Ann Swidler — Introduction to Sociology –University of California, Berkeley — Videos

Posted on January 29, 2017. Filed under: American History, Articles, Blogroll, College, College Courses Online Videos, Congress, Constitution, Culture, Economics, Education, Elections, Employment, Faith, Family, Freedom, Friends, government, government spending, history, History of Economic Thought, Language, Law, liberty, Life, media, People, Philosophy, Politics, Rants, Raves, Sociology, Sociology, Video, Wealth, Welfare, Wisdom, Work, Writing | Tags: , , , , , , , |

Image result for Ann Swidler sociologistsImage result for Ann SwidlerImage result for Ann Swidler

Sociology 1 – Lecture 1

Sociology 1 – Lecture 2

Sociology 1 – Lecture 3

Sociology 1 – Lecture 4

Lecture 5

Milgram Obedience Study

The Milgram Experiment 1962 Full Documentary

Milgram Experiment (Derren Brown)

Sociology 1 – Lecture 6

Sociology 1 – Lecture 7

Sociology 1 – Lecture 8

Sociology 1 – Lecture 9

Sociology 1 – Lecture 10

Sociology 1 – Lecture 11

Sociology 1 – Lecture 12

Sociology 1 – Lecture 13

Review Lecture

Midterm Exam

Sociology 1 – Lecture 14

Sociology 1 – Lecture 15

Sociology 1 – Lecture 16

Sociology 1 – Lecture 17

Sociology 1 – Lecture 18

Sociology 1 – Lecture 19

Sociology 1 – Lecture 20

Sociology 1 – Lecture 21

Sociology 1 – Lecture 22

Sociology 1 – Lecture 23

Sociology 1 – Lecture 24

Sociology 1 – Lecture 25

Sociology 1 – Lecture 26

Ann Swidler

Ann Swidler

Professor
Research Interests:
Culture, religion, theory, institutionalization, African responses to HIV/AIDS
Office:
444 Barrows
Curriculum Vitae:
Profile:

Ann Swidler (PhD UC Berkeley; BA Harvard) studies the interplay of culture and institutions. She asks how culture works–both how people use it and how it shapes social life. She is best known for her books Talk of Love, and the co-authored works Habits of the Heart and The Good Society, as well as her classic article, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies” (American Sociological Review, 1986).  Her most recent book, Talk of Love: How Culture Matters (Chicago, 2001), examines how actors select among elements of their cultural repertoires and how culture gets organized “from the outside in” by Codes, Contexts, and Institutions. In the co-authored Habits of the Heart and The Good Society, she and her collaborators analyzed the consequences of American individualism for individual selfhood, community, and political and economic institutions. With colleagues from the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, she has been engaged in an ambitious project to understand the societal determinants of human health and well being.

Swidler’s current research is on cultural and institutional responses to the AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Swidler’s research on AIDS Africa has led both to work on NGOs and the international response to the epidemic and to work on transactional sex, cultural barriers to condom use, and factors that have made the responses to the epidemic more successful in some African countries than in others. She is interested in how the massive international AIDS effort in sub-Saharan Africa–the infusion of money, organizations, programs and projects–interacts with existing cultural and institutional patterns to create new dilemmas and new possibilities. She is exploring these issues from two directions:

From the international side, she examines how the international AIDS effort is structured (who provides money to whom, how collaborative networks are structured, how programs get organized on the ground); why some interventions are favored over others; and what organizational forms international funders opt for.  From the African side, she is exploring why the NGO sector is more robust in some countries than others; when international AIDS efforts stimulate vs. impede or derail local efforts; and what organizational syncretisms sometimes emerge.

Swidler’s most recent work examines African religion and the institutions of African chieftaincy in order to understand the cultural and religious sources of collective capacities for social action.

Professor Swidler teaches sociology of culture, sociology of religion, and sociological theory. Her interests increasingly touch on political sociology, development, and sociology of science and medicine as well.

Representative Publications:

Books

  • 2001 Talk of Love: How Culture Matters (University of Chicago Press).
  • 2001 (eds.), Meaning and Modernity: Religion, Polity, Self (University of California Press). (with Madsen, Sullivan, Tipton)
  • 1996 Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth (Princeton University Press). (with Fischer, Hout, Jankowski, Lucas, and Voss)
  • 1991 The Good Society (Alfred A. Knopf). (with Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, and Tipton)
  • 1985 Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (University of California Press). (with Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, and Tipton)
  • 1979 Organization Without Authority: Dilemmas of Social Control in Free Schools (Harvard University Press).

Selected Articles and Chapters

Read Full Post | Make a Comment ( None so far )

John Geanakoplos — Financial Theory (ECON 251) — Yale University — Videos

Posted on November 9, 2015. Filed under: Articles, Blogroll, Business, Communications, Economics | Tags: , , , , , |

About the Course

This course attempts to explain the role and the importance of the financial system in the global economy. Rather than separating off the financial world from the rest of the economy, financial equilibrium is studied as an extension of economic equilibrium. The course also gives a picture of the kind of thinking and analysis done by hedge funds.

VIEW CLASS SESSIONS »

Course Structure

This Yale College course, taught on campus twice per week for 75 minutes, was recorded for Open Yale Courses in Fall 2009.

Course Materials

Download all course pages [zip – 10MB]

Video and audio elements from this course are also available on:

About Professor John Geanakoplos

John Geanakoplos is James Tobin Professor of Economics at Yale University. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University in 1980. He has been Director of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, co-Director of Hellenic Studies Program at Yale, chairman of the science steering committee at the Santa Fe Institute and Managing Director of Fixed Income Research at Kidder, Peabody & Co. Prizes he received include the Samuelson Prize (1999), and the Bodossaki Prize in economics (1994). He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (since 1999) and was visiting professor at MSRI in the UC Berkeley, Churchill College, Cambridge, the University of Pennsylvania, Harvard, Stanford, and MIT. He was one of the founding partners of Ellington Capital Management, where he remains a partner. One of his current research topics is the leverage cycle.

Syllabus

Professor

John Geanakoplos, James Tobin Professor of Economics

Description

This course attempts to explain the role and the importance of the financial system in the global economy. Rather than separating off the financial world from the rest of the economy, financial equilibrium is studied as an extension of economic equilibrium. The course also gives a picture of the kind of thinking and analysis done by hedge funds.

Texts

Bodie, Zvi, and Robert C. Merton. Finance, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000.

Chance, Don M. An Introduction to Derivatives, 3rd edition, Fort Worth, Texas: The Dryden Press, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1995.

DeGroot, Morris H. Probability and Statistics, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975.

Elton, Edwin J. and Martin J. Gruber. Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis, 5th edition, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995.

Fabozzi, Frank. Handbook of Mortgage Backed Securities, 6th edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001.

Fabozzi, Frank J. Handbook of Fixed Income Securities, 6th edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000.

Hull, John C. Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, 5th edition, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002.

Jarrow, Robert and Stuart Turnbull. Derivative Securities, 2nd edition, Cincinatti, Ohio: South-Western College Publishing, 2000.

Luenberger, David G. Investment Science, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Malkiel, Burton. A Random Walk Down Wall Street, New York: W.W. Norton, 1999.

Pliska, Stanley R. Introduction to Mathematical Finance. Discrete Time Models, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.

Ross, Stephen, Randolph Westerfield, and Jeffrey Jaffe. Corporate Finance, New York: Irwin, McGraw Hill, 1999.

Sharpe, William F., Gordon J. Alexander, and Jeffery V. Bailey. Investments, 6th edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999.

Swensen, David F. Pioneering Portfolio Management. An Unconventional Approach to Institutional Investment, New York: The Free Press, 2000.

Taggart, Jr, Robert A. Quantitative Analysis for Investment Management, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996.

Tobin, James with Stephen Golub. Money, Credit, and Capital, Boston: Irwin-McGraw Hill, 1998.

Requirements

Math in the course
Finance is a quantitative subject that can only be understood by solving concrete problems. But it uses mostly elementary mathematics. You need to be good at arithmetic (the distributive law is the basis for double entry bookkeeping), and be able to solve two or three simultaneous linear equations (x + y =10; x – y = 4. Solve for x and y). You must also be able to differentiate three elementary functions: dxn/dx =nxn-1; d ln x/dx = 1/x; deax/dx= aeax. The functions “log” and its inverse “exponential base e” are so important to finance because of continuous compounding of interest. Though they may be the most important functions in all of mathematics, they were discovered by bankers. You will also be taught how to use Excel.

Course reading
The textbook readings are meant to clarify or elaborate material presented in class, or to give you an idea of alternative presentations of the same material. For example, we might discuss bonds, how they pay, and how to value them. The readings might cover the specifics of particular bond markets (local, state, different countries), how they are taxed etc. There is no official textbook. In the past I have usedCorporate Finance, by former Yale professor Steve Ross and two co-authors, and two others, by Sharpe and Merton, both Nobel Prize winners in economics (for contributions to financial economics). Their books were regarded as insufficiently quantitative, but might be useful to browse in. Another very good book is by Luenberger, but it is a little too advanced for this course. I have listed a dozen or so good alternatives and supplements, to give you an idea of where you could read more if you become interested. None of these is required. You should be able to follow the course simply by attending the lectures, reading the web notes, and doing the problem sets.

