Non-accelarating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) — Phillips Curve — Money and Inflation — No Real Tradeoff Between Price Increases and Unemployment Rate In The Long Run — States and Nations Cutting Taxes Resulted In Higher Growth and Lower Unemployment — Videos

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NAIRU

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

NAIRU is an acronym for non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment,[1] and refers to a level of unemployment below which inflation rises. It was first introduced as NIRU (non-inflationary rate of unemployment) by Franco Modigliani and Lucas Papademos in 1975, as an improvement over the “natural rate of unemployment” concept,[2][3][4] which was proposed earlier by Milton Friedman.[5]

Monetary policy conducted under the assumption of a NAIRU involves allowing just enough unemployment in the economy to prevent inflation rising above a given target figure. Prices are allowed to increase gradually and some unemployment is tolerated.

Contents

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Origins

An early form of NAIRU is found in the work of Abba P. Lerner (Lerner 1951, Chapter 14), who referred to it as “low full employment” attained via the expansion of aggregate demand, in contrast with the “high full employment” which adds incomes policies (wage and price controls) to demand stimulation.

The concept arose in the wake of the popularity of the Phillips curve which summarized the observed negative correlation between the rate of unemployment and the rate of inflation (measured as annual nominal wage growth of employees) for number of industrialised countries with more or less mixed economies. This correlation (previously seen for the U.S. by Irving Fisher) persuaded some analysts that it was impossible for governments simultaneously to target both arbitrarily low unemployment and price stability, and that, therefore, it was government’s role to seek a point on the trade-off between unemployment and inflation which matched a domestic social consensus.

During the 1970s in the United States and several other industrialized countries, Phillips curve analysis became less popular, because inflation rose at the same time that unemployment rose (see stagflation).

Worse, as far as many economists were concerned, was that the Phillips curve had little or no theoretical basis. Critics of this analysis (such as Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps) argued that the Phillips curve could not be a fundamental characteristic of economic general equilibrium because it showed a correlation between a real economic variable (the unemployment rate) and a nominal economic variable (the inflation rate). Their counter-analysis was that government macroeconomic policy (primarily monetary policy) was being driven by a low unemployment target and that this caused expectations of inflation to change, so that steadily accelerating inflation rather than reduced unemployment was the result. The resulting prescription was that government economic policy (or at least monetary policy) should not be influenced by any level of unemployment below a critical level – the “natural rate” or NAIRU.[6]

The natural rate hypothesis

The idea behind the natural rate hypothesis put forward by Friedman was that any given labor market structure must involve a certain amount of unemployment, including frictional unemployment associated with individuals changing jobs and possibly classical unemployment arising from real wages being held above the market-clearing level by minimum wage laws, trade unions or other labour market institutions. Unexpected inflation might allow unemployment to fall below the natural rate by temporarily depressing real wages, but this effect would dissipate once expectations about inflation were corrected. Only with continuously accelerating inflation could rates of unemployment below the natural rate be maintained.

The analysis supporting the natural rate hypothesis was controversial, and empirical evidence suggested that the natural rate varied over time in ways that could not easily be explained by changes in labor market structures. As a result, the “natural rate” terminology was largely supplanted by that of the NAIRU, which referred to a rate of unemployment below which inflation would accelerate, but did not imply a commitment to any particular theoretical explanation, or a prediction that the rate would be stable over time.

Properties

If {\displaystyle U*}U* is the NAIRU and {\displaystyle U}U is the actual unemployment rate, the theory says that:

if {\displaystyle U<U*}U<U* for a few years, inflationary expectations rise, so that the inflation rate tends to increase;
if {\displaystyle U>U*}U>U* for a few years, inflationary expectations fall, so that the inflation rate tends to slow (there is disinflation); and
if {\displaystyle U=U*}U=U*, the inflation rate tends to stay the same, unless there is an exogenous shock.

Okun’s law can be stated as saying that for every one percentage point by which the actual unemployment rate exceeds the so-called “natural” rate of unemployment, real gross domestic product is reduced by 2% to 3%.

Criticism

The NAIRU analysis assumes that if inflation increases, workers and employers can create contracts that take into account expectations of higher inflation and agree on a level of wage inflation that matches the expected level of price inflation to maintain constant real wages. Therefore, the analysis requires inflation to accelerate to maintain low unemployment. However, this argument implicitly assumes that workers and employers cannot contract to incorporate accelerating inflation into wage expectations, but there is no clear justification for assuming that expectations or contract structures are limited in this way aside from the fact that such wage arrangements are not commonly observed.

The NAIRU analysis is especially problematic if the Phillips curve displays hysteresis, that is, if episodes of high unemployment raise the NAIRU.[7] This could happen, for example, if unemployed workers lose skills so that employers prefer to bid up of the wages of existing workers when demand increases, rather than hiring the unemployed.

Others, such as Abba Lerner (1951, 1967) and Hyman Minsky (1965) have argued that a similar effect can be achieved without the human costs of unemployment via a job guarantee, where rather than being unemployed, those who cannot find work in the private sector should be employed by the government. This theory, and the policy of the job guarantee replaces the NAIRU with the NAIBER (non-accelerating-inflation-buffer employment ratio).[8]

Relationship to other economic theories

Most economists do not see the NAIRU theory as explaining all inflation. Instead, it is possible to move along a short run Phillips Curve (even though the NAIRU theory says that this curve shifts in the longer run) so that unemployment can rise or fall due to changes in inflation. Exogenous supply-shock inflation is also possible, as with the “energy crises” of the 1970s or the credit crunch of the early 21st century.

The NAIRU theory was mainly intended as an argument against active Keynesian demand management and in favor of free markets (at least on the macroeconomic level). There is, for instance, no theoretical basis for predicting the NAIRU. Monetarists instead support the generalized assertion that the correct approach to unemployment is through microeconomic measures (to lower the NAIRU whatever its exact level), rather than macroeconomic activity based on an estimate of the NAIRU in relation to the actual level of unemployment. Monetary policy, they maintain, should aim instead at stabilizing the inflation rate.

Naming

The NAIRU, non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, is actually misnamed. It is the price level that is accelerating (or decelerating), not the inflation rate. The inflation rate is just changing, not accelerating.[9]

See also

References

  1. Jump up^ Coe, David T, Nominal Wages. The NAIRU and Wage Flexibility. (PDF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
  2. Jump up^ Modigliani, Franco; Papademos, Lucas (1975). “Targets for Monetary Policy in the Coming Year”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. The Brookings Institution. 1975 (1): 141–165. doi:10.2307/2534063. JSTOR 2534063.
  3. Jump up^ Robert M. Solow, Modigliani and Monetarism, p. 6.
  4. Jump up^ Snowdon, Brian; Vane, Howard R. (2005). Modern Macroeconomics: Its Origins, Development and Current State. Cheltenham: E. Elgar. p. 187. ISBN 1-84376-394-X.
  5. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton (1968). “The Role of Monetary Policy”. American Economic Review. 58 (1): 1–17. JSTOR 1831652.
  6. Jump up^ Hoover, Kevin D, “Phillips Curve”, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, The Library of Economics and Liberty, retrieved 16 July 2007
  7. Jump up^ Ball, Laurence (2009), Hysteresis in Unemployment: Old and New Evidence (PDF)
  8. Jump up^ William Mitchell, J. Muysken (2008), Full employment abandoned: shifting sands and policy failures, Edward Elgar Publishing, ISBN 1-85898-507-2
  9. Jump up^ Case, K.E. and Fair, R.C. and Oster, S.M. (2016). Principles of Macroeconomics. Pearson. ISBN 9780133023671.

Further reading

External links

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAIRU

Phillips curve

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
For the Phillips curve in supernova astrophysics, see Phillips relationship.

The Phillips curve is a single-equation empirical model, named after A. W. Phillips, describing a historical inverse relationship between rates of unemployment and corresponding rates of inflation that result within an economy. Stated simply, decreased unemployment, (i.e., increased levels of employment) in an economy will correlate with higher rates of inflation.

