, Carmen M. and Rogoff, Kenneth S., This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 143
  7. Jump up^ Bill Gross, “The Caine Mutiny Part 2”, PIMCO
  8. Jump up^ Giovannini, Alberto and de Melo, Martha, “Government Revenue from Financial Repression”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 Sep. 1993 (pp. 953-963)
  9. Jump up^ “The great repression”. The Economist. 16 June 2011.
  10. ^ Jump up to:a b “Financial Repression 101”. Allianz Global Investors. Retrieved 2 December 2014.
  11. Jump up^ Gillian Tett, “Policymakers learn a new and alarming catchphrase”, Financial Times, May 9, 2011
  12. Jump up^ Amerman, Daniel (September 12, 2011). “The 2nd Edge of Modern Financial Repression: Manipulating Inflation Indexes to Steal from Retirees & Public Wor

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_repression

Federal funds rate

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

10 year treasury compared to the Federal Funds Rate

Federal funds rate and capacity utilization in manufacturing.

In the United States, the federal funds rate is the interest rate at which depository institutions (banks and credit unions) lend reserve balances to other depository institutions overnight, on an uncollateralized basis. Reserve balances are amounts held at the Federal Reserve to maintain depository institutions’ reserve requirements. Institutions with surplus balances in their accounts lend those balances to institutions in need of larger balances. The federal funds rate is an important benchmark in financial markets.[1][2]

The interest rate that the borrowing bank pays to the lending bank to borrow the funds is negotiated between the two banks, and the weighted average of this rate across all such transactions is the federal funds effective rate.

The federal funds target rate is determined by a meeting of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee which normally occurs eight times a year about seven weeks apart. The committee may also hold additional meetings and implement target rate changes outside of its normal schedule.

The Federal Reserve uses open market operations to influence the supply of money in the U.S. economy[3] to make the federal funds effective rate follow the federal funds target rate.

Mechanism

Financial Institutions are obligated by law to maintain certain levels of reserves, either as reserves with the Fed or as vault cash. The level of these reserves is determined by the outstanding assets and liabilities of each depository institution, as well as by the Fed itself, but is typically 10%[4] of the total value of the bank’s demand accounts (depending on bank size). In the range of $9.3 million to $43.9 million, for transaction deposits (checking accounts, NOWs, and other deposits that can be used to make payments) the reserve requirement in 2007-2008 was 3 percent of the end-of-the-day daily average amount held over a two-week period. Transaction deposits over $43.9 million held at the same depository institution carried a 10 percent reserve requirement.

For example, assume a particular U.S. depository institution, in the normal course of business, issues a loan. This dispenses money and decreases the ratio of bank reserves to money loaned. If its reserve ratio drops below the legally required minimum, it must add to its reserves to remain compliant with Federal Reserve regulations. The bank can borrow the requisite funds from another bank that has a surplus in its account with the Fed. The interest rate that the borrowing bank pays to the lending bank to borrow the funds is negotiated between the two banks, and the weighted average of this rate across all such transactions is the federal funds effective rate.

The nominal rate is a target set by the governors of the Federal Reserve, which they enforce by open market operations and adjusting the interest paid on required and excess reserve balances. That nominal rate is almost always what is meant by the media referring to the Federal Reserve “changing interest rates.” The actual federal funds rate generally lies within a range of that target rate, as the Federal Reserve cannot set an exact value through open market operations.

Another way banks can borrow funds to keep up their required reserves is by taking a loan from the Federal Reserve itself at the discount window. These loans are subject to audit by the Fed, and the discount rate is usually higher than the federal funds rate. Confusion between these two kinds of loans often leads to confusion between the federal funds rate and the discount rate. Another difference is that while the Fed cannot set an exact federal funds rate, it does set the specific discount rate.

The federal funds rate target is decided by the governors at Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. The FOMC members will either increase, decrease, or leave the rate unchanged depending on the meeting’s agenda and the economic conditions of the U.S. It is possible to infer the market expectations of the FOMC decisions at future meetings from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) Fed Funds futures contracts, and these probabilities are widely reported in the financial media.

Applications

Interbank borrowing is essentially a way for banks to quickly raise money. For example, a bank may want to finance a major industrial effort but may not have the time to wait for deposits or interest (on loan payments) to come in. In such cases the bank will quickly raise this amount from other banks at an interest rate equal to or higher than the Federal funds rate.

Raising the federal funds rate will dissuade banks from taking out such inter-bank loans, which in turn will make cash that much harder to procure. Conversely, dropping the interest rates will encourage banks to borrow money and therefore invest more freely.[5] This interest rate is used as a regulatory tool to control how freely the U.S. economy operates.

By setting a higher discount rate the Federal Bank discourages banks from requisitioning funds from the Federal Bank, yet positions itself as a lender of last resort.

Comparison with LIBOR

Though the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the federal funds rate are concerned with the same action, i.e. interbank loans, they are distinct from one another, as follows:

  • The target federal funds rate is a target interest rate that is set by the FOMC for implementing U.S. monetary policies.
  • The (effective) federal funds rate is achieved through open market operations at the Domestic Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York which deals primarily in domestic securities (U.S. Treasury and federal agencies’ securities).[6]
  • LIBOR is based on a questionnaire where a selection of banks guess the rates at which they could borrow money from other banks.
  • LIBOR may or may not be used to derive business terms. It is not fixed beforehand and is not meant to have macroeconomic ramifications.[7]

Predictions by the market

Considering the wide impact a change in the federal funds rate can have on the value of the dollar and the amount of lending going to new economic activity, the Federal Reserve is closely watched by the market. The prices of Option contracts on fed funds futures (traded on the Chicago Board of Trade) can be used to infer the market’s expectations of future Fed policy changes. Based on CME Group 30-Day Fed Fund futures prices, which have long been used to express the market’s views on the likelihood of changes in U.S. monetary policy, the CME Group FedWatch tool allows market participants to view the probability of an upcoming Fed Rate hike. One set of such implied probabilities is published by the Cleveland Fed.

Historical rates

As of December 16, 2008, the most recent change the FOMC has made to the funds target rate is a 75 to 100 basis point cut from 1.0% to a range of zero to 0.25%. According to Jack A. Ablin, chief investment officer at Harris Private Bank, one reason for this unprecedented move of having a range, rather than a specific rate, was because a rate of 0% could have had problematic implications for money market funds, whose fees could then outpace yields.[8] This followed the 50 basis point cut on October 29, 2008, and the unusually large 75 basis point cut made during a special January 22, 2008 meeting, as well as a 50 basis point cut on January 30, 2008, a 75 basis point cut on March 18, 2008, and a 50 basis point cut on October 8, 2008.[9]

Federal funds rate history and recessions.png

Explanation of federal funds rate decisions

When the Federal Open Market Committee wishes to reduce interest rates they will increase the supply of money by buying government securities. When additional supply is added and everything else remains constant, price normally falls. The price here is the interest rate (cost of money) and specifically refers to the Federal Funds Rate. Conversely, when the Committee wishes to increase the Fed Funds Rate, they will instruct the Desk Manager to sell government securities, thereby taking the money they earn on the proceeds of those sales out of circulation and reducing the money supply. When supply is taken away and everything else remains constant, price (or in this case interest rates) will normally rise.[10]

The Federal Reserve has responded to a potential slow-down by lowering the target federal funds rate during recessions and other periods of lower growth. In fact, the Committee’s lowering has recently predated recessions,[9] in order to stimulate the economy and cushion the fall. Reducing the Fed Funds Rate makes money cheaper, allowing an influx of credit into the economy through all types of loans.

The charts linked below show the relation between S&P 500 and interest rates.

  • July 13, 1990 — Sept 4, 1992: 8.00%–3.00% (Includes 1990–1991 recession)[11][12]
  • Feb 1, 1995 — Nov 17, 1998: 6.00–4.75 [13][14][15]
  • May 16, 2000 — June 25, 2003: 6.50–1.00 (Includes 2001 recession)[16][17][18]
  • June 29, 2006 — (Oct. 29 2008): 5.25–1.00[19]
  • Dec 16, 2008 — 0.0–0.25[20]
  • Dec 16, 2015 — 0.25-0.50[21]
  • Dec 14, 2016 — 0.50-0.75[22]
  • Mar 15, 2017 — 0.75-1.00[23]

Bill Gross of PIMCO suggested that in the prior 15 years ending in 2007, in each instance where the fed funds rate was higher than the nominal GDP growth rate, assets such as stocks and/or housing fell.[24]

See also

References

  1. Jump up^ “Fedpoints: Federal Funds”. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. August 2007. Retrieved 2 October 2011.
  2. Jump up^ “The Implementation of Monetary Policy”. The Federal Reserve System: Purposes & Functions (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Federal Reserve Board. 24 August 2011. p. 4. Retrieved 2 October 2011.
  3. Jump up^ “Monetary Policy, Open Market Operations”. Federal Reserve Bank. 2008-01-30. Retrieved 2008-01-30.
  4. Jump up^ “Reserve Requirements”. Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System. December 16, 2015.
  5. Jump up^ “Fed funds rate”. Bankrate, Inc. March 2016.
  6. Jump up^ Cheryl L. Edwards (November 1997). Gerard Sinzdak. “Open Market Operations in the 1990s” (PDF). Federal Reserve Bulletin (PDF).
  7. Jump up^ “BBA LIBOR – Frequently asked questions”. British Bankers’ Association. March 21, 2006. Archived from the original on 2007-02-16.
  8. Jump up^ “4:56 p.m. US-Closing Stocks”. Associated Press. December 16, 2008.[dead link]
  9. ^ Jump up to:a b “Historical Changes of the Target Federal Funds and Discount Rates, 1971 to present”. New York Federal Reserve Branch. February 19, 2010. Archived from the original on December 21, 2008.
  10. Jump up^ David Waring (2008-02-19). “An Explanation of How The Fed Moves Interest Rates”. InformedTrades.com. Archived from the original on 2015-05-05. Retrieved 2009-07-20.
  11. Jump up^ “$SPX 1990-06-12 1992-10-04 (rate drop chart)”. StockCharts.com.
  12. Jump up^ “$SPX 1992-08-04 1995-03-01 (rate rise chart)”. StockCharts.com.
  13. Jump up^ “$SPX 1995-01-01 1997-01-01 (rate drop chart)”. StockCharts.com.
  14. Jump up^ “$SPX 1996-12-01 1998-10-17 (rate drop chart)”. StockCharts.com.
  15. Jump up^ “$SPX 1998-09-17 2000-06-16 (rate rise chart)”. StockCharts.com.
  16. Jump up^ “$SPX 2000-04-16 2002-01-01 (rate drop chart)”. StockCharts.com.
  17. Jump up^ “$SPX 2002-01-01 2003-07-25 (rate drop chart)”. StockCharts.com.
  18. Jump up^ “$SPX 2003-06-25 2006-06-29 (rate rise chart)”. StockCharts.com.
  19. Jump up^ “$SPX 2006-06-29 2008-06-01 (rate drop chart)”. StockCharts.com.
  20. Jump up^ “Press Release”. Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System. December 16, 2008.
  21. Jump up^ “Open Market Operations”. Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System. December 16, 2015.
  22. Jump up^ “Decisions Regarding Monetary Policy Implementation”. Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System.
  23. Jump up^ Cox, Jeff (2017-03-15). “Fed raises rates at March meeting”. CNBC. Retrieved 2017-03-15.
  24. Jump up^ Shaw, Richard (January 7, 2007). “The Bond Yield Curve as an Economic Crystal Ball”. Retrieved 3 April 2011.

External links

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_funds_rate

Monetary policy of the United States

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from U.S. monetary policy)
United States M2 money supply
% change in money supply
Money supply changes monthly basis

Monetary policy concerns the actions of a central bank or other regulatory authorities that determine the size and rate of growth of the money supply.

In the United States, the Federal Reserve is in charge of monetary policy, and implements it primarily by performing operations that influence short-term interest rates.

Money supply[edit]

Main article: Money supply

The money supply has different components, generally broken down into “narrow” and “broad” money, reflecting the different degrees of liquidity (‘spendability’) of each different type, as broader forms of money can be converted into narrow forms of money (or may be readily accepted as money by others, such as personal checks).[1]

For example, demand deposits are technically promises to pay on demand, while savings deposits are promises to pay subject to some withdrawal restrictions, and Certificates of Deposit are promises to pay only at certain specified dates; each can be converted into money, but “narrow” forms of money can be converted more readily. The Federal Reserve directly controls only the most narrow form of money, physical cash outstanding along with the reserves of banks throughout the country (known as M0 or the monetary base); the Federal Reserve indirectly influences the supply of other types of money.[1]

Broad money includes money held in deposit balances in banks and other forms created in the financial system. Basic economics also teaches that the money supply shrinks when loans are repaid;[2][3] however, the money supply will not necessarily decrease depending on the creation of new loans and other effects. Other than loans, investment activities of commercial banks and the Federal Reserve also increase and decrease the money supply.[4] Discussion of “money” often confuses the different measures and may lead to misguided commentary on monetary policy and misunderstandings of policy discussions.[5]

Structure of modern US institutions[edit]

Federal Reserve[edit]

Monetary policy in the US is determined and implemented by the US Federal Reserve System, commonly referred to as the Federal Reserve. Established in 1913 by the Federal Reserve Act to provide central banking functions,[6] the Federal Reserve System is a quasi-public institution. Ostensibly, the Federal Reserve Banks are 12 private banking corporations;[7][8][9] they are independent in their day-to-day operations, but legislatively accountable to Congress through the auspices of Federal Reserve Board of Governors.

The Board of Governors is an independent governmental agency consisting of seven officials and their support staff of over 1800 employees headquartered in Washington, D.C.[10] It is independent in the sense that the Board currently operates without official obligation to accept the requests or advice of any elected official with regard to actions on the money supply,[11]and its methods of funding also preserve independence. The Governors are nominated by the President of the United States, and nominations must be confirmed by the U.S. Senate.[12]

The presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks are nominated by each bank’s respective Board of Directors, but must also be approved by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board is generally considered to have the most important position, followed by the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.[12] The Federal Reserve System is primarily funded by interest collected on their portfolio of securities from the US Treasury, and the Fed has broad discretion in drafting its own budget,[13] but, historically, nearly all the interest the Federal Reserve collects is rebated to the government each year.[14]

The Federal Reserve has three main mechanisms for manipulating the money supply. It can buy or sell treasury securities. Selling securities has the effect of reducing the monetary base (because it accepts money in return for purchase of securities), taking that money out of circulation. Purchasing treasury securities increases the monetary base (because it pays out hard currency in exchange for accepting securities). Secondly, the discount rate can be changed. And finally, the Federal Reserve can adjust the reserve requirement, which can affect the money multiplier; the reserve requirement is adjusted only infrequently, and was last adjusted in 1992.[15]

In practice, the Federal Reserve uses open market operations to influence short-term interest rates, which is the primary tool of monetary policy. The federal funds rate, for which the Federal Open Market Committee announces a target on a regular basis, reflects one of the key rates for interbank lending. Open market operations change the supply of reserve balances, and the federal funds rate is sensitive to these operations.[16]

In theory, the Federal Reserve has unlimited capacity to influence this rate, and although the federal funds rate is set by banks borrowing and lending funds to each other, the federal funds rate generally stays within a limited range above and below the target (as participants are aware of the Fed’s power to influence this rate).

Assuming a closed economy, where foreign capital or trade does not affect the money supply, when money supply increases, interest rates go down. Businesses and consumers have a lower cost of capital and can increase spending and capital improvement projects. This encourages short-term growth. Conversely, when the money supply falls, interest rates go up, increasing the cost of capital and leading to more conservative spending and investment. The Federal reserve increases interest rates to combat Inflation.

U.S. Treasury[edit]

Private commercial banks[edit]

When money is deposited in a bank, it can then be lent out to another person. If the initial deposit was $100 and the bank lends out $100 to another customer the money supply has increased by $100. However, because the depositor can ask for the money back, banks have to maintain minimum reserves to service customer needs. If the reserve requirement is 10% then, in the earlier example, the bank can lend $90 and thus the money supply increases by only $90. The reserve requirement therefore acts as a limit on this multiplier effect. Because the reserve requirement only applies to the more narrow forms of money creation (corresponding to M1), but does not apply to certain types of deposits (such as time deposits), reserve requirements play a limited role in monetary policy.[17]

Money creation[edit]

Main article: Money creation

Currently, the US government maintains over US$800 billion in cash money (primarily Federal Reserve Notes) in circulation throughout the world,[18][19] up from a sum of less than $30 billion in 1959. Below is an outline of the process which is currently used to control the amount of money in the economy. The amount of money in circulation generally increases to accommodate money demanded by the growth of the country’s production. The process of money creation usually goes as follows:

  1. Banks go through their daily transactions. Of the total money deposited at banks, significant and predictable proportions often remain deposited, and may be referred to as “core deposits.” Banks use the bulk of “non-moving” money (their stable or “core” deposit base) by loaning it out.[20] Banks have a legal obligation to keep a certain fraction of bank deposit money on-hand at all times.[21]
  2. In order to raise additional money to cover excess spending, Congress increases the size of the National Debt by issuing securities typically in the form of a Treasury Bond[22] (see United States Treasury security). It offers the Treasury security for sale, and someone pays cash to the government in exchange. Banks are often the purchasers of these securities, and these securities currently play a crucial role in the process.
  3. The 12-person Federal Open Market Committee, which consists of the heads of the Federal Reserve System (the seven Federal governors and five bank presidents), meets eight times a year to determine how they would like to influence the economy.[23] They create a plan called the country’s “monetary policy” which sets targets for things such as interest rates.[24]
  4. Every business day, the Federal Reserve System engages in Open market operations.[25] If the Federal Reserve wants to increase the money supply, it will buy securities (such as U.S. Treasury Bonds) anonymously from banks in exchange for dollars. If the Federal Reserve wants to decrease the money supply, it will sell securities to the banks in exchange for dollars, taking those dollars out of circulation.[26][27] When the Federal Reserve makes a purchase, it credits the seller’s reserve account (with the Federal Reserve). The money that it deposits into the seller’s account is not transferred from any existing funds, therefore it is at this point that the Federal Reserve has created High-powered money.
  5. By means of open market operations, the Federal Reserve affects the free reserves of commercial banks in the country.[28] Anna Schwartz explains that “if the Federal Reserve increases reserves, a single bank can make loans up to the amount of its excess reserves, creating an equal amount of deposits”.[26][27][29]
  6. Since banks have more free reserves, they may loan out the money, because holding the money would amount to accepting the cost of foregone interest[28][30] When a loan is granted, a person is generally granted the money by adding to the balance on their bank account.[31]
  7. This is how the Federal Reserve’s high-powered money is multiplied into a larger amount of broad money, through bank loans; as written in a particular case study, “as banks increase or decrease loans, the nation’s (broad) money supply increases or decreases.”[3] Once granted these additional funds, the recipient has the option to withdraw physical currency (dollar bills and coins) from the bank, which will reduce the amount of money available for further on-lending (and money creation) in the banking system.[32]
  8. In many cases, account-holders will request cash withdrawals, so banks must keep a supply of cash handy. When they believe they need more cash than they have on hand, banks can make requests for cash with the Federal Reserve. In turn, the Federal Reserve examines these requests and places an order for printed money with the US Treasury Department.[33] The Treasury Department sends these requests to the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (to make dollar bills) and the Bureau of the Mint (to stamp the coins).
  9. The U.S. Treasury sells this newly printed money to the Federal Reserve for the cost of printing.[citation needed] This is about 6 cents per bill for any denomination.[34] Aside from printing costs, the Federal Reserve must pledge collateral (typically government securities such as Treasury bonds) to put new money, which does not replace old notes, into circulation.[35]This printed cash can then be distributed to banks, as needed.

Though the Federal Reserve authorizes and distributes the currency printed by the Treasury (the primary component of the narrow monetary base), the broad money supply is primarily created by commercial banks through the money multiplier mechanism.[29][31][36][37] One textbook summarizes the process as follows:

“The Fed” controls the money supply in the United States by controlling the amount of loans made by commercial banks. New loans are usually in the form of increased checking account balances, and since checkable deposits are part of the money supply, the money supply increases when new loans are made …[38]

This type of money is convertible into cash when depositors request cash withdrawals, which will require banks to limit or reduce their lending.[39][32] The vast majority of the broad money supply throughout the world represents current outstanding loans of banks to various debtors.[38][40][41] A very small amount of U.S. currency still exists as “United States Notes“, which have no meaningful economic difference from Federal Reserve notes in their usage, although they departed significantly in their method of issuance into circulation. The currency distributed by the Federal Reserve has been given the official designation of “Federal Reserve Notes.”[42]

Significant effects[edit]

Main article: Monetary policy

In 2005, the Federal Reserve held approximately 9% of the national debt[43] as assets against the liability of printed money. In previous periods, the Federal Reserve has used other debt instruments, such as debt securities issued by private corporations. During periods when the national debt of the United States has declined significantly (such as happened in fiscal years 1999 and 2000), monetary policy and financial markets experts have studied the practical implications of having “too little” government debt: both the Federal Reserve and financial markets use the price information, yield curve and the so-called risk free rate extensively.[44]

Experts are hopeful that other assets could take the place of National Debt as the base asset to back Federal Reserve notes, and Alan Greenspan, long the head of the Federal Reserve, has been quoted as saying, “I am confident that U.S. financial markets, which are the most innovative and efficient in the world, can readily adapt to a paydown of Treasury debt by creating private alternatives with many of the attributes that market participants value in Treasury securities.”[45] In principle, the government could still issue debt securities in significant quantities while having no net debt, and significant quantities of government debt securities are also held by other government agencies.

Although the U.S. government receives income overall from seigniorage, there are costs associated with maintaining the money supply.[41][46] Leading ecological economist and steady-state theorist Herman Daly, claims that “over 95% of our [broad] money supply [in the United States] is created by the private banking system (demand deposits) and bears interest as a condition of its existence,”[41] a conclusion drawn from the Federal Reserve’s ultimate dependence on increased activity in fractional reserve lending when it exercises open market operations.[47]Economist Eric Miller criticizes Daly’s logic because money is created in the banking system in response to demand for the money,[48] which justifies cost.[citation needed]

Thus, use of expansionary open market operations typically generates more debt in the private sector of society (in the form of additional bank deposits).[49] The private banking system charges interest to borrowers as a cost to borrow the money.[3][31][50] The interest costs are borne by those that have borrowed,[3][31] and without this borrowing, open market operations would be unsuccessful in maintaining the broad money supply,[30] though alternative implementations of monetary policy could be used. Depositors of funds in the banking system are paid interest on their savings (or provided other services, such as checking account privileges or physical security for their “cash”), as compensation for “lending” their funds to the bank.

Increases (or contractions) of the money supply corresponds to growth (or contraction) in interest-bearing debt in the country.[3][30][41] The concepts involved in monetary policy may be widely misunderstood in the general public, as evidenced by the volume of literature on topics such as “Federal Reserve conspiracy” and “Federal Reserve fraud.”[51]

Uncertainties

A few of the uncertainties involved in monetary policy decision making are described by the federal reserve:[52]

  • While these policy choices seem reasonably straightforward, monetary policy makers routinely face certain notable uncertainties. First, the actual position of the economy and growth in aggregate demand at any time are only partially known, as key information on spending, production, and prices becomes available only with a lag. Therefore, policy makers must rely on estimates of these economic variables when assessing the appropriate course of policy, aware that they could act on the basis of misleading information. Second, exactly how a given adjustment in the federal funds rate will affect growth in aggregate demand—in terms of both the overall magnitude and the timing of its impact—is never certain. Economic models can provide rules of thumb for how the economy will respond, but these rules of thumb are subject to statistical error. Third, the growth in aggregate supply, often called the growth in potential output, cannot be measured with certainty.
  • In practice, as previously noted, monetary policy makers do not have up-to-the-minute information on the state of the economy and prices. Useful information is limited not only by lags in the collection and availability of key data but also by later revisions, which can alter the picture considerably. Therefore, although monetary policy makers will eventually be able to offset the effects that adverse demand shocks have on the economy, it will be some time before the shock is fully recognized and—given the lag between a policy action and the effect of the action on aggregate demand—an even longer time before it is countered. Add to this the uncertainty about how the economy will respond to an easing or tightening of policy of a given magnitude, and it is not hard to see how the economy and prices can depart from a desired path for a period of time.
  • The statutory goals of maximum employment and stable prices are easier to achieve if the public understands those goals and believes that the Federal Reserve will take effective measures to achieve them.
  • Although the goals of monetary policy are clearly spelled out in law, the means to achieve those goals are not. Changes in the FOMC’s target federal funds rate take some time to affect the economy and prices, and it is often far from obvious whether a selected level of the federal funds rate will achieve those goals.

Opinions of the Federal Reserve

The Federal Reserve is lauded by some economists, while being the target of scathing criticism by other economists, legislators, and sometimes members of the general public. The former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Ben Bernanke, is one of the leading academic critics of the Federal Reserve’s policies during the Great Depression.[53]

Achievements

One of the functions of a central bank is to facilitate the transfer of funds through the economy, and the Federal Reserve System is largely responsible for the efficiency in the banking sector. There have also been specific instances which put the Federal Reserve in the spotlight of public attention. For instance, after the stock market crash in 1987, the actions of the Fed are generally believed to have aided in recovery. Also, the Federal Reserve is credited for easing tensions in the business sector with the reassurances given following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States.[54]

Criticisms

The Federal Reserve has been the target of various criticisms, involving: accountability, effectiveness, opacity, inadequate banking regulation, and potential market distortion. Federal Reserve policy has also been criticized for directly and indirectly benefiting large banks instead of consumers. For example, regarding the Federal Reserve’s response to the 2007–2010 financial crisis, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz explained how the U.S. Federal Reserve was implementing another monetary policy —creating currency— as a method to combat the liquidity trap.[55]

By creating $600 billion and inserting this directly into banks the Federal Reserve intended to spur banks to finance more domestic loans and refinance mortgages. However, banks instead were spending the money in more profitable areas by investing internationally in emerging markets. Banks were also investing in foreign currencies which Stiglitz and others point out may lead to currency wars while China redirects its currency holdings away from the United States.[56]

Auditing

The Federal Reserve is subject to different requirements for transparency and audits than other government agencies, which its supporters claim is another element of the Fed’s independence. Although the Federal Reserve has been required by law to publish independently audited financial statements since 1999, the Federal Reserve is not audited in the same way as other government agencies. Some confusion can arise because there are many types of audits, including: investigative or fraud audits; and financial audits, which are audits of accounting statements; there are also compliance, operational, and information system audits.

The Federal Reserve’s annual financial statements are audited by an outside auditor. Similar to other government agencies, the Federal Reserve maintains an Office of the Inspector General, whose mandate includes conducting and supervising “independent and objective audits, investigations, inspections, evaluations, and other reviews of Board programs and operations.”[57] The Inspector General’s audits and reviews are available on the Federal Reserve’s website.[58][59]

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has the power to conduct audits, subject to certain areas of operations that are excluded from GAO audits; other areas may be audited at specific Congressional request, and have included bank supervision, government securities activities, and payment system activities.[60][61] The GAO is specifically restricted any authority over monetary policy transactions;[60] the New York Times reported in 1989 that “such transactions are now shielded from outside audit, although the Fed influences interest rates through the purchase of hundreds of billions of dollars in Treasury securities.”[62] As mentioned above, it was in 1999 that the law governing the Federal Reserve was amended to formalize the already-existing annual practice of ordering independent audits of financial statements for the Federal Reserve Banks and the Board;[63] the GAO’s restrictions on auditing monetary policy continued, however.[61]

Congressional oversight on monetary policy operations, foreign transactions, and the FOMC operations is exercised through the requirement for reports and through semi-annual monetary policy hearings.[61] Scholars have conceded that the hearings did not prove an effective means of increasing oversight of the Federal Reserve, perhaps because “Congresspersons prefer to bash an autonomous and secretive Fed for economic misfortune rather than to share the responsibility for that misfortune with a fully accountable Central Bank,” although the Federal Reserve has also consistently lobbied to maintain its independence and freedom of operation.[64]

Fulfillment of wider economic goals

By law, the goals of the Fed’s monetary policy are: high employment, sustainable growth, and stable prices.[65]

Critics say that monetary policy in the United States has not achieved consistent success in meeting the goals that have been delegated to the Federal Reserve System by Congress. Congress began to review more options with regard to macroeconomic influence beginning in 1946 (after World War II), with the Federal Reserve receiving specific mandates in 1977 (after the country suffered a period of stagflation).