Grading

Problem sets: 20%
Midterm exam 1: 20%
Midterm exam 2: 20%
Final Exam: 40%

1. Why Finance?

This lecture gives a brief history of the young field of financial theory, which began in business schools quite separate from economics, and of my growing interest in the field and in Wall Street. A cornerstone of standard financial theory is the efficient markets hypothesis, but that has been discredited by the financial crisis of 2007-09. This lecture describes the kinds of questions standard financial theory nevertheless answers well. It also introduces the leverage cycle as a critique of standard financial theory and as an explanation of the crisis. The lecture ends with a class experiment illustrating a situation in which the efficient markets hypothesis works surprisingly well.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Course Introduction
10:16 – Chapter 2. Collateral in the Standard Theory
17:54 – Chapter 3. Leverage in Housing Prices
33:47 – Chapter 4. Examples of Finance
46:13 – Chapter 5. Why Study Finance?
50:13 – Chapter 6. Logistics
58:22 – Chapter 7. A Experiment of the Financial Market

Complete course materials are available at the Yale Online website: online.yale.edu

2. Utilities, Endowments, and Equilibrium

This lecture explains what an economic model is, and why it allows for counterfactual reasoning and often yields paradoxical conclusions. Typically, equilibrium is defined as the solution to a system of simultaneous equations. The most important economic model is that of supply and demand in one market, which was understood to some extent by the Ancient Greeks and even by Shakespeare. That model accurately fits the experiment from the last class, as well as many other markets, such as the Paris Bourse, online trading, the commodities pit, and a host of others. The modern theory of general economic equilibrium described in this lecture extends that model to continuous quantities and multiple commodities. It is the bedrock on which we will build the model of financial equilibrium in subsequent lectures.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction
07:04 – Chapter 2. Why Model?
13:30 – Chapter 3. History of Markets
24:41 – Chapter 4. Supply and Demand and General Equilibrium
37:59 – Chapter 5. Marginal Utility
45:20 – Chapter 6. Endowments and Equilibrium

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

3. Computing Equilibrium

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

Our understanding of the economy will be more tangible and vivid if we can in principle explain all the economic decisions of every agent in the economy. This lecture demonstrates, with two examples, how the theory lets us calculate equilibrium prices and allocations in a simple economy, either by hand or using a computer. In future lectures we shall extend this method so as to compute equilibrium in financial economies with stocks and bonds and other financial assets.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction
02:48 – Chapter 2. Welfare and Utility in Free Markets
16:52 – Chapter 3. Equilibrium amidst Consumption and Endowments
32:43 – Chapter 4. Anticipation of Prices
52:53 – Chapter 5. Log Utilities and Computer Models of Equilibrium

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

4. Efficiency, Assets, and Time

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

Over time, economists’ justifications for why free markets are a good thing have changed. In the first few classes, we saw how under some conditions, the competitive allocation maximizes the sum of agents’ utilities. When it was found that this property didn’t hold generally, the idea of Pareto efficiency was developed. This class reviews two proofs that equilibrium is Pareto efficient, looking at the arguments of economists Edgeworth, and Arrow-Debreu. The lecture suggests that if a broadening of the economic model invalidated the sum of utilities justification of free markets, a further broadening might invalidate the Pareto efficiency justification of unregulated markets. Finally, Professor Geanakoplos discusses how Irving Fisher introduced two crucial ingredients of finance,–time and assets–into the standard economic equilibrium model.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Is the Free Market Good? A Mathematical Perspective
11:20 – Chapter 2. The Pareto Efficiency and Equilibrium
38:42 – Chapter 3. Fundamental Theorem of Economics
46:27 – Chapter 4. Shortcomings of the Fundamental Theorem
52:39 – Chapter 5. History of Mathematical Economics
01:00:21 – Chapter 6. Elements of Financial Models

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

5. Present Value Prices and the Real Rate of Interest

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

Philosophers and theologians have railed against interest for thousands of years. But that is because they didn’t understand what causes interest. Irving Fisher built a model of financial equilibrium on top of general equilibrium (GE) by introducing time and assets into the GE model. He saw that trade between apples today and apples next year is completely analogous to trade between apples and oranges today. Similarly he saw that in a world without uncertainty, assets like stocks and bonds are significant only for the dividends they pay in the future, just like an endowment of multiple goods. With these insights Fisher was able to show that he could solve his model of financial equilibrium for interest rates, present value prices, asset prices, and allocations with precisely the same techniques we used to solve for general equilibrium. He concluded that the real rate of interest is a relative price, and just like any other relative price, is determined by market participants’ preferences and endowments, an insight that runs counter to the intuitions held by philosophers throughout much of human history. His theory did not explain the nominal rate of interest or inflation, but only their ratio.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Implications of General Equilibrium
03:08 – Chapter 2. Interest Rates and Stock Prices
22:06 – Chapter 3. Defining Financial Equilibrium
33:41 – Chapter 4. Inflation and Arbitrage
43:35 – Chapter 5. Present Value Prices
57:44 – Chapter 6. Real and Nominal Interest Rates

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

6. Irving Fisher’s Impatience Theory of Interest

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

Building on the general equilibrium setup solved in the last week, this lecture looks in depth at the relationships between productivity, patience, prices, allocations, and nominal and real interest rates. The solutions to three of Fisher’s famous examples are given: What happens to interest rates when people become more or less patient? What happens when they expect to receive windfall riches sometime in the future? And, what happens when wealth in an economy is redistributed from the poor to the rich?

00:00 – Chapter 1. From Financial to General Equilbrium
06:44 – Chapter 2. Applying the Principle of No Arbitrage
23:50 – Chapter 3. The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
39:25 – Chapter 4. Effects of Technology in Fisher Economy
51:31 – Chapter 5. The Impatience Theory of Interest
01:06:48 – Chapter 6. Conclusion

 

7. Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice and Collateral, Present Value and the Vocabulary of Finance

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

While economists didn’t have a good theory of interest until Irving Fisher came along, and didn’t understand the role of collateral until even later, Shakespeare understood many of these things hundreds of years earlier. The first half of this lecture examines Shakespeare’s economic insights in depth, and sees how they sometimes prefigured or even surpassed Irving Fisher’s intuitions. The second half of this lecture uses the concept of present value to define and explain some of the basic financial instruments: coupon bonds, annuities, perpetuities, and mortgages.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction
01:23 – Chapter 2. Contracts in Merchant of Venice
20:23 – Chapter 3. The Doubling Rule
36:07 – Chapter 4. Coupon Bonds, Annuities, and Perpetuities
54:24 – Chapter 5. Mortgage
59:15 – Chapter 6. Applications of Financial Instruments

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

8. How a Long-Lived Institution Figures an Annual Budget. Yield

In the 1990s, Yale discovered that it was faced with a deferred maintenance problem: the university hadn’t properly planned for important renovations in many buildings. A large, one-time expenditure would be needed. How should Yale have covered these expenses? This lecture begins by applying the lessons learned so far to show why Yale’s initial forecast budget cuts were overly pessimistic. In the second half of the class, we turn to the problem of measuring investment performance, and examine the strengths and weaknesses of various measures of yield, including yield-to-maturity and current yield.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Yale’s Budget Set
03:37 – Chapter 2. Analysis of Yale’s Expenditures and Endowment
31:51 – Chapter 3. Yield to Maturity and Internal Rate of Return
51:52 – Chapter 4. Assessing Performance of Coupon Bond

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

9. Yield Curve Arbitrage

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

Where can you find the market rates of interest (or equivalently the zero coupon bond prices) for every maturity? This lecture shows how to infer them from the prices of Treasury bonds of every maturity, first using the method of replication, and again using the principle of duality. Treasury bond prices, or at least Treasury bond yields, are published every day in major newspapers. From the zero coupon bond prices one can immediately infer the forward interest rates. Under certain conditions these forward rates can tell us a lot about how traders think the prices of Treasury bonds will evolve in the future.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Defining Yield
09:07 – Chapter 2. Assessing Market Interest Rate from Treasury Bonds
35:46 – Chapter 3. Zero Coupon Bonds and the Principle of Duality
50:31 – Chapter 4. Forward Interest Rate
01:10:05 – Chapter 5. Calculating Prices in the Future and Conclusion

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

10. Dynamic Present Value

 

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

In this lecture we move from present values to dynamic present values. If interest rates evolve along the forward curve, then the present value of the remaining cash flows of any instrument will evolve in a predictable trajectory. The fastest way to compute these is by backward induction. Dynamic present values help us understand the returns of various trading strategies, and how marking-to-market can prevent some subtle abuses of the system. They explain how mortgages work, why they’re called amortizing, and what is meant by the remaining balance. In the second half of the lecture we turn to an important application of present value thinking: an analysis of the troubles facing the Social Security system.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Dynamic Present Values
08:49 – Chapter 2. Marking to Market
39:53 – Chapter 3. Mortgages and Backward Induction
50:42 – Chapter 4. Remaining Balances and Amortization
54:52 – Chapter 5. Weaknesses in the U.S. Social Security System