While there is a short run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation, it has not been observed in the long run.[1] In 1968, Milton Friedman asserted that the Phillips curve was only applicable in the short-run and that in the long-run, inflationary policies will not decrease unemployment.[2][3] Friedman then correctly predicted that, in the 1973–75 recession, both inflation and unemployment would increase.[3] The long-run Phillips curve is now seen as a vertical line at the natural rate of unemployment, where the rate of inflation has no effect on unemployment.[4] Accordingly, the Phillips curve is now seen as too simplistic, with the unemployment rate supplanted by more accurate predictors of inflation based on velocity of moneysupply measures such as the MZM (“money zero maturity”) velocity,[5] which is affected by unemployment in the short but not the long term.[6]

Contents

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History

Rate of Change of Wages against Unemployment, United Kingdom 1913–1948 from Phillips (1958)

William Phillips, a New Zealand born economist, wrote a paper in 1958 titled The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957, which was published in the quarterly journal Economica.[7] In the paper Phillips describes how he observed an inverse relationship between money wage changes and unemployment in the British economy over the period examined. Similar patterns were found in other countries and in 1960 Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow took Phillips’ work and made explicit the link between inflation and unemployment: when inflation was high, unemployment was low, and vice versa.[8]

In the 1920s, an American economist Irving Fisher noted this kind of Phillips curve relationship. However, Phillips’ original curve described the behavior of money wages.[9]

In the years following Phillips’ 1958 paper, many economists in the advanced industrial countries believed that his results showed that there was a permanently stable relationship between inflation and unemployment.[citation needed] One implication of this for government policy was that governments could control unemployment and inflation with a Keynesian policy. They could tolerate a reasonably high rate of inflation as this would lead to lower unemployment – there would be a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. For example, monetary policy and/or fiscal policy could be used to stimulate the economy, raising gross domestic product and lowering the unemployment rate. Moving along the Phillips curve, this would lead to a higher inflation rate, the cost of enjoying lower unemployment rates.[citation needed] Economist James Forder argues that this view is historically false and that neither economists nor governments took that view and that the ‘Phillips curve myth’ was an invention of the 1970s.[10]

Since 1974, seven Nobel Prizes have been given to economists for, among other things, work critical of some variations of the Phillips curve. Some of this criticism is based on the United States’ experience during the 1970s, which had periods of high unemployment and high inflation at the same time. The authors receiving those prizes include Thomas Sargent, Christopher Sims, Edmund Phelps, Edward Prescott, Robert A. Mundell, Robert E. Lucas, Milton Friedman, and F.A. Hayek.[11]

Stagflation

In the 1970s, many countries experienced high levels of both inflation and unemployment also known as stagflation. Theories based on the Phillips curve suggested that this could not happen, and the curve came under a concerted attack from a group of economists headed by Milton Friedman.[citation needed] Friedman argued that the Phillips curve relationship was only a short-run phenomenon. In this he followed eight years after Samuelson and Solow [1960] who wrote ” All of our discussion has been phrased in short-run terms, dealing with what might happen in the next few years. It would be wrong, though, to think that our Figure 2 menu that related obtainable price and unemployment behavior will maintain its same shape in the longer run. What we do in a policy way during the next few years might cause it to shift in a definite way.”[8] As Samuelson and Solow had argued 8 years earlier, he argued that in the long run, workers and employers will take inflation into account, resulting in employment contracts that increase pay at rates near anticipated inflation. Unemployment would then begin to rise back to its previous level, but now with higher inflation rates. This result implies that over the longer-run there is no trade-off between inflation and unemployment. This implication is significant for practical reasons because it implies that central banks should not set employment targets above the natural rate.[1]

More recent research has shown that there is a moderate trade-off between low-levels of inflation and unemployment. Work by George Akerlof, William Dickens, and George Perry,[12]implies that if inflation is reduced from two to zero percent, unemployment will be permanently increased by 1.5 percent. This is because workers generally have a higher tolerance for real wage cuts than nominal ones. For example, a worker will more likely accept a wage increase of two percent when inflation is three percent, than a wage cut of one percent when the inflation rate is zero.

Today

U.S. Inflation and Unemployment 1/2000 to 4/2013

Most economists no longer use the Phillips curve in its original form because it was shown to be too simplistic.[6] This can be seen in a cursory analysis of US inflation and unemployment data from 1953–92. There is no single curve that will fit the data, but there are three rough aggregations—1955–71, 1974–84, and 1985–92—each of which shows a general, downwards slope, but at three very different levels with the shifts occurring abruptly. The data for 1953–54 and 1972–73 do not group easily, and a more formal analysis posits up to five groups/curves over the period.[1]

But still today, modified forms of the Phillips Curve that take inflationary expectations into account remain influential. The theory goes under several names, with some variation in its details, but all modern versions distinguish between short-run and long-run effects on unemployment. Modern Phillips curve models include both a short-run Phillips Curve and a long-run Phillips Curve. This is because in the short run, there is generally an inverse relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate; as illustrated in the downward sloping short-run Phillips curve. In the long run, that relationship breaks down and the economy eventually returns to the natural rate of unemployment regardless of the inflation rate.[13]

The “short-run Phillips curve” is also called the “expectations-augmented Phillips curve”, since it shifts up when inflationary expectations rise, Edmund Phelps and Milton Friedman argued. In the long run, this implies that monetary policy cannot affect unemployment, which adjusts back to its “natural rate“, also called the “NAIRU” or “long-run Phillips curve”. However, this long-run “neutrality” of monetary policy does allow for short run fluctuations and the ability of the monetary authority to temporarily decrease unemployment by increasing permanent inflation, and vice versa. The popular textbook of Blanchard gives a textbook presentation of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve.[14]

An equation like the expectations-augmented Phillips curve also appears in many recent New Keynesiandynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. In these macroeconomic models with sticky prices, there is a positive relation between the rate of inflation and the level of demand, and therefore a negative relation between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment. This relationship is often called the “New Keynesian Phillips curve.” Like the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, the New Keynesian Phillips curve implies that increased inflation can lower unemployment temporarily, but cannot lower it permanently. Two influential papers that incorporate a New Keynesian Phillips curve are Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999),[15] and Blanchard and Galí (2007).[16]

Mathematics

There are at least two different mathematical derivations of the Phillips curve. First, there is the traditional or Keynesian version. Then, there is the new Classical version associated with Robert E. Lucas, Jr.

The traditional Phillips curve

The original Phillips curve literature was not based on the unaided application of economic theory. Instead, it was based on empirical generalizations. After that, economists tried to develop theories that fit the data.

Money wage determination

The traditional Phillips curve story starts with a wage Phillips Curve, of the sort described by A.W. Phillips himself. This describes the rate of growth of money wages (gW). Here and below, the operator g is the equivalent of “the percentage rate of growth of” the variable that follows.

{\displaystyle gW=gW^{T}-f(U)}gW=gW^{{T}}-f(U)

The “money wage rate” (W) is shorthand for total money wage costs per production employee, including benefits and payroll taxes. The focus is on only production workers’ money wages, because (as discussed below) these costs are crucial to pricing decisions by the firms.

This equation tells us that the growth of money wages rises with the trend rate of growth of money wages (indicated by the superscript “T”) and falls with the unemployment rate (U). The function f() is assumed to be monotonically increasing with U so that the dampening of money-wage increases by unemployment is shown by the negative sign in the equation above.

There are several possible stories behind this equation. A major one is that money wages are set by bilateral negotiations under partial bilateral monopoly: as the unemployment rate rises, all else constant worker bargaining power falls, so that workers are less able to increase their wages in the face of employer resistance.

During the 1970s, this story had to be modified, because (as the late Abba Lerner had suggested in the 1940s) workers try to keep up with inflation. Since the 1970s, the equation has been changed to introduce the role of inflationary expectations (or the expected inflation rate, gPex). This produces the expectations-augmented wage Phillips curve:

{\displaystyle gW=gW^{T}-f(U)+\lambda .gP^{ex}.}gW=gW^{{T}}-f(U)+\lambda .gP^{{ex}}.