Throughout the period of the Federal Reserve following the mandates, the relative weight given to each of these goals has changed, depending on political developments.[citation needed] In particular, the theories of Keynesianism and monetarism have had great influence on both the theory and implementation of monetary policy, and the “prevailing wisdom” or consensus view of the economic and financial communities has changed over the years.[66]

  • Elastic currency (magnitude of the money multiplier): the success of monetary policy is dependent on the ability to strongly influence the supply of money available to the citizens. If a currency is highly “elastic” (that is, has a higher money multiplier, corresponding to a tendency of the financial system to create more broad money for a given quantity of base money), plans to expand the money supply and accommodate growth are easier to implement. Low elasticity was one of many factors that contributed to the depth of the Great Depression: as banks cut lending, the money multiplier fell, and at the same time the Federal Reserve constricted the monetary base. The depression of the late 1920s is generally regarded as being the worst in the country’s history, and the Federal Reserve has been criticized for monetary policy which worsened the depression.[67] Partly to alleviate problems related to the depression, the United States transitioned from a gold standard and now uses a fiat currency; elasticity is believed to have been increased greatly.[68]

The value of $1 over time, in 1776 dollars.[70]

  • Stable prices – While some economists would regard any consistent inflation as a sign of unstable prices,[71] policymakers could be satisfied with 1 or 2%;[72] the consensus of “price stability” constituting long-run inflation of 1-2% is, however, a relatively recent development, and a change that has occurred at other central banks throughout the world. Inflation has averaged a 4.22% increase annually following the mandates applied in 1977; historic inflation since the establishment of the Federal Reserve in 1913 has averaged 3.4%.[73] In contrast, some research indicates that average inflation for the 250 years before the system was near zero percent, though there were likely sharper upward and downward spikes in that timeframe as compared with more recent times.[74] Central banks in some other countries, notably the German Bundesbank, had considerably better records of achieving price stability drawing on experience from the two episodes of hyperinflation and economic collapse under the country’s previous central bank.

Inflation worldwide has fallen significantly since former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker began his tenure in 1979, a period which has been called the Great Moderation; some commentators attribute this to improved monetary policy worldwide, particularly in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.[75][76]BusinessWeek notes that inflation has been relatively low since mid-1980s[77] and it was during this time that Volcker wrote (in 1995), “It is a sobering fact that the prominence of central banks [such as the Federal Reserve] in this century has coincided with a general tendency towards more inflation, not less. By and large, if the overriding objective is price stability, we did better with the nineteenth-century gold standard and passive central banks, with currency boards, or even with ‘free banking.'”.

  • Sustainable growth – The growth of the economy may not be sustainable as the ability for households to save money has been on an overall decline[78] and household debt is consistently rising.[79]

Cause of The Great Depression

Money supply decreased significantly between Black Tuesday and the Bank Holiday in March 1933 when there were massive bank runs

Monetarists who believe that the Great Depression started as an ordinary recession but significant policy mistakes by monetary authorities (especially the Federal Reserve) caused a shrinking of the money supply which greatly exacerbated the economic situation, causing a recession to descend into the Great Depression.

Public confusion

The Federal Reserve has established a library of information on their websites, however, many experts have spoken about the general level of public confusion that still exists on the subject of the economy; this lack of understanding of macroeconomic questions and monetary policy, however, exists in other countries as well. Critics of the Fed widely regard the system as being “opaque“, and one of the Fed’s most vehement opponents of his time, Congressman Louis T. McFadden, even went so far as to say that “Every effort has been made by the Federal Reserve Board to conceal its powers….”[80]

There are, on the other hand, many economists who support the need for an independent central banking authority, and some have established websites that aim to clear up confusion about the economy and the Federal Reserve’s operations. The Federal Reserve website itself publishes various information and instructional materials for a variety of audiences.

Criticism of government interference

Some economists, especially those belonging to the heterodox Austrian School, criticize the idea of even establishing monetary policy, believing that it distorts investment. Friedrich Hayek won the Nobel Prize for his elaboration of the Austrian business cycle theory.

Briefly, the theory holds that an artificial injection of credit, from a source such as a central bank like the Federal Reserve, sends false signals to entrepreneurs to engage in long-term investments due to a favorably low interest rate. However, the surge of investments undertaken represents an artificial boom, or bubble, because the low interest rate was achieved by an artificial expansion of the money supply and not by savings. Hence, the pool of real savings and resources have not increased and do not justify the investments undertaken.

These investments, which are more appropriately called “malinvestments”, are realized to be unsustainable when the artificial credit spigot is shut off and interest rates rise. The malinvestments and unsustainable projects are liquidated, which is the recession. The theory demonstrates that the problem is the artificial boom which causes the malinvestments in the first place, made possible by an artificial injection of credit not from savings.

According to Austrian economics, without government intervention, interest rates will always be an equilibrium between the time-preferences of borrowers and savers, and this equilibrium is simply distorted by government intervention. This distortion, in their view, is the cause of the business cycle. Some Austrian economists—but by no means all—also support full reserve banking, a hypothetical financial/banking system where banks may not lend deposits. Others may advocate free banking, whereby the government abstains from any interference in what individuals may choose to use as money or the extent to which banks create money through the deposit and lending cycle.

Reserve requirement

The Federal Reserve regulates banking, and one regulation under its direct control is the reserve requirement which dictates how much money banks must keep in reserves, as compared to its demand deposits. Banks use their observation that the majority of deposits are not requested by the account holders at the same time.

Currently, the Federal Reserve requires that banks keep 10% of their deposits on hand.[81] Some countries have no nationally mandated reserve requirements—banks use their own resources to determine what to hold in reserve, however their lending is typically constrained by other regulations.[82] Other factors being equal, lower reserve percentages increases the possibility of Bank runs, such as the widespread runs of 1931. Low reserve requirements also allow for larger expansions of the money supply by actions of commercial banks—currently the private banking system has created much of the broad money supply of US dollars through lending activity. Monetary policy reform calling for 100% reserves has been advocated by economists such as: Irving Fisher,[83] Frank Knight,[84] many ecological economists along with economists of the Chicago School and Austrian School. Despite calls for reform, the nearly universal practice of fractional-reserve banking has remained in the United States.

Criticism of private sector involvement

Historically and to the present day, various social and political movements (such as social credit) have criticized the involvement of the private sector in “creating money”, claiming that only the government should have the power to “make money”. Some proponents also support full reserve banking or other non-orthodox approaches to monetary policy. Various terminology may be used, including “debt money”, which may have emotive or political connotations. These are generally considered to be akin to conspiracy theories by mainstream economists and ignored in academic literature on monetary policy.

See also

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monetary_policy_of_the_United_States

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Non-accelarating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) — Phillips Curve — Money and Inflation — No Real Tradeoff Between Price Increases and Unemployment Rate In The Long Run — States and Nations Cutting Taxes Resulted In Higher Growth and Lower Unemployment — Videos

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NAIRU

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

NAIRU is an acronym for non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment,[1] and refers to a level of unemployment below which inflation rises. It was first introduced as NIRU (non-inflationary rate of unemployment) by Franco Modigliani and Lucas Papademos in 1975, as an improvement over the “natural rate of unemployment” concept,[2][3][4] which was proposed earlier by Milton Friedman.[5]

Monetary policy conducted under the assumption of a NAIRU involves allowing just enough unemployment in the economy to prevent inflation rising above a given target figure. Prices are allowed to increase gradually and some unemployment is tolerated.

Contents

 [show] 

Origins

An early form of NAIRU is found in the work of Abba P. Lerner (Lerner 1951, Chapter 14), who referred to it as “low full employment” attained via the expansion of aggregate demand, in contrast with the “high full employment” which adds incomes policies (wage and price controls) to demand stimulation.

The concept arose in the wake of the popularity of the Phillips curve which summarized the observed negative correlation between the rate of unemployment and the rate of inflation (measured as annual nominal wage growth of employees) for number of industrialised countries with more or less mixed economies. This correlation (previously seen for the U.S. by Irving Fisher) persuaded some analysts that it was impossible for governments simultaneously to target both arbitrarily low unemployment and price stability, and that, therefore, it was government’s role to seek a point on the trade-off between unemployment and inflation which matched a domestic social consensus.

During the 1970s in the United States and several other industrialized countries, Phillips curve analysis became less popular, because inflation rose at the same time that unemployment rose (see stagflation).

Worse, as far as many economists were concerned, was that the Phillips curve had little or no theoretical basis. Critics of this analysis (such as Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps) argued that the Phillips curve could not be a fundamental characteristic of economic general equilibrium because it showed a correlation between a real economic variable (the unemployment rate) and a nominal economic variable (the inflation rate). Their counter-analysis was that government macroeconomic policy (primarily monetary policy) was being driven by a low unemployment target and that this caused expectations of inflation to change, so that steadily accelerating inflation rather than reduced unemployment was the result. The resulting prescription was that government economic policy (or at least monetary policy) should not be influenced by any level of unemployment below a critical level – the “natural rate” or NAIRU.[6]

The natural rate hypothesis

The idea behind the natural rate hypothesis put forward by Friedman was that any given labor market structure must involve a certain amount of unemployment, including frictional unemployment associated with individuals changing jobs and possibly classical unemployment arising from real wages being held above the market-clearing level by minimum wage laws, trade unions or other labour market institutions. Unexpected inflation might allow unemployment to fall below the natural rate by temporarily depressing real wages, but this effect would dissipate once expectations about inflation were corrected. Only with continuously accelerating inflation could rates of unemployment below the natural rate be maintained.

The analysis supporting the natural rate hypothesis was controversial, and empirical evidence suggested that the natural rate varied over time in ways that could not easily be explained by changes in labor market structures. As a result, the “natural rate” terminology was largely supplanted by that of the NAIRU, which referred to a rate of unemployment below which inflation would accelerate, but did not imply a commitment to any particular theoretical explanation, or a prediction that the rate would be stable over time.

Properties

If {\displaystyle U*}U* is the NAIRU and {\displaystyle U}U is the actual unemployment rate, the theory says that:

if {\displaystyle U<U*}U<U* for a few years, inflationary expectations rise, so that the inflation rate tends to increase;
if {\displaystyle U>U*}U>U* for a few years, inflationary expectations fall, so that the inflation rate tends to slow (there is disinflation); and
if {\displaystyle U=U*}U=U*, the inflation rate tends to stay the same, unless there is an exogenous shock.

Okun’s law can be stated as saying that for every one percentage point by which the actual unemployment rate exceeds the so-called “natural” rate of unemployment, real gross domestic product is reduced by 2% to 3%.

Criticism

The NAIRU analysis assumes that if inflation increases, workers and employers can create contracts that take into account expectations of higher inflation and agree on a level of wage inflation that matches the expected level of price inflation to maintain constant real wages. Therefore, the analysis requires inflation to accelerate to maintain low unemployment. However, this argument implicitly assumes that workers and employers cannot contract to incorporate accelerating inflation into wage expectations, but there is no clear justification for assuming that expectations or contract structures are limited in this way aside from the fact that such wage arrangements are not commonly observed.

The NAIRU analysis is especially problematic if the Phillips curve displays hysteresis, that is, if episodes of high unemployment raise the NAIRU.[7] This could happen, for example, if unemployed workers lose skills so that employers prefer to bid up of the wages of existing workers when demand increases, rather than hiring the unemployed.

Others, such as Abba Lerner (1951, 1967) and Hyman Minsky (1965) have argued that a similar effect can be achieved without the human costs of unemployment via a job guarantee, where rather than being unemployed, those who cannot find work in the private sector should be employed by the government. This theory, and the policy of the job guarantee replaces the NAIRU with the NAIBER (non-accelerating-inflation-buffer employment ratio).[8]

Relationship to other economic theories

Most economists do not see the NAIRU theory as explaining all inflation. Instead, it is possible to move along a short run Phillips Curve (even though the NAIRU theory says that this curve shifts in the longer run) so that unemployment can rise or fall due to changes in inflation. Exogenous supply-shock inflation is also possible, as with the “energy crises” of the 1970s or the credit crunch of the early 21st century.

The NAIRU theory was mainly intended as an argument against active Keynesian demand management and in favor of free markets (at least on the macroeconomic level). There is, for instance, no theoretical basis for predicting the NAIRU. Monetarists instead support the generalized assertion that the correct approach to unemployment is through microeconomic measures (to lower the NAIRU whatever its exact level), rather than macroeconomic activity based on an estimate of the NAIRU in relation to the actual level of unemployment. Monetary policy, they maintain, should aim instead at stabilizing the inflation rate.

Naming

The NAIRU, non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, is actually misnamed. It is the price level that is accelerating (or decelerating), not the inflation rate. The inflation rate is just changing, not accelerating.[9]

See also

References

  1. Jump up^ Coe, David T, Nominal Wages. The NAIRU and Wage Flexibility. (PDF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
  2. Jump up^ Modigliani, Franco; Papademos, Lucas (1975). “Targets for Monetary Policy in the Coming Year”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. The Brookings Institution. 1975 (1): 141–165. doi:10.2307/2534063. JSTOR 2534063.
  3. Jump up^ Robert M. Solow, Modigliani and Monetarism, p. 6.
  4. Jump up^ Snowdon, Brian; Vane, Howard R. (2005). Modern Macroeconomics: Its Origins, Development and Current State. Cheltenham: E. Elgar. p. 187. ISBN 1-84376-394-X.
  5. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton (1968). “The Role of Monetary Policy”. American Economic Review. 58 (1): 1–17. JSTOR 1831652.
  6. Jump up^ Hoover, Kevin D, “Phillips Curve”, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, The Library of Economics and Liberty, retrieved 16 July 2007
  7. Jump up^ Ball, Laurence (2009), Hysteresis in Unemployment: Old and New Evidence (PDF)
  8. Jump up^ William Mitchell, J. Muysken (2008), Full employment abandoned: shifting sands and policy failures, Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1-85898-507-2
  9. Jump up^ Case, K.E. and Fair, R.C. and Oster, S.M. (2016). Principles of Macroeconomics. Pearson. ISBN 9780133023671.

Further reading

External links

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAIRU

Phillips curve

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
For the Phillips curve in supernova astrophysics, see Phillips relationship.

The Phillips curve is a single-equation empirical model, named after A. W. Phillips, describing a historical inverse relationship between rates of unemployment and corresponding rates of inflation that result within an economy. Stated simply, decreased unemployment, (i.e., increased levels of employment) in an economy will correlate with higher rates of inflation.

While there is a short run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation, it has not been observed in the long run.[1] In 1968, Milton Friedman asserted that the Phillips curve was only applicable in the short-run and that in the long-run, inflationary policies will not decrease unemployment.[2][3] Friedman then correctly predicted that, in the 1973–75 recession, both inflation and unemployment would increase.[3] The long-run Phillips curve is now seen as a vertical line at the natural rate of unemployment, where the rate of inflation has no effect on unemployment.[4] Accordingly, the Phillips curve is now seen as too simplistic, with the unemployment rate supplanted by more accurate predictors of inflation based on velocity of moneysupply measures such as the MZM (“money zero maturity”) velocity,[5] which is affected by unemployment in the short but not the long term.[6]

Contents

 [show] 

History

Rate of Change of Wages against Unemployment, United Kingdom 1913–1948 from Phillips (1958)

William Phillips, a New Zealand born economist, wrote a paper in 1958 titled The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957, which was published in the quarterly journal Economica.[7] In the paper Phillips describes how he observed an inverse relationship between money wage changes and unemployment in the British economy over the period examined. Similar patterns were found in other countries and in 1960 Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow took Phillips’ work and made explicit the link between inflation and unemployment: when inflation was high, unemployment was low, and vice versa.[8]

In the 1920s, an American economist Irving Fisher noted this kind of Phillips curve relationship. However, Phillips’ original curve described the behavior of money wages.[9]

In the years following Phillips’ 1958 paper, many economists in the advanced industrial countries believed that his results showed that there was a permanently stable relationship between inflation and unemployment.[citation needed] One implication of this for government policy was that governments could control unemployment and inflation with a Keynesian policy. They could tolerate a reasonably high rate of inflation as this would lead to lower unemployment – there would be a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. For example, monetary policy and/or fiscal policy could be used to stimulate the economy, raising gross domestic product and lowering the unemployment rate. Moving along the Phillips curve, this would lead to a higher inflation rate, the cost of enjoying lower unemployment rates.[citation needed] Economist James Forder argues that this view is historically false and that neither economists nor governments took that view and that the ‘Phillips curve myth’ was an invention of the 1970s.[10]

Since 1974, seven Nobel Prizes have been given to economists for, among other things, work critical of some variations of the Phillips curve. Some of this criticism is based on the United States’ experience during the 1970s, which had periods of high unemployment and high inflation at the same time. The authors receiving those prizes include Thomas Sargent, Christopher Sims, Edmund Phelps, Edward Prescott, Robert A. Mundell, Robert E. Lucas, Milton Friedman, and F.A. Hayek.[11]

Stagflation

In the 1970s, many countries experienced high levels of both inflation and unemployment also known as stagflation. Theories based on the Phillips curve suggested that this could not happen, and the curve came under a concerted attack from a group of economists headed by Milton Friedman.[citation needed] Friedman argued that the Phillips curve relationship was only a short-run phenomenon. In this he followed eight years after Samuelson and Solow [1960] who wrote ” All of our discussion has been phrased in short-run terms, dealing with what might happen in the next few years. It would be wrong, though, to think that our Figure 2 menu that related obtainable price and unemployment behavior will maintain its same shape in the longer run. What we do in a policy way during the next few years might cause it to shift in a definite way.”[8] As Samuelson and Solow had argued 8 years earlier, he argued that in the long run, workers and employers will take inflation into account, resulting in employment contracts that increase pay at rates near anticipated inflation. Unemployment would then begin to rise back to its previous level, but now with higher inflation rates. This result implies that over the longer-run there is no trade-off between inflation and unemployment. This implication is significant for practical reasons because it implies that central banks should not set employment targets above the natural rate.[1]

More recent research has shown that there is a moderate trade-off between low-levels of inflation and unemployment. Work by George Akerlof, William Dickens, and George Perry,[12]implies that if inflation is reduced from two to zero percent, unemployment will be permanently increased by 1.5 percent. This is because workers generally have a higher tolerance for real wage cuts than nominal ones. For example, a worker will more likely accept a wage increase of two percent when inflation is three percent, than a wage cut of one percent when the inflation rate is zero.

Today

U.S. Inflation and Unemployment 1/2000 to 4/2013

Most economists no longer use the Phillips curve in its original form because it was shown to be too simplistic.[6] This can be seen in a cursory analysis of US inflation and unemployment data from 1953–92. There is no single curve that will fit the data, but there are three rough aggregations—1955–71, 1974–84, and 1985–92—each of which shows a general, downwards slope, but at three very different levels with the shifts occurring abruptly. The data for 1953–54 and 1972–73 do not group easily, and a more formal analysis posits up to five groups/curves over the period.[1]

But still today, modified forms of the Phillips Curve that take inflationary expectations into account remain influential. The theory goes under several names, with some variation in its details, but all modern versions distinguish between short-run and long-run effects on unemployment. Modern Phillips curve models include both a short-run Phillips Curve and a long-run Phillips Curve. This is because in the short run, there is generally an inverse relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate; as illustrated in the downward sloping short-run Phillips curve. In the long run, that relationship breaks down and the economy eventually returns to the natural rate of unemployment regardless of the inflation rate.[13]

The “short-run Phillips curve” is also called the “expectations-augmented Phillips curve”, since it shifts up when inflationary expectations rise, Edmund Phelps and Milton Friedman argued. In the long run, this implies that monetary policy cannot affect unemployment, which adjusts back to its “natural rate“, also called the “NAIRU” or “long-run Phillips curve”. However, this long-run “neutrality” of monetary policy does allow for short run fluctuations and the ability of the monetary authority to temporarily decrease unemployment by increasing permanent inflation, and vice versa. The popular textbook of Blanchard gives a textbook presentation of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve.[14]

An equation like the expectations-augmented Phillips curve also appears in many recent New Keynesiandynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. In these macroeconomic models with sticky prices, there is a positive relation between the rate of inflation and the level of demand, and therefore a negative relation between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment. This relationship is often called the “New Keynesian Phillips curve.” Like the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, the New Keynesian Phillips curve implies that increased inflation can lower unemployment temporarily, but cannot lower it permanently. Two influential papers that incorporate a New Keynesian Phillips curve are Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999),[15] and Blanchard and Galí (2007).[16]

Mathematics

There are at least two different mathematical derivations of the Phillips curve. First, there is the traditional or Keynesian version. Then, there is the new Classical version associated with Robert E. Lucas, Jr.

The traditional Phillips curve

The original Phillips curve literature was not based on the unaided application of economic theory. Instead, it was based on empirical generalizations. After that, economists tried to develop theories that fit the data.

Money wage determination

The traditional Phillips curve story starts with a wage Phillips Curve, of the sort described by A.W. Phillips himself. This describes the rate of growth of money wages (gW). Here and below, the operator g is the equivalent of “the percentage rate of growth of” the variable that follows.

{\displaystyle gW=gW^{T}-f(U)}gW=gW^{{T}}-f(U)

The “money wage rate” (W) is shorthand for total money wage costs per production employee, including benefits and payroll taxes. The focus is on only production workers’ money wages, because (as discussed below) these costs are crucial to pricing decisions by the firms.

This equation tells us that the growth of money wages rises with the trend rate of growth of money wages (indicated by the superscript “T”) and falls with the unemployment rate (U). The function f() is assumed to be monotonically increasing with U so that the dampening of money-wage increases by unemployment is shown by the negative sign in the equation above.

There are several possible stories behind this equation. A major one is that money wages are set by bilateral negotiations under partial bilateral monopoly: as the unemployment rate rises, all else constant worker bargaining power falls, so that workers are less able to increase their wages in the face of employer resistance.

During the 1970s, this story had to be modified, because (as the late Abba Lerner had suggested in the 1940s) workers try to keep up with inflation. Since the 1970s, the equation has been changed to introduce the role of inflationary expectations (or the expected inflation rate, gPex). This produces the expectations-augmented wage Phillips curve:

{\displaystyle gW=gW^{T}-f(U)+\lambda .gP^{ex}.}gW=gW^{{T}}-f(U)+\lambda .gP^{{ex}}.

The introduction of inflationary expectations into the equation implies that actual inflation can feed back into inflationary expectations and thus cause further inflation. The late economist James Tobin dubbed the last term “inflationary inertia,” because in the current period, inflation exists which represents an inflationary impulse left over from the past.

It also involved much more than expectations, including the price-wage spiral. In this spiral, employers try to protect profits by raising their prices and employees try to keep up with inflation to protect their real wages. This process can feed on itself, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The parameter λ (which is presumed constant during any time period) represents the degree to which employees can gain money wage increases to keep up with expected inflation, preventing a fall in expected real wages. It is usually assumed that this parameter equals unity in the long run.

In addition, the function f() was modified to introduce the idea of the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) or what’s sometimes called the “natural” rate of unemployment or the inflation-threshold unemployment rate:

[1] gW = gWTf(UU*) + λ·gPex.

Here, U* is the NAIRU. As discussed below, if U < U*, inflation tends to accelerate. Similarly, if U > U*, inflation tends to slow. It is assumed that f(0) = 0, so that when U = U*, the f term drops out of the equation.

In equation [1], the roles of gWT and gPex seem to be redundant, playing much the same role. However, assuming that λ is equal to unity, it can be seen that they are not. If the trend rate of growth of money wages equals zero, then the case where U equals U* implies that gW equals expected inflation. That is, expected real wages are constant.

In any reasonable economy, however, having constant expected real wages could only be consistent with actual real wages that are constant over the long haul. This does not fit with economic experience in the U.S. or any other major industrial country. Even though real wages have not risen much in recent years, there have been important increases over the decades.

An alternative is to assume that the trend rate of growth of money wages equals the trend rate of growth of average labor productivity (Z). That is:

[2] gWT = gZT.

Under assumption [2], when U equals U* and λ equals unity, expected real wages would increase with labor productivity. This would be consistent with an economy in which actual real wages increase with labor productivity. Deviations of real-wage trends from those of labor productivity might be explained by reference to other variables in the model.

Pricing decisions

Next, there is price behavior. The standard assumption is that markets are imperfectly competitive, where most businesses have some power to set prices. So the model assumes that the average business sets a unit price (P) as a mark-up (M) over the unit labor cost in production measured at a standard rate of capacity utilization (say, at 90 percent use of plant and equipment) and then adds in the unit materials cost.

The standardization involves later ignoring deviations from the trend in labor productivity. For example, assume that the growth of labor productivity is the same as that in the trend and that current productivity equals its trend value:

gZ = gZT and Z = ZT.

The markup reflects both the firm’s degree of market power and the extent to which overhead costs have to be paid. Put another way, all else equal, M rises with the firm’s power to set prices or with a rise of overhead costs relative to total costs.

So pricing follows this equation:

P = M × (unit labor cost) + (unit materials cost)
= M × (total production employment cost)/(quantity of output) + UMC.

UMC is unit raw materials cost (total raw materials costs divided by total output). So the equation can be restated as:

P = M × (production employment cost per worker)/(output per production employee) + UMC.

This equation can again be stated as:

P = M×(average money wage)/(production labor productivity) + UMC
= M×(W/Z) + UMC.

Now, assume that both the average price/cost mark-up (M) and UMC are constant. On the other hand, labor productivity grows, as before. Thus, an equation determining the price inflation rate (gP) is:

gP = gWgZT.

Price[edit]

Then, combined with the wage Phillips curve [equation 1] and the assumption made above about the trend behavior of money wages [equation 2], this price-inflation equation gives us a simple expectations-augmented price Phillips curve:

gP = −f(UU*) + λ·gPex.

Some assume that we can simply add in gUMC, the rate of growth of UMC, in order to represent the role of supply shocks (of the sort that plagued the U.S. during the 1970s). This produces a standard short-term Phillips curve:

gP = −f(UU*) + λ·gPex + gUMC.

Economist Robert J. Gordon has called this the “Triangle Model” because it explains short-run inflationary behavior by three factors: demand inflation (due to low unemployment), supply-shock inflation (gUMC), and inflationary expectations or inertial inflation.

In the long run, it is assumed, inflationary expectations catch up with and equal actual inflation so that gP = gPex. This represents the long-term equilibrium of expectations adjustment. Part of this adjustment may involve the adaptation of expectations to the experience with actual inflation. Another might involve guesses made by people in the economy based on other evidence. (The latter idea gave us the notion of so-called rational expectations.)

Expectational equilibrium gives us the long-term Phillips curve. First, with λ less than unity:

gP = [1/(1 − λ)]·(−f(UU*) + gUMC).

This is nothing but a steeper version of the short-run Phillips curve above. Inflation rises as unemployment falls, while this connection is stronger. That is, a low unemployment rate (less than U*) will be associated with a higher inflation rate in the long run than in the short run. This occurs because the actual higher-inflation situation seen in the short run feeds back to raise inflationary expectations, which in turn raises the inflation rate further. Similarly, at high unemployment rates (greater than U*) lead to low inflation rates. These in turn encourage lower inflationary expectations, so that inflation itself drops again.

This logic goes further if λ is equal to unity, i.e., if workers are able to protect their wages completely from expected inflation, even in the short run. Now, the Triangle Model equation becomes:

f(UU*) = gUMC.

If we further assume (as seems reasonable) that there are no long-term supply shocks, this can be simplified to become:

f(UU*) = 0 which implies that U = U*.

All of the assumptions imply that in the long run, there is only one possible unemployment rate, U* at any one time. This uniqueness explains why some call this unemployment rate “natural.”

To truly understand and criticize the uniqueness of U*, a more sophisticated and realistic model is needed. For example, we might introduce the idea that workers in different sectors push for money wage increases that are similar to those in other sectors. Or we might make the model even more realistic. One important place to look is at the determination of the mark-up, M.

New classical version

The Phillips curve equation can be derived from the (short-run) Lucas aggregate supply function. The Lucas approach is very different from that the traditional view. Instead of starting with empirical data, he started with a classical economic model following very simple economic principles.

Start with the aggregate supply function:

{\displaystyle Y=Y_{n}+a(P-P_{e})\,}Y=Y_{n}+a(P-P_{e})\,

where Y is log value of the actual output, Yn is log value of the “natural” level of output, a is a positive constant, P is log value of the actual price level, and Pe is log value of the expected price level. Lucas assumes that Yn has a unique value.

Note that this equation indicates that when expectations of future inflation (or, more correctly, the future price level) are totally accurate, the last term drops out, so that actual output equals the so-called “natural” level of real GDP. This means that in the Lucas aggregate supply curve, the only reason why actual real GDP should deviate from potential—and the actual unemployment rate should deviate from the “natural” rate—is because of incorrect expectations of what is going to happen with prices in the future. (The idea has been expressed first by Keynes, General Theory, Chapter 20 section III paragraph 4).

This differs from other views of the Phillips curve, in which the failure to attain the “natural” level of output can be due to the imperfection or incompleteness of markets, the stickiness of prices, and the like. In the non-Lucas view, incorrect expectations can contribute to aggregate demand failure, but they are not the only cause. To the “new Classical” followers of Lucas, markets are presumed to be perfect and always attain equilibrium (given inflationary expectations).

We re-arrange the equation into:

{\displaystyle P=P_{e}+{\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}}P=P_{e}+{\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}

Next we add unexpected exogenous shocks to the world supply v:

{\displaystyle P=P_{e}+{\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}+v}P=P_{e}+{\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}+v

Subtracting last year’s price levels P−1 will give us inflation rates, because

{\displaystyle P-P_{-1}\ \approx \pi }P-P_{{-1}}\ \approx \pi

and

{\displaystyle P_{e}-P_{-1}\ \approx \pi _{e}}P_{e}-P_{{-1}}\ \approx \pi _{e}

where π and πe are the inflation and expected inflation respectively.