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

11. Social Security

 

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

This lecture continues the analysis of Social Security started at the end of the last class. We describe the creation of the system in 1938 by Franklin Roosevelt and Frances Perkins and its current financial troubles. For many democrats Social Security is the most successful government program ever devised and for many Republicans Social Security is a bankrupt program that needs to be privatized. Is there any way to reconcile the views of Democrats and Republicans? How did the system get into so much financial trouble? We will see that the mess becomes quite clear when examined with the proper present value approach. Present value analysis reveals the flaws in the three most popular analyses of Social Security, that the financial breakdown is the fault of the baby boomers, that privatization would bring young investors a better return than they anticipate getting from their social security contributions, and that privatization is impossible without compromising today’s retired workers.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction
03:53 – Chapter 2. The Development of the U.S. Social Security System
19:16 – Chapter 3. Economic Imbalances in Social Security
38:48 – Chapter 4. Root Causes of Income Transfer in Social Security
01:05:21 – Chapter 5. Privatization of U.S. Social Security

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

12. Overlapping Generations Models of the Economy

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

In order for Social Security to work, people have to believe there’s some possibility that the world will last forever, so that each old generation will have a young generation to support it. The overlapping generations model, invented by Allais and Samuelson but here augmented with land, represents such a situation. Financial equilibrium can again be reduced to general equilibrium. At first glance it would seem that the model requires a solution of an infinite number of supply equals demand equations, one for each time period. But by assuming stationarity, the whole analysis can be reduced to one equation. In this mathematical framework we reach an even more precise and subtle understanding of Social Security and the real rate of interest. We find that Social Security likely increases the real rate of interest. The presence of land, an infinitely lived asset that pays a perpetual dividend, forces the real rate of interest to be positive, exposing the flaw in Samuelson’s contention that Social Security is a giant, yet beneficial, Ponzi scheme where each generation can win by perpetually deferring a growing cost.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction to the Overlapping Generation Model
12:59 – Chapter 2. Financial and General Equilibrium in Social Security
26:37 – Chapter 3. Present Value Analysis of Social Security
59:24 – Chapter 4. Real Rate of Interest and Social Security

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

13. Demography and Asset Pricing: Will the Stock Market Decline when the Baby Boomers Retire?

 

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

In this lecture, we use the overlapping generations model from the previous class to see, mathematically, how demographic changes can influence interest rates and asset prices. We evaluate Tobin’s statement that a perpetually growing population could solve the Social Security problem, and resolve, in a surprising way, a classical argument about the link between birth rates and the level of the stock market. Lastly, we finish by laying some of the philosophical and statistical groundwork for dealing with uncertainty.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Stationarity and Equilibrium in the Overlapping Generations Model
16:38 – Chapter 2. Evaluating Tobin’s Thoughts on Social Security
35:07 – Chapter 3. Birth Rates and Stock Market Levels
01:02:30 – Chapter 4. Philosophical and Statistical Framework of Uncertainty

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

14. Quantifying Uncertainty and Risk

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

Until now, the models we’ve used in this course have focused on the case where everyone can perfectly forecast future economic conditions. Clearly, to understand financial markets, we have to incorporate uncertainty into these models. The first half of this lecture continues reviewing the key statistical concepts that we’ll need to be able to think seriously about uncertainty, including expectation, variance, and covariance. We apply these concepts to show how diversification can reduce risk exposure. Next we show how expectations can be iterated through time to rapidly compute conditional expectations: if you think the Yankees have a 60% chance of winning any game against the Dodgers, what are the odds the Yankees will win a seven game series once they are up 2 games to 1? Finally we allow the interest rate, the most important variable in the economy according to Irving Fisher, to be uncertain. We ask whether interest rate uncertainty tends to make a dollar in the distant future more valuable or less valuable.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Expectation, Variance, and Covariance
19:06 – Chapter 2. Diversification and Risk Exposure
33:54 – Chapter 3. Conditional Expectation
53:39 – Chapter 4. Uncertainty in Interest Rates

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

15. Uncertainty and the Rational Expectations Hypothesis

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

According to the rational expectations hypothesis, traders know the probabilities of future events, and value uncertain future payoffs by discounting their expected value at the riskless rate of interest. Under this hypothesis the best predictor of a firm’s valuation in the future is its stock price today. In one famous test of this hypothesis, it was found that detailed weather forecasts could not be used to improve on contemporaneous orange prices as a predictor of future orange prices, but that orange prices could improve contemporaneous weather forecasts. Under the rational expectations hypothesis you can infer more about the odds of corporate or sovereign bonds defaulting by looking at their prices than by reading about the financial condition of their issuers.

00:00 – Chapter 1. The Rational Expectations Hypothesis
12:18 – Chapter 2. Dependence on Prices in a Certain World
24:42 – Chapter 3. Implications of Uncertain Discount Rates and Hyperbolic Discounting
46:53 – Chapter 4. Uncertainties of Default

On the other hand, when discount rates rather than payoffs are uncertain, today’s one year rate grossly overestimates the long run annualized rate. If today’s one year interest rate is 4%, and if the one year interest rate follows a geometric random walk, then the value today of one dollar in T years is described in the long run by the hyperbolic function 1/ √T, which is much larger than the exponential function 1/(1.04)T, no matter what the constant K. Hyperbolic discounting is the term used to describe the tendency of animals and humans to value the distant future much more than would be implied by (exponentially) discounting at a constant rate such as 4%. Hyperbolic discounting can justify expenses taken today to improve the environment in 500 years that could not be justified under exponential discounting.

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

16. Backward Induction and Optimal Stopping Times

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

In the first part of the lecture we wrap up the previous discussion of implied default probabilities, showing how to calculate them quickly by using the same duality trick we used to compute forward interest rates, and showing how to interpret them as spreads in the forward rates. The main part of the lecture focuses on the powerful tool of backward induction, once used in the early 1900s by the mathematician Zermelo to prove the existence of an optimal strategy in chess. We explore its application in a series of optimal stopping problems, starting with examples quite distant from economics such as how to decide when it is time to stop dating and get married. In each case we find that the option to continue is surprisingly valuable.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Calculating Default Probabilities
14:58 – Chapter 2. Relationship Between Defaults and Forward Rates
28:09 – Chapter 3. Zermelo, Chess, and Backward Induction
36:48 – Chapter 4. Optimal Stopping Games and Backward Induction
01:06:47 – Chapter 5. The Optimal Marriage Problem

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

17. Callable Bonds and the Mortgage Prepayment Option

This lecture is about optimal exercise strategies for callable bonds, which are bonds bundled with an option that allows the borrower to pay back the loan early, if she chooses. Using backward induction, we calculate the borrower’s optimal strategy and the value of the option. As with the simple examples in the previous lecture, the option value turns out to be very large. The most important callable bond is the fixed rate amortizing mortgage; calling a mortgage means prepaying your remaining balance. We examine how high bankers must set the mortgage rate in order to compensate for the prepayment option they give homeowners. Looking at data on mortgage rates we see that mortgage borrowers often fail to prepay optimally.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction to Callable Bonds and Mortgage Options
12:14 – Chapter 2. Assessing Option Value via Backward Induction
42:44 – Chapter 3. Fixed Rate Amortizing Mortgage
57:51 – Chapter 4. How Banks Set Mortgage Rates for Prepayers

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

18. Modeling Mortgage Prepayments and Valuing Mortgages

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

A mortgage involves making a promise, backing it with collateral, and defining a way to dissolve the promise at prearranged terms in case you want to end it by prepaying. The option to prepay, the refinancing option, makes the mortgage much more complicated than a coupon bond, and therefore something that a hedge fund could make money trading. In this lecture we discuss how to build and calibrate a model to forecast prepayments in order to value mortgages. Old fashioned economists still make non-contingent forecasts, like the recent predictions that unemployment would peak at 8%. A model makes contingent forecasts. The old prepayment models fit a curve to historical data estimating how sensitive aggregate prepayments have been to changes in the interest rate. The modern agent based approach to modeling rationalizes behavior at the individual level and allows heterogeneity among individual types. From either kind of model we see that mortgages are very risky securities, even in the absence of default. This raises the question of how investors and banks should hedge them.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Review of Mortgages
03:20 – Chapter 2. Complications of Refinancing Mortgages
19:26 – Chapter 3. Non-contingent Forecasts of Mortgage Value
28:40 – Chapter 4. The Modern Behavior Rationalizing Model of Mortgage Value
54:07 – Chapter 5. Risk in Mortgages and Hedging

19. History of the Mortgage Market: A Personal Narrative

Professor Geanakoplos explains how, as a mathematical economist, he became interested in the practical world of mortgage securities, and how he became the Head of Fixed Income Securities at Kidder Peabody, and then one of six founding partners of Ellington Capital Management. During that time Kidder Peabody became the biggest issuer of collateralized mortgage obligations, and Ellington became the biggest mortgage hedge fund. He describes securitization and trenching of mortgage pools, the role of investment banks and hedge funds, and the evolution of the prime and subprime mortgage markets. He also discusses agent based models of prepayments in the mortgage market.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Mortgage Securities Market
17:01 – Chapter 2. Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
22:44 – Chapter 3. Modeling Prepayment Tendencies at Kidder Peabody
35:40 – Chapter 4. The Rise of Ellington Capital Management and the Role of Hedge Funds
52:52 – Chapter 5. The Leverage Cycle and the Subprime Mortgage Market
01:13:51 – Chapter 6. The Credit Default Swap
01:18:36 – Chapter 7. Conclusion