The introduction of inflationary expectations into the equation implies that actual inflation can feed back into inflationary expectations and thus cause further inflation. The late economist James Tobin dubbed the last term “inflationary inertia,” because in the current period, inflation exists which represents an inflationary impulse left over from the past.

It also involved much more than expectations, including the price-wage spiral. In this spiral, employers try to protect profits by raising their prices and employees try to keep up with inflation to protect their real wages. This process can feed on itself, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The parameter λ (which is presumed constant during any time period) represents the degree to which employees can gain money wage increases to keep up with expected inflation, preventing a fall in expected real wages. It is usually assumed that this parameter equals unity in the long run.

In addition, the function f() was modified to introduce the idea of the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) or what’s sometimes called the “natural” rate of unemployment or the inflation-threshold unemployment rate:

[1] gW = gWTf(UU*) + λ·gPex.

Here, U* is the NAIRU. As discussed below, if U < U*, inflation tends to accelerate. Similarly, if U > U*, inflation tends to slow. It is assumed that f(0) = 0, so that when U = U*, the f term drops out of the equation.

In equation [1], the roles of gWT and gPex seem to be redundant, playing much the same role. However, assuming that λ is equal to unity, it can be seen that they are not. If the trend rate of growth of money wages equals zero, then the case where U equals U* implies that gW equals expected inflation. That is, expected real wages are constant.

In any reasonable economy, however, having constant expected real wages could only be consistent with actual real wages that are constant over the long haul. This does not fit with economic experience in the U.S. or any other major industrial country. Even though real wages have not risen much in recent years, there have been important increases over the decades.

An alternative is to assume that the trend rate of growth of money wages equals the trend rate of growth of average labor productivity (Z). That is:

[2] gWT = gZT.

Under assumption [2], when U equals U* and λ equals unity, expected real wages would increase with labor productivity. This would be consistent with an economy in which actual real wages increase with labor productivity. Deviations of real-wage trends from those of labor productivity might be explained by reference to other variables in the model.

Pricing decisions

Next, there is price behavior. The standard assumption is that markets are imperfectly competitive, where most businesses have some power to set prices. So the model assumes that the average business sets a unit price (P) as a mark-up (M) over the unit labor cost in production measured at a standard rate of capacity utilization (say, at 90 percent use of plant and equipment) and then adds in the unit materials cost.

The standardization involves later ignoring deviations from the trend in labor productivity. For example, assume that the growth of labor productivity is the same as that in the trend and that current productivity equals its trend value:

gZ = gZT and Z = ZT.

The markup reflects both the firm’s degree of market power and the extent to which overhead costs have to be paid. Put another way, all else equal, M rises with the firm’s power to set prices or with a rise of overhead costs relative to total costs.

So pricing follows this equation:

P = M × (unit labor cost) + (unit materials cost)
= M × (total production employment cost)/(quantity of output) + UMC.

UMC is unit raw materials cost (total raw materials costs divided by total output). So the equation can be restated as:

P = M × (production employment cost per worker)/(output per production employee) + UMC.

This equation can again be stated as:

P = M×(average money wage)/(production labor productivity) + UMC
= M×(W/Z) + UMC.

Now, assume that both the average price/cost mark-up (M) and UMC are constant. On the other hand, labor productivity grows, as before. Thus, an equation determining the price inflation rate (gP) is:

gP = gWgZT.

Price[edit]

Then, combined with the wage Phillips curve [equation 1] and the assumption made above about the trend behavior of money wages [equation 2], this price-inflation equation gives us a simple expectations-augmented price Phillips curve:

gP = −f(UU*) + λ·gPex.

Some assume that we can simply add in gUMC, the rate of growth of UMC, in order to represent the role of supply shocks (of the sort that plagued the U.S. during the 1970s). This produces a standard short-term Phillips curve:

gP = −f(UU*) + λ·gPex + gUMC.

Economist Robert J. Gordon has called this the “Triangle Model” because it explains short-run inflationary behavior by three factors: demand inflation (due to low unemployment), supply-shock inflation (gUMC), and inflationary expectations or inertial inflation.

In the long run, it is assumed, inflationary expectations catch up with and equal actual inflation so that gP = gPex. This represents the long-term equilibrium of expectations adjustment. Part of this adjustment may involve the adaptation of expectations to the experience with actual inflation. Another might involve guesses made by people in the economy based on other evidence. (The latter idea gave us the notion of so-called rational expectations.)

Expectational equilibrium gives us the long-term Phillips curve. First, with λ less than unity:

gP = [1/(1 − λ)]·(−f(UU*) + gUMC).

This is nothing but a steeper version of the short-run Phillips curve above. Inflation rises as unemployment falls, while this connection is stronger. That is, a low unemployment rate (less than U*) will be associated with a higher inflation rate in the long run than in the short run. This occurs because the actual higher-inflation situation seen in the short run feeds back to raise inflationary expectations, which in turn raises the inflation rate further. Similarly, at high unemployment rates (greater than U*) lead to low inflation rates. These in turn encourage lower inflationary expectations, so that inflation itself drops again.

This logic goes further if λ is equal to unity, i.e., if workers are able to protect their wages completely from expected inflation, even in the short run. Now, the Triangle Model equation becomes:

f(UU*) = gUMC.

If we further assume (as seems reasonable) that there are no long-term supply shocks, this can be simplified to become:

f(UU*) = 0 which implies that U = U*.

All of the assumptions imply that in the long run, there is only one possible unemployment rate, U* at any one time. This uniqueness explains why some call this unemployment rate “natural.”

To truly understand and criticize the uniqueness of U*, a more sophisticated and realistic model is needed. For example, we might introduce the idea that workers in different sectors push for money wage increases that are similar to those in other sectors. Or we might make the model even more realistic. One important place to look is at the determination of the mark-up, M.

New classical version

The Phillips curve equation can be derived from the (short-run) Lucas aggregate supply function. The Lucas approach is very different from that the traditional view. Instead of starting with empirical data, he started with a classical economic model following very simple economic principles.

Start with the aggregate supply function:

{\displaystyle Y=Y_{n}+a(P-P_{e})\,}Y=Y_{n}+a(P-P_{e})\,

where Y is log value of the actual output, Yn is log value of the “natural” level of output, a is a positive constant, P is log value of the actual price level, and Pe is log value of the expected price level. Lucas assumes that Yn has a unique value.

Note that this equation indicates that when expectations of future inflation (or, more correctly, the future price level) are totally accurate, the last term drops out, so that actual output equals the so-called “natural” level of real GDP. This means that in the Lucas aggregate supply curve, the only reason why actual real GDP should deviate from potential—and the actual unemployment rate should deviate from the “natural” rate—is because of incorrect expectations of what is going to happen with prices in the future. (The idea has been expressed first by Keynes, General Theory, Chapter 20 section III paragraph 4).

This differs from other views of the Phillips curve, in which the failure to attain the “natural” level of output can be due to the imperfection or incompleteness of markets, the stickiness of prices, and the like. In the non-Lucas view, incorrect expectations can contribute to aggregate demand failure, but they are not the only cause. To the “new Classical” followers of Lucas, markets are presumed to be perfect and always attain equilibrium (given inflationary expectations).

We re-arrange the equation into:

{\displaystyle P=P_{e}+{\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}}P=P_{e}+{\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}

Next we add unexpected exogenous shocks to the world supply v:

{\displaystyle P=P_{e}+{\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}+v}P=P_{e}+{\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}+v

Subtracting last year’s price levels P−1 will give us inflation rates, because

{\displaystyle P-P_{-1}\ \approx \pi }P-P_{{-1}}\ \approx \pi

and

{\displaystyle P_{e}-P_{-1}\ \approx \pi _{e}}P_{e}-P_{{-1}}\ \approx \pi _{e}

where π and πe are the inflation and expected inflation respectively.

There is also a negative relationship between output and unemployment (as expressed by Okun’s law). Therefore, using

{\displaystyle {\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}=-b(U-U_{n})}{\frac {Y-Y_{n}}{a}}=-b(U-U_{n})

where b is a positive constant, U is unemployment, and Un is the natural rate of unemployment or NAIRU, we arrive at the final form of the short-run Phillips curve:

{\displaystyle \pi =\pi _{e}-b(U-U_{n})+v\,}\pi =\pi _{e}-b(U-U_{n})+v\,

This equation, plotting inflation rate π against unemployment U gives the downward-sloping curve in the diagram that characterises the Phillips curve.