There is also a negative relationship between output and unemployment (as expressed by Okun’s law). Therefore, using

{\displaystyle {\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}=-b(U-U_{n})}{\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}=-b(U-U_{n})

where b is a positive constant, U is unemployment, and Un is the natural rate of unemployment or NAIRU, we arrive at the final form of the short-run Phillips curve:

{\displaystyle \pi =\pi _{e}-b(U-U_{n})+v\,}\pi =\pi _{e}-b(U-U_{n})+v\,

This equation, plotting inflation rate π against unemployment U gives the downward-sloping curve in the diagram that characterises the Phillips curve.

New Keynesian version

The New Keynesian Phillips curve was originally derived by Roberts in 1995,[17] and since been used in most state-of-the-art New Keynesian DSGE models like the one of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000).[18][19]

{\displaystyle \pi _{t}=\beta E_{t}[\pi _{t+1}]+\kappa y_{t}}\pi _{{t}}=\beta E_{{t}}[\pi _{{t+1}}]+\kappa y_{{t}}

where {\displaystyle \kappa ={\frac {\alpha [1-(1-\alpha )\beta ]\phi }{1-\alpha }}}\kappa ={\frac {\alpha [1-(1-\alpha )\beta ]\phi }{1-\alpha }}. The current expectations of next period’s inflation are incorporated as {\displaystyle \beta E_{t}[\pi _{t+1}]}\beta E_{{t}}[\pi _{{t+1}}]

NAIRU and rational expectations

Short-Run Phillips Curve before and after Expansionary Policy, with Long-Run Phillips Curve (NAIRU)

In the 1970s, new theories, such as rational expectations and the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) arose to explain how stagflation could occur. The latter theory, also known as the “natural rate of unemployment“, distinguished between the “short-term” Phillips curve and the “long-term” one. The short-term Phillips Curve looked like a normal Phillips Curve, but shifted in the long run as expectations changed. In the long run, only a single rate of unemployment (the NAIRU or “natural” rate) was consistent with a stable inflation rate. The long-run Phillips Curve was thus vertical, so there was no trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Edmund Phelps won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2006 in part for this. However, the expectations argument was in fact very widely understood before his work on it.[20]

In the diagram, the long-run Phillips curve is the vertical red line. The NAIRU theory says that when unemployment is at the rate defined by this line, inflation will be stable. However, in the short-run policymakers will face an inflation-unemployment rate tradeoff marked by the “Initial Short-Run Phillips Curve” in the graph. Policymakers can therefore reduce the unemployment rate temporarily, moving from point A to point B through expansionary policy. However, according to the NAIRU, exploiting this short-run tradeoff will raise inflation expectations, shifting the short-run curve rightward to the “New Short-Run Phillips Curve” and moving the point of equilibrium from B to C. Thus the reduction in unemployment below the “Natural Rate” will be temporary, and lead only to higher inflation in the long run.

Since the short-run curve shifts outward due to the attempt to reduce unemployment, the expansionary policy ultimately worsens the exploitable tradeoff between unemployment and inflation. That is, it results in more inflation at each short-run unemployment rate. The name “NAIRU” arises because with actual unemployment below it, inflation accelerates, while with unemployment above it, inflation decelerates. With the actual rate equal to it, inflation is stable, neither accelerating nor decelerating. One practical use of this model was to provide an explanation for stagflation, which confounded the traditional Phillips curve.

The rational expectations theory said that expectations of inflation were equal to what actually happened, with some minor and temporary errors. This in turn suggested that the short-run period was so short that it was non-existent: any effort to reduce unemployment below the NAIRU, for example, would immediately cause inflationary expectations to rise and thus imply that the policy would fail. Unemployment would never deviate from the NAIRU except due to random and transitory mistakes in developing expectations about future inflation rates. In this perspective, any deviation of the actual unemployment rate from the NAIRU was an illusion.

However, in the 1990s in the U.S., it became increasingly clear that the NAIRU did not have a unique equilibrium and could change in unpredictable ways. In the late 1990s, the actual unemployment rate fell below 4% of the labor force, much lower than almost all estimates of the NAIRU. But inflation stayed very moderate rather than accelerating. So, just as the Phillips curve had become a subject of debate, so did the NAIRU.

Furthermore, the concept of rational expectations had become subject to much doubt when it became clear that the main assumption of models based on it was that there exists a single (unique) equilibrium in the economy that is set ahead of time, determined independently of demand conditions. The experience of the 1990s suggests that this assumption cannot be sustained.

Theoretical questions

The Phillips curve started as an empirical observation in search of a theoretical explanation.[citation needed] Specifically, the Phillips curve tried to determine whether the inflation-unemployment link was causal or simply correlational. There are several major explanations of the short-term Phillips curve regularity.

To Milton Friedman there is a short-term correlation between inflation shocks and employment. When an inflationary surprise occurs, workers are fooled into accepting lower pay because they do not see the fall in real wages right away. Firms hire them because they see the inflation as allowing higher profits for given nominal wages. This is a movement along the Phillips curve as with change A. Eventually, workers discover that real wages have fallen, so they push for higher money wages. This causes the Phillips curve to shift upward and to the right, as with B. Some research underlines that some implicit and serious assumptions are actually in the background of the Friedmanian Phillips curve. This information asymmetry and a special pattern of flexibility of prices and wages are both necessary if one wants to maintain the mechanism told by Friedman. However, as it is argued, these presumptions remain completely unrevealed and theoretically ungrounded by Friedman.[21]

Economists such as Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps reject this theory because it implies that workers suffer from money illusion. According to them, rational workers would only react to real wages, that is, inflation adjusted wages. However, one of the characteristics of a modern industrial economy is that workers do not encounter their employers in an atomized and perfect market. They operate in a complex combination of imperfect markets, monopolies, monopsonies, labor unions, and other institutions. In many cases, they may lack the bargaining power to act on their expectations, no matter how rational they are, or their perceptions, no matter how free of money illusion they are. It is not that high inflation causes low unemployment (as in Milton Friedman’s theory) as much as vice versa: Low unemployment raises worker bargaining power, allowing them to successfully push for higher nominal wages. To protect profits, employers raise prices.

Similarly, built-in inflation is not simply a matter of subjective “inflationary expectations” but also reflects the fact that high inflation can gather momentum and continue beyond the time when it was started, due to the objective price/wage spiral.

However, other economists, like Jeffrey Herbener, argue that price is market-determined and competitive firms cannot simply raise prices.[citation needed] They reject the Phillips curve entirely, concluding that unemployment’s influence is only a small portion of a much larger inflation picture that includes prices of raw materials, intermediate goods, cost of raising capital, worker productivity, land, and other factors.

Gordon’s triangle model

Robert J. Gordon of Northwestern University has analyzed the Phillips curve to produce what he calls the triangle model, in which the actual inflation rate is determined by the sum of

  1. demand pull or short-term Phillips curve inflation,
  2. cost push or supply shocks, and
  3. built-in inflation.

The last reflects inflationary expectations and the price/wage spiral. Supply shocks and changes in built-in inflation are the main factors shifting the short-run Phillips Curve and changing the trade-off. In this theory, it is not only inflationary expectations that can cause stagflation. For example, the steep climb of oil prices during the 1970s could have this result.

Changes in built-in inflation follow the partial-adjustment logic behind most theories of the NAIRU:

  1. Low unemployment encourages high inflation, as with the simple Phillips curve. But if unemployment stays low and inflation stays high for a long time, as in the late 1960s in the U.S., both inflationary expectations and the price/wage spiral accelerate. This shifts the short-run Phillips curve upward and rightward, so that more inflation is seen at any given unemployment rate. (This is with shift B in the diagram.)
  2. High unemployment encourages low inflation, again as with a simple Phillips curve. But if unemployment stays high and inflation stays low for a long time, as in the early 1980s in the U.S., both inflationary expectations and the price/wage spiral slow. This shifts the short-run Phillips curve downward and leftward, so that less inflation is seen at each unemployment rate.

In between these two lies the NAIRU, where the Phillips curve does not have any inherent tendency to shift, so that the inflation rate is stable. However, there seems to be a range in the middle between “high” and “low” where built-in inflation stays stable. The ends of this “non-accelerating inflation range of unemployment rates” change over time.

Joke article

In 2008, Gregor Smith published a joke article in the prestigious Journal of Money, Credit and Banking titled “Japan’s Phillips Curve Looks Like Japan”. This article points out the uncanny resemblance between Japan’s Phillips curve and the country’s geographic shape.[22]

See also

References

  1. ^ Jump up to:a b c Chang, R. (1997) “Is Low Unemployment Inflationary?” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review 1Q97:4-13
  2. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton (1968). “The role of monetary policy”. American Economic Review. 68 (1): 1–17. JSTOR 1831652.
  3. ^ Jump up to:a b Phelan, John (23 October 2012). “Milton Friedman and the rise and fall of the Phillips Curve”. thecommentator.com. Retrieved September 29, 2014.
  4. Jump up^ “Phillips Curve: The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics – Library of Economics and Liberty”.
  5. Jump up^ “Velocity of MZM Money Stock”. 22 December 2016.
  6. ^ Jump up to:a b Oliver Hossfeld (2010) “US Money Demand, Monetary Overhang, and Inflation Prediction” International Network for Economic Research working paper no. 2010.4
  7. Jump up^ Phillips, A. W. (1958). “The Relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in the United Kingdom 1861-1957”. Economica. 25 (100): 283–299. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1958.tb00003.x.
  8. ^ Jump up to:a b Samuelson, Paul A.; Solow, Robert M. (1960). “Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy”. American Economic Review. 50 (2): 177–194. JSTOR 1815021.
  9. Jump up^ Fisher, Irving (1973). “I discovered the Phillips curve: ‘A statistical relation between unemployment and price changes'”. Journal of Political Economy. The University of Chicago Press. 81 (2): 496–502. doi:10.1086/260048. JSTOR 1830534. Reprinted from 1926 edition of International Labour Review.
  10. Jump up^ Forder, James (2014). Macroeconomics and the Phillips Curve Myth. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-968365-9.
  11. Jump up^ Domitrovic, Brain (10 October 2011). “The Economics Nobel Goes to Sargent & Sims: Attackers of the Phillips Curve”. Forbes.com. Retrieved 12 October 2011.
  12. Jump up^ Akerlof, George A.; Dickens, William T.; Perry, George L. (2000). “Near-Rational Wage and Price Setting and the Long-Run Phillips Curve”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 2000 (1): 1–60.
  13. Jump up^ Jacob, Reed (2016). “AP Macroeconomics Review: Phillips Curve”. APEconReview.com.
  14. Jump up^ Blanchard, Olivier (2000). Macroeconomics (Second ed.). Prentice Hall. pp. 149–55. ISBN 0-13-013306-X.
  15. Jump up^ Clarida, Richard; Galí, Jordi; Gertler, Mark (1999). “The science of monetary policy: a New-Keynesian perspective”. Journal of Economic Literature. American Economic Association. 37 (4): 1661–1707. doi:10.1257/jel.37.4.1661. JSTOR 2565488.
  16. Jump up^ Blanchard, Olivier; Galí, Jordi (2007). “Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model”. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. 39 (s1): 35–65. doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2007.00015.x.
  17. Jump up^ Roberts, John M. (1995). “New Keynesian Economics and the Phillips Curve”. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 27 (4): 975–984. JSTOR 2077783.
  18. Jump up^ Clarida, Richard; Galí, Jordi; Gertler, Mark (2000). “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 115 (1): 147–180. doi:10.1162/003355300554692.
  19. Jump up^ Romer, David (2012). “Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models of Fluctuation”. Advanced Macroeconomics. New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin. pp. 312–364. ISBN 978-0-07-351137-5.
  20. Jump up^ Forder, James (2010). “The historical place of the ‘Friedman-Phelps’ expectations critique”. European Journal of the History of Economic Thought. 17 (3): 493–511. doi:10.1080/09672560903114875.
  21. Jump up^ Galbács, Peter (2015). The Theory of New Classical Macroeconomics. A Positive Critique. Heidelberg/New York/Dordrecht/London: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17578-2. ISBN 978-3-319-17578-2.
  22. Jump up^ Smith, Gregor W. (1 September 2008). “Japan’s Phillips Curve Looks Like Japan”. 40 (6): 1325–1326. doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00160.x – via Wiley Online Library.

Further reading

External links

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phillips_curve

Milton Friedman

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from Milton friedman)
Milton Friedman
Portrait of Milton Friedman.jpg

Friedman in 2004
Born July 31, 1912
Brooklyn, New York, U.S.
Died November 16, 2006 (aged 94)
San Francisco, California, U.S.
Nationality American
Spouse(s) Rose Friedman
Institution
School or
tradition
Chicago School
Alma mater
Doctoral
advisor
Simon Kuznets
Doctoral
students
Phillip Cagan
Harry Markowitz
Lester G. Telser[1]
David I. Meiselman
Neil Wallace
Miguel Sidrauski
Influences
Influenced
Contributions
Awards
Information at IDEAS / RePEc
Signature
Milton friedman signature.svg
Notes

Milton Friedman (July 31, 1912 – November 16, 2006) was an American economist who received the 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his research on consumption analysis, monetary history and theory, and the complexity of stabilization policy.[4] With George Stigler and others, Friedman was among the intellectual leaders of the second generation of Chicago price theory, a methodological movement at the University of Chicago’s Department of Economics, Law School, and Graduate School of Business from the 1940s onward. Several students and young professors that were recruited or mentored by Friedman at Chicago went on to become leading economists; they include Gary Becker, Robert Fogel, Thomas Sowell,[5] and Robert Lucas, Jr.[6]

Friedman’s challenges to what he later called “naive Keynesian” theory[7] began with his 1950s reinterpretation of the consumption function. In the 1960s, he became the main advocate opposing Keynesian government policies,[8] and described his approach (along with mainstream economics) as using “Keynesian language and apparatus” yet rejecting its “initial” conclusions.[9] He theorized that there existed a “natural” rate of unemployment, and argued that employment above this rate would cause inflation to accelerate.[10] He argued that the Phillips curve was, in the long run, vertical at the “natural rate” and predicted what would come to be known as stagflation.[11] Friedman promoted an alternative macroeconomic viewpoint known as “monetarism“, and argued that a steady, small expansion of the money supply was the preferred policy.[12] His ideas concerning monetary policy, taxation, privatization and deregulation influenced government policies, especially during the 1980s. His monetary theory influenced the Federal Reserve’s response to the global financial crisis of 2007–08.[13]

Friedman was an advisor to Republican U.S. President Ronald Reagan[14] and Conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.[15] His political philosophy extolled the virtues of a free market economic system with minimal intervention. He once stated that his role in eliminating U.S. conscription was his proudest accomplishment. In his 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman advocated policies such as a volunteer military, freely floating exchange rates, abolition of medical licenses, a negative income tax, and school vouchers.[16] His support for school choice led him to found the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, later renamed EdChoice.[17]

Milton Friedman’s works include many monographs, books, scholarly articles, papers, magazine columns, television programs, and lectures, and cover a broad range of economic topics and public policy issues. His books and essays have had an international influence, including in former communist states.[18][19][20][21] A survey of economists ranked Friedman as the second-most popular economist of the twentieth century after John Maynard Keynes,[22] and The Economist described him as “the most influential economist of the second half of the 20th century … possibly of all of it”.[23]

Contents

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Early life

Friedman was born in Brooklyn, New York on July 31, 1912. His parents, Sára Ethel (née Landau) and Jenő Saul Friedman,[24] were Jewish immigrants from Beregszász in Carpathian Ruthenia, Kingdom of Hungary (now Berehove in Ukraine). They both worked as dry goods merchants. Shortly after Milton’s birth, the family relocated to Rahway, New Jersey. In his early teens, Friedman was injured in a car accident, which scarred his upper lip.[25] A talented student, Friedman graduated from Rahway High School in 1928, just before his 16th birthday.[26][27]

In 1932, Friedman graduated from Rutgers University, where he specialized in mathematics and economics and initially intended to become an actuary. During his time at Rutgers, Friedman became influenced by two economics professors, Arthur F. Burns and Homer Jones, who convinced him that modern economics could help end the Great Depression.

After graduating from Rutgers, Friedman was offered two scholarships to do graduate work—one in mathematics at Brown University and the other in economics at the University of Chicago.[28] Friedman chose the latter, thus earning a Master of Arts degree in 1933. He was strongly influenced by Jacob Viner, Frank Knight, and Henry Simons. It was at Chicago that Friedman met his future wife, economist Rose Director. During the 1933–1934 academic year he had a fellowship at Columbia University, where he studied statistics with renowned statistician and economist Harold Hotelling. He was back in Chicago for the 1934–1935 academic year, working as a research assistant for Henry Schultz, who was then working on Theory and Measurement of Demand. That year, Friedman formed what would prove to be lifelong friendships with George Stigler and W. Allen Wallis.[29]

Public service

Friedman was initially unable to find academic employment, so in 1935 he followed his friend W. Allen Wallis to Washington, where Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s New Deal was “a lifesaver” for many young economists.[30] At this stage, Friedman said that he and his wife “regarded the job-creation programs such as the WPA, CCC, and PWA appropriate responses to the critical situation,” but not “the price- and wage-fixing measures of the National Recovery Administration and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.”[31] Foreshadowing his later ideas, he believed price controls interfered with an essential signaling mechanism to help resources be used where they were most valued. Indeed, Friedman later concluded that all government intervention associated with the New Deal was “the wrong cure for the wrong disease,” arguing that the money supply should simply have been expanded, instead of contracted.[32] Later, Friedman and his colleague Anna Schwartz wrote A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, which argued that the Great Depression was caused by a severe monetary contraction due to banking crises and poor policy on the part of the Federal Reserve.[33]

During 1935, he began work for the National Resources Committee, which was then working on a large consumer budget survey. Ideas from this project later became a part of his Theory of the Consumption Function. Friedman began employment with the National Bureau of Economic Research during autumn 1937 to assist Simon Kuznets in his work on professional income. This work resulted in their jointly authored publication Incomes from Independent Professional Practice, which introduced the concepts of permanent and transitory income, a major component of the Permanent Income Hypothesis that Friedman worked out in greater detail in the 1950s. The book hypothesizes that professional licensing artificially restricts the supply of services and raises prices.

During 1940, Friedman was appointed an assistant professor teaching Economics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, but encountered antisemitism in the Economics department and decided to return to government service.[34][35] From 1941 to 1943 Friedman worked on wartime tax policy for the Federal Government, as an advisor to senior officials of the United States Department of the Treasury. As a Treasury spokesman during 1942 he advocated a Keynesian policy of taxation. He helped to invent the payroll withholding tax system, since the federal government badly needed money in order to fight the war.[36] He later said, “I have no apologies for it, but I really wish we hadn’t found it necessary and I wish there were some way of abolishing withholding now.”[37]

Academic career

Early years

In 1940, Friedman accepted a position at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, but left because of differences with faculty regarding United States involvement in World War II. Friedman believed the United States should enter the war.[38] In 1943, Friedman joined the Division of War Research at Columbia University (headed by W. Allen Wallis and Harold Hotelling), where he spent the rest of World War II working as a mathematical statistician, focusing on problems of weapons design, military tactics, and metallurgical experiments.[38][39]

In 1945, Friedman submitted Incomes from Independent Professional Practice (co-authored with Kuznets and completed during 1940) to Columbia as his doctoral dissertation. The university awarded him a PhD in 1946. Friedman spent the 1945–1946 academic year teaching at the University of Minnesota (where his friend George Stigler was employed). On February 12, 1945, his son, David D. Friedman was born.

University of Chicago

In 1946, Friedman accepted an offer to teach economic theory at the University of Chicago (a position opened by departure of his former professor Jacob Viner to Princeton University). Friedman would work for the University of Chicago for the next 30 years. There he contributed to the establishment of an intellectual community that produced a number of Nobel Prize winners, known collectively as the Chicago school of economics.

At that time, Arthur F. Burns, who was then the head of the National Bureau of Economic Research, asked Friedman to rejoin the Bureau’s staff. He accepted the invitation, and assumed responsibility for the Bureau’s inquiry into the role of money in the business cycle. As a result, he initiated the “Workshop in Money and Banking” (the “Chicago Workshop”), which promoted a revival of monetary studies. During the latter half of the 1940s, Friedman began a collaboration with Anna Schwartz, an economic historian at the Bureau, that would ultimately result in the 1963 publication of a book co-authored by Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960.

Friedman spent the 1954–1955 academic year as a Fulbright Visiting Fellow at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. At the time, the Cambridge economics faculty was divided into a Keynesian majority (including Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn) and an anti-Keynesian minority (headed by Dennis Robertson). Friedman speculated that he was invited to the fellowship, because his views were unacceptable to both of the Cambridge factions. Later his weekly columns for Newsweek magazine (1966–84) were well read and increasingly influential among political and business people.[40] From 1968 to 1978, he and Paul Samuelson participated in the Economics Cassette Series, a biweekly subscription series where the economist would discuss the days’ issues for about a half-hour at a time.[41][42]

Friedman was an economic adviser to Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater during 1964.

Personal life

Retirement

In 1977, at the age of 65, Friedman retired from the University of Chicago after teaching there for 30 years. He and his wife moved to San Francisco where he became a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. From 1977 on, he was affiliated with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. During the same year, Friedman was approached by the Free To Choose Network and asked to create a television program presenting his economic and social philosophy.

The Friedmans worked on this project for the next three years, and during 1980, the ten-part series, titled Free to Choose, was broadcast by the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). The companion book to the series (co-authored by Milton and his wife, Rose Friedman), also titled Free To Choose, was the bestselling nonfiction book of 1980 and has since been translated into 14 foreign languages.

Friedman served as an unofficial adviser to Ronald Reagan during his 1980 presidential campaign, and then served on the President’s Economic Policy Advisory Board for the rest of the Reagan Administration. Ebenstein says Friedman was “the ‘guru’ of the Reagan administration.”[43] In 1988 he received the National Medal of Science and Reagan honored him with the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Milton Friedman is known now as one of the most influential economists of the 20th century.[44][45] Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Friedman continued to write editorials and appear on television. He made several visits to Eastern Europe and to China, where he also advised governments. He was also for many years a Trustee of the Philadelphia Society.[46][47][48]

Later life

According to a 2007 article in Commentary magazine, his “parents were moderately observant [Jews], but Friedman, after an intense burst of childhood piety, rejected religion altogether.”[49] He described himself as an agnostic.[50] Friedman wrote extensively of his life and experiences, especially in 1998 in his memoirs with his wife Rose, titled Two Lucky People.

Death

Friedman died of heart failure at the age of 94 years in San Francisco on November 16, 2006.[51] He was still a working economist performing original economic research; his last column was published in The Wall Street Journal the day after his death.[52] He was survived by his wife (who died on August 18, 2009) and their two children, David, known for the anarcho-capitalist book The Machinery of Freedom, and Janet.

Scholarly contributions

Economics

Friedman was best known for reviving interest in the money supply as a determinant of the nominal value of output, that is, the quantity theory of money. Monetarism is the set of views associated with modern quantity theory. Its origins can be traced back to the 16th-century School of Salamanca or even further; however, Friedman’s contribution is largely responsible for its modern popularization. He co-authored, with Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (1963), which was an examination of the role of the money supply and economic activity in the U.S. history. A striking conclusion of their research regarded the way in which money supply fluctuations contribute to economic fluctuations. Several regression studies with David Meiselman during the 1960s suggested the primacy of the money supply over investment and government spending in determining consumption and output. These challenged a prevailing, but largely untested, view on their relative importance. Friedman’s empirical research and some theory supported the conclusion that the short-run effect of a change of the money supply was primarily on output but that the longer-run effect was primarily on the price level.

Friedman was the main proponent of the monetarist school of economics. He maintained that there is a close and stable association between inflation and the money supply, mainly that inflation could be avoided with proper regulation of the monetary base’s growth rate. He famously used the analogy of “dropping money out of a helicopter.”,[53] in order to avoid dealing with money injection mechanisms and other factors that would overcomplicate his models.

Friedman’s arguments were designed to counter the popular concept of cost-push inflation, that the increased general price level at the time was the result of increases in the price of oil, or increases in wages; as he wrote,

Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.

— Milton Friedman, 1963.[54]

Friedman rejected the use of fiscal policy as a tool of demand management; and he held that the government’s role in the guidance of the economy should be restricted severely. Friedman wrote extensively on the Great Depression, which he termed the Great Contraction, arguing that it had been caused by an ordinary financial shock whose duration and seriousness were greatly increased by the subsequent contraction of the money supply caused by the misguided policies of the directors of the Federal Reserve.

The Fed was largely responsible for converting what might have been a garden-variety recession, although perhaps a fairly severe one, into a major catastrophe. Instead of using its powers to offset the depression, it presided over a decline in the quantity of money by one-third from 1929 to 1933 … Far from the depression being a failure of the free-enterprise system, it was a tragic failure of government.

— Milton Friedman, Two Lucky People, 233[55]

Friedman also argued for the cessation of government intervention in currency markets, thereby spawning an enormous literature on the subject, as well as promoting the practice of freely floating exchange rates. His close friend George Stigler explained, “As is customary in science, he did not win a full victory, in part because research was directed along different lines by the theory of rational expectations, a newer approach developed by Robert Lucas, also at the University of Chicago.”[56] The relationship between Friedman and Lucas, or new classical macroeconomics as a whole, was highly complex. The Friedmanian Phillips curve was an interesting starting point for Lucas, but he soon realized that the solution provided by Friedman was not quite satisfactory. Lucas elaborated a new approach in which rational expectations were presumed instead of the Friedmanian adaptive expectations. Due to this reformulation, the story in which the theory of the new classical Phillips curve was embedded radically changed. This modification, however, had a significant effect on Friedman’s own approach, so, as a result, the theory of the Friedmanian Phillips curve also changed.[57] Moreover, new classical Neil Wallace, who was a graduate student at the University of Chicago between 1960 and 1963, regarded Friedman’s theoretical courses as a mess.[58] This evaluation clearly indicates the broken relationship between Friedmanian monetarism and new classical macroeconomics.

Friedman was also known for his work on the consumption function, the permanent income hypothesis (1957), which Friedman himself referred to as his best scientific work.[59] This work contended that rational consumers would spend a proportional amount of what they perceived to be their permanent income. Windfall gains would mostly be saved. Tax reductions likewise, as rational consumers would predict that taxes would have to increase later to balance public finances. Other important contributions include his critique of the Phillips curve and the concept of the natural rate of unemployment (1968). This critique associated his name, together with that of Edmund Phelps, with the insight that a government that brings about greater inflation cannot permanently reduce unemployment by doing so. Unemployment may be temporarily lower, if the inflation is a surprise, but in the long run unemployment will be determined by the frictions and imperfections of the labor market.

Friedman’s essay “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (1953) provided the epistemological pattern for his own subsequent research and to a degree that of the Chicago School. There he argued that economics as science should be free of value judgments for it to be objective. Moreover, a useful economic theory should be judged not by its descriptive realism but by its simplicity and fruitfulness as an engine of prediction. That is, students should measure the accuracy of its predictions, rather than the ‘soundness of its assumptions’. His argument was part of an ongoing debate among such statisticians as Jerzy Neyman, Leonard Savage, and Ronald Fisher.[60]

Statistics

One of his most famous contributions to statistics is sequential sampling. Friedman did statistical work at the Division of War Research at Columbia, where he and his colleagues came up with the technique. It later became, in the words of The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, “the standard analysis of quality control inspection”. The dictionary adds, “Like many of Friedman’s contributions, in retrospect it seems remarkably simple and obvious to apply basic economic ideas to quality control; that however is a measure of his genius.”[61]

Public policy positions

Federal Reserve

Due to its poor performance,[62] Friedman believed that the Federal Reserve Board should be abolished.[63][64] Friedman was deeply critical about Federal Reserve policies, even during the so-called ‘Volcker shock’ that was labelled ‘monetarist.’[65] He further believed that if the money supply was to be centrally controlled (as by the Federal Reserve System) that the preferable way to do it would be with a mechanical system that would keep the quantity of money increasing at a steady rate.