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

20. Dynamic Hedging

Suppose you have a perfect model of contingent mortgage prepayments, like the one built in the previous lecture. You are willing to bet on your prepayment forecasts, but not on which way interest rates will move. Hedging lets you mitigate the extra risk, so that you only have to rely on being right about what you know. The trouble with hedging is that there are so many things that can happen over the 30 year life of a mortgage. Even if interest rates can do only two things each year, in 30 years there are over a billion interest rate scenarios. It would seem impossible to hedge against so many contingencies. The principle of dynamic hedging shows that it is enough to hedge yourself against the two things that can happen next year (which is far less onerous), provided that each following year you adjust the hedge to protect against what might occur one year after that. To illustrate the issue we reconsider the World Series problem from a previous lecture. Suppose you know the Yankees have a 60% chance of beating the Dodgers in each game and that you can bet any amount at 60:40 odds on individual games with other bookies. A naive fan is willing to bet on the Dodgers winning the whole Series at even odds. You have a 71% chance of winning a bet against the fan, but bad luck can cause you to lose anyway. What bets on individual games should you make with the bookies to lock in your expected profit from betting against the fan on the whole Series?

00:00 – Chapter 1. Fundamentals of Hedging
15:38 – Chapter 2. The Principle of Dynamic Hedging
24:26 – Chapter 3. How Does Hedging Generate Profit?
43:48 – Chapter 4. Maintaining Profits from Dynamic Hedging
54:08 – Chapter 5. Dynamic Hedging in the Bond Market
01:10:30 – Chapter 6. Conclusion

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

21. Dynamic Hedging and Average Life

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

This lecture reviews the intuition from the previous class, where the idea of dynamic hedging was introduced. We learn why the crucial idea of dynamic hedging is marking to market: even when there are millions of possible scenarios that could come to pass over time, by hedging a little bit each step of the way, the number of possibilities becomes much more manageable. We conclude the discussion of hedging by introducing a measure for the average life of a bond, and show how traders use this to figure out the appropriate hedge against interest rate movements.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Review of Dynamic Hedging
09:15 – Chapter 2. Dynamic Hedging as Marking-to-Market
19:55 – Chapter 3. Dynamic Hedging and Prepayment Models in the Market
30:50 – Chapter 4. Appropriate Hedges against Interest Rate Movements
01:05:15 – Chapter 5. Measuring the Average Life of a Bond

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

22. Risk Aversion and the Capital Asset Pricing Theorem

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

Until now we have ignored risk aversion. The Bernoulli brothers were the first to suggest a tractable way of representing risk aversion. They pointed out that an explanation of the St. Petersburg paradox might be that people care about expected utility instead of expected income, where utility is some concave function, such as the logarithm. One of the most famous and important models in financial economics is the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which can be derived from the hypothesis that every agent has a (different) quadratic utility. Much of the modern mutual fund industry is based on the implications of this model. The model describes what happens to prices and asset holdings in general equilibrium when the underlying risks can’t be hedged in the aggregate. It turns out that the tools we developed in the beginning of this course provide an answer to this question.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Risk Aversion
03:35 – Chapter 2. The Bernoulli Explanation of Risk
12:38 – Chapter 3. Foundations of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
22:15 – Chapter 4. Accounting for Risk in Prices and Asset Holdings in General Equilibrium
54:11 – Chapter 5. Implications of Risk in Hedging
01:09:40 – Chapter 6. Diversification in Equilibrium and Conclusion

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

23. The Mutual Fund Theorem and Covariance Pricing Theorems

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

This lecture continues the analysis of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, building up to two key results. One, the Mutual Fund Theorem proved by Tobin, describes the optimal portfolios for agents in the economy. It turns out that every investor should try to maximize the Sharpe ratio of his portfolio, and this is achieved by a combination of money in the bank and money invested in the “market” basket of all existing assets. The market basket can be thought of as one giant index fund or mutual fund. This theorem precisely defines optimal diversification. It led to the extraordinary growth of mutual funds like Vanguard. The second key result of CAPM is called the covariance pricing theorem because it shows that the price of an asset should be its discounted expected payoff less a multiple of its covariance with the market. The riskiness of an asset is therefore measured by its covariance with the market, rather than by its variance. We conclude with the shocking answer to a puzzle posed during the first class, about the relative valuations of a large industrial firm and a risky pharmaceutical start-up.

00:00 – Chapter 1. The Mutual Fund Theorem
03:47 – Chapter 2. Covariance Pricing Theorem and Diversification
25:19 – Chapter 3. Deriving Elements of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
40:25 – Chapter 4. Mutual Fund Theorem in Math and Its Significance
52:36 – Chapter 5. The Sharpe Ratio and Independent Risks
01:04:19 – Chapter 6. Price Dependence on Covariance, Not Variance

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

24. Risk, Return, and Social Security

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

This lecture addresses some final points about the CAPM. How would one test the theory? Given the theory, what’s the right way to think about evaluating fund managers’ performance? Should the manager of a hedge fund and the manager of a university endowment be judged by the same performance criteria? More generally, how should we think about the return differential between stocks and bonds? Lastly, looking back to the lectures on Social Security earlier in the semester, how should the CAPM inform our thinking about the role of stocks and bonds in Social Security? Can the views of Democrats and Republicans be reconciled? What if Social Security were privatized, but workers were forced to hold their assets in a new kind of asset called PAAWS, which pay the holder more if the wage of young workers is higher?

00:00 – Chapter 1. Testing the Capital Asset Pricing Model
14:08 – Chapter 2. Evaluation of Fund Management Performance Using CAPM
22:30 – Chapter 3. Reassessing Assets within Social Security
53:04 – Chapter 4. Reconciling Democratic and Republican Views on Social Security
59:32 – Chapter 5. Geanakoplos’s Personal Annuitized Average Wage Securities
01:08:48 – Chapter 6. The Black-Scholes Model

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

25. The Leverage Cycle and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis

Standard financial theory left us woefully unprepared for the financial crisis of 2007-09. Something is missing in the theory. In the majority of loans the borrower must agree on an interest rate and also on how much collateral he will put up to guarantee repayment. The standard theory presented in all the textbooks ignores collateral. The next two lectures introduce a theory of the Leverage Cycle, in which default and collateral are endogenously determined. The main implication of the theory is that when collateral requirements get looser and leverage increases, asset prices rise, but then when collateral requirements get tougher and leverage decreases, asset prices fall. This stands in stark contrast to the fundamental value theory of asset pricing we taught so far. We’ll look at a number of facts about the subprime mortgage crisis, and see whether the new theory offers convincing explanations.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Assumptions on Loans in the Subprime Mortgage Market
18:27 – Chapter 2. Market Weaknesses Revealed in the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis
29:00 – Chapter 3. Collateral and Introduction to the Leverage Cycle
38:53 – Chapter 4. Contrasts between the Leverage Cycle and CAPM
43:36 – Chapter 5. Leverage Cycle Theory in Recent Financial History
01:03:55 – Chapter 6. Negative Implications of the Leverage Cycle
01:14:14 – Chapter 7. Conclusion

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

 

26. The Leverage Cycle and Crashes

Financial Theory (ECON 251)

In order to understand the precise predictions of the Leverage Cycle theory, in this last class we explicitly solve two mathematical examples of leverage cycles. We show how supply and demand determine leverage as well as the interest rate, and how impatience and volatility play crucial roles in setting the interest rate and the leverage. Mathematically, the model helps us identify the three key elements of a crisis. First, scary bad news increases uncertainty. Second, leverage collapses. Lastly, the most optimistic people get crushed, so the new marginal buyers are far less sanguine about the economy. The result is that the drop in asset prices is amplified far beyond what any market participant would expect from the news alone. If we want to mitigate the fallout from a crisis, the place to begin is in controlling those three elements. If we want to prevent leverage cycle crashes, we must monitor leverage and regulate it, the same way we monitor and adjust interest rates.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction
02:15 – Chapter 2. Understanding Leverage
13:45 – Chapter 3. Supply and Demand Effects on Interest Rates and Leverage
21:52 – Chapter 4. Impatience and Volatility on Setting Leverage
34:48 – Chapter 5. Bad News, Pessimism, Price Drops, and Leverage Cycle Crashes
48:01 – Chapter 6. Can Leverage Be Monitored?