New Keynesian version

The New Keynesian Phillips curve was originally derived by Roberts in 1995,[17] and since been used in most state-of-the-art New Keynesian DSGE models like the one of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000).[18][19]

{\displaystyle \pi _{t}=\beta E_{t}[\pi _{t+1}]+\kappa y_{t}}\pi _{{t}}=\beta E_{{t}}[\pi _{{t+1}}]+\kappa y_{{t}}

where {\displaystyle \kappa ={\frac {\alpha [1-(1-\alpha )\beta ]\phi }{1-\alpha }}}\kappa ={\frac {\alpha [1-(1-\alpha )\beta ]\phi }{1-\alpha }}. The current expectations of next period’s inflation are incorporated as {\displaystyle \beta E_{t}[\pi _{t+1}]}\beta E_{{t}}[\pi _{{t+1}}]

NAIRU and rational expectations

Short-Run Phillips Curve before and after Expansionary Policy, with Long-Run Phillips Curve (NAIRU)

In the 1970s, new theories, such as rational expectations and the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) arose to explain how stagflation could occur. The latter theory, also known as the “natural rate of unemployment“, distinguished between the “short-term” Phillips curve and the “long-term” one. The short-term Phillips Curve looked like a normal Phillips Curve, but shifted in the long run as expectations changed. In the long run, only a single rate of unemployment (the NAIRU or “natural” rate) was consistent with a stable inflation rate. The long-run Phillips Curve was thus vertical, so there was no trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Edmund Phelps won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2006 in part for this. However, the expectations argument was in fact very widely understood before his work on it.[20]

In the diagram, the long-run Phillips curve is the vertical red line. The NAIRU theory says that when unemployment is at the rate defined by this line, inflation will be stable. However, in the short-run policymakers will face an inflation-unemployment rate tradeoff marked by the “Initial Short-Run Phillips Curve” in the graph. Policymakers can therefore reduce the unemployment rate temporarily, moving from point A to point B through expansionary policy. However, according to the NAIRU, exploiting this short-run tradeoff will raise inflation expectations, shifting the short-run curve rightward to the “New Short-Run Phillips Curve” and moving the point of equilibrium from B to C. Thus the reduction in unemployment below the “Natural Rate” will be temporary, and lead only to higher inflation in the long run.

Since the short-run curve shifts outward due to the attempt to reduce unemployment, the expansionary policy ultimately worsens the exploitable tradeoff between unemployment and inflation. That is, it results in more inflation at each short-run unemployment rate. The name “NAIRU” arises because with actual unemployment below it, inflation accelerates, while with unemployment above it, inflation decelerates. With the actual rate equal to it, inflation is stable, neither accelerating nor decelerating. One practical use of this model was to provide an explanation for stagflation, which confounded the traditional Phillips curve.

The rational expectations theory said that expectations of inflation were equal to what actually happened, with some minor and temporary errors. This in turn suggested that the short-run period was so short that it was non-existent: any effort to reduce unemployment below the NAIRU, for example, would immediately cause inflationary expectations to rise and thus imply that the policy would fail. Unemployment would never deviate from the NAIRU except due to random and transitory mistakes in developing expectations about future inflation rates. In this perspective, any deviation of the actual unemployment rate from the NAIRU was an illusion.

However, in the 1990s in the U.S., it became increasingly clear that the NAIRU did not have a unique equilibrium and could change in unpredictable ways. In the late 1990s, the actual unemployment rate fell below 4% of the labor force, much lower than almost all estimates of the NAIRU. But inflation stayed very moderate rather than accelerating. So, just as the Phillips curve had become a subject of debate, so did the NAIRU.

Furthermore, the concept of rational expectations had become subject to much doubt when it became clear that the main assumption of models based on it was that there exists a single (unique) equilibrium in the economy that is set ahead of time, determined independently of demand conditions. The experience of the 1990s suggests that this assumption cannot be sustained.

Theoretical questions

The Phillips curve started as an empirical observation in search of a theoretical explanation.[citation needed] Specifically, the Phillips curve tried to determine whether the inflation-unemployment link was causal or simply correlational. There are several major explanations of the short-term Phillips curve regularity.

To Milton Friedman there is a short-term correlation between inflation shocks and employment. When an inflationary surprise occurs, workers are fooled into accepting lower pay because they do not see the fall in real wages right away. Firms hire them because they see the inflation as allowing higher profits for given nominal wages. This is a movement along the Phillips curve as with change A. Eventually, workers discover that real wages have fallen, so they push for higher money wages. This causes the Phillips curve to shift upward and to the right, as with B. Some research underlines that some implicit and serious assumptions are actually in the background of the Friedmanian Phillips curve. This information asymmetry and a special pattern of flexibility of prices and wages are both necessary if one wants to maintain the mechanism told by Friedman. However, as it is argued, these presumptions remain completely unrevealed and theoretically ungrounded by Friedman.[21]

Economists such as Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps reject this theory because it implies that workers suffer from money illusion. According to them, rational workers would only react to real wages, that is, inflation adjusted wages. However, one of the characteristics of a modern industrial economy is that workers do not encounter their employers in an atomized and perfect market. They operate in a complex combination of imperfect markets, monopolies, monopsonies, labor unions, and other institutions. In many cases, they may lack the bargaining power to act on their expectations, no matter how rational they are, or their perceptions, no matter how free of money illusion they are. It is not that high inflation causes low unemployment (as in Milton Friedman’s theory) as much as vice versa: Low unemployment raises worker bargaining power, allowing them to successfully push for higher nominal wages. To protect profits, employers raise prices.

Similarly, built-in inflation is not simply a matter of subjective “inflationary expectations” but also reflects the fact that high inflation can gather momentum and continue beyond the time when it was started, due to the objective price/wage spiral.

However, other economists, like Jeffrey Herbener, argue that price is market-determined and competitive firms cannot simply raise prices.[citation needed] They reject the Phillips curve entirely, concluding that unemployment’s influence is only a small portion of a much larger inflation picture that includes prices of raw materials, intermediate goods, cost of raising capital, worker productivity, land, and other factors.

Gordon’s triangle model

Robert J. Gordon of Northwestern University has analyzed the Phillips curve to produce what he calls the triangle model, in which the actual inflation rate is determined by the sum of

  1. demand pull or short-term Phillips curve inflation,
  2. cost push or supply shocks, and
  3. built-in inflation.

The last reflects inflationary expectations and the price/wage spiral. Supply shocks and changes in built-in inflation are the main factors shifting the short-run Phillips Curve and changing the trade-off. In this theory, it is not only inflationary expectations that can cause stagflation. For example, the steep climb of oil prices during the 1970s could have this result.

Changes in built-in inflation follow the partial-adjustment logic behind most theories of the NAIRU:

  1. Low unemployment encourages high inflation, as with the simple Phillips curve. But if unemployment stays low and inflation stays high for a long time, as in the late 1960s in the U.S., both inflationary expectations and the price/wage spiral accelerate. This shifts the short-run Phillips curve upward and rightward, so that more inflation is seen at any given unemployment rate. (This is with shift B in the diagram.)
  2. High unemployment encourages low inflation, again as with a simple Phillips curve. But if unemployment stays high and inflation stays low for a long time, as in the early 1980s in the U.S., both inflationary expectations and the price/wage spiral slow. This shifts the short-run Phillips curve downward and leftward, so that less inflation is seen at each unemployment rate.

In between these two lies the NAIRU, where the Phillips curve does not have any inherent tendency to shift, so that the inflation rate is stable. However, there seems to be a range in the middle between “high” and “low” where built-in inflation stays stable. The ends of this “non-accelerating inflation range of unemployment rates” change over time.