Exchange rates

Friedman was a strong advocate for floating exchange rates throughout the entire Bretton-Woods period. He argued that a flexible exchange rate would make external adjustment possible and allow countries to avoid Balance of Payments crises. He saw fixed exchange rates as an undesirable form of government intervention. The case was articulated in an influential 1953 paper, “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates”, at a time, when most commentators regarded the possibility of floating exchange rates as a fantasy.[66][67]

School choice

In his 1955 article “The Role of Government in Education”[68] Friedman proposed supplementing publicly operated schools with privately run but publicly funded schools through a system of school vouchers.[69] Reforms similar to those proposed in the article were implemented in, for example, Chile in 1981 and Sweden in 1992.[70] In 1996, Friedman, together with his wife, founded the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice to advocate school choice and vouchers. In 2016, the Friedman Foundation changed its name to EdChoice to honor the Friedmans’ desire to have the educational choice movement live on without their names attached to it after their deaths.[17]

Conscription

While Walter Oi is credited with establishing the economic basis for a volunteer military, Milton Friedman was a proponent, stating that the draft was “inconsistent with a free society.”[71][72] In Capitalism and Freedom, he argued that conscription is inequitable and arbitrary, preventing young men from shaping their lives as they see fit.[73] During the Nixon administration he headed the committee to research a conversion to paid/volunteer armed force. He would later state that his role in eliminating the conscription in the United States was his proudest accomplishment.[12] Friedman did, however, believe a nation could compel military training as a reserve in case of war time.[73]

Foreign policy

Biographer Lanny Ebenstein noted a drift over time in Friedman’s views from an interventionist to a more cautious foreign policy.[74] He supported US involvement in the Second World War and initially supported a hard line against Communism, but moderated over time.[74] He opposed the Gulf War and the Iraq War.[74] In a spring 2006 interview, Friedman said that the USA’s stature in the world had been eroded by the Iraq War, but that it might be improved if Iraq were to become a peaceful independent country.[75]

Libertarianism and the Republican Party

He served as a member of President Reagan’s Economic Policy Advisory Board starting at 1981. In 1988, he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the National Medal of Science. He said that he was a libertarian philosophically, but a member of the U.S. Republican Party for the sake of “expediency” (“I am a libertarian with a small ‘l’ and a Republican with a capital ‘R.’ And I am a Republican with a capital ‘R’ on grounds of expediency, not on principle.”) But, he said, “I think the term classical liberal is also equally applicable. I don’t really care very much what I’m called. I’m much more interested in having people thinking about the ideas, rather than the person.”[76]

Public goods and monopoly

Friedman was supportive of the state provision of some public goods that private businesses are not considered as being able to provide. However, he argued that many of the services performed by government could be performed better by the private sector. Above all, if some public goods are provided by the state, he believed that they should not be a legal monopoly where private competition is prohibited; for example, he wrote:

There is no way to justify our present public monopoly of the post office. It may be argued that the carrying of mail is a technical monopoly and that a government monopoly is the least of evils. Along these lines, one could perhaps justify a government post office, but not the present law, which makes it illegal for anybody else to carry the mail. If the delivery of mail is a technical monopoly, no one else will be able to succeed in competition with the government. If it is not, there is no reason why the government should be engaged in it. The only way to find out is to leave other people free to enter.

— Milton Friedman, Friedman, Milton & Rose D. Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 29

Social security, welfare programs, and negative income tax

After 1960 Friedman attacked Social Security from a free market view stating that it had created welfare dependency.[77]

Friedman proposed that if there had to be a welfare system of any kind, he would replace the existing U.S. welfare system with a negative income tax, a progressive tax system in which the poor receive a basic living income from the government.[78] According to the New York Times, Friedman’s views in this regard were grounded in a belief that while “market forces … accomplish wonderful things”, they “cannot ensure a distribution of income that enables all citizens to meet basic economic needs”.[78]

Drug policy

Friedman also supported libertarian policies such as legalization of drugs and prostitution. During 2005, Friedman and more than 500 other economists advocated discussions regarding the economic benefits of the legalization of marijuana.[79]

Gay rights

Friedman was also a supporter of gay rights.[80][81] He never specifically supported same-sex marriage, instead saying “I do not believe there should be any discrimination against gays.”[81]

Economic freedom

Michael Walker of the Fraser Institute and Friedman hosted a series of conferences from 1986 to 1994. The goal was to create a clear definition of economic freedom and a method for measuring it. Eventually this resulted in the first report on worldwide economic freedom, Economic Freedom in the World.[82] This annual report has since provided data for numerous peer-reviewed studies and has influenced policy in several nations.

Along with sixteen other distinguished economists he opposed the Copyright Term Extension Act and filed an amicus brief in Eldred v. Ashcroft.[83] He supported the inclusion of the word “no-brainer” in the brief.[84]

Friedman argued for stronger basic legal (constitutional) protection of economic rights and freedoms to further promote industrial-commercial growth and prosperity and buttress democracy and freedom and the rule of law generally in society.[85]

Honors, recognition, and influence

George H. Nash, a leading historian of American conservatism, says that by, “the end of the 1960s he was probably the most highly regarded and influential conservative scholar in the country, and one of the few with an international reputation.”[86] Friedman allowed the libertarian Cato Institute to use his name for its biannual Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty beginning in 2001. A Friedman Prize was given to the late British economist Peter Bauer in 2002, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto in 2004, Mart Laar, former Estonian Prime Minister in 2006 and a young Venezuelan student Yon Goicoechea in 2008. His wife Rose, sister of Aaron Director, with whom he initiated the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, served on the international selection committee.[87][88] Friedman was also a recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics.

Upon Friedman’s death, Harvard President Lawrence Summers called him “The Great Liberator” saying “… any honest Democrat will admit that we are now all Friedmanites.” He said Friedman’s great popular contribution was “in convincing people of the importance of allowing free markets to operate.”[89]

In 2013 Stephen Moore, a member of the editorial forward of the Wall Street Journal said, “Quoting the most-revered champion of free-market economics since Adam Smith has become a little like quoting the Bible.” He adds, “There are sometimes multiple and conflicting interpretations.”[90]

Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences

Friedman won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, the sole recipient for 1976, “for his achievements in the fields of consumption analysis, monetary history and theory and for his demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy.”[4]

Hong Kong

Friedman once said, “If you want to see capitalism in action, go to Hong Kong.”[91] He wrote in 1990 that the Hong Kong economy was perhaps the best example of a free market economy.[92]

One month before his death, he wrote the article “Hong Kong Wrong – What would Cowperthwaite say?” in the Wall Street Journal, criticizing Donald Tsang, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, for abandoning “positive noninterventionism.”[93] Tsang later said he was merely changing the slogan to “big market, small government,” where small government is defined as less than 20% of GDP. In a debate between Tsang and his rival, Alan Leong, before the 2007 Chief Executive election, Leong introduced the topic and jokingly accused Tsang of angering Friedman to death.

Chile

Main articles: Miracle of Chile and Chicago Boys

During 1975, two years after the military coup that brought military dictator President Augusto Pinochet to power and ended the government of Salvador Allende, the economy of Chile experienced a severe crisis. Friedman and Arnold Harberger accepted an invitation of a private Chilean foundation to visit Chile and speak on principles of economic freedom.[94] He spent seven days in Chile giving a series of lectures at the Universidad Católica de Chile and the (National) University of Chile. One of the lectures was entitled “The Fragility of Freedom” and according to Friedman, “dealt with precisely the threat to freedom from a centralized military government.”[95]

In an April 21, 1975, letter to Pinochet, Friedman considered the “key economic problems of Chile are clearly … inflation and the promotion of a healthy social market economy“.[96] He stated that “There is only one way to end inflation: by drastically reducing the rate of increase of the quantity of money …” and that “… cutting government spending is by far and away the most desirable way to reduce the fiscal deficit, because it … strengthens the private sector thereby laying the foundations for healthy economic growth”.[96] As to how rapidly inflation should be ended, Friedman felt that “for Chile where inflation is raging at 10–20% a month … gradualism is not feasible. It would involve so painful an operation over so long a period that the patient would not survive.” Choosing “a brief period of higher unemployment…” was the lesser evil.. and that “the experience of Germany, … of Brazil …, of the post-war adjustment in the U.S. … all argue for shock treatment“. In the letter Friedman recommended to deliver the shock approach with “… a package to eliminate the surprise and to relieve acute distress” and “… for definiteness let me sketch the contents of a package proposal … to be taken as illustrative” although his knowledge of Chile was “too limited to enable [him] to be precise or comprehensive”. He listed a “sample proposal” of 8 monetary and fiscal measures including “the removal of as many as obstacles as possible that now hinder the private market. For example, suspend … the present law against discharging employees”. He closed, stating “Such a shock program could end inflation in months”. His letter suggested that cutting spending to reduce the fiscal deficit would result in less transitional unemployment than raising taxes.

Sergio de Castro, a Chilean Chicago School graduate, became the nation’s Minister of Finance in 1975. During his six-year tenure, foreign investment increased, restrictions were placed on striking and labor unions, and GDP rose yearly.[97] A foreign exchange program was created between the Catholic University of Chile and the University of Chicago. Many other Chicago School alumni were appointed government posts during and after the Pinochet years; others taught its economic doctrine at Chilean universities. They became known as the Chicago Boys.[98]

Friedman did not criticize Pinochet’s dictatorship at the time, nor the assassinations, illegal imprisonments, torture, or other atrocities that were well known by then.[99] In 1976 Friedman defended his unofficial adviser position with: “I do not consider it as evil for an economist to render technical economic advice to the Chilean Government, any more than I would regard it as evil for a physician to give technical medical advice to the Chilean Government to help end a medical plague.”[100]

Friedman defended his activity in Chile on the grounds that, in his opinion, the adoption of free market policies not only improved the economic situation of Chile but also contributed to the amelioration of Pinochet’s rule and to the eventual transition to a democratic government during 1990. That idea is included in Capitalism and Freedom, in which he declared that economic freedom is not only desirable in itself but is also a necessary condition for political freedom. In his 1980 documentary Free to Choose, he said the following: “Chile is not a politically free system, and I do not condone the system. But the people there are freer than the people in Communist societies because government plays a smaller role. … The conditions of the people in the past few years has been getting better and not worse. They would be still better to get rid of the junta and to be able to have a free democratic system.”[101][102] In 1984, Friedman stated that he has “never refrained from criticizing the political system in Chile.”[95] In 1991 he said: “I have nothing good to say about the political regime that Pinochet imposed. It was a terrible political regime. The real miracle of Chile is not how well it has done economically; the real miracle of Chile is that a military junta was willing to go against its principles and support a free market regime designed by principled believers in a free market. […] In Chile, the drive for political freedom, that was generated by economic freedom and the resulting economic success, ultimately resulted in a referendum that introduced political democracy. Now, at long last, Chile has all three things: political freedom, human freedom and economic freedom. Chile will continue to be an interesting experiment to watch to see whether it can keep all three or whether, now that it has political freedom,that political freedom will tend to be used to destroy or reduce economic freedom.”[103] He stressed that the lectures he gave in Chile were the same lectures he later gave in China and other socialist states.[104]

During the 2000 PBS documentary The Commanding Heights (based on the book), Friedman continued to argue that “free markets would undermine [Pinochet’s] political centralization and political control.”,[105][106] and that criticism over his role in Chile missed his main contention that freer markets resulted in freer people, and that Chile’s unfree economy had caused the military government. Friedman advocated for free markets which undermined “political centralization and political control”.[107]

Iceland

Friedman visited Iceland during the autumn of 1984, met with important Icelanders and gave a lecture at the University of Iceland on the “tyranny of the status quo.” He participated in a lively television debate on August 31, 1984 with socialist intellectuals, including Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, who later became the president of Iceland.[108] When they complained that a fee was charged for attending his lecture at the University and that, hitherto, lectures by visiting scholars had been free-of-charge, Friedman replied that previous lectures had not been free-of-charge in a meaningful sense: lectures always have related costs. What mattered was whether attendees or non-attendees covered those costs. Friedman thought that it was fairer that only those who attended paid. In this discussion Friedman also stated that he did not receive any money for delivering that lecture.

Estonia

Although Friedman never visited Estonia, his book Free to Choose exercised a great influence on that nation’s then 32-year-old prime minister, Mart Laar, who has claimed that it was the only book on economics he had read before taking office. Laar’s reforms are often credited with responsibility for transforming Estonia from an impoverished Soviet Republic to the “Baltic Tiger.” A prime element of Laar’s program was introduction of the flat tax. Laar won the 2006 Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty, awarded by the Cato Institute.[109]

United Kingdom

After 1950 Friedman was frequently invited to lecture in Britain, and by the 1970s his ideas had gained widespread attention in conservative circles. For example, he was a regular speaker at the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), a libertarian think tank. Conservative politician Margaret Thatcher closely followed IEA programs and ideas, and met Friedman there in 1978. He also strongly influenced Keith Joseph, who became Thatcher’s senior advisor on economic affairs, as well as Alan Walters and Patrick Minford, two other key advisers. Major newspapers, including the Daily Telegraph, The Times, and The Financial Times all promulgated Friedman’s monetarist ideas to British decision-makers. Friedman’s ideas strongly influenced Thatcher and her allies when she became Prime Minister in 1979.[110][111]

Criticism

Econometrician David Hendry criticized part of Friedman’s and Anna Schwartz’s 1982 Monetary Trends.[112] When asked about it during an interview with Icelandic TV in 1984,[113] Friedman said that the criticism referred to a different problem from that which he and Schwartz had tackled, and hence was irrelevant,[114] and pointed out the lack of consequential peer review amongst econometricians on Hendry’s work.[115] In 2006, Hendry said that Friedman was guilty of “serious errors” of misunderstanding that meant “the t-ratios he reported for UK money demand were overstated by nearly 100 per cent”, and said that, in a paper published in 1991 with Neil Ericsson,[116] he had refuted “almost every empirical claim […] made about UK money demand” by Friedman and Schwartz.[117] A 2004 paper updated and confirmed the validity of the Hendry–Ericsson findings through 2000.[118]

Although Keynesian Nobel laureate Paul Krugman praised Friedman as a “great economist and a great man” after Friedman’s death in 2006, and acknowledged his many, widely accepted contributions to empirical economics, Krugman had been, and remains, a prominent critic of Friedman. Krugman has written that “he slipped all too easily into claiming both that markets always work and that only markets work. It’s extremely hard to find cases in which Friedman acknowledged the possibility that markets could go wrong, or that government intervention could serve a useful purpose.”[119]

In her book The Shock Doctrine, author and social activist Naomi Klein criticized Friedman’s economic liberalism, identifying it with the principles that guided the economic restructuring that followed the military coups in countries such as Chile and Indonesia. Based on their assessments of the extent to which what she describes as neoliberal policies contributed to income disparities and inequality, both Klein and Noam Chomsky have suggested that the primary role of what they describe as neoliberalism was as an ideological cover for capital accumulation by multinational corporations.[120]

Visit to Chile

Because of his involvement with the Pinochet government, there were international protests when Friedman was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1976.[121] Friedman was accused of supporting the military dictatorship in Chile because of the relation of economists of the University of Chicago to Pinochet, and a controversial six-day trip[122] he took to Chile during March 1975 (less than two years after the coup that deposed President Salvador Allende). Friedman answered that he never was an adviser to the dictatorship, but only gave some lectures and seminars on inflation, and met with officials, including Augusto Pinochet, while in Chile.[123]

Chilean economist Orlando Letelier asserted that Pinochet’s dictatorship resorted to oppression because of popular opposition to Chicago School policies in Chile.[124] After a 1991 speech on drug legalisation, Friedman answered a question on his involvement with the Pinochet regime, saying that he was never an advisor to Pinochet (also mentioned in his 1984 Iceland interview[95]), but that a group of his students at the University of Chicago were involved in Chile’s economic reforms. Friedman credited these reforms with high levels of economic growth and with the establishment of democracy that has subsequently occurred in Chile.[125][126] In October 1988, after returning from a lecture tour of China during which he had met with Zhao Ziyang, Friedman wrote to The Stanford Daily asking if he should anticipate a similar “avalanche of protests for having been willing to give advice to so evil a government? And if not, why not?”[127]

Capitalism and Freedom

Capitalism and Freedom is a seminal work by Friedman. In the book, Friedman talks about the need to move to a classically liberal society, that free markets would help nations and individuals in the long-run and fix the efficiency problems currently faced by the United States and other major countries of the 1950s and 1960s. He goes through the chapters specifying a specific issue in each respective chapter from the role of government and money supply to social welfare programs to a special chapter on occupational licensure. Friedman concludes Capitalism and Freedom with his “classical liberal” stance, that government should stay out of matters that do not need and should only involve itself when absolutely necessary for the survival of its people and the country. He recounts how the best of a country’s abilities come from its free markets while its failures come from government intervention.[77]

Selected bibliography

  • A Theory of the Consumption Function (1957)
  • A Program for Monetary Stability (Fordham University Press, 1960) 110 pp. online version
  • Capitalism and Freedom (1962), highly influential series of essays that established Friedman’s position on major issues of public policy excerpts
  • A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, with Anna J. Schwartz, 1963; part 3 reprinted as The Great Contraction
  • “The Role of Monetary Policy.” American Economic Review, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Mar., 1968), pp. 1–17 JSTOR presidential address to American Economics Association
  • “Inflation and Unemployment: Nobel lecture”, 1977, Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 85, pp. 451–72. JSTOR
  • Free to Choose: A personal statement, with Rose Friedman, (1980), highly influential restatement of policy views
  • The Essence of Friedman, essays edited by Kurt R. Leube, (1987) (ISBN 0-8179-8662-6)
  • Two Lucky People: Memoirs (with Rose Friedman) ISBN 0-226-26414-9 (1998) excerpt and text search
  • Milton Friedman on Economics: Selected Papers by Milton Friedman, edited by Gary S. Becker (2008)
  • An Interview with Milton Friedman, John B. Taylor (2001). Macroeconomic Dynamics, 5, pp 101–31

See also

Notes

  1. Jump up^ Ebenstein, Lanny (2007). Milton Friedman: A Biography. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 89.
  2. Jump up^ Charles Moore (2013). Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One: Not For Turning. Penguin. pp. 576–77.
  3. Jump up^ Lanny Ebenstein (2007). Milton Friedman: A Biography. St. Martin’s Press. p. 208.
  4. ^ Jump up to:a b “Milton Friedman on nobelprize.org”. Nobel Prize. 1976. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  5. Jump up^ Thomas Sowell (2016-09-16). A Personal Odyssey. Free Press. p. 320. ISBN 0743215087.
  6. Jump up^ The Chicago School: How the University of Chicago Assembled the Thinkers Who Revolutionized Economics and Business
  7. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman”. Commanding Heights. PBS. October 1, 2000. Retrieved September 19, 2011.
  8. Jump up^ Milton Friedman—Economist as Public Intellectual
  9. Jump up^ Mark Skousen (2009-02-28). The Making of Modern Economics: The Lives and Ideas of the Great Thinkers. M.E. Sharpe. p. 407. ISBN 0-7656-2227-0.
  10. Jump up^ Among macroeconomists, the “natural” rate has been increasingly replaced by James Tobin‘s NAIRU, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, which is seen as having fewer normative connotations.
  11. Jump up^ Nobel prize winner Paul Krugman stated that, “In 1968 in one of the decisive intellectual achievements of postwar economics, Friedman not only showed why the apparent tradeoff embodied in the idea of the Phillips curve was wrong; he also predicted the emergence of combined inflation and high unemployment … dubbed ‘stagflation.” Paul Krugman, Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in an Age of Diminished Expectations (1995) p. 43 online
  12. ^ Jump up to:a b Doherty, Brian (June 1, 1995). “Best of Both Worlds”. Reason Magazine. Retrieved October 24, 2009
  13. Jump up^ Edward Nelson, “Friedman’s Monetary Economics in Practice,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, April 13, 2011. Nelson stated, “in important respects, the overall monetary and financial policy response to the crisis can be viewed as Friedman’s monetary economics in practice.” and “Friedman’s recommendations for responding to a financial crisis largely lined up with the principal financial and monetary policy measures taken since 2007.” Nelson, “Review,” in Journal of Economic Literature (Dec, 2012) 50#4 pp. 1106–09
  14. Jump up^ Lanny Ebenstein (2007). Milton Friedman: A Biography. St. Martin’s Press. p. 208.
  15. Jump up^ Charles Moore (2013). Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One: Not For Turning. Penguin. pp. 576–77.
  16. Jump up^ Milton Friedman (1912–2006)
  17. ^ Jump up to:a b Sullivan, Maureen (July 30, 2016). “Milton Friedman’s Name Disappears From Foundation, But His School-Choice Beliefs Live On”. Forbes. Retrieved 14 September 2016.
  18. Jump up^ “Capitalism and Friedman” (editorial), The Wall Street Journal November 17, 2006
  19. Jump up^ Václav Klaus (January 29, 2007). “Remarks at Milton Friedman Memorial Service”. Retrieved August 22, 2008.
  20. Jump up^ Johan Norberg, Defaming Milton Friedman: Naomi Klein’s disastrous yet popular polemic against the great free market economist, Reason Magazine, Washington, D.C., Oct. 2008
  21. Jump up^ Friedman 1999, p. 506
  22. Jump up^ Davis, William L, Bob Figgins, David Hedengren, and Daniel B. Klein. “Economic Professors’ Favorite Economic Thinkers, Journals, and Blogs”, Econ Journal Watch 8(2): 126–46, May 2011.
  23. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman, a giant among economists”. The Economist. November 23, 2006. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  24. Jump up^ “Who’s who in American Jewry”. 1980.
  25. Jump up^ Alan O. Ebenstein, Milton Friedman: a biography (2007) p. 10; Milton & Rose Friedman, Two Lucky People. Memoirs, Chicago 1998, p. 22.
  26. Jump up^ Eamonn Butler, Milton Friedman (2011) ch 1
  27. Jump up^ Alan O. Ebenstein, Milton Friedman: a biography (2007) pp. 5–12
  28. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman and his start in economics”. Young America’s Foundation. August 2006. Retrieved March 12, 2012.
  29. Jump up^ Ebenstein, Milton Friedman: a biography (2007) pp. 13–30
  30. Jump up^ Feeney, Mark (November 16, 2006). “Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman dies at 94”. The Boston Globe. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  31. Jump up^ Friedman 1999, p. 59
  32. Jump up^ “Right from the Start? What Milton Friedman can teach progressives.” (PDF). J. Bradford DeLong. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  33. Jump up^ Bernanke 2004, p. 7
  34. Jump up^ Friedman 1999, p. 42
  35. Jump up^ Friedman 1999, pp. 84–85
  36. Jump up^ Milton Friedman; Rose D. Friedman (1999). Two Lucky People: Memoirs. University of Chicago Press. pp. 122–23. ISBN 9780226264158.
  37. Jump up^ Doherty, Brian (June 1995). “Best of Both Worlds”. Reason. Retrieved July 28, 2010.
  38. ^ Jump up to:a b “Milton Friedman Biography – Academy of Achievement”. Achievement.org. Retrieved 2014-04-22.
  39. Jump up^ Philip Mirowski (2002). Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science. Cambridge University Press. pp. 202–03. ISBN 9780521775267.
  40. Jump up^ CATO, “Letter from Washington,” National Review, September 19, 1980, Vol. 32 Issue 19, p. 1119
  41. Jump up^ Rose and Milton Friedman
  42. Jump up^ Inventory of the Paul A. Samuelson Papers, 1933–2010 and undated | Finding Aids | Rubenstein Library
  43. Jump up^ Ebenstein (2007). Milton Friedman: A Biography. p. 208.
  44. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman: An enduring legacy”. The Economist. November 17, 2006. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  45. Jump up^ Sullivan, Patricia (November 17, 2006). “Economist Touted Laissez-Faire Policy”. The Washington Post. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  46. Jump up^ Milton Friedman – Biography | Cato Institute
  47. Jump up^ Trustees
  48. Jump up^ Milton Friedman
  49. Jump up^ Lanny Ebenstein, Milton Friedman, Commentary, May 2007, p. 286.
  50. Jump up^ Asman, David (November 16, 2006). “‘Your World’ Interview With Economist Milton Friedman”. Fox News. Retrieved August 2, 2011.
  51. Jump up^ Christie, Jim (November 16, 2006). “Free market economist Milton Friedman dead at 94”. Reuters. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  52. Jump up^ Peter Robinson (2008-10-17). “What Would Milton Friedman Say?”. forbes.com. Retrieved 2014-12-13.
  53. Jump up^ Optimum Quantity of Money. Aldine Publishing Company. 1969. p. 4.
  54. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton. Inflation: Causes and Consequences. New York: Asia Publishing House.
  55. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman: END THE FED”. Themoneymasters.com. Retrieved 2014-04-22.
  56. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton (1969). Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist. Aldine Publishing Company. p. 4.
  57. Jump up^ Galbács, Peter (2015). The Theory of New Classical Macroeconomics. A Positive Critique. Heidelberg/New York/Dordrecht/London: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17578-2. ISBN 978-3-319-17578-2.
  58. Jump up^ Kevin Hoover; Warren Young (2011). Rational Expectations – Retrospect and Prospect (PDF). Durham: Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University.
  59. Jump up^ “Charlie Rose Show”. December 26, 2005. Missing or empty |series= (help)
  60. Jump up^ David Teira, “Milton Friedman, the Statistical Methodologist,” History of Political Economy (2007) 39#3 pp. 511–27,
  61. Jump up^ The Life and Times of Milton Friedman – Remembering the 20th century’s most influential libertarian
  62. Jump up^ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6fkdagNrjI “There in no institution in the US that has such a high public standing and such a poor record of performance” “It’s done more harm than good”
  63. Jump up^ “My first preference would be to abolish the Federal Reserve” on YouTube
  64. Jump up^ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6fkdagNrjI “I have long been in favor of abolishing it.”
  65. Jump up^ Reichart Alexandre & Abdelkader Slifi (2016). ‘The Influence of Monetarism on Federal Reserve Policy during the 1980s.’ Cahiers d’économie Politique/Papers in Political Economy, (1), pp. 107–50. https://www.cairn.info/revue-cahiers-d-economie-politique-2016-1-page-107.htm
  66. Jump up^ [1]
  67. Jump up^ [2]
  68. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton (1955). Solo, Robert A., ed. “The Role of Government in Education,” as printed in the book Economics and the Public Interest (PDF). Rutgers University Press. pp. 123–144.
  69. Jump up^ Leonard Ross and Richard Zeckhauser (December 1970). “Review: Education Vouchers”. The Yale Law Journal. 80 (2): 451–61. doi:10.2307/795126. JSTOR 795126.
  70. Jump up^ Martin Carnoy (August 1998). “National Voucher Plans in Chile and Sweden: Did Privatization Reforms Make for Better Education?”. Comparative Education Review. 42 (3): 309–37. doi:10.1086/447510. JSTOR 1189163.
  71. Jump up^ Milton Friedman (1991). The War on Drugs. America’s Drug Forum.
  72. Jump up^ Rostker, Bernard (2006). I Want You!: The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force. Rand Corporation. p. 4. ISBN 978-0-8330-3895-1.
  73. ^ Jump up to:a b Friedman, Milton (November 15, 2002). Capitalism and Freedom. University Of Chicago Press. p. 36.
  74. ^ Jump up to:a b c Ebenstein, Lanny (2007). Milton Friedman: a biography. New York: St. Martin’s Press. pp. 231–32. ISBN 978-0-230-60409-4.
  75. Jump up^ Ebenstein, Lanny (2007). Milton Friedman: a biography. New York: St. Martin’s Press. p. 243. ISBN 978-0-230-60409-4.
  76. Jump up^ Friedman and Freedom. Queen’s Journal. Archived from the original on August 11, 2006. Retrieved February 20, 2008., Interview with Peter Jaworski. The Journal, Queen’s University, March 15, 2002 – Issue 37, Volume 129
  77. ^ Jump up to:a b Milton Friedman; Rose D. Friedman (1962). Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition. U. of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780226264189.
  78. ^ Jump up to:a b Frank, Robert H (2006-11-23). “The Other Milton Friedman: A Conservative With a Social Welfare Program”. New York Times. The New York Times.
  79. Jump up^ “An open letter”. Prohibition Costs. Retrieved November 9, 2012.
  80. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman”. Liberal Democratic Party (Australia). Retrieved February 19, 2013.
  81. ^ Jump up to:a b Alan O. Ebenstein, Milton Friedman: A Biography (2007) p. 228
  82. Jump up^ “Economic Freedom of the World project”. Fraser Institute. Retrieved 16 February 2016.
  83. Jump up^ “In the Supreme Court of the United States” (PDF). Harvard Law School. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  84. Jump up^ Lessig, Lawrence (November 19, 2006). “only if the word ‘no-brainer’ appears in it somewhere: RIP Milton Friedman (Lessig Blog)”. Lessig.org. Retrieved April 2, 2013.
  85. Jump up^ “A New British Bill of Rights: The Case For”. ISR Online Guide. Retrieved 16 February 2016.
  86. Jump up^ Lanny Ebenstein (2007). Milton Friedman: A Biography. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 260.
  87. Jump up^ Selection Committee Announced for the 2008 Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty,” Cato Institute, September 5, 2007. Accessed 4 January 2014.
  88. Jump up^ Milton Friedman Prize page at Cato Institute website. Accessed 5 January 2014.
  89. Jump up^ Summers, Larry (November 19, 2006). “The Great Liberator”. The New York Times.
  90. Jump up^ Stephen Moore, What Would Milton Friedman Say?” Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2013 p. A13
  91. Jump up^ Ingdahl, Waldemar (March 22, 2007). “Real Virtuality”. The American. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  92. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton; Friedman, Rose (1990). Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. Harvest Books. p. 34. ISBN 0-15-633460-7.
  93. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton (October 6, 2006). “Dr. Milton Friedman”. Opinion Journal. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  94. Jump up^ Letter from Arnold Harberger to Stig Ramel as reprinted in the Wall Street Journal 12/10/1976, and in Two Lucky People: Memoirs By Milton Friedman, Rose D. Friedman. Appendix A, pp. 598–99. Accessible at books.google.com
  95. ^ Jump up to:a b c Milton Friedman (August 31, 1984). Iceland Television Debate (Flash Video) (Television production). Reykjavík: Icelandic State Television. Event occurs at 009:48:00. Retrieved June 27, 2010.
  96. ^ Jump up to:a b [http:// Two Lucky People: Memoirs By Milton Friedman, Rose D. Friedman. Appendix A, pp. 591–93. Letter from Friedman to Pinochet, April 21, 1975.]
  97. Jump up^ Mask II, William Ray (May 2013). The Great Chilean Recovery: Assigning Responsibility For The Chilean Miracle(s) (Thesis). California State University, Fresno.
  98. Jump up^ “Chile and the “Chicago Boys””. The Hoover Institution. Stanford University. Retrieved 20 June 2014.
  99. Jump up^ O’Shaughnessy, Hugh (December 11, 2006). “General Augusto Pinochet”. The Independent. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  100. Jump up^ Newsweek of June 14, 1976
  101. Jump up^ “Free to Choose Vol. 5”. Archived from the original on February 9, 2008. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  102. Jump up^ Frances Fox Piven vs. Milton Friedman, Thomas Sowell, debate, 1980, YouTube.
  103. Jump up^ The Smith Center: Milton Friedman’s lecture, “Economic Freedom, Human Freedom, Political Freedom”, by Milton Friedman, delivered November 1, 1991.
  104. Jump up^ Friedman 1999, pp. 600–01
  105. Jump up^ “Interview with Jeffery Sachs on the “Miracle of Chile””. PBS. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  106. Jump up^ “Commanding Heights: Milton Friedman”. PBS. Retrieved December 29, 2008.
  107. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman interview”. PBS. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  108. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton; Grímsson, Ólafur Ragnar. Milton Friedman on Icelandic State Television in 1984.
  109. Jump up^ “Mart Laar”. Cato Institute. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  110. Jump up^ John F. Lyons (2013). America in the British Imagination: 1945 to the Present. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 102.
  111. Jump up^ Subroto Roy & John Clarke, eds., Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution: How it Happened and What it Meant (Continuum 2005)
  112. Jump up^ David F. Hendry; Neil R. Ericsson (October 1983). “Assertion without Empirical Basis: An Econometric Appraisal of ‘Monetary Trends in … the United Kingdom’ by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz,” in Monetary Trends in the United Kingdom, Bank of England Panel of Academic Consultants, Panel Paper No. 22, pp. 45–101.See also Federal Reserve International Finance Discussion Paper No. 270 (December 1985), which is a revised and shortened version of Hendry–Ericsson 1983.
  113. Jump up^ “M.Friedman – Iceland TV (1984)”. YouTube. Retrieved 16 February 2016.
  114. Jump up^ van Steven Moore, CMA (1984-08-31). “Milton Friedman – Iceland 2 of 8”. YouTube. Retrieved 2014-04-22.
  115. Jump up^ J. Daniel Hammond (2005). Theory and Measurement: Causality Issues in Milton Friedman’s Monetary Economics. Cambridge U.P. pp. 193–99.
  116. Jump up^ David F. Hendry; Neil R. Ericsson (July 1989). “An Econometric Analysis of UK Money Demand in Monetary Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom by Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz” (PDF). International Finance Discussion Papers: 355. Federal Reserve. Retrieved 2 August 2013.
  117. Jump up^ Hendry, David F. (25 April 2013). “Friedman’s t-ratios were overstated by nearly 100%”. ft.com. Retrieved 1 May 2013.
  118. Jump up^ Escribano, Alvaro (2004). “Nonlinear error correction: The case of money demand in the United Kingdom (1878–2000)” (PDF). Macroeconomic Dynamics. 8 (1): 76–116. doi:10.1017/S1365100503030013.
    Escribano’s approach had already been recognized by Friedman, Schwartz, Hendry et al. (p. 14 of the pdf) as yielding significant improvements over previous money demand equations.
  119. Jump up^ The New York Review of Books, Who Was Milton Friedman?, February 15, 2007
  120. Jump up^ Noam Chomsky (1999). Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order. New York, NY: Seven Stories Press.
  121. Jump up^ Feldman, Burton (2000). “Chapter 9: The Economics Memorial Prize”. The Nobel Prize: A History of Genius, Controversy, and Prestige. New York: Arcade Publishing. p. 350. ISBN 1-55970-537-X.
  122. Jump up^ O’Shaughnessy, Hugh (11 December 2006). “General Augusto Pinochet”. The Independent.
  123. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton; Friedman, Rose D. “Two Lucky People: One Week in Stockholm”. Hoover Digest: Research and Opinion on Public Policy. 1998 (4).
  124. Jump up^ Orlando Letelier, “Economic Freedom’s Awful Toll”, The Nation, August 28, 1976.
  125. Jump up^ The Drug War as a Socialist Enterprise, Milton Friedman, From: Friedman & Szasz on Liberty and Drugs, edited and with a Preface by Arnold S. Trebach and Kevin B. Zeese. Washington, D.C.: The Drug Policy Foundation, 1992.
  126. Jump up^ YouTube clip: Milton Friedman – Pinochet and Chile
  127. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton; Friedman, Rose D. Two Lucky People: Memoirs. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780226264158. Retrieved 18 October 2016.