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

Read Full Post | Make a Comment ( None so far )

American History–Thomas E. Woods, Jr., Ph.D.–The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History Lectures–Videos

Posted on July 14, 2012. Filed under: American History, Baseball, Blogroll, Books, Business, College, Communications, Culture, Economics, Education, Employment, European History, Farming, Federal Government, Fiscal Policy, Food, Foreign Policy, government, government spending, High School, history, History of Economic Thought, Immigration, Inflation, Investments, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Macroeconomics, media, Microeconomics, Monetary Policy, People, Philosophy, Politics, Railroads, Rants, Raves, Regulations, Religion, Resources, Science, Ships, Sports, Taxes, Technology, Transportation, Unemployment, Union, Unions, Video, War, Wealth, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , |

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 1 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

Lecture 1, “Themes and Lessons from Colonial America” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 2 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr. 

Lecture 2, “The Constitution: Four Disputed Clauses” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 3 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

Lecture 3, “The Principles of ’98” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 4 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

 Lecture 4, “Lysander Spooner and Other Antebellum Radicalism” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 5 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr. 

Lecture 5, “Secession and the American Experience” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 6 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr. 

Lecture 6, “Secession and War” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 7 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

Lecture 7, “Reconstruction” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 8 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

Lecture 8, “Myths and Facts About Big Business” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 9 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

Lecture 9, “World War I” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 10 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr. 

Lecture 10, “The 1920s – Domestic and International” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 11 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

Lecture 11, “Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 12 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr. 

Lecture 12, “The Economics of the New Deal and World War II” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 13 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

Lecture 13, “The History of Foreign Aid Programs” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 14 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

Lecture 14, “Civil Rights and the Supreme Court” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History, Lecture 15 | Thomas E. Woods, Jr.

Lecture 15, “Welfare Programs and the Great Society” by Dr. Thomas E. Woods, Jr., a senior fellow in history at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, presents this fifteen-lecture course covering the material in his book The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History. Presented to the Auburn University Academy for Lifelong Learners, and recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama between September 2006 and March 2007.

Read Full Post | Make a Comment ( None so far )

Joanne Freeman–The American Revolution–Yale University–Videos

Posted on June 16, 2012. Filed under: Blogroll, Business, College, Communications, Economics, Education, Law, liberty, Life, Links, media, People, Philosophy, Politics, Raves, Strategy, Tax Policy, Taxes, Video, War, Wealth, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |

1. Introduction: Freeman’s Top Five Tips for Studying the Revolution 

 

 Professor Freeman offers an introduction to the course, summarizing the readings and discussing the course’s main goals. She also offers five tips for studying the Revolution: 1) Avoid thinking about the Revolution as a story about facts and dates; 2) Remember that words we take for granted today, like “democracy,” had very different meanings; 3) Think of the “Founders” as real people rather than mythic historic figures; 4) Remember that the “Founders” aren’t the only people who count in the Revolution; 5) Remember the importance of historical contingency: that anything could have happened during the Revolution.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: Is the War Part of the American Revolution?
08:24 – Chapter 2. Reading Materials for the Course
13:45 – Chapter 3. Freeman’s Tips One and Two: Facts and Meanings
22:13 – Chapter 4. Freeman’s Tip Three: The Founders Were Human, Too
31:33 – Chapter 5. Freeman’s Tip Four: The Other Revolutionaries
37:48 – Chapter 6. Freeman’s Tip Five and Conclusion

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

2. Being a British Colonist

Professor Freeman discusses what it meant to be a British colonist in America in the eighteenth century. She explains how American colonists had deep bonds of tradition and culture with Great Britain. She argues that, as British colonists with a strong sense of their British liberties, settlers in America valued their liberties above all else. She also explains that many Americans had a sense of inferiority when they compared their colonial lifestyles to the sophistication of Europe. Professor Freeman discusses the social order in America during the eighteenth century, and suggests that the lack of an entrenched aristocracy made social rank more fluid in America than in Europe. She ends the lecture by suggesting that the great importance that American colonists placed on British liberties and their link with Britain helped pave the way for the Revolution.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction
02:02 – Chapter 2. Association of Colonists’ Identity to English Monarchy
11:51 – Chapter 3. The British Colonists’ Inferiority Complex
20:34 – Chapter 4. The Fluidity of American Social Order: Gentry Minorities, Prisoners, and Religious Exiles
35:02 – Chapter 5. Salutary Neglect’s Effect on British Liberties in the Colonies and Conclusion 

3. Being a British American

 

Professor Freeman discusses the differences between society in the American colonies and society in Britain in the eighteenth century. She uses examples from colonists’ writings to show that the American colonies differed from British society in three distinct ways: the distinctive character of the people who migrated to the colonies; the distinctive conditions of life in British America; and the nature of British colonial administration.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction
02:30 – Chapter 2. From Dr. Hamilton’s Diary: Religiosity, Diversity, and Coloniality
11:56 – Chapter 3. Risk-takers, Landowners, Voters: Life in British America
17:31 – Chapter 4. Door Persuasions and Middling Society
23:33 – Chapter 5. Free Will and Spiritual Equality: The Impact of the Great Awakening
32:13 – Chapter 6. The Power of Colonial Legislatures and the British-American Identity  

4. “Ever at Variance and Foolishly Jealous”: Intercolonial Relations

 

Professor Freeman discusses colonial attempts to unite before the 1760s and the ways in which regional distrust and localism complicated matters. American colonists joined together in union three times before the 1760s. Two of these attempts were inspired by the necessity of self-defense; the third attempt was instigated by the British as a means of asserting British control over the colonies.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction
02:52 – Chapter 2. Intercolonial Opinions: Notes from Jefferson, Washington, and Adams
11:44 – Chapter 3. Colony Types, and Differences between New England and Middle Colonies
23:58 – Chapter 4. Education and Social Culture in the Southern Colonies
30:43 – Chapter 5. Dutch Expansion and the English Dominion: The First Two Unions
36:30 – Chapter 6. The French and Indian Threats: The Third Colonial Union  

5. Outraged Colonials: The Stamp Act Crisis 

 

Professor Freeman concludes her discussion (from the previous lecture) of the three early instances in which the American colonies joined together to form a union. She then turns to a discussion of the Stamp Act crisis, and how American colonists found a shared bond through their dissatisfaction with the Stamp Act. Faced with massive national debts incurred by the recent war with France, Prime Minister George Grenville instituted several new taxes to generate revenue for Britain and its empire. The colonists saw these taxes as signaling a change in colonial policy, and thought their liberties and rights as British subjects were being abused. These feelings heightened with the Stamp Act of 1765. Finding a shared cause in their protestations against these new British acts, Americans set the foundation for future collaboration between the colonies.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: The Albany Congress of 1754
09:32 – Chapter 2. British Budget Post-French and Indian War, and the Sugar Act
22:24 – Chapter 3. Colonial Responses to the Early Acts, and the Stamp Act
30:49 – Chapter 4. Limited Liberties in Virtual Representation and the Stamp Act
36:02 – Chapter 5. Patrick Henry on the Stamp Act and Conclusion

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

This course was recorded in Spring 2010  

6. Resistance or Rebellion? (Or, What the Heck is Happening in Boston?)

 

Professor Freeman discusses the mounting tensions between the colonists and the British in the late 1760s and early 1770s. The Virginia Resolves were published and read throughout the colonies in 1765, and generated discussion about colonial rights and liberties. Colonies began working together to resolve their problems, and formed the Stamp Act Congress in 1765. Meanwhile, Boston was becoming more radicalized and mobs began acting out their frustration with British policies. Colonists began to believe that the British were conspiring to oppress their liberties, a belief that seemed to be confirmed when the British stationed troops in Boston. The mounting tension between the Bostonians and British troops culminated in the violence of the Boston Massacre in March 1770.

00:00 – Chapter 1. The Circulation of the Virginia Resolves
03:47 – Chapter 2. The Stamp Act Congress and Parliamentary Thoughts on the Stamp Act
10:11 – Chapter 3. Mob Protests by the Sons of Liberty
15:41 – Chapter 4. The Repeal of the Stamp Act and the Complications of the Declaratory Act
19:39 – Chapter 5. Reactions to the Townshend Acts and Samuel Adams’s Propaganda
31:48 – Chapter 6. Different Viewpoints on the Boston Massacre

Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://open.yale.edu/courses

This course was recorded in Spring 2010. 

7. Being a Revolutionary 

Professor Freeman continues her discussion of the Boston Massacre and how it represented a growing sense of alienation between the American colonists and the British authorities. The Americans and British both felt that the colonies were subordinate to Parliament in some way, but differed in their ideas of the exact nature of the imperial relationship. This period saw the formation of non-importation associations to discourage merchants from importing British goods, as well as committees of correspondence to coordinate resistance. One instance of such resistance occurred in December 1773, when Boston radicals who were frustrated with the Tea Act threw shipments of tea into Boston Harbor.