Joke article

In 2008, Gregor Smith published a joke article in the prestigious Journal of Money, Credit and Banking titled “Japan’s Phillips Curve Looks Like Japan”. This article points out the uncanny resemblance between Japan’s Phillips curve and the country’s geographic shape.[22]

See also

References

  1. ^ Jump up to:a b c Chang, R. (1997) “Is Low Unemployment Inflationary?” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review 1Q97:4-13
  2. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton (1968). “The role of monetary policy”. American Economic Review. 68 (1): 1–17. JSTOR 1831652.
  3. ^ Jump up to:a b Phelan, John (23 October 2012). “Milton Friedman and the rise and fall of the Phillips Curve”. thecommentator.com. Retrieved September 29, 2014.
  4. Jump up^ “Phillips Curve: The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics – Library of Economics and Liberty”.
  5. Jump up^ “Velocity of MZM Money Stock”. 22 December 2016.
  6. ^ Jump up to:a b Oliver Hossfeld (2010) “US Money Demand, Monetary Overhang, and Inflation Prediction” International Network for Economic Research working paper no. 2010.4
  7. Jump up^ Phillips, A. W. (1958). “The Relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in the United Kingdom 1861-1957”. Economica. 25 (100): 283–299. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1958.tb00003.x.
  8. ^ Jump up to:a b Samuelson, Paul A.; Solow, Robert M. (1960). “Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy”. American Economic Review. 50 (2): 177–194. JSTOR 1815021.
  9. Jump up^ Fisher, Irving (1973). “I discovered the Phillips curve: ‘A statistical relation between unemployment and price changes'”. Journal of Political Economy. The University of Chicago Press. 81 (2): 496–502. doi:10.1086/260048. JSTOR 1830534. Reprinted from 1926 edition of International Labour Review.
  10. Jump up^ Forder, James (2014). Macroeconomics and the Phillips Curve Myth. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-968365-9.
  11. Jump up^ Domitrovic, Brain (10 October 2011). “The Economics Nobel Goes to Sargent & Sims: Attackers of the Phillips Curve”. Forbes.com. Retrieved 12 October 2011.
  12. Jump up^ Akerlof, George A.; Dickens, William T.; Perry, George L. (2000). “Near-Rational Wage and Price Setting and the Long-Run Phillips Curve”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 2000 (1): 1–60.
  13. Jump up^ Jacob, Reed (2016). “AP Macroeconomics Review: Phillips Curve”. APEconReview.com.
  14. Jump up^ Blanchard, Olivier (2000). Macroeconomics (Second ed.). Prentice Hall. pp. 149–55. ISBN 0-13-013306-X.
  15. Jump up^ Clarida, Richard; Galí, Jordi; Gertler, Mark (1999). “The science of monetary policy: a New-Keynesian perspective”. Journal of Economic Literature. American Economic Association. 37 (4): 1661–1707. doi:10.1257/jel.37.4.1661. JSTOR 2565488.
  16. Jump up^ Blanchard, Olivier; Galí, Jordi (2007). “Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model”. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. 39 (s1): 35–65. doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2007.00015.x.
  17. Jump up^ Roberts, John M. (1995). “New Keynesian Economics and the Phillips Curve”. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 27 (4): 975–984. JSTOR 2077783.
  18. Jump up^ Clarida, Richard; Galí, Jordi; Gertler, Mark (2000). “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 115 (1): 147–180. doi:10.1162/003355300554692.
  19. Jump up^ Romer, David (2012). “Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models of Fluctuation”. Advanced Macroeconomics. New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin. pp. 312–364. ISBN 978-0-07-351137-5.
  20. Jump up^ Forder, James (2010). “The historical place of the ‘Friedman-Phelps’ expectations critique”. European Journal of the History of Economic Thought. 17 (3): 493–511. doi:10.1080/09672560903114875.
  21. Jump up^ Galbács, Peter (2015). The Theory of New Classical Macroeconomics. A Positive Critique. Heidelberg/New York/Dordrecht/London: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17578-2. ISBN 978-3-319-17578-2.
  22. Jump up^ Smith, Gregor W. (1 September 2008). “Japan’s Phillips Curve Looks Like Japan”. 40 (6): 1325–1326. doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00160.x – via Wiley Online Library.

Further reading

External links

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phillips_curve

Milton Friedman

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from Milton friedman)
Milton Friedman
Portrait of Milton Friedman.jpg

Friedman in 2004
Born July 31, 1912
Brooklyn, New York, U.S.
Died November 16, 2006 (aged 94)
San Francisco, California, U.S.
Nationality American
Spouse(s) Rose Friedman
Institution
School or
tradition
Chicago School
Alma mater
Doctoral
advisor
Simon Kuznets
Doctoral
students
Phillip Cagan
Harry Markowitz
Lester G. Telser[1]
David I. Meiselman
Neil Wallace
Miguel Sidrauski
Influences
Influenced
Contributions
Awards
Information at IDEAS / RePEc
Signature
Milton friedman signature.svg
Notes

Milton Friedman (July 31, 1912 – November 16, 2006) was an American economist who received the 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his research on consumption analysis, monetary history and theory, and the complexity of stabilization policy.[4] With George Stigler and others, Friedman was among the intellectual leaders of the second generation of Chicago price theory, a methodological movement at the University of Chicago’s Department of Economics, Law School, and Graduate School of Business from the 1940s onward. Several students and young professors that were recruited or mentored by Friedman at Chicago went on to become leading economists; they include Gary Becker, Robert Fogel, Thomas Sowell,[5] and Robert Lucas, Jr.[6]

Friedman’s challenges to what he later called “naive Keynesian” theory[7] began with his 1950s reinterpretation of the consumption function. In the 1960s, he became the main advocate opposing Keynesian government policies,[8] and described his approach (along with mainstream economics) as using “Keynesian language and apparatus” yet rejecting its “initial” conclusions.[9] He theorized that there existed a “natural” rate of unemployment, and argued that employment above this rate would cause inflation to accelerate.[10] He argued that the Phillips curve was, in the long run, vertical at the “natural rate” and predicted what would come to be known as stagflation.[11] Friedman promoted an alternative macroeconomic viewpoint known as “monetarism“, and argued that a steady, small expansion of the money supply was the preferred policy.[12] His ideas concerning monetary policy, taxation, privatization and deregulation influenced government policies, especially during the 1980s. His monetary theory influenced the Federal Reserve’s response to the global financial crisis of 2007–08.[13]

Friedman was an advisor to Republican U.S. President Ronald Reagan[14] and Conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.[15] His political philosophy extolled the virtues of a free market economic system with minimal intervention. He once stated that his role in eliminating U.S. conscription was his proudest accomplishment. In his 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman advocated policies such as a volunteer military, freely floating exchange rates, abolition of medical licenses, a negative income tax, and school vouchers.[16] His support for school choice led him to found the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, later renamed EdChoice.[17]

Milton Friedman’s works include many monographs, books, scholarly articles, papers, magazine columns, television programs, and lectures, and cover a broad range of economic topics and public policy issues. His books and essays have had an international influence, including in former communist states.[18][19][20][21] A survey of economists ranked Friedman as the second-most popular economist of the twentieth century after John Maynard Keynes,[22] and The Economist described him as “the most influential economist of the second half of the 20th century … possibly of all of it”.[23]

Contents

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Early life

Friedman was born in Brooklyn, New York on July 31, 1912. His parents, Sára Ethel (née Landau) and Jenő Saul Friedman,[24] were Jewish immigrants from Beregszász in Carpathian Ruthenia, Kingdom of Hungary (now Berehove in Ukraine). They both worked as dry goods merchants. Shortly after Milton’s birth, the family relocated to Rahway, New Jersey. In his early teens, Friedman was injured in a car accident, which scarred his upper lip.[25] A talented student, Friedman graduated from Rahway High School in 1928, just before his 16th birthday.[26][27]

In 1932, Friedman graduated from Rutgers University, where he specialized in mathematics and economics and initially intended to become an actuary. During his time at Rutgers, Friedman became influenced by two economics professors, Arthur F. Burns and Homer Jones, who convinced him that modern economics could help end the Great Depression.