References

  • Bernanke, Ben (2004). Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-11820-5
  • Butler, Eamonn (2011). Milton Friedman. Harriman Economic Essentials.
  • Ebenstein, Alan O. (2007). Milton Friedman: a biography.
  • Friedman, Milton (1999). Two Lucky People: Memoirs. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-26415-7.
  • Wood, John Cunningham, and Ronald N. Wood, ed. (1990), Milton Friedman: Critical Assessments, v. 3. Scroll to chapter-preview links. Routledge.

Further reading

External links

Free to Choose (original series) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1Fj5tzuYBE

Videos

Robert Mundell

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Robert Mundell
Rmundell.jpg
Born October 24, 1932 (age 84)
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
Nationality Canadian
Institution Johns Hopkins University (1959–61, 1997–98, 2000–01)
University of Chicago (1965–72)
Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland (1965–75) [1]
University of Waterloo (1972–74)
McGill University (1989–1990)[2]
Columbia University (1974 – present)
Chinese University of Hong Kong (2009 – present)
Field Monetary economics
School or
tradition
Supply-side economics
Alma mater London School of Economics
UBC Vancouver School of Economics
University of Washington
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
University of Waterloo
Doctoral
advisor
Charles Kindleberger[3]
Doctoral
students
Jacob A. Frenkel
Rudi Dornbusch[4]
Carmen Reinhart[5]
Influences Ludwig Von Mises
Influenced Arthur Laffer
Jude Wanniski
Michael Mussa
Contributions Mundell–Fleming model
Optimum currency areas
Research on the gold standard
Awards Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (1999)
Information at IDEAS / RePEc

Robert Alexander Mundell, CC (born October 24, 1932) is a Nobel Prize-winning Canadian economist. Currently, he is a professor of economics at Columbia University and the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

He received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1999 for his pioneering work in monetary dynamics and optimum currency areas. Mundell is known as the “father”[6] of the Euro, as he laid the groundwork for its introduction through this work and helped to start the movement known as supply-side economics. Mundell is also known for the Mundell–Fleming model and Mundell–Tobin effect.

Background

Mundell was born in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. He earned his BA in Economics at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, and his MA at the University of Washington in Seattle. After studying at the University of British Columbia and at The London School of Economics in 1956,[7] he then attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he obtained his PhD in Economics in 1956. In 2006 Mundell earned an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from the University of Waterloo in Canada.[8] He was Professor of Economics and Editor of the Journal of Political Economy at the University of Chicago from 1965 to 1972, Chairman of the Department of Economics at the University of Waterloo 1972 to 1974 and since 1974 he was Professor of Economics at Columbia University.[9] He also held the post of Repap Professor of Economics at McGill University.[10][11]

Career

Since 1974 he has been a professor in the Economics department at Columbia University; since 2001 he has held Columbia’s highest academic rank – University Professor. After completing his post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Chicago in 1957, he began teaching economics at Stanford University, and then Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University during 1959–1961.[2] In 1961, he went on to staff the International Monetary Fund. Mundell returned to academics as professor of economics at the University of Chicago from 1966 to 1971, and then served as professor during summers at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva until 1975. In 1989, he was appointed to the post of Repap Professor of Economics at McGill University.,[10][11] In the 1970s, he laid the groundwork for the introduction of the euro through his pioneering work in monetary dynamics and optimum currency forms for which he won the 1999 Nobel Prize in Economics. During this time he continued to serve as an economic adviser to the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, the European Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, the United States Department of Treasury and the governments of Canada and other countries. He is currently the Distinguished Professor-at-Large of The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Among his major contributions are:

Awards

Mundell was awarded the Guggenheim Fellowship in 1971 and the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1999. In 2002 he was made a Companion of the Order of Canada.

In 1992, Mundell received the Docteur Honoris Causa from the University of Paris. Mundell’s honorary professorships and fellowships were from Brookings Institution, the University of Chicago, the University of Southern California, McGill University, the University of Pennsylvania, the Bologna Center and Renmin University of China. He became a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1998. In June 2005 he was awarded the Global Economics Prize World Economics Institute in Kiel, Germany and in September 2005 he was made a Cavaliere di Gran Croce del Reale Ordine del Merito sotto il Titolo di San Ludovico by Principe Don Carlo Ugo di Borbone Parma.

The Mundell International University of Entrepreneurship in the Zhongguancun district of Beijing, People’s Republic of China is named in his honor.

International monetary flows

Mundell is best known in politics for his support of tax cuts and supply-side economics; however, in economics it is for his work on currency areas[12] and international exchange rates[13] that he was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel by the Bank of Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank). Nevertheless, supply-side economics featured prominently in his Bank of Sweden prize speech.

In the 1960s, Canada, of which Mundell is a native, floated its exchange: this caused Mundell to begin investigating the results of floating exchange rates, a phenomenon not widely seen since the 1930s “Stockholm School” successfully lobbied Sweden to leave the gold standard.

In 1962, along with Marcus Fleming, he co-authored the Mundell–Fleming model of exchange rates, and noted that it was impossible to have domestic autonomy, fixed exchange rates, and free capital flows: no more than two of those objectives could be met. The model is, in effect, an extension of the IS/LM model applied to currency rates.

According to Mundell’s analysis:

  • Discipline under the Bretton Woods system was more due to the US Federal Reserve than to the discipline of gold.
  • Demand side fiscal policy would be ineffective in restraining central banks under a floating exchange rate system.
  • Single currency zones relied, therefore, on similar levels of price stability, where a single monetary policy would suffice for all.

His analysis led to his conclusion that it was a disagreement between Europe and the United States over the rate of inflation, partially to finance the Vietnam War, and that Bretton Woods disintegrated because of the undervaluing of gold and the consequent monetary discipline breakdown. There is a famous point/counterpoint over this issue between Mundell and Milton Friedman.[14]

This work later led to the creation of the euro and his prediction that leaving the Bretton Woods system would lead to “stagflation” so long as highly progressive income tax rates applied. In 1974, he advocated a drastic tax reduction and a flattening of income tax rates.

Mundell, though lionized by some conservatives, has many of his harshest critics from the right: he denies the need for a fixed gold based currency or currency board[citation needed] (he still often recommends this as a policy in hyperinflationary environments) and he is both a fiscal and balance of payments deficit hawk. He is well known for stating that in a floating exchange rate system, expansion of the money supply can come about only by a positive balance of payments.

In 2000, he predicted that before 2010, the euro zone would expand to cover 50 countries, while the dollar would spread throughout Latin America, and much of Asia would look towards the yen.[15] Such predictions have proved highly inaccurate.

Nobel Prize winner

Mundell won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1999 and gave as his prize lecture a speech titled “A Reconsideration of the Twentieth Century”. According to the Nobel Prize Committee, he got the honor for “his analysis of monetary and fiscal policy under different exchange rate regimes and his analysis of optimum currency areas”.

Mundell concluded in that lecture that “the international monetary system depends only on the power configuration of the countries that make it up”. He divided the entire twentieth century into three parts by different periods of time:

  • The first third of the century, from its beginning to the Great Depression of the 1930s, economics was dominated by the confrontation of the Federal Reserve System with the gold standard.
  • The second third of the century was from World War II to 1973, when the international monetary system was dominated by fixing the price of gold with the US dollar.
  • The last third of the century started with the destruction of the old monetary system due to the problem of inflation.

With the destruction of the old monetary system, a new international monetary system was finally founded. Controlling inflation by each country became a main topic during this era.

Television appearances

Mundell has appeared on CBS‘s Late Show with David Letterman. His first appearance was on October 17, 2002[16] where he gave The Top 10 List on “Ways My Life has Changed Since Winning the Nobel Prize.” In March 2004[17] he told “You might be a redneck” jokes followed in May 2004[18] with “Yo Mama” jokes. In September 2004[19] he appeared again, this time to read excerpts from Paris Hilton‘s memoir at random moments throughout the show. In November 2005[20] he told a series of Rodney Dangerfield‘s jokes. On February 7, 2006[21] he read Grammy Award nominated song lyrics, the night before CBS aired the 48th Grammy Awards.

Mundell also appeared on Bloomberg Television many times.

Mundell has also appeared on China Central Television‘s popular Lecture Room series. Professor Mundell was also a special guest making the ceremonial first move in Game Five of the 2010 World Chess Championship between Viswanathan Anand and Veselin Topalov.

Mundell started the Pearl Spring Chess Tournament, a double round robin tournament with six players. The first tournament in 2008 was won by the Bulgarian, Veselin Topalov. The next two: 2009–2010 was won by the Norwegian, Magnus Carlsen.

See also

References

  1. Jump up^ http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1999/mundell-bio.html
  2. ^ Jump up to:a b Nobel Prize Winners from Johns Hopkins University
  3. Jump up^ Essays in the theory of international capital movementspage 3. Retrieved September 12, 2016.
  4. Jump up^ RUDI DORNBUSCH by Stanley Fischer – Project Syndicate
  5. Jump up^ Warsh, David (November 1, 2009). “What The Woman Lived”. Economic Principals. Retrieved October 17, 2016.
  6. Jump up^ “Mr. Mundell, known as the father of the euro”[dead link]
  7. Jump up^ “Robert Mundell – Nobel Prize Winners – Key facts – About LSE – Home”. .lse.ac.uk. March 13, 2009. Retrieved January 1, 2012.
  8. Jump up^ [1]
  9. Jump up^ http://www.polyu.edu.hk/iao/nobel2009/mundell_bio.pdf
  10. ^ Jump up to:a b “Robert A. Mundell – Biography”. Nobelprize.org. Retrieved January 1, 2012.
  11. ^ Jump up to:a b “Biography | The Works of Robert Mundell”. Robertmundell.net. Retrieved January 1, 2012.
  12. Jump up^ A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas; The American Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 657–665, 1961
  13. Jump up^ Capital Mobility, and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates; Revue Canadienne d’Economique et de Science Politique, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 475–485, 1963
  14. Jump up^ “Mundell-Friedman debate” (PDF). Retrieved January 1, 2012.
  15. Jump up^ Mark Milner and Charlotte Denny (January 14, 2000). “The new endangered species | Business”. London: The Guardian. Retrieved January 1, 2012.
  16. Jump up^ show #1891 Archived August 15, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
  17. Jump up^ show #2144 Archived October 17, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
  18. Jump up^ show #2162 Archived May 16, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
  19. Jump up^ show # 2238 Archived February 23, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
  20. Jump up^ show #2466 Archived December 15, 2005, at the Wayback Machine.
  21. Jump up^ show #2505 Archived May 16, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.

External links

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Unemployment Breaking News: Economix Blog: For the Employment Rate, an Uptick

US Job Gains Again Surpass Outlook in June

US Adds 195K Jobs as Unemployment Rate Sticks

Jobs Report Looks Good as 195,000 More Get to Work

Employment Situation Summary Table A. Household data, seasonally adjusted

HOUSEHOLD DATA
Summary table A. Household data, seasonally adjusted

[Numbers in thousands]
Category June
2012
Apr.
2013
May
2013
June
2013
Change from:
May
2013-
June
2013
Employment status
Civilian noninstitutional population 243,155 245,175 245,363 245,552 189
Civilian labor force 155,149 155,238 155,658 155,835 177
Participation rate 63.8 63.3 63.4 63.5 0.1
Employed 142,448 143,579 143,898 144,058 160
Employment-population ratio 58.6 58.6 58.6 58.7 0.1
Unemployed 12,701 11,659 11,760 11,777 17
Unemployment rate 8.2 7.5 7.6 7.6 0.0
Not in labor force 88,006 89,936 89,705 89,717 12
Unemployment rates
Total, 16 years and over 8.2 7.5 7.6 7.6 0.0
Adult men (20 years and over) 7.7 7.1 7.2 7.0 -0.2
Adult women (20 years and over) 7.4 6.7 6.5 6.8 0.3
Teenagers (16 to 19 years) 23.7 24.1 24.5 24.0 -0.5
White 7.3 6.7 6.7 6.6 -0.1
Black or African American 14.4 13.2 13.5 13.7 0.2
Asian (not seasonally adjusted) 6.3 5.1 4.3 5.0
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity 11.0 9.0 9.1 9.1 0.0
Total, 25 years and over 6.9 6.1 6.1 6.2 0.1
Less than a high school diploma 12.5 11.6 11.1 10.7 -0.4
High school graduates, no college 8.5 7.4 7.4 7.6 0.2
Some college or associate degree 7.3 6.4 6.5 6.4 -0.1
Bachelor’s degree and higher 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.9 0.1
Reason for unemployment
Job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs 7,121 6,410 6,147 6,119 -28
Job leavers 936 864 944 1,030 86
Reentrants 3,243 3,151 3,333 3,291 -42
New entrants 1,316 1,280 1,268 1,259 -9
Duration of unemployment
Less than 5 weeks 2,825 2,474 2,706 2,692 -14
5 to 14 weeks 2,826 2,848 2,669 2,864 195
15 to 26 weeks 1,813 1,967 1,950 1,896 -54
27 weeks and over 5,336 4,353 4,357 4,328 -29
Employed persons at work part time
Part time for economic reasons 8,210 7,916 7,904 8,226 322
Slack work or business conditions 5,471 5,129 4,841 5,193 352
Could only find part-time work 2,514 2,527 2,721 2,652 -69
Part time for noneconomic reasons 18,825 18,908 18,934 19,044 110
Persons not in the labor force (not seasonally adjusted)
Marginally attached to the labor force 2,483 2,347 2,164 2,582
Discouraged workers 821 835 780 1,027
– Over-the-month changes are not displayed for not seasonally adjusted data.
NOTE: Persons whose ethnicity is identified as Hispanic or Latino may be of any race. Detail for the seasonally adjusted data shown in this table will not necessarily add to totals because of the independent seasonal adjustment of the various series. Updated population
 

Employment Situation Summary Table B. Establishment data, seasonally adjusted

ESTABLISHMENT DATA Summary table B. Establishment data, seasonally adjusted
Category June 2012 Apr. 2013 May 2013(p) June 2013(p)
EMPLOYMENT BY SELECTED INDUSTRY (Over-the-month change, in thousands)
Total nonfarm 87 199 195 195
Total private 78 188 207 202
Goods-producing 14 -17 0 8
Mining and logging -2 -3 0 1
Construction 7 -7 7 13
Manufacturing 9 -7 -7 -6
Durable goods(1) 9 -1 0 -3
Motor vehicles and parts 5.8 -0.4 4.8 5.1
Nondurable goods 0 -6 -7 -3
Private service-providing(1) 64 205 207 194
Wholesale trade 8.9 3.8 8.3 11.3
Retail trade -3.1 22.4 26.9 37.1
Transportation and warehousing -2.5 6.5 -6.8 -5.1
Information -6 -9 1 -5
Financial activities 6 14 6 17
Professional and business services(1) 35 69 65 53
Temporary help services 20.5 20.8 23.6 9.5
Education and health services(1) 6 36 23 13
Health care and social assistance 11.7 37.8 12.7 23.5
Leisure and hospitality 14 60 69 75
Other services 5 1 13 -4
Government 9 11 -12 -7
WOMEN AND PRODUCTION AND NONSUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES(2) AS A PERCENT OF ALL EMPLOYEES
Total nonfarm women employees 49.4 49.4 49.4 49.4
Total private women employees 47.9 47.9 47.9 47.9
Total private production and nonsupervisory employees 82.6 82.6 82.6 82.6
HOURS AND EARNINGS ALL EMPLOYEES
Total private
Average weekly hours 34.4 34.5 34.5 34.5
Average hourly earnings $23.50 $23.89 $23.91 $24.01
Average weekly earnings $808.40 $824.21 $824.90 $828.35
Index of aggregate weekly hours (2007=100)(3) 96.2 98.2 98.4 98.6
Over-the-month percent change 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.2
Index of aggregate weekly payrolls (2007=100)(4) 107.9 111.9 112.2 112.9
Over-the-month percent change 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.6
HOURS AND EARNINGS PRODUCTION AND NONSUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES
Total private
Average weekly hours 33.7 33.7 33.7 33.7
Average hourly earnings $19.75 $20.07 $20.09 $20.14
Average weekly earnings $665.58 $676.36 $677.03 $678.72
Index of aggregate weekly hours (2002=100)(3) 103.8 105.5 105.7 105.9
Over-the-month percent change 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.2
Index of aggregate weekly payrolls (2002=100)(4) 136.9 141.5 141.9 142.5
Over-the-month percent change 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4
DIFFUSION INDEX(5) (Over 1-month span)
Total private (266 industries) 57.3 57.7 61.8 58.8
Manufacturing (81 industries) 50.6 44.4 48.1 46.3
Footnotes (1) Includes other industries, not shown separately. (2) Data relate to production employees in mining and logging and manufacturing, construction employees in construction, and nonsupervisory employees in the service-providing industries. (3) The indexes of aggregate weekly hours are calculated by dividing the current month’s estimates of aggregate hours by the corresponding annual average aggregate hours. (4) The indexes of aggregate weekly payrolls are calculated by dividing the current month’s estimates of aggregate weekly payrolls by the corresponding annual average aggregate weekly payrolls. (5) Figures are the percent of industries with employment increasing plus one-half of the industries with unchanged employment, where 50 percent indicates an equal balance between industries with increasing and decreasing employment. (p) Preliminary

Data extracted on: July 5, 2013 (5:45:01 PM)

Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey

Employment Level

144,058,000

Series Id: LNS12000000 Seasonally Adjusted

Series title: (Seas) Employment Level

Labor force status: Employed

Type of data: Number in thousands

Age: 16 years and over

employment_level

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 136559(1) 136598 136701 137270 136630 136940 136531 136662 136893 137088 137322 137614
2001 137778 137612 137783 137299 137092 136873 137071 136241 136846 136392 136238 136047
2002 135701 136438 136177 136126 136539 136415 136413 136705 137302 137008 136521 136426
2003 137417(1) 137482 137434 137633 137544 137790 137474 137549 137609 137984 138424 138411
2004 138472(1) 138542 138453 138680 138852 139174 139556 139573 139487 139732 140231 140125
2005 140245(1) 140385 140654 141254 141609 141714 142026 142434 142401 142548 142499 142752
2006 143150(1) 143457 143741 143761 144089 144353 144202 144625 144815 145314 145534 145970
2007 146028(1) 146057 146320 145586 145903 146063 145905 145682 146244 145946 146595 146273
2008 146378(1) 146156 146086 146132 145908 145737 145532 145203 145076 144802 144100 143369
2009 142153(1) 141644 140721 140652 140250 140005 139898 139481 138810 138421 138665 138025
2010 138439(1) 138624 138767 139296 139255 139148 139167 139405 139388 139097 139046 139295
2011 139253(1) 139471 139643 139606 139681 139405 139509 139870 140164 140314 140771 140896
2012 141608(1) 142019 142020 141934 142302 142448 142250 142164 142974 143328 143277 143305
2013 143322(1) 143492 143286 143579 143898 144058
1 : Data affected by changes in population controls.

Civilian Labor Force Level

155,835,000

Series Id: LNS11000000 Seasonally Adjusted

Series title: (Seas) Civilian Labor Force Level

Labor force status: Civilian labor force

Type of data: Number in thousands

Age: 16 years and over

civilian_labor_force

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 142267(1) 142456 142434 142751 142388 142591 142278 142514 142518 142622 142962 143248
2001 143800 143701 143924 143569 143318 143357 143654 143284 143989 144086 144240 144305
2002 143883 144653 144481 144725 144938 144808 144803 145009 145552 145314 145041 145066
2003 145937(1) 146100 146022 146474 146500 147056 146485 146445 146530 146716 147000 146729
2004 146842(1) 146709 146944 146850 147065 147460 147692 147564 147415 147793 148162 148059
2005 148029(1) 148364 148391 148926 149261 149238 149432 149779 149954 150001 150065 150030
2006 150214(1) 150641 150813 150881 151069 151354 151377 151716 151662 152041 152406 152732
2007 153144(1) 152983 153051 152435 152670 153041 153054 152749 153414 153183 153835 153918
2008 154063(1) 153653 153908 153769 154303 154313 154469 154641 154570 154876 154639 154655
2009 154232(1) 154526 154142 154479 154742 154710 154505 154300 153815 153804 153887 153120
2010 153455(1) 153702 153960 154577 154110 153623 153709 154078 153966 153681 154140 153649
2011 153244(1) 153269 153358 153478 153552 153369 153325 153707 154074 154010 154096 153945
2012 154356(1) 154825 154707 154451 154998 155149 154995 154647 155056 155576 155319 155511
2013 155654(1) 155524 155028 155238 155658 155835
1 : Data affected by changes in population controls.

Labor Force Participation Rate

63.5%

Series Id: LNS11300000 Seasonally Adjusted

Series title: (Seas) Labor Force Participation Rate

Labor force status: Civilian labor force participation rate

Type of data: Percent or rate

Age: 16 years and over

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 67.3 67.3 67.3 67.3 67.1 67.1 66.9 66.9 66.9 66.8 66.9 67.0
2001 67.2 67.1 67.2 66.9 66.7 66.7 66.8 66.5 66.8 66.7 66.7 66.7
2002 66.5 66.8 66.6 66.7 66.7 66.6 66.5 66.6 66.7 66.6 66.4 66.3
2003 66.4 66.4 66.3 66.4 66.4 66.5 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 65.9
2004 66.1 66.0 66.0 65.9 66.0 66.1 66.1 66.0 65.8 65.9 66.0 65.9
2005 65.8 65.9 65.9 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.0 66.0
2006 66.0 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.2 66.3 66.4
2007 66.4 66.3 66.2 65.9 66.0 66.0 66.0 65.8 66.0 65.8 66.0 66.0
2008 66.2 66.0 66.1 65.9 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.0 66.0 65.9 65.8
2009 65.7 65.8 65.6 65.7 65.7 65.7 65.5 65.4 65.1 65.0 65.0 64.6
2010 64.8 64.9 64.9 65.1 64.9 64.6 64.6 64.7 64.6 64.4 64.6 64.3
2011 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.0 64.0 64.1 64.2 64.1 64.1 64.0
2012 63.7 63.9 63.8 63.6 63.8 63.8 63.7 63.5 63.6 63.8 63.6 63.6
2013 63.6 63.5 63.3 63.3 63.4 63.5

labor_force_participation_rate

Unemployment Level

11,777,000

Series Id: LNS13000000 Seasonally Adjusted

Series title: (Seas) Unemployment Level

Labor force status: Unemployed

Type of data: Number in thousands

Age: 16 years and over

 unemployment_level

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 5708 5858 5733 5481 5758 5651 5747 5853 5625 5534 5639 5634
2001 6023 6089 6141 6271 6226 6484 6583 7042 7142 7694 8003 8258
2002 8182 8215 8304 8599 8399 8393 8390 8304 8251 8307 8520 8640
2003 8520 8618 8588 8842 8957 9266 9011 8896 8921 8732 8576 8317
2004 8370 8167 8491 8170 8212 8286 8136 7990 7927 8061 7932 7934
2005 7784 7980 7737 7672 7651 7524 7406 7345 7553 7453 7566 7279
2006 7064 7184 7072 7120 6980 7001 7175 7091 6847 6727 6872 6762
2007 7116 6927 6731 6850 6766 6979 7149 7067 7170 7237 7240 7645
2008 7685 7497 7822 7637 8395 8575 8937 9438 9494 10074 10538 11286
2009 12079 12881 13421 13826 14492 14705 14607 14819 15005 15382 15223 15095
2010 15016 15078 15192 15281 14856 14475 14542 14673 14577 14584 15094 14354
2011 13992 13798 13716 13872 13871 13964 13817 13837 13910 13696 13325 13049
2012 12748 12806 12686 12518 12695 12701 12745 12483 12082 12248 12042 12206
2013 12332 12032 11742 11659 11760

11777

Unemployment Rate U-3

7.6%

Series Id: LNS14000000 Seasonally Adjusted

Series title: (Seas) Unemployment Rate

Labor force status: Unemployment rate

Type of data: Percent or rate

Age: 16 years and over

unemployment_rate

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
2001 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.7
2002 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.9 6.0
2003 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.7
2004 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.4
2005 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9
2006 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4
2007 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 5.0
2008 5.0 4.9 5.1 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.1 6.5 6.8 7.3
2009 7.8 8.3 8.7 9.0 9.4 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.8 10.0 9.9 9.9
2010 9.8 9.8 9.9 9.9 9.6 9.4 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.8 9.3
2011 9.1 9.0 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.0 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.6 8.5
2012 8.3 8.3 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.1 7.8 7.9 7.8 7.8
2013 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.6 7.6

16-19 Years (Teenage) Unemployment Rate

24.0%

Series Id: LNS14000012 Seasonally Adjusted

Series title: (Seas) Unemployment Rate – 16-19 yrs.