 Professor Freeman continues her discussion of the Boston Massacre and how it represented a growing sense of alienation between the American colonists and the British authorities. The Americans and British both felt that the colonies were subordinate to Parliament in some way, but differed in their ideas of the exact nature of the imperial relationship. This period saw the formation of non-importation associations to discourage merchants from importing British goods, as well as committees of correspondence to coordinate resistance. One instance of such resistance occurred in December 1773, when Boston radicals who were frustrated with the Tea Act threw shipments of tea into Boston Harbor.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Different Conceptions of Colonists’ Relationship to Britain
07:55 – Chapter 2. The Growth of Non-Importation Associations in the Colonies
19:05 – Chapter 3. Taxing as Display of British Supremacy: Parliament’s Reactions
26:34 – Chapter 4. The Impact of the Tea Tax and the Development of Committees of Correspondence
33:50 – Chapter 5. Colonial Interpretation of and Reactions to the Tea Act: The Boston Tea Party
43:09 – Chapter 6. British Dismantling of Colonial Governance and Conclusion  

8. The Logic of Resistance

Professor Freeman lays out the logic of American resistance to British imperial policy during the 1770s. Prime Minister Lord North imposed the Intolerable Acts on Massachusetts to punish the radicals for the Boston Tea Party, and hoped that the act would divide the colonies. Instead, the colonies rallied around Massachusetts because they were worried that the Intolerable Acts set a new threatening precedent in the imperial relationship. In response to this seeming threat, the colonists formed the First Continental Congress in 1774 to determine a joint course of action. The meeting of the First Continental Congress is important for four reasons: it forced the colonists to clarify and define their grievances with Britain; it helped to form ties between the colonies; it served as a training ground for young colonial politicians; and in British eyes, it symbolized a step towards rebellion. The lecture concludes with a look at the importance of historical lessons for the colonists, and how these lessons helped form a “logic of resistance” against the new measures that Parliament was imposing upon the colonies.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: The Logic of Resistance
03:23 – Chapter 2. North’s Intolerable Acts and Colonial Solidarity
11:28 – Chapter 3. The First Continental Congress
19:14 – Chapter 4. Jefferson’s Dinner Party and the Influence of Enlightenment Thought on the Colonists
27:24 – Chapter 5. Jefferson’s Reflection on Hamilton’s Favorite Hero
35:58 – Chapter 6. The Logic of Colonial Unity from the British Perspective
45:48 – Chapter 7. Edmund Burke’s Warning and Conclusion

9. Who Were the Loyalists?

The lecture first concludes the discussion of the First Continental Congress, which met in 1774. Ultimately, although its delegates represented a range of opinions, the voices of the political radicals in the Congress were the loudest. In October 1774, the Continental Congress passed both the radical Suffolk Resolves and the Declaration and Resolves, which laid out the colonists’ grievances with Parliament. The Congress also sent a petition to the King which warned him that the British Parliament was stripping the American colonists of their rights as English citizens. Given such radical measures, by early 1775, many American colonists were choosing sides in the growing conflict, and many chose to be Loyalists. Professor Freeman concludes her lecture with a discussion of the varied reasons why different Loyalists chose to support the British Crown, and what kinds of people tended to be Loyalists in the American Revolution.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: The Loyalists
01:32 – Chapter 2. Radical Voices in the First Continental Congress: the Grand Council and the Suffolk Resolves
17:23 – Chapter 3. Deliberations over Declaration and Resolves, and the Impact of the Continental Association
27:49 – Chapter 4. Taking Sides: The King’s Friends, or the Loyalists
37:53 – Chapter 5. Loyalist Demographics
44:46 – Chapter 6. Conclusion

10. Common Sense

 
This lecture focuses on the best-selling pamphlet of the American Revolution: Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, discussing Paine’s life and the events that led him to write his pamphlet. Published in January of 1776, it condemned monarchy as a bad form of government, and urged the colonies to declare independence and establish their own form of republican government. Its incendiary language and simple format made it popular throughout the colonies, helping to radicalize many Americans and pushing them to seriously consider the idea of declaring independence from Britain.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: Voting on Voting
01:40 – Chapter 2. On Paine’s Burial
05:52 – Chapter 3. Colonial Mindset during the Second Continental Congress
12:28 – Chapter 4. Serendipity and Passion: The Early Life of Thomas Paine
21:53 – Chapter 5. Major Arguments and Rhetorical Styles in Common Sense
33:45 – Chapter 6. Common Sense’s Popularity and Founders’ Reactions
39:16 – Chapter 7. Social Impact of the Pamphlet and Conclusion

 

11. Independence

In this lecture, Professor Freeman discusses the Declaration of Independence and sets the document in its historical context. The Declaration was not the main focus of the Second Continental Congress, which was largely concerned with organizing the defensive war effort. The Congress had sent King George III the Olive Branch Petition in a last attempt at reconciliation in August 1775, but the King ignored the petition and declared the colonies to be in rebellion. Throughout the colonies, local communities began debating the issue of independence on their own, often at the instruction of their colonial legislatures, and these local declarations of independence contributed to the formal declaration of independence by the Continental Congress in July 1776. Professor Freeman concludes the lecture by describing the decision to have Thomas Jefferson draft the Declaration.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: Independence
03:38 – Chapter 2. Organizing for War during the Second Continental Congress
10:46 – Chapter 3. King George III’s Response to the Olive Branch Petition and the Release of Common Sense
18:01 – Chapter 4. The General Populace’s Thoughts on Cries for Independence
28:35 – Chapter 5. Debates on Drafting a Formal Declaration of Independence
39:33 – Chapter 6. Editing the Declaration and Conclusion

12. Civil War

Professor Freeman concludes the discussion of the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration was widely circulated and read aloud throughout the colonies. Professor Freeman argues that by 1775-1776, British and American citizens were operating under different assumptions about how the conflict between them could be resolved. The American colonists began to organize themselves for defensive measures against an aggressive British state. Meanwhile, the British assumed that the rebels were a minority group, and if they could suppress this radical minority through an impressive display of force, the rest of the colonists would submit to their governance again. Spring of 1775 saw the beginnings of military conflict between the British army and colonial militias, with fighting at Lexington, Concord, and Breed’s Hill. As a result, the colonists began to seriously consider the need for independence, and the Continental Congress began the process of organizing a war.

00:00 – Chapter 1. The Editing Process of the Declaration of Independence
04:26 – Chapter 2. Short Cheers for Independence, Looming Plans for War
10:16 – Chapter 3. British Thoughts on Colonial Radicalism and Plans for Display of Force
19:19 – Chapter 4. The Symbolic Battle at Salem
25:07 – Chapter 5. The Conciliatory Resolution and Gunshots at Lexington and Concord
35:23 – Chapter 6. Changing British and Americans Opinions at Breed’s Hill
41:42 – Chapter 7. Congress’s Efforts to Organize War Efforts and Conclusion

 

13. Organizing a War

In this lecture, Professor Freeman discusses four difficulties that the Continental Congress faced in organizing the colonial war effort: regionalism, localism, the supply shortage that the Continental Army faced in providing for its troops, and the Continental Congress’s inexperience in organizing an army. The lecture concludes with a discussion of a Connecticut newspaper from July 1776.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: Organizing a War
02:54 – Chapter 2. Regionalism in Leadership and Military Makeup: The Promotion of George Washington
21:50 – Chapter 3. Localism and Supply Shortages: Issues in Fighting for a National Cause and in Fighting with Proper Equipment
29:31 – Chapter 4. Continental Congress’s Inexperience in Organizing an Army
42:31 – Chapter 5. Snapshot of Early Communication in the States: The Connecticut Courant

14. Heroes and Villains 

In this lecture, Professor Freeman discusses Benedict Arnold as a case study of the ways in which ideas about regionalism, social rank, and gender – and the realities of the Continental Congress and the Continental Army – played out in this period. Like many Americans during this period, Benedict Arnold thought that he could improve his social rank and reputation in the military, but he was unable to advance due to the Continental Congress’s policy on military promotions. Frustrated and facing mounting personal debts, he decided to aid the British in exchange for a reward. Arnold and his wife Peggy developed a plan for Arnold to smuggle American military plans to the British with the help of a young British soldier named John André. However, André was captured while smuggling Arnold’s papers and the plot quickly unraveled. In the end, Arnold fled; his wife played upon conventional stereotypes of women to avoid punishment; and André was executed but idealized in the process.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: Complications within the Continental Congress
06:48 – Chapter 2. Opportunities for Social Mobility in the American Revolution
14:20 – Chapter 3. Benedict Arnold’s Early Frustrating Military Career
23:36 – Chapter 4. Arnold’s Marriage with Peggy Shippen and Plans for Spying
37:39 – Chapter 5. The Unraveling of Arnold’s Plot
44:17 – Chapter 6. An Example out of John Andre and the Fate of the Arnolds

 15. Citizens and Choices: Experiencing the Revolution in New Haven

To show how Americans experienced the war and made difficult choices, Professor Freeman offers a spur-of-the-moment lecture on New Haven during the Revolution, discussing how Yale College students and New Haven townspeople gradually became caught up in the war. Warfare finally came to New Haven in July 1779 when the British army invaded the town. Professor Freeman draws on first-hand accounts to provide a narrative of the invasion of New Haven.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: The Revolution in New Haven
06:16 – Chapter 2. Yale College as the Seedbed of Political Protest and its Relation with the New Haven Community
17:18 – Chapter 3. Diversity of Colonial Opinions at Yale and the Formation of New Haven Military Units
26:05 – Chapter 4. British Landing in New Haven and Yale’s Call to Arms
41:08 – Chapter 5. The Influence of the Revolution on Citizenship and Leadership in the Common Person

 