After graduating from Rutgers, Friedman was offered two scholarships to do graduate work—one in mathematics at Brown University and the other in economics at the University of Chicago.[28] Friedman chose the latter, thus earning a Master of Arts degree in 1933. He was strongly influenced by Jacob Viner, Frank Knight, and Henry Simons. It was at Chicago that Friedman met his future wife, economist Rose Director. During the 1933–1934 academic year he had a fellowship at Columbia University, where he studied statistics with renowned statistician and economist Harold Hotelling. He was back in Chicago for the 1934–1935 academic year, working as a research assistant for Henry Schultz, who was then working on Theory and Measurement of Demand. That year, Friedman formed what would prove to be lifelong friendships with George Stigler and W. Allen Wallis.[29]

Public service

Friedman was initially unable to find academic employment, so in 1935 he followed his friend W. Allen Wallis to Washington, where Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s New Deal was “a lifesaver” for many young economists.[30] At this stage, Friedman said that he and his wife “regarded the job-creation programs such as the WPA, CCC, and PWA appropriate responses to the critical situation,” but not “the price- and wage-fixing measures of the National Recovery Administration and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.”[31] Foreshadowing his later ideas, he believed price controls interfered with an essential signaling mechanism to help resources be used where they were most valued. Indeed, Friedman later concluded that all government intervention associated with the New Deal was “the wrong cure for the wrong disease,” arguing that the money supply should simply have been expanded, instead of contracted.[32] Later, Friedman and his colleague Anna Schwartz wrote A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, which argued that the Great Depression was caused by a severe monetary contraction due to banking crises and poor policy on the part of the Federal Reserve.[33]

During 1935, he began work for the National Resources Committee, which was then working on a large consumer budget survey. Ideas from this project later became a part of his Theory of the Consumption Function. Friedman began employment with the National Bureau of Economic Research during autumn 1937 to assist Simon Kuznets in his work on professional income. This work resulted in their jointly authored publication Incomes from Independent Professional Practice, which introduced the concepts of permanent and transitory income, a major component of the Permanent Income Hypothesis that Friedman worked out in greater detail in the 1950s. The book hypothesizes that professional licensing artificially restricts the supply of services and raises prices.

During 1940, Friedman was appointed an assistant professor teaching Economics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, but encountered antisemitism in the Economics department and decided to return to government service.[34][35] From 1941 to 1943 Friedman worked on wartime tax policy for the Federal Government, as an advisor to senior officials of the United States Department of the Treasury. As a Treasury spokesman during 1942 he advocated a Keynesian policy of taxation. He helped to invent the payroll withholding tax system, since the federal government badly needed money in order to fight the war.[36] He later said, “I have no apologies for it, but I really wish we hadn’t found it necessary and I wish there were some way of abolishing withholding now.”[37]

Academic career

Early years

In 1940, Friedman accepted a position at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, but left because of differences with faculty regarding United States involvement in World War II. Friedman believed the United States should enter the war.[38] In 1943, Friedman joined the Division of War Research at Columbia University (headed by W. Allen Wallis and Harold Hotelling), where he spent the rest of World War II working as a mathematical statistician, focusing on problems of weapons design, military tactics, and metallurgical experiments.[38][39]

In 1945, Friedman submitted Incomes from Independent Professional Practice (co-authored with Kuznets and completed during 1940) to Columbia as his doctoral dissertation. The university awarded him a PhD in 1946. Friedman spent the 1945–1946 academic year teaching at the University of Minnesota (where his friend George Stigler was employed). On February 12, 1945, his son, David D. Friedman was born.

University of Chicago

In 1946, Friedman accepted an offer to teach economic theory at the University of Chicago (a position opened by departure of his former professor Jacob Viner to Princeton University). Friedman would work for the University of Chicago for the next 30 years. There he contributed to the establishment of an intellectual community that produced a number of Nobel Prize winners, known collectively as the Chicago school of economics.

At that time, Arthur F. Burns, who was then the head of the National Bureau of Economic Research, asked Friedman to rejoin the Bureau’s staff. He accepted the invitation, and assumed responsibility for the Bureau’s inquiry into the role of money in the business cycle. As a result, he initiated the “Workshop in Money and Banking” (the “Chicago Workshop”), which promoted a revival of monetary studies. During the latter half of the 1940s, Friedman began a collaboration with Anna Schwartz, an economic historian at the Bureau, that would ultimately result in the 1963 publication of a book co-authored by Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960.

Friedman spent the 1954–1955 academic year as a Fulbright Visiting Fellow at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. At the time, the Cambridge economics faculty was divided into a Keynesian majority (including Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn) and an anti-Keynesian minority (headed by Dennis Robertson). Friedman speculated that he was invited to the fellowship, because his views were unacceptable to both of the Cambridge factions. Later his weekly columns for Newsweek magazine (1966–84) were well read and increasingly influential among political and business people.[40] From 1968 to 1978, he and Paul Samuelson participated in the Economics Cassette Series, a biweekly subscription series where the economist would discuss the days’ issues for about a half-hour at a time.[41][42]

Friedman was an economic adviser to Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater during 1964.

Personal life

Retirement

In 1977, at the age of 65, Friedman retired from the University of Chicago after teaching there for 30 years. He and his wife moved to San Francisco where he became a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. From 1977 on, he was affiliated with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. During the same year, Friedman was approached by the Free To Choose Network and asked to create a television program presenting his economic and social philosophy.

The Friedmans worked on this project for the next three years, and during 1980, the ten-part series, titled Free to Choose, was broadcast by the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). The companion book to the series (co-authored by Milton and his wife, Rose Friedman), also titled Free To Choose, was the bestselling nonfiction book of 1980 and has since been translated into 14 foreign languages.

Friedman served as an unofficial adviser to Ronald Reagan during his 1980 presidential campaign, and then served on the President’s Economic Policy Advisory Board for the rest of the Reagan Administration. Ebenstein says Friedman was “the ‘guru’ of the Reagan administration.”[43] In 1988 he received the National Medal of Science and Reagan honored him with the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Milton Friedman is known now as one of the most influential economists of the 20th century.[44][45] Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Friedman continued to write editorials and appear on television. He made several visits to Eastern Europe and to China, where he also advised governments. He was also for many years a Trustee of the Philadelphia Society.[46][47][48]

Later life

According to a 2007 article in Commentary magazine, his “parents were moderately observant [Jews], but Friedman, after an intense burst of childhood piety, rejected religion altogether.”[49] He described himself as an agnostic.[50] Friedman wrote extensively of his life and experiences, especially in 1998 in his memoirs with his wife Rose, titled Two Lucky People.

Death

Friedman died of heart failure at the age of 94 years in San Francisco on November 16, 2006.[51] He was still a working economist performing original economic research; his last column was published in The Wall Street Journal the day after his death.[52] He was survived by his wife (who died on August 18, 2009) and their two children, David, known for the anarcho-capitalist book The Machinery of Freedom, and Janet.

Scholarly contributions

Economics

Friedman was best known for reviving interest in the money supply as a determinant of the nominal value of output, that is, the quantity theory of money. Monetarism is the set of views associated with modern quantity theory. Its origins can be traced back to the 16th-century School of Salamanca or even further; however, Friedman’s contribution is largely responsible for its modern popularization. He co-authored, with Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (1963), which was an examination of the role of the money supply and economic activity in the U.S. history. A striking conclusion of their research regarded the way in which money supply fluctuations contribute to economic fluctuations. Several regression studies with David Meiselman during the 1960s suggested the primacy of the money supply over investment and government spending in determining consumption and output. These challenged a prevailing, but largely untested, view on their relative importance. Friedman’s empirical research and some theory supported the conclusion that the short-run effect of a change of the money supply was primarily on output but that the longer-run effect was primarily on the price level.

Friedman was the main proponent of the monetarist school of economics. He maintained that there is a close and stable association between inflation and the money supply, mainly that inflation could be avoided with proper regulation of the monetary base’s growth rate. He famously used the analogy of “dropping money out of a helicopter.”,[53] in order to avoid dealing with money injection mechanisms and other factors that would overcomplicate his models.

Friedman’s arguments were designed to counter the popular concept of cost-push inflation, that the increased general price level at the time was the result of increases in the price of oil, or increases in wages; as he wrote,

Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.