Labor force status: Unemployment rate

Type of data: Percent or rate

Age: 16 to 19 years

teenage_unemployment_rate

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 12.7 13.8 13.3 12.6 12.8 12.3 13.4 14.0 13.0 12.8 13.0 13.2
2001 13.8 13.7 13.8 13.9 13.4 14.2 14.4 15.6 15.2 16.0 15.9 17.0
2002 16.5 16.0 16.6 16.7 16.6 16.7 16.8 17.0 16.3 15.1 17.1 16.9
2003 17.2 17.2 17.8 17.7 17.9 19.0 18.2 16.6 17.6 17.2 15.7 16.2
2004 17.0 16.5 16.8 16.6 17.1 17.0 17.8 16.7 16.6 17.4 16.4 17.6
2005 16.2 17.5 17.1 17.8 17.8 16.3 16.1 16.1 15.5 16.1 17.0 14.9
2006 15.1 15.3 16.1 14.6 14.0 15.8 15.9 16.0 16.3 15.2 14.8 14.6
2007 14.8 14.9 14.9 15.9 15.9 16.3 15.3 15.9 15.9 15.4 16.2 16.8
2008 17.8 16.6 16.1 15.9 19.0 19.2 20.7 18.6 19.1 20.0 20.3 20.5
2009 20.7 22.2 22.2 22.2 23.4 24.7 24.3 25.0 25.9 27.1 26.9 26.6
2010 26.0 25.4 26.2 25.5 26.6 26.0 26.0 25.7 25.8 27.2 24.6 25.1
2011 25.5 24.0 24.4 24.7 24.0 24.7 24.9 25.2 24.4 24.1 23.9 22.9
2012 23.4 23.7 25.0 24.9 24.4 23.7 23.9 24.5 23.7 23.7 23.6 23.5
2013 23.4 25.1 24.2 24.1 24.5 24.0

Series Id:           LNS14000006
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Unemployment Rate – Black or African American
Labor force status:  Unemployment rate
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 years and over
Race:                Black or African American

Black or African American Unemployment Rate

13.7 % 

 black_unemployment_rate

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 8.2 8.1 7.4 7.0 7.7 7.8 7.7 7.9 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.4
2001 8.2 7.7 8.3 8.0 7.9 8.3 8.0 9.1 8.9 9.5 9.8 10.1
2002 10.0 9.9 10.5 10.7 10.2 10.5 9.8 9.8 9.7 9.8 10.7 11.3
2003 10.5 10.7 10.3 10.9 10.9 11.5 10.9 10.9 11.1 11.4 10.2 10.1
2004 10.4 9.7 10.3 9.8 10.1 10.2 11.0 10.5 10.3 10.8 10.7 10.7
2005 10.6 10.9 10.5 10.3 10.1 10.2 9.2 9.7 9.4 9.1 10.6 9.2
2006 8.9 9.5 9.5 9.4 8.7 8.9 9.5 8.8 9.0 8.4 8.5 8.3
2007 7.9 8.0 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.5 8.1 7.6 8.0 8.5 8.5 9.0
2008 9.1 8.4 9.2 8.6 9.6 9.4 10.0 10.6 11.3 11.4 11.5 12.1
2009 12.7 13.7 13.6 15.0 15.0 14.9 14.8 14.9 15.3 15.9 15.7 16.1
2010 16.5 16.1 16.8 16.5 15.5 15.3 15.6 16.0 15.9 15.8 16.0 15.6
2011 15.8 15.5 15.7 16.3 16.3 16.2 15.8 16.5 15.8 14.9 15.5 15.6
2012 13.6 14.1 14.0 13.1 13.6 14.4 14.1 14.0 13.4 14.5 13.2 14.0
2013 13.8 13.8 13.3 13.2 13.5 13.7

Average Weeks Unemployed

35.6 Weeks

Series Id:  LNS13008275

Seasonally Adjusted Series title: (Seas) Average Weeks Unemployed

Labor force status: Unemployed

Type of data: Number of weeks

Age: 16 years and over

Average Weeks Unemployed

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 13.1 12.6 12.7 12.4 12.6 12.3 13.4 12.9 12.2 12.7 12.4 12.5
2001 12.7 12.8 12.8 12.4 12.1 12.7 12.9 13.3 13.2 13.3 14.3 14.5
2002 14.7 15.0 15.4 16.3 16.8 16.9 16.9 16.5 17.6 17.8 17.6 18.5
2003 18.5 18.5 18.1 19.4 19.0 19.9 19.7 19.2 19.5 19.3 19.9 19.8
2004 19.9 20.1 19.8 19.6 19.8 20.5 18.8 18.8 19.4 19.5 19.7 19.4
2005 19.5 19.1 19.5 19.6 18.6 17.9 17.6 18.4 17.9 17.9 17.5 17.5
2006 16.9 17.8 17.1 16.7 17.1 16.6 17.1 17.1 17.1 16.3 16.2 16.1
2007 16.3 16.7 17.8 16.9 16.6 16.5 17.2 17.0 16.3 17.0 17.3 16.6
2008 17.5 16.9 16.5 16.9 16.6 17.1 17.0 17.7 18.6 19.9 18.9 19.9
2009 19.8 20.1 20.9 21.6 22.4 23.9 25.1 25.3 26.7 27.4 29.0 29.7
2010 30.4 29.8 31.6 33.2 33.9 34.4 33.8 33.6 33.4 34.0 34.1 34.8
2011 37.3 37.4 39.2 38.6 39.5 39.6 40.4 40.3 40.4 38.9 40.7 40.7
2012 40.2 39.9 39.5 39.1 39.6 39.7 38.8 39.3 39.6 39.9 39.7 38.1
2013 35.3 36.9 37.1 36.5 36.9 35.6

Unemployment Level New Entrants

1,259,000

Series Id: LNS13023569 Seasonally Adjusted

Series title: (Seas) Unemployment Level – New Entrants

Labor force status: Unemployed

Type of data: Number in thousands

Age: 16 years and over

Unemployed entrant status: New entrants

New_Entrants_Unemployment_Level

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 394 420 429 406 466 427 433 499 415 402 419 490
2001 444 396 378 457 468 467 448 485 473 481 495 515
2002 484 507 538 527 497 549 545 612 536 479 591 535
2003 599 584 630 635 630 661 669 652 686 636 593 693
2004 676 666 631 652 718 649 702 704 695 734 700 702
2005 621 753 712 764 710 650 630 626 607 638 673 633
2006 616 711 636 591 517 646 639 646 612 572 591 586
2007 622 599 615 620 530 640 602 588 668 696 678 679
2008 677 656 704 625 797 786 835 821 815 819 763 803
2009 779 999 874 901 965 1002 1004 1085 1150 1100 1326 1240
2010 1199 1192 1155 1188 1201 1170 1207 1279 1211 1277 1272 1308
2011 1352 1289 1308 1301 1220 1231 1278 1260 1370 1289 1271 1286
2012 1258 1382 1421 1362 1347 1316 1299 1268 1253 1302 1326 1291
2013 1287 1279 1316 1280 1268 1259

Not in Labor Force, Search For Work and Available

2,582,000

Series Id: LNU05026642 Not Seasonally Adjusted

Series title: (Unadj) Not in Labor Force, Searched For Work and Available

Labor force status: Not in labor force

Type of data: Number in thousands

Age: 16 years and over

Job desires/not in labor force: Want a job now

Reasons not in labor force: Available to work now

Not_in_Labor_Force_Searched_for_work

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 1207 1281 1219 1216 1113 1142 1172 1097 1166 1044 1100 1125 1157
2001 1295 1337 1109 1131 1157 1170 1232 1364 1335 1398 1331 1330 1266
2002 1532 1423 1358 1397 1467 1380 1507 1456 1501 1416 1401 1432 1439
2003 1598 1590 1577 1399 1428 1468 1566 1665 1544 1586 1473 1483 1531
2004 1670 1691 1643 1526 1533 1492 1557 1587 1561 1647 1517 1463 1574
2005 1804 1673 1588 1511 1428 1583 1516 1583 1438 1414 1415 1589 1545
2006 1644 1471 1468 1310 1388 1584 1522 1592 1299 1478 1366 1252 1448
2007 1577 1451 1385 1391 1406 1454 1376 1365 1268 1364 1363 1344 1395
2008 1729 1585 1352 1414 1416 1558 1573 1640 1604 1637 1947 1908 1614
2009 2130 2051 2106 2089 2210 2176 2282 2270 2219 2373 2323 2486 2226
2010 2539 2527 2255 2432 2223 2591 2622 2370 2548 2602 2531 2609 2487
2011 2800 2730 2434 2466 2206 2680 2785 2575 2511 2555 2591 2540 2573
2012 2809 2608 2352 2363 2423 2483 2529 2561 2517 2433 2505 2614 2516
2013 2443 2588 2326 2347 2164 2582

Not in Labor Force, Searched for Work and Available,

Discouraged Reasons For Not Currently Looking

1,027,000

Series Id: LNU05026645 Not Seasonally Adjusted

Series title: (Unadj) Not in Labor Force, Searched For Work and Available, Discouraged Reasons For Not Currently Looking

Labor force status: Not in labor force

Type of data: Number in thousands

Age: 16 years and over

Job desires/not in labor force: Want a job now

Reasons not in labor force: Discouragement over job prospects (Persons who believe no job is available.)

Not_in_Labor_Force_Discouraged_Worker

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 236 267 258 331 280 309 266 203 253 232 236 269 262
2001 301 287 349 349 328 294 310 337 285 331 328 348 321
2002 328 375 330 320 414 342 405 378 392 359 385 403 369
2003 449 450 474 437 482 478 470 503 388 462 457 433 457
2004 432 484 514 492 476 478 504 534 412 429 392 442 466
2005 515 485 480 393 392 476 499 384 362 392 404 451 436
2006 396 386 451 381 323 481 428 448 325 331 349 274 381
2007 442 375 381 399 368 401 367 392 276 320 349 363 369
2008 467 396 401 412 400 420 461 381 467 484 608 642 462
2009 734 731 685 740 792 793 796 758 706 808 861 929 778
2010 1065 1204 994 1197 1083 1207 1185 1110 1209 1219 1282 1318 1173
2011 993 1020 921 989 822 982 1119 977 1037 967 1096 945 989
2012 1059 1006 865 968 830 821 852 844 802 813 979 1068 909
2013 804 885 803 835 780 1027

Total Unemployment Rate U-6

14.3%

Series Id: LNS13327709 Seasonally Adjusted

Series title: (seas) Total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of all civilian labor force plus all marginally attached workers

Labor force status: Aggregated totals unemployed

Type of data: Percent or rate

Age: 16 years and over

Percent/rates: Unemployed and mrg attached and pt for econ reas as percent of labor force plus marg attached

U_6_Unemployment_Rate

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 7.1 7.2 7.1 6.9 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.0 6.8 7.1 6.9
2001 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.9 7.8 8.1 8.7 9.3 9.4 9.6
2002 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.7 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.7 9.8
2003 10.0 10.2 10.0 10.2 10.1 10.3 10.3 10.1 10.4 10.2 10.0 9.8
2004 9.9 9.7 10.0 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.7 9.4 9.2
2005 9.3 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.8 8.9 9.0 8.7 8.7 8.6
2006 8.4 8.4 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.0 8.2 8.1 7.9
2007 8.4 8.2 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.8
2008 9.2 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.7 10.1 10.5 10.8 11.0 11.8 12.6 13.6
2009 14.2 15.1 15.7 15.9 16.4 16.5 16.5 16.7 16.7 17.1 17.1 17.1
2010 16.7 17.0 17.0 17.1 16.6 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.8 16.7 16.9 16.6
2011 16.2 16.0 15.8 16.0 15.8 16.1 16.0 16.1 16.3 16.0 15.5 15.2
2012 15.1 15.0 14.5 14.5 14.8 14.8 14.9 14.7 14.7 14.5 14.4 14.4
2013 14.4 14.3 13.8 13.9 13.8 14.3

Background Articles and Videos

Employment Situation Summary

Transmission of material in this release is embargoed            USDL-13-1284
until 8:30 a.m. (EDT) Friday, July 5, 2013

Technical information:
 Household data:       (202) 691-6378  *  cpsinfo@bls.gov  *  www.bls.gov/cps
 Establishment data:   (202) 691-6555  *  cesinfo@bls.gov  *  www.bls.gov/ces

Media contact:         (202) 691-5902  *  PressOffice@bls.gov

                      THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION -- JUNE 2013

Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 195,000 in June, and the
unemployment rate was unchanged at 7.6 percent, the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics reported today. Employment rose in leisure and
hospitality, professional and business services, retail trade, health
care, and financial activities.

Household Survey Data

The number of unemployed persons, at 11.8 million, and the unemployment 
rate, at 7.6 percent, were unchanged in June. Both measures have shown 
little change since February. (See table A-1.)

Among the major worker groups, the unemployment rate for adult women
(6.8 percent) edged up in June, while the rates for adult men (7.0
percent), teenagers (24.0 percent), whites (6.6 percent), blacks (13.7
percent), and Hispanics (9.1 percent) showed little or no change. The
jobless rate for Asians was 5.0 percent (not seasonally adjusted), down 
from 6.3 percent a year earlier. (See tables A-1, A-2, and A-3.)

In June, the number of long-term unemployed (those jobless for 27 weeks 
or more) was essentially unchanged at 4.3 million. These individuals 
accounted for 36.7 percent of the unemployed. Over the past 12 months, 
the number of long-term unemployed has declined by 1.0 million. (See 
table A-12.)

The civilian labor force participation rate, at 63.5 percent, and the
employment-population ratio, at 58.7 percent, changed little in June.
Over the year, the labor force participation rate is down by 0.3
percentage point. (See table A-1.)

The number of persons employed part time for economic reasons (sometimes 
referred to as involuntary part-time workers) increased by 322,000 to 8.2 
million in June. These individuals were working part time because their 
hours had been cut back or because they were unable to find a full-time 
job. (See table A-8.)

In June, 2.6 million persons were marginally attached to the labor force, 
essentially unchanged from a year earlier. (The data are not seasonally 
adjusted.) These individuals were not in the labor force, wanted and 
were available for work, and had looked for a job sometime in the prior 
12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had not 
searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey. (See table A-16.)

Among the marginally attached, there were 1.0 million discouraged
workers in June, an increase of 206,000 from a year earlier. (The data
are not seasonally adjusted.) Discouraged workers are persons not
currently looking for work because they believe no jobs are available
for them. The remaining 1.6 million persons marginally attached to the
labor force in June had not searched for work for reasons such as
school attendance or family responsibilities. (See table A-16.)

Establishment Survey Data

Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 195,000 in June, in line
with the average monthly gain of 182,000 over the prior 12 months. In
June, job growth occurred in leisure and hospitality, professional and
business services, retail trade, health care, and financial activities. 
(See table B-1.)

Leisure and hospitality added 75,000 jobs in June. Monthly job growth
in this industry has averaged 55,000 thus far in 2013, almost twice
the average gain of 30,000 per month in 2012. Within leisure and
hospitality, employment in food services and drinking places continued
to expand, increasing by 52,000 in June. Employment in the amusements,
gambling, and recreation industry also continued to trend up in June
(+19,000).

Employment in professional and business services rose by 53,000 in
June. Job gains occurred in management and technical consulting
services (+8,000) and in computer systems design and related services
(+7,000). Employment continued to trend up in temporary help services
(+10,000). Over the past year, professional and business services has
added 624,000 jobs.

Retail trade employment increased by 37,000 in June. Within retail
trade, employment increased by 9,000 in building material and garden
supply stores and by 8,000 in motor vehicle and parts dealers.
Employment in wholesale trade continued to trend up (+11,000).

Health care continued to add jobs in June, with a gain of 20,000.
Within the industry, employment continued to trend up in ambulatory
health care services (+13,000). A gain of 5,000 jobs in hospitals
followed a loss of 8,000 jobs in May.

Employment in financial activities rose by 17,000 in June, with most
of the increase occurring in credit intermediation (+6,000) and in
insurance carriers and related activities (+6,000).

Federal government employment continued to trend down in June (-5,000)
and has declined by 65,000 over the past 12 months.

Employment in most other major industries, including mining and
logging, construction, manufacturing, and transportation and
warehousing, showed little change in June.

The average workweek for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls was
unchanged in June at 34.5 hours. In manufacturing, the workweek
increased by 0.1 hour to 40.9 hours, and overtime was unchanged at 3.3
hours. The average workweek for production and nonsupervisory
employees on private nonfarm payrolls was unchanged at 33.7 hours.
(See tables B-2 and B-7.)

In June, average hourly earnings for all employees on private nonfarm
payrolls rose by 10 cents to $24.01. Over the year, average hourly
earnings have risen by 51 cents, or 2.2 percent. In June, average
hourly earnings of private-sector production and nonsupervisory
employees increased by 5 cents to $20.14. (See tables B-3 and B-8.)

The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for April was revised
from +149,000 to +199,000, and the change for May was revised from
+175,000 to +195,000. With these revisions, employment gains in April
and May combined were 70,000 higher than previously reported.

____________
The Employment Situation for July is scheduled to be released on
Friday, August 2, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. (EDT).
http://bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm
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The U.S. Economy Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Grew Only 1.8% (Third Estimate) Not 2.4% (Second Estimate) in First Quarter of 2013 — Videos

Posted on June 28, 2013. Filed under: American History, Blogroll, College, Communications, Constitution, Economics, Education, Employment, Federal Government, Federal Government Budget, Fiscal Policy, government spending, history, Law, liberty, Life, Links, media, People, Philosophy, Politics, Raves, Resources, Security, Video, Wealth, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , |

gdp_large

GDP

saupload_Real-GDP-per-capita-since-1960_thumb1

saupload_Real-GDP-per-capita-since-1960-log

saupload_Real-GDP-per-capita-percent-off-high

http://seekingalpha.com/article/1379861-real-gdp-per-capita-another-perspective-on-the-economy

Line 2011 2012 2013
I II III IV I II III IV I
1 Gross domestic product 0.1 2.5 1.3 4.1 2.0 1.3 3.1 0.4 1.8
2 Personal consumption expenditures 3.1 1.0 1.7 2.0 2.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.6
3 Goods 5.4 -1.0 1.4 5.4 4.7 0.3 3.6 4.3 4.4
4 Durable goods 7.3 -2.3 5.4 13.9 11.5 -0.2 8.9 13.6 7.6
5 Nondurable goods 4.6 -0.3 -0.4 1.8 1.6 0.6 1.2 0.1 2.8
6 Services 2.0 1.9 1.8 0.3 1.3 2.1 0.6 0.6 1.7
7 Gross private domestic investment -5.3 12.5 5.9 33.9 6.1 0.7 6.6 1.3 7.4
8 Fixed investment -1.3 12.4 15.5 10.0 9.8 4.5 0.9 14.0 3.0
9 Nonresidential -1.3 14.5 19.0 9.5 7.5 3.6 -1.8 13.2 0.4
10 Structures -28.2 35.2 20.7 11.5 12.9 0.6 0.0 16.7 -8.3
11 Equipment and software 11.1 7.8 18.3 8.8 5.4 4.8 -2.6 11.8 4.1
12 Residential -1.4 4.1 1.4 12.1 20.5 8.5 13.5 17.6 14.0
13 Change in private inventories
14 Net exports of goods and services
15 Exports 5.7 4.1 6.1 1.4 4.4 5.3 1.9 -2.8 -1.1
16 Goods 5.7 3.7 6.2 6.0 4.0 7.0 1.1 -5.0 -2.5
17 Services 5.8 5.1 6.1 -8.8 5.2 1.1 4.0 2.5 2.4
18 Imports 4.3 0.1 4.7 4.9 3.1 2.8 -0.6 -4.2 -0.4
19 Goods 5.2 -0.7 2.9 6.3 2.0 2.9 -1.2 -3.9 -1.3
20 Services -0.6 4.2 13.8 -1.7 9.0 2.3 2.6 -5.6 4.5
21 Government consumption expenditures and gross investment -7.0 -0.8 -2.9 -2.2 -3.0 -0.7 3.9 -7.0 -4.8
22 Federal -10.3 2.8 -4.3 -4.4 -4.2 -0.2 9.5 -14.8 -8.7
23 National defense -14.3 8.3 2.6 -10.6 -7.1 -0.2 12.9 -22.1 -12.0
24 Nondefense -1.7 -7.5 -17.4 10.2 1.8 -0.4 3.0 1.7 -2.1
25 State and local -4.7 -3.2 -2.0 -0.7 -2.2 -1.0 0.3 -1.5 -2.1
Addendum:
26 Gross domestic product, current dollars 2.2 5.2 4.3 4.2 4.2 2.8 5.9 1.3 3.1

US first-quarter growth was 1.8%, not 2.4% – economy

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Background Articles and Videos

GDP Propaganda Exposed

EMBARGOED UNTIL RELEASE AT 8:30 A.M. EDT, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2013
BEA 13-30

* See the navigation bar at the right side of the news release text for links to data tables,
contact personnel and their telephone numbers, and supplementary materials.

Lisa Mataloni: (202) 606-5304 (GDP) gdpniwd@bea.gov
Kate Shoemaker: (202) 606-5564 (Profits) cpniwd@bea.gov
Recorded message: (202) 606-5306
Jeannine Aversa: (202) 606-2649 (News Media)
National Income and Product Accounts
Gross Domestic Product, 1st quarter 2013 (third estimate);
Corporate Profits, 1st quarter 2013 (revised estimate)
      Real gross domestic product -- the output of goods and services produced by labor and property
located in the United States -- increased at an annual rate of 1.8 percent in the first quarter of 2013 (that
is, from the fourth quarter to the first quarter), according to the "third" estimate released by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis.  In the fourth quarter, real GDP increased 0.4 percent.

      The GDP estimate released today is based on more complete source data than were available for
the "second" estimate issued last month.  In the second estimate, real GDP increased 2.4 percent.  With
the third estimate for the first quarter, the increase in personal consumption expenditures (PCE) was less
than previously estimated, and exports and imports are now estimated to have declined (for more
information, see "Revisions" on page 3).

      The increase in real GDP in the first quarter primarily reflected positive contributions from PCE,
private inventory investment, and residential fixed investment that were partly offset by negative
contributions from federal government spending, state and local government spending, and exports.
Imports, which are a subtraction in the calculation of GDP, decreased.

BOX._____________

     Comprehensive Revision of the National Income and Product Accounts

     BEA will release the results of the 14th comprehensive (or benchmark) revision of the national
income and product accounts (NIPAs) in conjunction with the second quarter 2013 "advance" estimate
on July 31, 2013.  More information on the revision is available on BEA’s Web site at
www.bea.gov/gdp-revisions.  An article in the March 2013 issue of the Survey of Current Business
discusses the upcoming changes in definitions and presentations, and an article in the May Survey
describes the changes in statistical methods.  Revised NIPA table stubs and news release stubs are also
available on the Web site.  An article in the September Survey will describe the estimates in detail.
________________

FOOTNOTE._______
Quarterly estimates are expressed at seasonally adjusted annual rates, unless otherwise specified.
Quarter-to-quarter dollar changes are differences between these published estimates.  Percent changes are
calculated from unrounded data and are annualized.  "Real" estimates are in chained (2005) dollars.
Price indexes are chain-type measures.

      This news release is available on BEA’s Web site along with the Technical Note
 and Highlights related to this release.  For information on revisions, see "Revisions to GDP, GDI, and Their Major Components".
_________________

      The acceleration in real GDP in the first quarter primarily reflected an upturn in private
inventory investment, an acceleration in PCE, and smaller decreases in federal government spending and
in exports that were partly offset by a deceleration in nonresidential fixed investment and a smaller
decrease in imports.

      Motor vehicle output added 0.33 percentage point to the first-quarter change in real GDP after
adding 0.18 percentage point to the fourth-quarter change.  Final sales of computers added 0.09
percentage point to the first-quarter change in real GDP after adding 0.10 percentage point to the fourth-
quarter change.

      The price index for gross domestic purchases, which measures prices paid by U.S. residents,
increased 1.2 percent in the first quarter, unrevised from the second estimate; this index increased 1.6
percent in the fourth quarter.  Excluding food and energy prices, the price index for gross domestic
purchases increased 1.5 percent in the first quarter, compared with an increase of 1.2 percent in the
fourth.

      Real personal consumption expenditures increased 2.6 percent in the first quarter, compared with
an increase of 1.8 percent in the fourth.  Durable goods increased 7.6 percent, compared with an increase
of 13.6 percent.  Nondurable goods increased 2.8 percent, compared with an increase of 0.1 percent.
Services increased 1.7 percent, compared with an increase of 0.6 percent.

      Real nonresidential fixed investment increased 0.4 percent in the first quarter, compared with an
increase of 13.2 percent in the fourth.  Nonresidential structures decreased 8.3 percent, in contrast to an
increase of 16.7 percent.  Equipment and software increased 4.1 percent, compared with an increase of
11.8 percent.  Real residential fixed investment increased 14.0 percent, compared with an increase of
17.6 percent.

      Real exports of goods and services decreased 1.1 percent in the first quarter, compared with a
decrease of 2.8 percent in the fourth.  Real imports of goods and services decreased 0.4 percent,
compared with a decrease of 4.2 percent.

      Real federal government consumption expenditures and gross investment decreased 8.7 percent
in the first quarter, compared with a decrease of 14.8 percent in the fourth.  National defense decreased
12.0 percent, compared with a decrease of 22.1 percent.  Nondefense decreased 2.1 percent, in contrast
to an increase of 1.7 percent.  Real state and local government consumption expenditures and gross
investment decreased 2.1 percent, compared with a decrease of 1.5 percent.

      The change in real private inventories added 0.57 percentage point to the first-quarter change in
real GDP, after subtracting 1.52 percentage points from the fourth-quarter change.  Private businesses
increased inventories $36.7 billion in the first quarter, following increases of $13.3 billion in the fourth
quarter and $60.3 billion in the third.

      Real final sales of domestic product -- GDP less change in private inventories -- increased 1.2
percent in the first quarter, compared with an increase of 1.9 percent in the fourth.

Gross domestic purchases

      Real gross domestic purchases -- purchases by U.S. residents of goods and services wherever
produced -- increased 1.8 percent in the first quarter; it was unchanged in the fourth.

Gross national product

      Real gross national product -- the goods and services produced by the labor and property
supplied by U.S. residents -- increased 1.2 percent in the first quarter, compared with an increase of 0.9
percent in the fourth.  GNP includes, and GDP excludes, net receipts of income from the rest of the
world, which decreased $17.7 billion in the first quarter after increasing $19.2 billion in the fourth; in
the first quarter, receipts decreased $16.3 billion, and payments increased $1.4 billion.

Current-dollar GDP

      Current-dollar GDP -- the market value of the nation's output of goods and services -- increased
3.1 percent, or $120.0 billion, in the first quarter to a level of $15,984.1 billion.  In the fourth quarter,
current-dollar GDP increased 1.3 percent, or $53.1 billion.

Gross domestic income

      Real gross domestic income (GDI), which measures the output of the economy as the costs
incurred and the incomes earned in the production of GDP, increased 2.5 percent in the first quarter,
compared with an increase of 5.5 percent in the fourth.  For a given quarter, the estimates of GDP and
GDI may differ for a variety of reasons, including the incorporation of largely independent source data.
However, over longer time spans, the estimates of GDP and GDI tend to follow similar patterns of
change.

Revisions

      The downward revision to the percent change in real GDP primarily reflected downward
revisions to personal consumption expenditures, to exports, and to nonresidential fixed investment that
were partly offset by a downward revision to imports.

                                             Advance Estimate         Second Estimate         Third Estimate
				        		(Percent change from preceding quarter)

Real GDP......................................     2.5                     2.4                     1.8
Current-dollar GDP............................     3.7                     3.6                     3.1
Gross domestic purchases price index..........     1.1                     1.2                     1.2

                                              Corporate Profits

      Profits from current production (corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital
consumption adjustments) decreased $28.0 billion in the first quarter, in contrast to an increase of $45.4
billion in the fourth quarter.  Current-production cash flow (net cash flow with inventory valuation
adjustment) -- the internal funds available to corporations for investment -- increased $125.6 billion in
the first quarter, in contrast to a decrease of $89.8 billion in the fourth.