16. The Importance of George Washington

This lecture focuses on George Washington and the combined qualities that made him a key figure in Revolutionary America, arguing that the most crucial reason for his success as a national leader was that he proved repeatedly that he could be trusted with power – a vital quality in a nation fearful of the collapse of republican governance at the hands of a tyrant.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: The Importance of George Washington
03:36 – Chapter 2. The Many Merits of Washington from the Letters of Hamilton and Adams
15:42 – Chapter 3. Ingredients of the Washington Phenomenon: Self-Presentation, Fortune, and the Need for a King
25:07 – Chapter 4. Balancing Solemnity with Humility: Washington as the Reluctant Leader
30:13 – Chapter 5. Washington’s Symbolic Gestures as Commander-in-Chief of a Republican Army
43:08 – Chapter 6. Washington’s Legacy as a Leader

 

17. The Logic of a Campaign (or, How in the World Did We Win?)

In this lecture, Professor Freeman explains the logic behind American and British military strategy during the early phases of the Revolution. First, she discusses the logistic disadvantages of the British during the war: the difficulties shipping men and supplies from more than three thousand miles away; the vast expanse of countryside with no one central target to attack; difficulties in recruiting British soldiers to fight in America; and the fact that the British faced a citizen army comprised of highly motivated soldiers who didn’t act in predictable ways. In addition, the British consistently underestimated the revolutionaries in America, and overestimated Loyalist support. Professor Freeman also discusses the four main phases of the Revolutionary War, differentiated by shifts in British strategy. During the earliest phase of the war, the British thought that a show of military force would quickly lead to reconciliation with the colonists. During the second phase, the British resolved to seize a major city – New York – in the hope that isolating New England from the rest of the colonies would end hostilities. By 1777, the war had entered its third phase, and the British set their sights on seizing Philadelphia and defeating George Washington. This phase ended with the Battle of Saratoga in late 1777.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction
04:14 – Chapter 2. British Disadvantages in the War
10:39 – Chapter 3. British Assumptions of Citizen Armies and Loyalists
18:45 – Chapter 4. The First Phase: British Displays of Force
29:31 – Chapter 5. The Second Phase: Capturing New York
41:42 – Chapter 6. Third Phase: Defeating Washington and the Battle at Saratoga

18. Fighting the Revolution: The Big Picture

Today’s lecture concludes Professor Freeman’s discussion of the four phases of the Revolutionary War. America’s victory at the Battle of Saratoga in 1777 marked the end of the third phase of the war, and led to a turning point in the conflict: France’s decision to recognize American independence and enter into an alliance with the fledging nation. Although the British made one final attempt at reconciliation in 1778 with the Conciliatory Propositions, they were rejected by the Continental Congress. The fourth and final phase of the war lasted from 1779 to 1781, as the British Army focused its attention on the American South. The British seized Charleston and South Carolina, and defeated the Continental Army in a series of battles. But with the help of the French fleet, Washington was able to defeat Cornwallis’s army at the Battle of Yorktown in 1781. Peace negotiations to end the Revolutionary War began in Paris in June of 1782.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: The Revolution was Not Inevitable
04:46 – Chapter 2. Summary of the First Three Phases of the War
12:13 – Chapter 3. Franklin in Paris and France’s Recognition of America
21:20 – Chapter 4. The British Conciliatory Propositions and their Rejection
25:09 – Chapter 5. The Final Phase: Valley Forge and the American South
39:04 – Chapter 6. The French Impact on the War and Peace Negotiations in Paris
45:08 – Chapter 7. Victory, Independence, and Uncertainty

 

19. War and Society

 

In this lecture, Professor Freeman discusses the experiences of African Americans, women, and Native Americans during the Revolution, framing her discussion within a larger historical debate over whether or not the Revolution was “radical.” Freeman ultimately concludes that while white American males improved their position in society as a result of the Revolution, women, African Americans, and Native Americans did not benefit in the same ways.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: War and Society
01:53 – Chapter 2. How Radical was the Revolution?
08:52 – Chapter 3. African Americans during the American Revolution: Issues on Fighting and Slavery
24:02 – Chapter 4. The Extent of Inclusion of Women in the Political Community
34:24 – Chapter 5. Native Americans’ Relations with the British and the Americans
41:34 – Chapter 6. Conclusion

 

20. Confederation

This lecture discusses the ongoing political experimentation involved in creating new constitutions for the new American states. Having declared independence from Great Britain, Americans had to determine what kind of government best suited their individual states as well as the nation at large; to many, this was the “whole object” of their revolutionary turmoil. Different people had different ideas about what kind of republican government would work best for their state. Should there be a unicameral or a bicameral legislature? How should political representation be organized and effected? How far should the principle of popular sovereignty be taken?

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: Confederation
03:13 – Chapter 2. An Atmosphere of Experimentation with Governance
07:47 – Chapter 3. Congressional Encouragement of New State Constitutions
13:38 – Chapter 4. Adams’s Thoughts on Government: Support for Bicameral Legislature
20:12 – Chapter 5. Core Tenets and Ideas in the State Constitutions
32:30 – Chapter 6. The Development of the Articles of Confederation
41:31 – Chapter 7. Conclusion

21. A Union Without Power

In this lecture, Professor Freeman discusses the Articles of Confederation. Although they seem hopelessly weak in the long view of history, the Articles made perfect sense as a first stab at a national government by a people who deeply distrusted centralized power – a direct product of their recent experience of the British monarchy. Among the many issues that complicated the drafting of the Articles, three central issues included: how war debts to European nations would be divided among the states; whether western territories should be sold by the national government to pay for those debts; and how large and small states would compromise on representation. When a series of events – like Shays’ Rebellion – highlighted the weaknesses of the Articles, some Americans felt ready to consider a stronger national government.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: A Union Without Power
02:12 – Chapter 2. Representation, Taxation, Western Lands: Debates on the Articles of Confederation
10:03 – Chapter 3. The Immediate Effects of the Articles
17:15 – Chapter 4. Frail Foreign Relations, Weak Congress, Splitting States: Weaknesses in the Confederation in the 1780s
30:40 – Chapter 5. Shays’ Rebellion and Newbough Conspiracy: Their Impacts on Thoughts for a Stronger, National Government
40:02 – Chapter 6. How Can the States be United? Debates on the National Constitution

22. The Road to a Constitutional Convention

In this lecture, Professor Freeman discusses how the new nation moved towards creating a stronger, more centralized national government than the Articles of Confederation. Complications of commerce between individual states – a factor that wasn’t regulated by the Articles – led to a series of interstate gatherings, like the Mount Vernon Conference of March 1785. Some strong nationalists saw these meetings as an ideal opportunity to push towards revising the Articles of Confederation. Professor Freeman ends with a discussion of James Madison’s preparations for the Federal Convention, and the importance of his notes in understanding the process by which delegates drafted a new Constitution.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: The Road to the Constitutional Convention
06:07 – Chapter 2. Complications of Interstate Commerce and the Mount Vernon Conference
13:11 – Chapter 3. Nationalist Hopes to the Revise the Articles of Confederation
23:29 – Chapter 4. Madison’s Historical Analyses of Republics and the Results of the Annapolis Convention
37:27 – Chapter 5. Madison’s Notes on the Constitutional Convention

 

23. Creating a Constitution

Professor Freeman discusses the national debate over the proposed Constitution, arguing that in many ways, when Americans debated its ratification, they were debating the consequences and meaning of the Revolution. Some feared that a stronger, more centralized government would trample on the rights and liberties that had been won through warfare, pushing the new nation back into tyranny, monarchy, or aristocracy. The Federalist essays represented one particularly ambitious attempt to quash Anti-Federalist criticism of the Constitution. In the end, the Anti-Federalists did have one significant victory, securing a Bill of Rights to be added after the new Constitution had been ratified by the states.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: The Constitution was Not Inevitable
08:48 – Chapter 2. State Fears of Monarchy: Attendees of the Constitutional Convention
22:24 – Chapter 3. Initial Plans to Revise the Articles and Madison’s Virginia Plan
29:11 – Chapter 4. The New Jersey Plan and Hamilton’s Praise of British Governance
34:56 – Chapter 5. Debates on State Representation, Slavery, and the Executive Branch
44:44 – Chapter 6. Conclusion

24. Creating a Nation

Professor Freeman discusses the national debate over the proposed Constitution, arguing that in many ways, when Americans debated its ratification, they were debating the consequences and meaning of the Revolution. Some feared that a stronger, more centralized government would trample on the rights and liberties that had been won through warfare, pushing the new nation back into tyranny, monarchy, or aristocracy. The Federalist essays represented one particularly ambitious attempt to quash Anti-Federalist criticism of the Constitution. In the end, the Anti-Federalists did have one significant victory, securing a Bill of Rights to be added after the new Constitution had been ratified by the states.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: Creating a Nation
02:53 – Chapter 2. Difficulties in Ratifying the Constitution: Exchanges between Jefferson and Madison, and Ezra Stiles’s Diary
14:20 – Chapter 3. Debates on Balance of Power between Anti-Federalists and Federalists
22:32 – Chapter 4. In Defense of the Constitution: The Federalist Essays
28:54 – Chapter 5. The Anti-Federalists’ Push for Bill of Rights
36:04 – Chapter 6. General Consensus on Experimenting with Republican Government and Conclusion

 

25. Being an American: The Legacy of the Revolution

Professor Freeman discusses when we can consider a revolution to have ended, arguing that a revolution is finally complete when a new political regime gains general acceptance throughout society – and that, for this reason, it is the American citizenry who truly decided the fate and trajectory of the American Revolution. Yet, in deciding the meaning of the Revolution, the evolving popular memory of its meaning counts as well. Founders like Thomas Jefferson and John Adams frequently told younger Americans not to revere the Revolution and its leaders as demigods, insisting that future generations were just as capable, if not more so, of continuing and improving America’s experiment in government. Professor Freeman concludes the lecture by suggesting that the ultimate lesson of the American Revolution is that America’s experiment in government was supposed to be an ongoing process; that the Revolution taught Americans that their political opinions and actions mattered a great deal – and that they still do.