— Milton Friedman, 1963.[54]

Friedman rejected the use of fiscal policy as a tool of demand management; and he held that the government’s role in the guidance of the economy should be restricted severely. Friedman wrote extensively on the Great Depression, which he termed the Great Contraction, arguing that it had been caused by an ordinary financial shock whose duration and seriousness were greatly increased by the subsequent contraction of the money supply caused by the misguided policies of the directors of the Federal Reserve.

The Fed was largely responsible for converting what might have been a garden-variety recession, although perhaps a fairly severe one, into a major catastrophe. Instead of using its powers to offset the depression, it presided over a decline in the quantity of money by one-third from 1929 to 1933 … Far from the depression being a failure of the free-enterprise system, it was a tragic failure of government.

— Milton Friedman, Two Lucky People, 233[55]

Friedman also argued for the cessation of government intervention in currency markets, thereby spawning an enormous literature on the subject, as well as promoting the practice of freely floating exchange rates. His close friend George Stigler explained, “As is customary in science, he did not win a full victory, in part because research was directed along different lines by the theory of rational expectations, a newer approach developed by Robert Lucas, also at the University of Chicago.”[56] The relationship between Friedman and Lucas, or new classical macroeconomics as a whole, was highly complex. The Friedmanian Phillips curve was an interesting starting point for Lucas, but he soon realized that the solution provided by Friedman was not quite satisfactory. Lucas elaborated a new approach in which rational expectations were presumed instead of the Friedmanian adaptive expectations. Due to this reformulation, the story in which the theory of the new classical Phillips curve was embedded radically changed. This modification, however, had a significant effect on Friedman’s own approach, so, as a result, the theory of the Friedmanian Phillips curve also changed.[57] Moreover, new classical Neil Wallace, who was a graduate student at the University of Chicago between 1960 and 1963, regarded Friedman’s theoretical courses as a mess.[58] This evaluation clearly indicates the broken relationship between Friedmanian monetarism and new classical macroeconomics.

Friedman was also known for his work on the consumption function, the permanent income hypothesis (1957), which Friedman himself referred to as his best scientific work.[59] This work contended that rational consumers would spend a proportional amount of what they perceived to be their permanent income. Windfall gains would mostly be saved. Tax reductions likewise, as rational consumers would predict that taxes would have to increase later to balance public finances. Other important contributions include his critique of the Phillips curve and the concept of the natural rate of unemployment (1968). This critique associated his name, together with that of Edmund Phelps, with the insight that a government that brings about greater inflation cannot permanently reduce unemployment by doing so. Unemployment may be temporarily lower, if the inflation is a surprise, but in the long run unemployment will be determined by the frictions and imperfections of the labor market.

Friedman’s essay “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (1953) provided the epistemological pattern for his own subsequent research and to a degree that of the Chicago School. There he argued that economics as science should be free of value judgments for it to be objective. Moreover, a useful economic theory should be judged not by its descriptive realism but by its simplicity and fruitfulness as an engine of prediction. That is, students should measure the accuracy of its predictions, rather than the ‘soundness of its assumptions’. His argument was part of an ongoing debate among such statisticians as Jerzy Neyman, Leonard Savage, and Ronald Fisher.[60]

Statistics

One of his most famous contributions to statistics is sequential sampling. Friedman did statistical work at the Division of War Research at Columbia, where he and his colleagues came up with the technique. It later became, in the words of The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, “the standard analysis of quality control inspection”. The dictionary adds, “Like many of Friedman’s contributions, in retrospect it seems remarkably simple and obvious to apply basic economic ideas to quality control; that however is a measure of his genius.”[61]

Public policy positions

Federal Reserve

Due to its poor performance,[62] Friedman believed that the Federal Reserve Board should be abolished.[63][64] Friedman was deeply critical about Federal Reserve policies, even during the so-called ‘Volcker shock’ that was labelled ‘monetarist.’[65] He further believed that if the money supply was to be centrally controlled (as by the Federal Reserve System) that the preferable way to do it would be with a mechanical system that would keep the quantity of money increasing at a steady rate.

Exchange rates

Friedman was a strong advocate for floating exchange rates throughout the entire Bretton-Woods period. He argued that a flexible exchange rate would make external adjustment possible and allow countries to avoid Balance of Payments crises. He saw fixed exchange rates as an undesirable form of government intervention. The case was articulated in an influential 1953 paper, “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates”, at a time, when most commentators regarded the possibility of floating exchange rates as a fantasy.[66][67]

School choice

In his 1955 article “The Role of Government in Education”[68] Friedman proposed supplementing publicly operated schools with privately run but publicly funded schools through a system of school vouchers.[69] Reforms similar to those proposed in the article were implemented in, for example, Chile in 1981 and Sweden in 1992.[70] In 1996, Friedman, together with his wife, founded the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice to advocate school choice and vouchers. In 2016, the Friedman Foundation changed its name to EdChoice to honor the Friedmans’ desire to have the educational choice movement live on without their names attached to it after their deaths.[17]

Conscription

While Walter Oi is credited with establishing the economic basis for a volunteer military, Milton Friedman was a proponent, stating that the draft was “inconsistent with a free society.”[71][72] In Capitalism and Freedom, he argued that conscription is inequitable and arbitrary, preventing young men from shaping their lives as they see fit.[73] During the Nixon administration he headed the committee to research a conversion to paid/volunteer armed force. He would later state that his role in eliminating the conscription in the United States was his proudest accomplishment.[12] Friedman did, however, believe a nation could compel military training as a reserve in case of war time.[73]

Foreign policy

Biographer Lanny Ebenstein noted a drift over time in Friedman’s views from an interventionist to a more cautious foreign policy.[74] He supported US involvement in the Second World War and initially supported a hard line against Communism, but moderated over time.[74] He opposed the Gulf War and the Iraq War.[74] In a spring 2006 interview, Friedman said that the USA’s stature in the world had been eroded by the Iraq War, but that it might be improved if Iraq were to become a peaceful independent country.[75]

Libertarianism and the Republican Party

He served as a member of President Reagan’s Economic Policy Advisory Board starting at 1981. In 1988, he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the National Medal of Science. He said that he was a libertarian philosophically, but a member of the U.S. Republican Party for the sake of “expediency” (“I am a libertarian with a small ‘l’ and a Republican with a capital ‘R.’ And I am a Republican with a capital ‘R’ on grounds of expediency, not on principle.”) But, he said, “I think the term classical liberal is also equally applicable. I don’t really care very much what I’m called. I’m much more interested in having people thinking about the ideas, rather than the person.”[76]

Public goods and monopoly

Friedman was supportive of the state provision of some public goods that private businesses are not considered as being able to provide. However, he argued that many of the services performed by government could be performed better by the private sector. Above all, if some public goods are provided by the state, he believed that they should not be a legal monopoly where private competition is prohibited; for example, he wrote:

There is no way to justify our present public monopoly of the post office. It may be argued that the carrying of mail is a technical monopoly and that a government monopoly is the least of evils. Along these lines, one could perhaps justify a government post office, but not the present law, which makes it illegal for anybody else to carry the mail. If the delivery of mail is a technical monopoly, no one else will be able to succeed in competition with the government. If it is not, there is no reason why the government should be engaged in it. The only way to find out is to leave other people free to enter.

— Milton Friedman, Friedman, Milton & Rose D. Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 29

Social security, welfare programs, and negative income tax

After 1960 Friedman attacked Social Security from a free market view stating that it had created welfare dependency.[77]

Friedman proposed that if there had to be a welfare system of any kind, he would replace the existing U.S. welfare system with a negative income tax, a progressive tax system in which the poor receive a basic living income from the government.[78] According to the New York Times, Friedman’s views in this regard were grounded in a belief that while “market forces … accomplish wonderful things”, they “cannot ensure a distribution of income that enables all citizens to meet basic economic needs”.[78]

Drug policy

Friedman also supported libertarian policies such as legalization of drugs and prostitution. During 2005, Friedman and more than 500 other economists advocated discussions regarding the economic benefits of the legalization of marijuana.[79]

Gay rights

Friedman was also a supporter of gay rights.[80][81] He never specifically supported same-sex marriage, instead saying “I do not believe there should be any discrimination against gays.”[81]

Economic freedom

Michael Walker of the Fraser Institute and Friedman hosted a series of conferences from 1986 to 1994. The goal was to create a clear definition of economic freedom and a method for measuring it. Eventually this resulted in the first report on worldwide economic freedom, Economic Freedom in the World.[82] This annual report has since provided data for numerous peer-reviewed studies and has influenced policy in several nations.