      Taxes on corporate income decreased $10.5 billion in the first quarter, compared with a decrease
of $4.4 billion in the fourth.  Profits after tax with inventory valuation and capital consumption
adjustments decreased $17.5 billion in the first quarter, in contrast to an increase of $49.8 billion in the
fourth.  Dividends decreased $103.5 billion, in contrast to an increase of $124.3 billion.  The large
fourth-quarter increase reflected accelerated and special dividends paid by corporations at the end of
2012 in anticipation of changes to individual income tax rates.   Current-production undistributed profits
increased $85.8 billion, in contrast to a decrease of $74.3 billion.

      Domestic profits of financial corporations decreased $3.4 billion in the first quarter, compared
with a decrease of $3.5 billion in the fourth.  Domestic profits of nonfinancial corporations decreased
$5.0 billion in the first quarter, in contrast to an increase of $24.8 billion in the fourth.  In the first
quarter, real gross value added of nonfinancial corporations increased, and profits per unit of real value
added decreased.  The decrease in unit profits reflected an increase in the unit nonlabor costs incurred by
corporations that was partly offset by a decrease in unit labor costs; unit prices were unchanged.

      The rest-of-the-world component of profits decreased $19.6 billion in the first quarter, in contrast
to an increase of $24.1 billion in the fourth.  This measure is calculated as (1) receipts by U.S. residents
of earnings from their foreign affiliates plus dividends received by U.S. residents from unaffiliated
foreign corporations minus (2) payments by U.S. affiliates of earnings to their foreign parents plus
dividends paid by U.S. corporations to unaffiliated foreign residents.  The first-quarter decrease was
accounted for by a larger decrease in receipts than in payments.

      Profits before tax with inventory valuation adjustment is the best available measure of industry
profits because estimates of the capital consumption adjustment by industry do not exist.  This measure
reflects depreciation-accounting practices used for federal income tax returns.  According to this
measure, domestic profits of both financial and nonfinancial corporations decreased.  The decrease in
nonfinancial corporations primarily reflected decreases in "other" nonfinancial and in manufacturing that
were partly offset by increases in information and in wholesale trade.  Within manufacturing, the largest
decreases were in petroleum and coal products and in machinery.

      Profits before tax decreased $34.7 billion in the first quarter, in contrast to an increase of $27.3
billion in the fourth.  The before-tax measure of profits does not reflect, as does profits from current
production, the capital consumption and inventory valuation adjustments.  These adjustments convert
depreciation of fixed assets and inventory withdrawals reported on a tax-return, historical-cost basis to
the current-cost measures used in the national income and product accounts.  The capital consumption
adjustment increased $12.5 billion in the first quarter (from -$199.5 billion to -$187.0 billion), compared
with an increase of $0.5 billion in the fourth.  The inventory valuation adjustment decreased $5.8 billion
(from -$9.2 billion to -$15.0 billion), in contrast to an increase of $17.6 billion.

      The first-quarter changes in taxes on corporate income and in the capital consumption
adjustment mainly reflect the expiration of bonus depreciation claimed under the American Taxpayer
Relief Act of 2012.  For detailed data, see the table "Net Effects of the Tax Acts of 2002, 2003, 2008,
2009, 2010, and 2012 on Selected Measures of Corporate Profits" at
www.bea.gov/national/xls/technote_tax_acts.xls.  Profits from current production are not affected
because they do not depend on the depreciation-accounting practices used for federal income tax returns;
rather, they are based on depreciation of fixed assets valued at current cost using consistent depreciation
profiles based on used-asset prices. For more details on the effect of tax act provisions on the capital
consumption adjustment, see FAQ #999 on the BEA Web site, "Why does the capital consumption
adjustment for domestic business decline so much in the first quarter of 2012?"

                                        *          *          *

      BEA’s national, international, regional, and industry estimates; the Survey of Current Business;
and BEA news releases are available without charge on BEA’s Web site at www.bea.gov.  By visiting
the site, you can also subscribe to receive free e-mail summaries of BEA releases and announcements.

                                        *          *          *

                         Next release -- July 31, 2013, at 8:30 A.M. EDT for:
                    Gross Domestic Product:  Second Quarter 2013 (Advance Estimate)
                  Comprehensive Revision of the National Income and Product Accounts
                                  (1929 through First Quarter 2013)

Real GDP Per Capita: Another Perspective On The Economy

Earlier Friday we learned that the Advance Estimate for Q1 2013 real GDP came in at 2.5 percent, up from 0.4 percent in Q4 2012. Let’s now review the numbers on a per-capita basis.

For an alternate historical view of the economy, here is a chart of real GDP per-capita growth since 1960. For this analysis I’ve chained in today’s dollar for the inflation adjustment. The per-capita calculation is based on quarterly aggregates of mid-month population estimates by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, which date from 1959 (hence my 1960 starting date for this chart, even though quarterly GDP has is available since 1947). The population data is available in the FRED series POPTHM. The logarithmic vertical axis ensures that the highlighted contractions have the same relative scale.

I’ve drawn an exponential regression through the data using the Excel GROWTH() function to give us a sense of the historical trend. The regression illustrates the fact that the trend since the Great Recession has a visibly lower slope than long-term trend. In fact, the current GDP per-capita is 11.6% below the regression trend.

(click to enlarge)

The real per-capita series gives us a better understanding of the depth and duration of GDP contractions. As we can see, since our 1960 starting point, the recession that began in December 2007 is associated with a deeper trough than previous contractions, which perhaps justifies its nickname as the Great Recession. In fact, at this point, 20 quarters beyond the 2007 GDP peak, real GDP per capita is still 1.04% off the all-time high following the deepest trough in the series.

Here is a more revealing snapshot of real GDP per capita, specifically illustrating the percent off the most recent peak across time, with recessions highlighted. The underlying calculation is to show peaks at 0% on the right axis. The callouts shows the percent off real GDP per-capita at significant troughs as well as the current reading for this metric.

(click to enlarge)
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Larry Kudlow On The Failure Of Obama’s Keynesian Fiscal Policy–Videos

Posted on September 20, 2012. Filed under: American History, Banking, Blogroll, College, Communications, Economics, Education, Employment, Energy, Federal Government, Federal Government Budget, Fiscal Policy, government, government spending, history, Law, liberty, Life, Links, media, Monetary Policy, Money, People, Philosophy, Politics, Public Sector, Rants, Raves, Security, Tax Policy, Taxes, Technology, Unemployment, Unions, Video, Wealth, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , |

Larry Kudlow: If Keynesian taxing and spending was going to work it would have already worked 

[youdtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z0B3dWOno90]

Larry Kudlow: If Keynesian taxing and spending was going to work it would have already worked Part 2 

Rep. Kevin Brady on CNBC’s Kudlow Report 8-31-12 

Background Articles and Videos

Keynesian Economics Is Wrong: Bigger Gov’t Is Not Stimulus

Eight Reasons Why Big Government Hurts Economic Growth 

Free Markets and Small Government Produce Prosperity

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Carl Menger and The Marginalist Revolution–Videos

Posted on May 16, 2011. Filed under: Blogroll, Communications, Economics, Microeconomics | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , |

 

The Marginalist Revolution | Joseph T. Salerno

 

Menger and the Early Austrians

 

History of Austrian Economics

 

Principles of Economics by Carl Menger (read online)

“The reading of this book made an economist of me.”

~Ludwig von Mises

http://mises.org/etexts/menger/principles.asp

 

Background Articles and Videos

 

Biography of Carl Menger: The Founder of the Austrian School (1840-1921)

Joseph T. Salerno

Biography of Carl Menger: The Founder of the Austrian School (1840-1921)

by Joseph T. Salerno

“…Despite the many illustrious forerunners in its six-hundred year prehistory, Carl Menger (1840-1921) was the true and sole founder of the Austrian school of economics proper. He merits this title if for no other reason than that he created the system of value and price theory that constitutes the core of Austrian economic theory. But Menger did more than this: he also originated and consistently applied the correct, praxeological method for pursuing theoretical research in economics. Thus in its method and core theory, Austrian economics always was and will forever remain Mengerian economics.

Menger’s position as the originator of the fundamental doctrines of Austrian economics has been recognized and hailed by all eminent authorities on the history of Austrian economics. In his eulogy of Menger written upon the latter’s death in 1921, Joseph Schumpeter averred that “Menger is nobody’s pupil and what he created stands . . . . Menger’s theory of value, price, and distribution is the best we have up to now.” Ludwig von Mises wrote that “What is known as the Austrian School of Economics started in 1871 when Carl Menger published a slender volume under the title Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre [Principles of Economics]…. Until the end of the Seventies there was no `Austrian School.’ There was only Carl Menger.” For F. A. Hayek (1992, p. 62), the Austrian school’s “fundamental ideas belong fully and wholly to Carl Menger. . . . [W]hat is common to the members of the Austrian school, what constitutes their peculiarity and provided the foundations for their later contributions, is their acceptance of the teaching of Carl Menger.”

While there is no dispute regarding Menger’s role as creator of the defining principles of Austrian economics, there does exist some confusion regarding the precise nature of his contribution. It is not always fully recognized that Menger’s endeavor to radically reconstruct the theory of price on the basis of the law of marginal utility was not inspired by a vague subjectivism in outlook. Rather, Menger was motivated by the specific and overarching aim of establishing a causal link between the subjective values underlying the choices of consumers and the objective market prices used in the economic calculations of businessmen. The Classical economists had formulated a theory attempting to explain market prices as the outcome of the operation of the law of supply and demand. Yet, these economists were compelled to restrict their analysis to the monetary calculations and choices of businessmen while neglecting consumer choice for the lack of a satisfactory theory of value. Their theory of “calculated action” was correct as far as it went, and was used in demolishing the protectionist and interventionist schemes of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century mercantilists and the statist fantasies of nineteenth-century Utopian socialists. Thus, Menger’s ultimate goal was not to destroy Classical economics, as has sometimes been suggested, but to complete and firm up the Classical project by grounding the theory of price determination and monetary calculation in a general theory of human action. …”

http://mises.org/about/3239

The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics

Carl Menger

(1840-1921)

 

“… Carl Menger has the twin distinctions of being the founder of Austrian economics and a cofounder of the marginal utility revolution. Menger worked separately from William Jevons and Leon Walras and reached similar conclusions by a different method. Unlike Jevons, Menger did not believe that goods provide “utils,” or units of utility. Rather, he wrote, goods are valuable because they serve various uses whose importance differs. For example, the first pails of water are used to satisfy the most important uses, and successive pails are used for less and less important purposes.

Menger used this insight to resolve the diamond-water paradox that had baffled Adam Smith (see marginalism). He also used it to refute the labor theory of value. Goods acquire their value, he showed, not because of the amount of labor used in producing them, but because of their ability to satisfy people’s wants. Indeed, Menger turned the labor theory of value on its head. If the value of goods is determined by the importance of the wants they satisfy, then the value of labor and other inputs of production (he called them “goods of a higher order”) derive from their ability to produce these goods. Mainstream economists still accept this theory, which they call the theory of “derived demand.”

Menger used his “subjective theory of value” to arrive at one of the most powerful insights in economics: both sides gain from exchange. People will exchange something they value less for something they value more. Because both trading partners do this, both gain. This insight led him to see that middlemen are highly productive: they facilitate transactions that benefit those they buy from and those they sell to. Without the middlemen, these transactions either would not have taken place or would have been more costly.

Menger also came up with an explanation of how money develops that is still accepted today. If people barter, he pointed out, then they can rarely get what they want in one or two transactions. If they have lamps and want chairs, for example, they will not necessarily be able to trade lamps for chairs but may instead have to make a few intermediate trades. This is a hassle. But people notice that the hassle is much less when they trade what they have for some good that is widely accepted, and then use this good to buy what they want. The good that is widely accepted eventually becomes money. Modern economists describe this function of money as “avoiding the need for the double coincidence of wants.” Indeed, the word “pecuniary” derives from the Latin pecus, meaning “cattle,” which in some societies served as money. Other societies have used cigarettes, cognac, salt, furs, or stones as money. As economies became more complex and wealthier, they began to use precious metals (gold, silver, and so on) as money.

Menger extended his analysis to other institutions. He argued that language, for example, developed for the same reason money developed—to facilitate interactions between people. He called such developments “organic.” Neither language nor money was developed by government. …”

http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Menger.html

Carl Menger

“…Carl Menger (February 28, 1840 – February 26, 1921) was the founder of the Austrian School of economics, famous for contributing to the development of the theory of marginal utility, which contested the cost-of-production theories of value, developed by the classical economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

Biography

Menger was born in Nowy Sącz in Austrian Galicia, (now in Poland). He was the son of a wealthy family of minor nobility; his father, Anton, was a lawyer. His mother, Caroline, was the daughter of a wealthy Bohemian merchant. He had two brothers, Anton and Max, both prominent as lawyers. After attending Gymnasium he studied law at the Universities of Prague and Vienna and later received a doctorate in jurisprudence from the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. In the 1860s Menger left school and enjoyed a stint as a journalist reporting and analyzing market news, first at the Lemberger Zeitung in Lwów, Ukraine and later at the Wiener Zeitung in Vienna.

During the course of his newspaper work he noticed a discrepancy between what the classical economics he was taught in school said about price determination and what real world market participants believed. In 1867 Menger began a study of political economy which culminated in 1871 with the publication of his Principles of Economics (Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre), thus becoming the father of the Austrian School of economic thought. It was in this work that he challenged classical cost-based theories of value with his theory of marginality.

In 1872 Menger was enrolled into the law faculty at the University of Vienna and spent the next several years teaching finance and political economy both in seminars and lectures to a growing number of students. In 1873 he received the university’s chair of economic theory at the very young age of 33.

In 1876 Menger began tutoring Archduke Rudolf von Habsburg, the Crown Prince of Austria in political economy and statistics. For three years Menger accompanied the prince in his travels, first through continental Europe and then later through the British Isles.[1] He is also thought to have assisted the crown prince in the composition of a pamphlet, published anonymously in 1878, which was highly critical of the higher Austrian aristocracy. His association with the prince would last until Rudolf’s suicide in 1889 (see the Mayerling Affair).

In 1878 Rudolf’s father, Emperor Franz Josef, appointed Menger to the chair of political economy at Vienna. The title of Hofrat was conferred on him, and he was appointed to the Austrian Herrenhaus in 1900.

Ensconced in his professorship he set about refining and defending the positions he took and methods he utilized in Principles, the result of which was the 1883 publication of Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with Special Reference to Economics (Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der politischen Oekonomie insbesondere). The book caused a firestorm of debate, during which members of the Historical school of economics began to derisively call Menger and his students the “Austrian School” to emphasize their departure from mainstream economic thought in Germany – the term was specifically used in an unfavorable review by Gustav von Schmoller. In 1884 Menger responded with the pamphlet The Errors of Historicism in German Economics and launched the infamous Methodenstreit, or methodological debate, between the Historical School and the Austrian School. During this time Menger began to attract like-minded disciples who would go on to make their own mark on the field of economics, most notably Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, and Friedrich von Wieser.

In the late 1880s Menger was appointed to head a commission to reform the Austrian monetary system. Over the course of the next decade he authored a plethora of articles which would revolutionize monetary theory, including “The Theory of Capital” (1888) and “Money” (1892).[2] Largely due to his pessimism about the state of German scholarship, Menger resigned his professorship in 1903 to concentrate on study.

References

  1. ^ The History of Economic Thought: A Reader
  2. ^ “On the Origin of Money” (English translation by Caroline A. Foley), Economic Journal, Volume 2 (1892), pp. 239-55.

External links

  • Biography of Carl Menger The Founder of the Austrian School by Joseph T. Salerno
  • Biography of Carl Menger The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Library of Economics and Liberty
  • The Epistemological Import of Carl Menger’s Theory of the Origin of Money Ludwig von Mises in Human Action on Menger’s Theory of the Origins of Money
  • Profile on Carl Menger at the History of Economic Thought Website
  • Principles of Economics, online version provided by the Ludwig von Mises Institute.
  • Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Principles of Economics)
  • Principles of Economics (PDF Spanish)
  • On the Origin of Money (English Translation), online version provided by the Monadnock Press …”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Menger

Carl Menger still woth reading

It’s the 171st birthday of the founder of the Austrian School of Economics, and his work is still relevant.

By Mario Rizzo, Guest blogger / February 24, 2011

“…Today is the birthday of Carl Menger, born February 23, 1840. Menger was, of course, the founder of the Austrian School of Economics. His Principles of Economics, a great achievement for its time, is still well worth reading. It conveys like no other book at the time (and unlike most basic texts today) the importance of mind, knowledge, ignorance, causal relationships between goods and wants, and of course marginal utility. I think we can still learn from Menger’s book today, especially about the importance of knowledge in economic development. Austrians should be pleased to have such a great mind as the founder of their school.

Menger’s work has garnered respect from even those who have not considered themselves Austrians. George Stigler, for example, wrote a very appreciative essay on Menger in his Production and Distribution Theories.For a long time Menger’s contributions were not clearly distinguished from those of Jevons and Walras, the other leaders of the “marginalist revolution.” We have William Jaffe to thank for his de-homogenization of the three great economists. But, really, a moment’s perusal of the three books should make the differences obvious. Walras is concerned about mathematical elegance and Jevons is so enamored of hedonistic psychology that he gives the appearance, at least, of casting marginalism as an application of Jeremy Bentham’s philosophy – thus unduly limiting it.

Menger also made contributions to the Scottish Enlightenment project of spontaneous order, especially with respect to the evolution of money and of common law. In this he shows himself a worthy successor to Adam Smith in a way that Walras and Jevons are not. …”

http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/ThinkMarkets/2011/0224/Carl-Menger-still-woth-reading

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David Wessel–In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War On The Great Panic–Videos

Posted on October 17, 2010. Filed under: Blogroll, Communications, Economics, Federal Government, Fiscal Policy, government, government spending, history, Investments, Law, liberty, Life, Links, media, Monetary Policy, People, Philosophy, Politics, Quotations, Raves, Strategy, Taxes, Technology, Video, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , |

 

Peter Schiff “We Should Save ‘Person Of The Year’ For People Who Do Good!

 

2/19/10 Ron Paul on CNBC: Faith in the Fed? Yeah, Right!

 

In Fed We Trust – Ben Bernanke’s War On The Great Panic (ABC Radio National interview)

 

David Wessel – In Fed We Trust

 

David Wessel (9/22/09)

Authors@Google: David Wessel

 

Background Articles and Videos

Peter Schiff’s Response to Time Magazine

 

Money, Banking and the Federal Reserve

 

The Gold Dollar | Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.

 

How to Abolish the Federal Reserve

 

 

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Thomas Sowell and Conflict of Visions–Videos

Thomas Sowell On The Housing Boom and Bust–Videos

Econ Talk With Thomas Sowell–Videos

Peter Thiel–Videos

Thomas E. Woods, Jr.–Videos

Thomas E. Woods–The Economic Crisis and The Federal Reserve–Videos

Tom Woods–Lectures On Liberty–Videos

Thomas E. Woods–The Market Economy–Videos

Tom Woods On Personal Rights and Property Ownership

Tom Woods–Smashing Myths and Restoring Sound Money–Videos

Tom Woods–Who Killed The Constitution

Tom Wright On The FairTax–Videos

Banking Cartel’s Public Relations Campaign Continues:Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke On The Record

 

 

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Obama Depression: 20 Months Of Unemployment Over 8% For Official U-3 Rate and Over 15% For Total U-6 Rate–Over 26 Million Americans Looking For A Full Time Job and 41.8 Million On Food Stamps!–Followed By 36 More Months Of Over 8% Official Unemployment U-3 Rate and 15% Total Unemployment U-6 Rate!

Posted on October 8, 2010. Filed under: Blogroll, Communications, Demographics, Economics, Employment, Federal Government, Fiscal Policy, government, government spending, Health Care, Immigration, Law, liberty, Life, Links, media, People, Philosophy, Politics, Rants, Raves, Regulations, Taxes, Technology, Video, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |

“Government spending cannot create additional jobs. If the government provides the funds required by taxing the citizens or by borrowing from the public, it abolishes on the one hand as many jobs as it creates on the other.”

“True, governments can reduce the rate of interest in the short run. They can issue additional paper money. They can open the way to credit expansion by the banks. They can thus create an artificial boom and the appearance of prosperity. But such a boom is bound to collapse soon or late and to bring about a depression.”

~Ludwig von Mises

Economy Sheds 95,000 Jobs; 14.8 Million out of Work

 

RECORD 41.8 MILLION PEOPLE ON FOOD STAMPS 9-15-2010

  

 

Sept 2010 Employment Report

 

U.S. Recovering Jobs But Pace Has Slowed, Analyst Says

 

Goolsbee Sees Need to Get ‘Job Engine’ Growing Faster: Video

 

“Traders will look at the U6 unemployment rate…on Friday”

President Obama on September, 2010 Jobs Numbers

Ron Paul: Obama Stimulus Package Will Turn Recession Into Depression

 

The U.S. jobless ” recovery” continues and is getting worse.

While the official unemployment rate of 9.6% as measured by U-3  did not go up in September, the real total unemployment rate went from 16.7% in August to 17.1% in September 2010.

The official unemployment level is currently at 14,767,000 unemployed Americans and exceeds the 13 million unemployed during the worse year of the Great Depression, 1933.

The total unemployment level calculated as 17.1% of the civilian labor force of about 154,158,000 is over 26 million, twice the number of unemployed during the worse year of the Great Depression, 1933.   

The Obama Depression is not over or  improving but is in fact getting worse.

The Keynesian economics recipe for economic disaster of more and more stimulus spending, larger and larger budgetary deficits, financed by layer upon layer of government debt has been a big failure.

A failure made even worse by the Federal Reserves’ quantitative easing monetary policy of monetization of the debt by “printing” more and more money in exchange for the Federal Government’s debt.

Neither the fiscal policy of stimulus spending nor the monetary policy of quantitative easing will create more jobs.

 Obama’s economic policies  only increase the belief among consumers and business owners that the Federal Government is completely out-of-control.

Only when President Obama’s economic policies are reversed and the current regime in Congress and the President are votedout of office will you finally see job creation and low  full employment rates of 2%% to 3% This will take not months but at least five years.

Dixion Says Fed Quantitative Easing Won’t Create New Jobs

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=85Olz2h6ehM

The immediate result of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy is the devaluing of the dollar

The Federal Reserve’s policy is a massive tax increase on all Americans as the purchasing power of their money declines daily.

This will only mean higher prices for all imports including petroleum and the costs of all goods and services to the extent they require imported goods and services such as petroleum.

Ron Paul vs. Ben Bernanke

Peter Schiff–Dollar Collaspse–Gold As A Hedge Against The Fed’s Committment To Raise Inflation

 

Who reappointed The Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke,–President Barack Obama.

Ron Paul : We Can’t Say Cut Spending For Food Stamps But NOT For The Military Industrial Complex!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=whfopF8Xj8I

 

 

 

All Labor and Unemployment Statistics Are From

The Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?ln

 

As Of October 2010

The Numbers In Red Are For The Obama Administration  

U-3

Series Id: LNS14000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title: (Seas) Unemployment Rate
Labor force status: Unemployment rate
Type of data: Percent or rate
Age: 16 years and over

 Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9  
2001 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.7  
2002 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.9 6.0  
2003 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.7  
2004 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.4  
2005 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9  
2006 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4  
2007 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 5.0  
2008 5.0 4.8 5.1 5.0 5.4 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.6 6.9 7.4  
2009 7.7 8.2 8.6 8.9 9.4 9.5 9.4 9.7 9.8 10.1 10.0 10.0  
2010 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.9 9.7 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.6        

U-6

Series Id:           LNS13327709
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (seas) Total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of all civilian labor force plus all marginally attached workers
Labor force status:  Aggregated totals unemployed
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 years and over
Percent/rates:       Unemployed and mrg attached and pt for econ reas as percent of labor force plus marg attached

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 7.1 7.2 7.1 6.9 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.0 6.8 7.1 6.9  
2001 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.9 7.8 8.1 8.7 9.3 9.4 9.6  
2002 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.7 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.7 9.8  
2003 10.0 10.2 10.0 10.2 10.1 10.3 10.3 10.1 10.4 10.2 10.0 9.8  
2004 9.9 9.7 10.0 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.7 9.4 9.2  
2005 9.3 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.8 8.9 9.0 8.7 8.7 8.6  
2006 8.4 8.4 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.0 8.2 8.1 8.0  
2007 8.3 8.1 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.5 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.8  
2008 9.1 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.7 10.0 10.5 10.9 11.2 11.9 12.8 13.7  
2009 14.0 15.0 15.6 15.8 16.4 16.5 16.4 16.8 17.0 17.4 17.2 17.3  
2010 16.5 16.8 16.9 17.1 16.6 16.5 16.5 16.7 17.1        

 

Series Id:           LNS13000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Unemployment Level
Labor force status:  Unemployed
Type of data:        Number in thousands
Age:                 16 years and over

 

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 5708 5858 5733 5481 5758 5651 5747 5853 5625 5534 5639 5634  
2001 6023 6089 6141 6271 6226 6484 6583 7042 7142 7694 8003 8258  
2002 8182 8215 8304 8599 8399 8393 8390 8304 8251 8307 8520 8640  
2003 8520 8618 8588 8842 8957 9266 9011 8896 8921 8732 8576 8317  
2004 8370 8167 8491 8170 8212 8286 8136 7990 7927 8061 7932 7934  
2005 7784 7980 7737 7672 7651 7524 7406 7345 7553 7453 7566 7279  
2006 7059 7185 7075 7122 6977 6998 7154 7097 6853 6728 6883 6784  
2007 7085 6898 6725 6845 6765 6966 7113 7096 7200 7273 7284 7696  
2008 7628 7435 7793 7631 8397 8560 8895 9509 9569 10172 10617 11400  
2009 11919 12714 13310 13816 14518 14721 14534 14993 15159 15612 15340 15267  
2010 14837 14871 15005 15260 14973 14623 14599 14860 14767        

 

 In order to reduce the U.S. official  unemployment rate by .1% in a single month requires the creation of  between 250,000 and 300,000 jobs per month depending upon the number of new entrants into the labor market due to population growth and the labor participation rate or those seeking employment.

The labor participation rate goes down as an economy goes into a recession and goes up as the economy grows and prospers. The labor participation rate is currently  64.7%, well below the more normal range of 66% to 67.5% .

 A higher labor participation rate means more individuals are actively seeking full-time employment and more jobs need to be created each month to absorb both new entrants and re-entrants into the labor market.

This is the reason why between 250,000 and 300,000 jobs need to be created each month to reduce the unemployment rate just .1%.

Series Id:           LNS11300000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Labor Force Participation Rate
Labor force status:  Civilian labor force participation rate
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 years and over

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 67.3 67.3 67.3 67.3 67.1 67.1 66.9 66.9 66.9 66.8 66.9 67.0  
2001 67.2 67.1 67.2 66.9 66.7 66.7 66.8 66.5 66.8 66.7 66.7 66.7  
2002 66.5 66.8 66.6 66.7 66.7 66.6 66.5 66.6 66.7 66.6 66.4 66.3  
2003 66.4 66.4 66.3 66.4 66.4 66.5 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 65.9  
2004 66.1 66.0 66.0 65.9 66.0 66.1 66.1 66.0 65.8 65.9 66.0 65.9  
2005 65.8 65.9 65.9 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.0 66.0  
2006 66.0 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.2 66.3 66.4  
2007 66.4 66.3 66.3 66.0 66.0 66.0 66.0 65.8 66.0 65.8 66.0 66.0  
2008 66.2 66.0 66.1 66.0 66.2 66.1 66.0 66.1 66.0 66.0 65.8 65.8  
2009 65.7 65.7 65.6 65.8 65.8 65.7 65.4 65.4 65.1 65.0 64.9 64.6  
2010 64.7 64.8 64.9 65.2 65.0 64.7 64.6 64.7 64.7        

 

It takes at between 100,000 and 150,000 jobs to employ new entrants into the labor market mostly high school and college graduates.

 There are currently over 1.1 million new entrants into the labor force that have not found their first  job.

 

Series Id:                  LNS13023569
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:               (Seas) Unemployment Level – New Entrants
Labor force status:         Unemployed
Type of data:               Number in thousands
Age:                        16 years and over
Unemployed entrant status:  New entrants

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 394 420 429 406 466 427 433 499 415 402 419 490  
2001 444 396 378 457 468 467 448 485 473 481 495 515  
2002 484 507 538 527 497 549 545 612 536 479 591 535  
2003 599 584 630 635 630 661 669 652 686 636 593 693  
2004 676 666 631 652 718 649 702 704 695 734 700 702  
2005 621 753 712 764 710 650 630 626 607 638 673 633  
2006 618 710 635 590 522 644 638 647 612 573 583 588  
2007 628 599 614 621 536 634 599 590 668 700 661 688  
2008 685 660 705 631 807 771 829 826 811 826 735 820  
2009 792 1016 881 919 977 969 994 1096 1134 1114 1270 1270  
2010 1235 1238 1197 1231 1206 1140 1188 1259 1187        

 

The unemployment rate for the young, ages 16 to 19, is 26%!