00:00 – Chapter 1. Introduction: The End of the Revolution
02:21 – Chapter 2. Change and Acceptance of Revolutionary Principles between the 1770s and 1790s
15:00 – Chapter 3. Gauging Change in Public Opinion and Acceptance of New Governance: Eyewitness Accounts
24:29 – Chapter 4. Reconstructing and Remembering the American Revolution: The Founders’ Reflections
39:27 – Chapter 5. Revolution Runs in the People: A Conclusion

Read Full Post | Make a Comment ( None so far )

Sylvia Ceyer–Principles of Chemical Science–Massachusetts Institute of Technology Open Courseware–Videos

Posted on March 24, 2010. Filed under: Blogroll, Chemistry, Communications, Education, Science, Technology, Video | Tags: , , , , , , |

5.112 Principles of Chemical Science

As taught in: Fall 2005

Level:

Undergraduate

Instructors:

Prof. Sylvia Ceyer

Prof. Christopher Cummins

Linear combinations of atomic orbitals for tetrahedral methane.
Linear combinations of H 1s atomic orbitals that match nodal properties of C 2p atomic orbitals for tetrahedral methane. (Figure by MIT OCW.)

Course Features

Course Highlights

This course features a full set of video lectures.

Course Description

5.112 is an introductory chemistry course for students with an unusually strong background in chemistry. Knowledge of calculus equivalent to 18.01 is recommended. Emphasis is on basic principles of atomic and molecular electronic structure, thermodynamics, acid-base and redox equilibria, chemical kinetics, and catalysis. The course also covers applications of basic principles to problems in metal coordination chemistry, organic chemistry, and biological chemistry.

Technical Requirements

Special software is required to use some of the files in this course: .iv, .rm, and .mp3.

Syllabus

Amazon logo Help support MIT OpenCourseWare by shopping at Amazon.com! MIT OpenCourseWare offers direct links to Amazon.com to purchase the books cited in this course. Click on the Amazon logo to the left of any citation and purchase the book from Amazon.com, and MIT OpenCourseWare will receive up to 10% of all purchases you make. Your support will enable MIT to continue offering open access to MIT courses.

Textbooks

Amazon logo Atkins, Peter and Loretta Jones. Chemical Principles: The Quest for Insight. 3rd ed. New York, NY: W.H. Freeman and Company, 2004. ISBN: 9780716757016.

Amazon logo ———. Chemical Principles: The Quest for Insight/Student Study Guide and Solutions Manual. 3rd ed. New York, NY: W.H. Freeman and Company, 2004. ISBN: 9780716707400. (Bundled set. Amazon logo ISBN: 9780716762546.)

Grading

Grading criteria.
activities points
Three 1-hour Exams (100 points each) 300
Final Exam 300
Homework 100
Total 700

Readings

Amazon logo Help support MIT OpenCourseWare by shopping at Amazon.com! MIT OpenCourseWare offers direct links to Amazon.com to purchase the books cited in this course. Click on the Amazon logo to the left of any citation and purchase the book from Amazon.com, and MIT OpenCourseWare will receive up to 10% of all purchases you make. Your support will enable MIT to continue offering open access to MIT courses.

Readings are from the required textbook:

Amazon logo Atkins, Peter and Loretta Jones. Chemical Principles: The Quest for Insight. 3rd ed. New York, NY: W.H. Freeman and Company, 2004. ISBN: 9780716757016.

Course readings.
Lec # Topics readings
  Review of High School Chemistry Topics FundamentalsSection A.1Sections B.3-B.5

Sections C – M

Sections 1.A – 1.F

Sections 2.4 – 2.12

Sections 3.1 – 3.3

Sections 6.14 – 6.21

1-5 Atomic Theory of MatterDiscovery of NucleusWave-Particle Duality of Radiation and Matter

Particle-Like Nature of Light

Matter as a Wave

Sections A.2 – A.3Sections B.1 – B.2Sections 1.1 – 1.7
6-8 Schrödinger Equation for H AtomHydrogen Atom WavefunctionsP Orbitals Sections 1.8 – 1.10
9-13 Electronic Structure of Multielectron AtomsPeriodic Trends in Elemental PropertiesWhy Wavefunctions are Important?

Ionic Bonds – Classical Model and Mechanism

Kinetic Theory – Behavior of Gases

Sections 1.11 – 1.21Section 2.3Sections 2.14 – 2.17

Sections 4.13 – 4.15

14 Distribution Molecular Energies Sections 13.11 – 13.13
15-18 Internal Degrees of FreedomIntermolecular InteractionsPolarizability

Thermodynamics and Spontaneous Change

Chapter 2, Box 2.2, p. 77.Chapter 5, Sections 5.1 – 5.5Chapter 6, Sections 6.3, 6.6, 6.7, 6.14, 6.16 – 6.19, and 6.21

Chapter 7, Sections 7.1 – 7.2, 7.8, 7.11-7.13, and 7.15

Chapter 9

19 Molecular Description of Acids and Bases  
20 Lewis and Brønsted Acid-Base Concepts  
21 Titration Curves and pH Indicators  
22 Electrons in Chemistry: Redox Processes  
23 Cell Potentials and Free Energy  
24 Theory of Molecular Shapes  
25 Valence Bond Theory  
26 Molecular Orbital Theory  
27 Molecular Orbital Theory for Diatomic Molecules  
28 Molecular Orbital Theory for Polyatomic Molecules  
29-30 Crystal Field Theory  
31 Color and Magnetism of Coordination Complexes  
32 Coordination Complexes and Ligands  
33 Ligand Substitution Reactions: Kinetics  
34 Bonding in Metals and Semiconductors  
35 Metals in Biology  
36 Nuclear Chemistry and the Cardiolite® Story

http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/Chemistry/5-112Fall-2005/VideoLectures/detail/embed01.htm

http://www.youtube.com/user/MIT

Lecture 1: Atomic Theory of Matter

Lecture 2: Discovery of Nucleus

Lecture 3: Wave-Particle Duality of Radiation and Matter

Lecture 4: Particle-Like Nature of Light

Lecture 5: Matter as a Wave

Lecture 6: Schrodinger Equation for H Atom

Lecture 7:Hydrogen Atom Wave functions

Lecture 8: P Orbitals

Lecture 9: Electronic Structure of Multi-electron Atoms

Lecture 10: Periodic Trends in Elemental Properties

Lecture 11: Why Wavefunctions are Important?

Lecture 12: Ionic Bonds – Classical Model and Mechanism

Lecture 13: Kinetic Theory – Behavior of Gases

Lecture 14: Distribution Molecular Energies

Lecture 15: Internal Degrees of Freedom

Lecture 16: Intermolecular Interactions

Lecture 17: Polarizability

Lecture 18: Thermodynamics and Spontaneous Change

Lecture 19: Molecular Description of Acids and Bases

Lecture 20: Lewis and Bronsted Acid-Base Concepts

Lecture 21:Titration Curves and pH Indicators

Lecture 22: Electrons in Chemistry: Redox Processes

Lecture 23: Cell Potentials and Free Energy

Lecture 24: Theory of Molecular Shapes

Lecture 25: Valence Bond Theory

Lecture 26: Molecular Orbital Theory

Lecture 27: Molecular Orbital Theory for Diatomic Molecules

Lecture 28: Molecular Orbital Theory for Polyatomic Molecules

Lecture 29: Crystal Field Theory

Lecture 30: Crystal Field Theory View

Lecture 31: Color and Magnetism of Coordination Complexes

Lecture 32: Coordination Complexes and Ligands

Lecture 33: Ligand Substitution Reactions: Kinetics

Lecture 34: Bonding in Metals and Semiconductors

Lecture 35: Nuclear Chemistry and the Cardiolite(R) Story

 

Related Posts On Pronk Palisades

Professors

Donald Kagan–Ancient Greek History–Open Yale Course–Videos

J. Michael McBride–Organic Chemistry–Yale University Online Course–Videos

Robert Schiller–Financial Markets–Videos

Steven B. Smith On Political Philosophy–Videos

David Zetland–Political Economy–Videos

Read Full Post | Make a Comment ( None so far )

Liked it here?
Why not try sites on the blogroll...