The unemployment rate for the young is currently nearly double the  usual unemployment rate for ages 16 to 19 of between 12% and 16% when the economy is growing. 

 

Series Id:           LNS14000012
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Unemployment Rate – 16-19 yrs.
Labor force status:  Unemployment rate
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 to 19 years

 

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 12.7 13.8 13.3 12.6 12.8 12.3 13.4 14.0 13.0 12.8 13.0 13.2  
2001 13.8 13.7 13.8 13.9 13.4 14.2 14.4 15.6 15.2 16.0 15.9 17.0  
2002 16.5 16.0 16.6 16.7 16.6 16.7 16.8 17.0 16.3 15.1 17.1 16.9  
2003 17.2 17.2 17.8 17.7 17.9 19.0 18.2 16.6 17.6 17.2 15.7 16.2  
2004 17.0 16.5 16.8 16.6 17.1 17.0 17.8 16.7 16.6 17.4 16.4 17.6  
2005 16.2 17.5 17.1 17.8 17.8 16.3 16.1 16.1 15.5 16.1 17.0 14.9  
2006 15.2 15.3 16.1 14.6 14.0 15.7 15.9 16.1 16.3 15.2 14.9 14.7  
2007 14.8 14.9 14.9 15.6 15.9 16.2 15.3 16.0 16.0 15.5 16.2 16.9  
2008 17.8 16.5 16.0 15.6 18.9 19.0 20.8 18.9 19.3 20.3 20.3 20.8  
2009 20.9 21.8 22.0 21.8 23.2 24.3 24.5 25.7 26.1 27.6 26.8 27.1  
2010 26.4 25.0 26.1 25.4 26.4 25.7 26.1 26.3 26.0        

 

Both high school graduates and those who either dropped out or failed to graduate from high school are finding it very difficult to find their first job.

Illegal immigrants, mainly from Mexico and Latin America, of between 10 million to 20 million, has made it even more difficult for young inexperienced American citizens to find entry-level jobs.

Also the Federal  minimum hourly wage law prevents many small businesses from hiring young workers.

Good Intentions 2 of 3 Minimum Wage, Licensing, and Labor Laws with Walter Williams

 

 

Good Intentions 3 of 3 The Welfare System and Conclusions with Walter Williams

It currently takes between 100,000 and 150,000 new jobs in addition to the 100,000 to 150,000 jobs for new entrants to reduce the unemployment rate by .1%.

The civilian labor force is currently about 155 million.

Series Id:           LNS11000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Civilian Labor Force Level
Labor force status:  Civilian labor force
Type of data:        Number in thousands
Age:                 16 years and over

 

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 142267(1) 142456 142434 142751 142388 142591 142278 142514 142518 142622 142962 143248  
2001 143800 143701 143924 143569 143318 143357 143654 143284 143989 144086 144240 144305  
2002 143883 144653 144481 144725 144938 144808 144803 145009 145552 145314 145041 145066  
2003 145937(1) 146100 146022 146474 146500 147056 146485 146445 146530 146716 147000 146729  
2004 146842(1) 146709 146944 146850 147065 147460 147692 147564 147415 147793 148162 148059  
2005 148029(1) 148364 148391 148926 149261 149238 149432 149779 149954 150001 150065 150030  
2006 150201(1) 150629 150839 150915 151085 151368 151383 151729 151650 152020 152360 152698  
2007 153117(1) 152941 153093 152531 152717 153045 153039 152781 153393 153158 153767 153869  
2008 154048(1) 153600 153966 153936 154420 154327 154410 154696 154590 154849 154524 154587  
2009 154140(1) 154401 154164 154718 154956 154759 154351 154426 153927 153854 153720 153059  
2010 153170(1) 153512 153910 154715 154393 153741 153560 154110 154158        

Multiply the civilian labor force of  about 155 million by .1% and the result is 155,000.

This is approximate number of jobs that need to be created to reduce the unemployment rate by .1 with no growth in the labor force. 

When you add in the natural growth of the labor force by new entrants from population growth  you arrive at an estimate of between 250,000 to 300,000 new jobs that need to be created each month to reduce the unemployment rate by .1%.

In a robust  economic recovery the private sector should be creating 500,000 to 600,000 jobs per month.

Unfortunately, the private business sector and particularly  small and medium size businesses, are not creating anywhere near 250,000 to 300,000 per month.

In September the private sector created only a net total of 75,000 new jobs. This is far short of the 250,000 to 300,000 jobs needed to reduce the U-3 official unemployment rate by just .1%.

Even if 250,000 new jobs were being created each month and the unemployment rate declined 1.2% per year and over 3 million jobs were created in a year, it would take over five years to bring the official unemployment rate ( U-3) down to under a 3% rate of unemployment or a near full employment level.

The stimulus package of over $789 billion plus billions in interest payments was supposed to keep the unemployment rate under 8% and not above 8%!   

 

 

 

 

http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/blogs/beltway-confidential/white-houses-stimulus-math-doesnt-add-up-100456089.html

The stimulus package has been an abject failure of the Keynesian economists including Romer and Berstein who advised Obama that this was what was needed.

Series Id:           LNS12000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Employment Level
Labor force status:  Employed
Type of data:        Number in thousands
Age:                 16 years and over

 Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 136559(1) 136598 136701 137270 136630 136940 136531 136662 136893 137088 137322 137614  
2001 137778 137612 137783 137299 137092 136873 137071 136241 136846 136392 136238 136047  
2002 135701 136438 136177 136126 136539 136415 136413 136705 137302 137008 136521 136426  
2003 137417(1) 137482 137434 137633 137544 137790 137474 137549 137609 137984 138424 138411  
2004 138472(1) 138542 138453 138680 138852 139174 139556 139573 139487 139732 140231 140125  
2005 140245(1) 140385 140654 141254 141609 141714 142026 142434 142401 142548 142499 142752  
2006 143142(1) 143444 143765 143794 144108 144370 144229 144631 144797 145292 145477 145914  
2007 146032(1) 146043 146368 145686 145952 146079 145926 145685 146193 145885 146483 146173  
2008 146421(1) 146165 146173 146306 146023 145768 145515 145187 145021 144677 143907 143188  
2009 142221(1) 141687 140854 140902 140438 140038 139817 139433 138768 138242 138381 137792  
2010 138333(1) 138641 138905 139455 139420 139119 138960 139250 139391        

President Bush’s Federal income tax rate cuts of 2001 and capital gains and interest rate cuts of 2003 worked and the negative impact on the economy of the September 11, 2001 Islamic Al-Qaeda Jihadist terrorist attack was mostly minimized and avoided.

However, President Bush failed to control Federal Government spending by not vetoing the massive Government spending increases of both the Republican controlled House and Senate in 2005 and 2006 and the Democratic controlled House and Senate in 2007 and 2008. 

President Obama followed the lead of President Bush and the Democratic controlled Congress by more than doubling the Federal budget deficits in 2009 and 2010. 

Dan Mitchell on the Deficit

Dan Mitchell discusses Reagonomics vs. Obamanomics

The result is the Obama Depression with more than twice the number of Americans looking for a full-time job  than the 13 million Americans that were unemployed in March, 1933, the worse month of the Great Depression.

President Obama is following in the footsteps of Presidents Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and George W. Bush by pursuing both the expansion of government with huge budgetary deficits (2009 was over $1,400 billion and 2010 is over 1,340 billion) and tax rate increases by letting the Bush tax rate cuts expire,  supporting a massive cap-and-trade energy tax and imposing a mandatory health care plan on Americans that they must purchase or pay a tax penalty.

Feldstein Predicts Dollar to Weaken, Boosting Exports: Video

News Update: CBO Deficit estimates

 

The result is the same–massive unemployment–over 26 million seeking a full-time job and 41.8 million Americans on food stamps.

My recommendation made  February 1, 2009 was to first have a six month  payroll tax holiday on payroll and capital gains taxes and at the end of the six month period switch from the current Federal income tax system to the FairTax, which is a national sales consumption tax on the sale of all new goods and services.

American People’s Plan = 6 Month Tax Holiday + FairTax = Real Hope + Real Change!–Millions To March On Washington D.C. Saturday, July 4, 2009! Revised and Updated

 

The FairTax would replace all Federal personal and corporate income taxes, payroll taxes, Social Security taxes, Medicare taxes, capital gains taxes, interest and dividend taxes, alternative minimum taxes, estate and gift taxes.

The FairTax requires the repeal the 16th Amendment that gave the Federal government the power to collect an income tax.

“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”

     

The FairTax is also progressive for it provides a prebate or check each month to every American to pay the sales tax on necessities of living such as food, clothing, housing, and energy (electricity and gasoline).

 Had the FairTax been implemented with a six month payroll and capital gains  tax  holiday, the unemployment rate would have been significantly below 8% by now and the economy growing at a rate above 5%. 

 

The FairTax: It’s Time

The recommended economic policy of cutting both Federal taxes and Federal Government spending and regulation had been tried and proved successful in the past when the United States entered the roaring twenties:

Why You’ve Never Heard of the Great Depression of 1920 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

Keynesian Predictions vs. American History | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

 

While the above economic policy recommendations would still work, it will never happen under the existing  ruling political class.

 Unfortunately, the political ruling class based in Washington, D.C., both Democrats and Republicans, vigorously opposed those proposing the FairTax.

 Comprehensive tax reform is opposed by the lobbyist and special interests on K Street in Washington D.C. who benefit from the  complicated Federal Income Tax.

Professional politicians of both political parties need the campaign contributions of these special interests and lobbyists to run for re-election.

The real problem is simply too much Federal Government spending.

The high levels of Federal Government spending is what is driving the need for new and higher  Federal taxation, every increasing borrowing to finance the deficits, and a reckless  expansionary credit and monetary policy.

The solution is to cut Federal government spending by eliminating entire Federal Departments, agencies and programs.

That is why I recommended that Federal Government spending be limited to 80% of FairTax collections with the  remaining 20% used to pay down the National Debt and fund entitlement (Social Security and Medicare) unfunded liabilities.

A Common Sense Political Agenda For A New Conservative and Libertarian Party: American Citizens Alliance Party (ACAP)–A CAP On Government Spending, Taxes, Debt and Regulations!

 

It’s Simple to Balance The Budget Without Higher Taxes

This solution is anathema to the progressive radical socialist of the Democratic Party led by President Obama.

Instead President Obama went with the failed economic policies of the Keynesian economists who always advocate more and more Federal Government spending, which is precisely what the progressive radical socialists want to impose on the American people.

Keynesian Economics Is Wrong: Bigger Gov’t Is Not Stimulus

  

As a direct  result of President Obama and the Democratic Party controlled Congress failure in cutting Federal Government spending, closing permanently many Federal Departments and agencies and ending hundreds of Federal Government programs, while  proposing even more and higher taxes,  more Americans are now  unemployed and seeking full-time employment than any time in the history of the United States.

 The number of unemployed are twice that of the Great Depression!

The U-3  official unemployment rate will remain above 8% and the U-6 total unemployment rate will remain above 15% for at least another 36 months.

By then the American people will vote President Obama out of office.

By then the American people will vote those Democratic and Republican Senators and Representatives who failed to institute deep and permanent cuts to the Federal budget, a balanced or surplus budget and the FairTax.

President Obama is a progressive radical socialist ideologue.

Obama wants to grow the size and scope of the Federal Government and use coercion and government intervention in the form of higher taxes and pervasive government regulation to redistribute wealth and limit consumer sovereignty and the liberties of the American people.

Paul Ryan on how to break the capital strike  

Krauthammer: “We Are Having A Capital Strike”

President Obama’s economic policies created massive economic uncertainty for consumers and businesses resulting in tens of millions of unemployed and underemployed Americans.

President Obama is a regime that must be changed if there is any hope for the tens of millions of unemployed Americans to find a full-time job.

On November 2, 2010 the American people will vote the Democrats out of office who were responsible for this economic disaster by massive government intervention into the economy and expansion of the size and scope of government.

Most Americans cannot wait to vote President Obama out of office in 2012.

Mr. President, you know  you are an economic illiterate.

Do the right thing Mr. President, resign for the good of the country and the American people.

Just think, Mr. President,  you will have more time to play golf, smoke and be with your family.

Everbody wins.

Good-Bye and Good Luck.

 

 

“Capitalism means free enterprise, sovereignty of the consumers in economic matters, and sovereignty of the voters in political matters. Socialism means full government control of every sphere of the individual’s life and the unrestricted supremacy of the government in its capacity as central board of production management.”

~Ludwig von Mises

Background Articles and Videos

 

Christina Romer explains a new report about job creation

The Job Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan

By Christine Romer and Jared Bernstein

January 9, 2009

http://otrans.3cdn.net/45593e8ecbd339d074_l3m6bt1te.pdf

 

 Christie Romer: The Only Surefire Way for Policymakers to Substantially Increase Aggregate Demand in the Short Run Is for the Government to Spend More and Tax Less

“…In a report that Jared Bernstein and I issued during the transition, we estimated that by the end of 2010, a stimulus package like the Recovery Act would raise real GDP by about 3 1⁄2 percent and employment by about 31⁄2 million jobs, relative to what otherwise would have occurred. As the Council of Economic Advisers has documented in a series of reports to Congress, there is widespread agreement that the Act is broadly on track to meet these milestones…. What the Act hasn’t done is prevent unemployment from going above 8 percent, something else that Jared and I projected it would do. The reason that prediction was so far off is implicit in much of what I have been saying this afternoon. An estimate of what the economy will look like if a policy is adopted contains two components: a forecast of what would happen in the absence of the policy, and an estimate of the effect of the policy. As I’ve described, our estimates of the impact of the Recovery Act have proven quite accurate. But we, like virtually every other forecaster, failed to anticipate just how violent the recession would be in the absence of policy, and the degree to which the usual relationship between GDP and unemployment would break down.

By February 2009, before the Recovery Act was passed, unemployment was already over 8 percent; and by June, before the Recovery Act could have had much of an impact, it was 9 1⁄2 percent… our projection turned out to be wrong even before the Recovery Act had a chance to get off the ground, which is about as clear-cut evidence as one could imagine that the problem was in our assessment of the baseline, and not in the effects of the Act….

I certainly don’t regret having done the study. During the Transition, the little paper helped to build the case both internally and externally for a stimulus of unprecedented proportions. Only in retrospect does saying that our best guess was that unemployment would rise to 9 1⁄2 percent without aggressive action look rosy. At the time, it was scary as hell. It helped convince both our team and the Congress to go for as big a program as possible. And laying down a firm marker that the legislation had to save or create 3 1⁄2 million jobs helped prevent the package from shrinking greatly during Congressional negotiations….

The thing I do regret is that there is still so much unfinished business. I would give anything if unemployment really were down to 8 percent or lower…. That the economy remains as troubled as it is despite aggressive action reflects the fact that this has not been a normal recession. Just as the downturn was uncharted territory, so is its recovery. Because the recession began with interest rates at low levels, we can’t just have interest rates fall and housing, investment, and other interest-sensitive sectors come roaring back as they typically do in recoveries….”

http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2010/09/christie-romer-the-only-surefire-way-for-policymakers-to-substantially-increase-aggregate-demand-in-the-short-run-is-for-the.html

Democratic Pollster: GOP Poised to Seize House and Senate

By: David A. Patten

“…Republicans are on the brink of pulling off a landslide “of potentially epic proportions” that would bring them control of both Houses of Congress and a majority of governorships, Democratic pollster and Fox News commentator Douglas Schoen says.

In an exclusive Newsmax interview, Schoen says he now sees several indications that matters are going from bad to worse for Democrats in this election cycle.

He points to a RealClearPolitics.com analysis that now shows Republicans picking up a net gain of nine seats in the Senate, which would deadlock the upper chamber 50 to 50. And polls show several other GOP candidates, including Carly Fiorina in California and Dino Rossi in Washington state, remain within striking distance, he says.

Schoen, a pollster for former President Bill Clinton, is co-author of the new book “Mad as Hell: How the Tea Party Movement is Fundamentally Remaking Our Two-Party System.”
…”

http://www.newsmax.com/Headline/gop-polls-lead-democrats/2010/10/08/id/373121?s=al&promo_code=AF37-1

 Monetization

“…Monetization is the process of converting or establishing something into legal tender. It usually refers to the printing of banknotes by central banks, but things such as gold, diamonds and emeralds, and art can also be monetized. Even intrinsically worthless items can be made into money, as long as they are difficult to make or acquire. Monetization may also refer to exchanging securities for currency, selling a possession, charging for something that used to be free or making money on goods or services that were previously unprofitable. …”

“…Monetizing debtIn many countries the government has assigned exclusive power to issue or print its national currency to independently operated central banks. For example, in the USA the independently owned and operated Federal Reserve banks do this.[1] Such governments thereby disavow the overly convenient ‘slippery slope’ option of paying their bills by printing new currency. They must instead pay with currency already in circulation, or else finance deficits by issuing new bonds, and selling them to the public or to their central bank so as to acquire the necessary money. For the bonds to end up in the central bank it must conduct an open market purchase. This action increases the monetary base through the money creation process. This process of financing government spending is called monetizing the debt.[2] Monetizing debt is thus a two step process where the government issues debt to finance its spending and the central bank purchases the debt from the public. The public is left with an increased supply of base money.

Effects on inflation

When government deficits are financed through this method of debt monetization the outcome is an increase in the monetary base, or the money supply. If a budget deficit persists for a substantial period of time then the monetary base will also increase, shifting the aggregate demand curve to the right leading to a rise in the price level.[3] When governments intentionally do this, they devalue existing stockpiles of wealth of anyone who is holding assets based in that currency. It is in essence a “tax” as the overall value of their assets decrease due to a loss in spending power. This is known as “inflation tax“.

To summarize: a deficit can be the source of sustained inflation only if it is persistent rather than temporary and if the government finances it by creating money (through monetizing the debt), rather than leaving bonds in the hands of the public.[4]

Examples

Monetizing the debt can be used as a component of quantitative easing strategies, which involve the creation of new currency by the central bank, which may be used to purchase government debt, or can be used in other ways.

However, there can be an insidious effect. As one observer noted:

When governments reach the point where they are borrowing to pay the interest on their borrowing they are coming dangerously close to running a sovereign Ponzi scheme. Ponzi schemes have a way of ending unhappily. To get out of the Ponzi trap, governments will have to increase tax revenues, or cut spending, or monetize the debt–or most likely do some combination of all three. [5] …”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monetization

 Quantitative Easing

“…The term quantitative easing (QE) describes a monetary policy used by central banks to increase the supply of money by increasing the excess reserves of the banking system. This policy is usually invoked when the normal methods to control the money supply have failed, i.e the bank interest rate, discount rate and/or interbank interest rate are either at, or close to, zero.

A central bank implements QE by first crediting its own account with money it creates ex nihilo (“out of nothing”).[1] It then purchases financial assets, including government bonds, agency debt, mortgage-backed securities and corporate bonds, from banks and other financial institutions in a process referred to as open market operations. The purchases, by way of account deposits, give banks the excess reserves required for them to create new money, and thus hopefully induce a stimulation of the economy, by the process of deposit multiplication from increased lending in the fractional reserve banking system.

Risks include the policy being more effective than intended, spurring hyperinflation, or the risk of not being effective enough, if banks opt simply to sit on the additional cash in order to increase their capital reserves in a climate of increasing defaults in their present loan portfolio.[1]

“Quantitative” refers to the fact that a specific quantity of money is being created; “easing” refers to reducing the pressure on banks.[2] However, another explanation is that the name comes from the Japanese-language expression for “stimulatory monetary policy”, which uses the term “easing”.[3] Quantitative easing is sometimes colloquially described as “printing money” although in reality the money is simply created by electronically adding a number to an account. Examples of economies where this policy has been used include Japan during the early 2000s, and the United States, the United Kingdom and the Eurozone during the global financial crisis of 2008–the present, since the programme is suitable for economies where the bank interest rate, discount rate and/or interbank interest rate are either at, or close to, zero

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantitative_easing

Consumer Sovereignty

“…Consumer sovereignty is a term which is used in economics to refer to the rule or sovereignty of consumers in markets as to production of goods. It is the power of consumers to decide what gets produced. People use this term to describe the consumer as the “king,” or ruler, of the market, the one who determines what products will be produced. [1] Also, this term denotes the way in which a consumer ideologically chooses to buy a good or service. Furthermore, the term can be used as either a norm (as to what consumers should be permitted) or a description (as to what consumers are permitted).

In unrestricted markets, those with income or wealth are able to use their purchasing power to motivate producers as what to produce (and how much). Customers do not necessarily have to buy and, if dissatisfied, can take their business elsewhere, while the profit-seeking sellers find that they can make the greatest profit by trying to provide the best possible products for the price (or the lowest possible price for a given product). In the language of cliché, “The one with the gold makes the rules.”

To most neoclassical economists, complete consumer sovereignty is an ideal rather than a reality because of the existence—or even the ubiquity—of market failure. Some economists of the Chicago school and the Austrian school see consumer sovereignty as a reality in a free market economy without interference from government or other non-market institutions, or anti-market institutions such as monopolies or cartels. That is, alleged market failures are seen as being a result of non-market forces.

The term “consumer sovereignty” was coined by William Hutt who firstly used it in his 1936 book “Economists and the Public”. …”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_sovereignty

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Stimulus II: A Sequel America Can’t Afford

 

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The Laffer Curve–Videos

Posted on February 10, 2010. Filed under: Blogroll, Communications, Economics, Education, Employment, Energy, Federal Government, Fiscal Policy, government, government spending, history, Investments, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, media, Monetary Policy, People, Philosophy, Politics, Quotations, Rants, Raves, Regulations, Resources, Taxes, Technology, Video, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , |

 

http://www.heritage.org/research/taxes/bg1765.cfm

The Laffer Curve, Part I: Understanding the Theory

The Laffer Curve, Part II: Understanding the Theory

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Background Articles and Videos

Life on the Downside of the Laffer Curve

Laffer Curve

“…In economics, the Laffer curve is a theoretical representation of the relationship between government revenue raised by taxation and all possible rates of taxation. It is used to illustrate the concept of Taxable Income Elasticity (that taxable income will change in response to changes in the rate of taxation). The curve is constructed by thought experiment. First, the amount of tax revenue raised at the extreme tax rates of 0% and 100% is considered. It is clear that a 0% tax rate raises no revenue, but the Laffer curve hypothesis is that a 100% tax rate will also generate no revenue because at such a rate there is no longer any incentive for a rational taxpayer to earn any income, thus the revenue raised will be 100% of nothing. If both a 0% rate and 100% rate of taxation generate no revenue, it follows that there must exist a rate in between where tax revenue would be a maximum. The Laffer curve is typically represented as a stylized graph which starts at 0% tax, zero revenue, rises to a maximum rate of revenue raised at an intermediate rate of taxation and then falls again to zero revenue at a 100% tax rate.

One potential result of the Laffer curve is that increasing taxes beyond a certain point will become counterproductive for raising further tax revenue because of diminishing returns. A hypothetical Laffer curve for any given economy can only be estimated and such estimates are sometimes controversial. The Laffer curve is associated with supply side economics, where its use in debates over rates of taxation has also been controversial.

The Laffer curve was popularised by Jude Wanniski in the 1970s, with Wanniski naming the curve after the work of Arthur Laffer. Laffer later pointed out that concept was not original, noting similar ideas in the writings of both 14th century North African polymath Ibn Khaldun—who discussed the idea in his 1377 Muqaddimah—and John Maynard Keynes.[1] …”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laffer_curve

The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future

by Arthur B. Laffer

Backgrounder #1765

“…A more recent version (of incredible clarity) was written by John Maynard Keynes:

When, on the contrary, I show, a little elaborately, as in the ensuing chapter, that to create wealth will increase the national income and that a large proportion of any increase in the national income will accrue to an Exchequer, amongst whose largest outgoings is the payment of incomes to those who are unemployed and whose receipts are a proportion of the incomes of those who are occupied…

Nor should the argument seem strange that taxation may be so high as to defeat its object, and that, given sufficient time to gather the fruits, a reduction of taxation will run a better chance than an increase of balancing the budget. For to take the opposite view today is to resemble a manufacturer who, running at a loss, decides to raise his price, and when his declining sales increase the loss, wrapping himself in the rectitude of plain arithmetic, decides that prudence requires him to raise the price still more–and who, when at last his account is balanced with nought on both sides, is still found righteously declaring that it would have been the act of a gambler to reduce the price when you were already making a loss.2 …”

http://www.heritage.org/research/taxes/bg1765.cfm

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Investors

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Tom Woods and Murry Rothbard on Keynesian Predictions vs. American History–Lessons President Obama Never Learned–Videos

Posted on February 7, 2010. Filed under: Blogroll, Communications, Demographics, Economics, Education, Employment, Federal Government, Fiscal Policy, Foreign Policy, government, government spending, history, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, media, Monetary Policy, People, Philosophy, Politics, Quotations, Rants, Raves, Regulations, Video, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , |

“The fallacies implied in the Keynesian full-employment doctrine are, in a new attire, essentially the same errors which [Adam] Smith and [Jean Baptiste] Say long since demolished.”

“What he really  did was to write an apology for the prevailing policies of governments.”

~Ludwig von Mises writing about John M. Keynes

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“Keynes did not add any new idea to the body of inflationist fallacies, a thousand times refuted by economists… He merely knew how to cloak the plea for inflation and credit expansion in the sophisticated terminology of mathematical economics.”

“In old fashioned language, Keynes proposed cheating the workers.”

Ludwig von Mises

Background Articles and Videos

Keynesian Economics

“…Keynesian economics (pronounced /ˈkeɪnziən/, also called Keynesianism and Keynesian Theory) is a macroeconomic theory based on the ideas of 20th-century British economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynesian economics argues that private sector decisions sometimes lead to inefficient macroeconomic outcomes and therefore advocates active policy responses by the public sector, including monetary policy actions by the central bank and fiscal policy actions by the government to stabilize output over the business cycle.[1] The theories forming the basis of Keynesian economics were first presented in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, published in 1936; the interpretations of Keynes are contentious, and several schools of thought claim his legacy.

Keynesian economics advocates a mixed economy—predominantly private sector, but with a large role of government and public sector—and served as the economic model during the latter part of the Great Depression, World War II, and the post-war economic expansion (1945–1973), though it lost some influence following the stagflation of the 1970s. As a middle way between laissez-faire capitalism and socialism, it has been and continues to be attacked from both the right and the left.[2][3] The advent of the global financial crisis in 2007 has caused a resurgence in Keynesian thought. The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and other global leaders have used the theory of Keynesian economics to justify intervening in the world economy.[4]

…”

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keynesian_economics

 

Austrian School

“…The Austrian School (also known as the Vienna School or the Psychological School) is a non-mainstream school of economic thought that emphasizes the spontaneous organizing power of the price mechanism or price system. Austrians hold that the complexity of human behavior makes mathematical modeling of the evolving market extremely difficult (or undecidable) and advocate a laissez faire approach to the economy. Austrian School economists advocate the strict enforcement of voluntary contractual agreements between economic agents, and hold that commercial transactions should be subject to the smallest possible imposition of forces they consider to be coercive (in particular the smallest possible amount of government intervention).

The Austrian School derives its name from its predominantly Austrian founders and early supporters, including Carl Menger, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Ludwig von Mises. Other prominent Austrian School economists of the 20th century include Henry Hazlitt, Murray Rothbard, and Nobel Laureate Friedrich Hayek.[1] Though called ‘Austrian’ today, supporters or proponents of the Austrian School can come from any part of the world. The Austrian School was influential in the early 20th century and was for a time considered by many to be part of mainstream economics. Austrian contributions to mainstream economic thought include involvement in the development of the neoclassical theory of value, including the subjective theory of value on which it is based, as well as contributions to the “economic calculation debate” which concerns the allocative properties of a centrally planned economy versus a decentralized free market economy.[2] From the middle of the 20th century onwards, it has been considered a heterodox school[3][4] and arguably contributes relatively little to mainstream economic thought.[5][6]

Austrian School economists advocate strict adherence to methodological individualism, which they describe as analyzing human action from the perspective of individual agents.[7] Austrian School economists argue that the only means of arriving at a valid economic theory is to derive it logically from basic principles of human action, a method called praxeology. Additionally, whereas natural experiments are often utilized within mainstream economics, Austrian economists contend that testability in economics is virtually impossible since it relies on human actors who cannot be placed in a lab setting without altering their would-be actions. Mainstream economists are generally critical of methodologies used by modern Austrian economics.[5]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_School

Why You’ve Never Heard of the Great Depression of 1920

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Rothbard On Keynes–Videos

Posted on October 25, 2009. Filed under: Blogroll, Communications, Economics, Employment, Fiscal Policy, government spending, history, Investments, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Monetary Policy, People, Philosophy, Politics, Quotations, Rants, Raves, Regulations, Resources, Video, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , |

rothbard