Along with sixteen other distinguished economists he opposed the Copyright Term Extension Act and filed an amicus brief in Eldred v. Ashcroft.[83] He supported the inclusion of the word “no-brainer” in the brief.[84]

Friedman argued for stronger basic legal (constitutional) protection of economic rights and freedoms to further promote industrial-commercial growth and prosperity and buttress democracy and freedom and the rule of law generally in society.[85]

Honors, recognition, and influence

George H. Nash, a leading historian of American conservatism, says that by, “the end of the 1960s he was probably the most highly regarded and influential conservative scholar in the country, and one of the few with an international reputation.”[86] Friedman allowed the libertarian Cato Institute to use his name for its biannual Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty beginning in 2001. A Friedman Prize was given to the late British economist Peter Bauer in 2002, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto in 2004, Mart Laar, former Estonian Prime Minister in 2006 and a young Venezuelan student Yon Goicoechea in 2008. His wife Rose, sister of Aaron Director, with whom he initiated the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, served on the international selection committee.[87][88] Friedman was also a recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics.

Upon Friedman’s death, Harvard President Lawrence Summers called him “The Great Liberator” saying “… any honest Democrat will admit that we are now all Friedmanites.” He said Friedman’s great popular contribution was “in convincing people of the importance of allowing free markets to operate.”[89]

In 2013 Stephen Moore, a member of the editorial forward of the Wall Street Journal said, “Quoting the most-revered champion of free-market economics since Adam Smith has become a little like quoting the Bible.” He adds, “There are sometimes multiple and conflicting interpretations.”[90]

Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences

Friedman won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, the sole recipient for 1976, “for his achievements in the fields of consumption analysis, monetary history and theory and for his demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy.”[4]

Hong Kong

Friedman once said, “If you want to see capitalism in action, go to Hong Kong.”[91] He wrote in 1990 that the Hong Kong economy was perhaps the best example of a free market economy.[92]

One month before his death, he wrote the article “Hong Kong Wrong – What would Cowperthwaite say?” in the Wall Street Journal, criticizing Donald Tsang, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, for abandoning “positive noninterventionism.”[93] Tsang later said he was merely changing the slogan to “big market, small government,” where small government is defined as less than 20% of GDP. In a debate between Tsang and his rival, Alan Leong, before the 2007 Chief Executive election, Leong introduced the topic and jokingly accused Tsang of angering Friedman to death.

Chile

Main articles: Miracle of Chile and Chicago Boys

During 1975, two years after the military coup that brought military dictator President Augusto Pinochet to power and ended the government of Salvador Allende, the economy of Chile experienced a severe crisis. Friedman and Arnold Harberger accepted an invitation of a private Chilean foundation to visit Chile and speak on principles of economic freedom.[94] He spent seven days in Chile giving a series of lectures at the Universidad Católica de Chile and the (National) University of Chile. One of the lectures was entitled “The Fragility of Freedom” and according to Friedman, “dealt with precisely the threat to freedom from a centralized military government.”[95]

In an April 21, 1975, letter to Pinochet, Friedman considered the “key economic problems of Chile are clearly … inflation and the promotion of a healthy social market economy“.[96] He stated that “There is only one way to end inflation: by drastically reducing the rate of increase of the quantity of money …” and that “… cutting government spending is by far and away the most desirable way to reduce the fiscal deficit, because it … strengthens the private sector thereby laying the foundations for healthy economic growth”.[96] As to how rapidly inflation should be ended, Friedman felt that “for Chile where inflation is raging at 10–20% a month … gradualism is not feasible. It would involve so painful an operation over so long a period that the patient would not survive.” Choosing “a brief period of higher unemployment…” was the lesser evil.. and that “the experience of Germany, … of Brazil …, of the post-war adjustment in the U.S. … all argue for shock treatment“. In the letter Friedman recommended to deliver the shock approach with “… a package to eliminate the surprise and to relieve acute distress” and “… for definiteness let me sketch the contents of a package proposal … to be taken as illustrative” although his knowledge of Chile was “too limited to enable [him] to be precise or comprehensive”. He listed a “sample proposal” of 8 monetary and fiscal measures including “the removal of as many as obstacles as possible that now hinder the private market. For example, suspend … the present law against discharging employees”. He closed, stating “Such a shock program could end inflation in months”. His letter suggested that cutting spending to reduce the fiscal deficit would result in less transitional unemployment than raising taxes.

Sergio de Castro, a Chilean Chicago School graduate, became the nation’s Minister of Finance in 1975. During his six-year tenure, foreign investment increased, restrictions were placed on striking and labor unions, and GDP rose yearly.[97] A foreign exchange program was created between the Catholic University of Chile and the University of Chicago. Many other Chicago School alumni were appointed government posts during and after the Pinochet years; others taught its economic doctrine at Chilean universities. They became known as the Chicago Boys.[98]

Friedman did not criticize Pinochet’s dictatorship at the time, nor the assassinations, illegal imprisonments, torture, or other atrocities that were well known by then.[99] In 1976 Friedman defended his unofficial adviser position with: “I do not consider it as evil for an economist to render technical economic advice to the Chilean Government, any more than I would regard it as evil for a physician to give technical medical advice to the Chilean Government to help end a medical plague.”[100]

Friedman defended his activity in Chile on the grounds that, in his opinion, the adoption of free market policies not only improved the economic situation of Chile but also contributed to the amelioration of Pinochet’s rule and to the eventual transition to a democratic government during 1990. That idea is included in Capitalism and Freedom, in which he declared that economic freedom is not only desirable in itself but is also a necessary condition for political freedom. In his 1980 documentary Free to Choose, he said the following: “Chile is not a politically free system, and I do not condone the system. But the people there are freer than the people in Communist societies because government plays a smaller role. … The conditions of the people in the past few years has been getting better and not worse. They would be still better to get rid of the junta and to be able to have a free democratic system.”[101][102] In 1984, Friedman stated that he has “never refrained from criticizing the political system in Chile.”[95] In 1991 he said: “I have nothing good to say about the political regime that Pinochet imposed. It was a terrible political regime. The real miracle of Chile is not how well it has done economically; the real miracle of Chile is that a military junta was willing to go against its principles and support a free market regime designed by principled believers in a free market. […] In Chile, the drive for political freedom, that was generated by economic freedom and the resulting economic success, ultimately resulted in a referendum that introduced political democracy. Now, at long last, Chile has all three things: political freedom, human freedom and economic freedom. Chile will continue to be an interesting experiment to watch to see whether it can keep all three or whether, now that it has political freedom,that political freedom will tend to be used to destroy or reduce economic freedom.”[103] He stressed that the lectures he gave in Chile were the same lectures he later gave in China and other socialist states.[104]

During the 2000 PBS documentary The Commanding Heights (based on the book), Friedman continued to argue that “free markets would undermine [Pinochet’s] political centralization and political control.”,[105][106] and that criticism over his role in Chile missed his main contention that freer markets resulted in freer people, and that Chile’s unfree economy had caused the military government. Friedman advocated for free markets which undermined “political centralization and political control”.[107]

Iceland

Friedman visited Iceland during the autumn of 1984, met with important Icelanders and gave a lecture at the University of Iceland on the “tyranny of the status quo.” He participated in a lively television debate on August 31, 1984 with socialist intellectuals, including Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, who later became the president of Iceland.[108] When they complained that a fee was charged for attending his lecture at the University and that, hitherto, lectures by visiting scholars had been free-of-charge, Friedman replied that previous lectures had not been free-of-charge in a meaningful sense: lectures always have related costs. What mattered was whether attendees or non-attendees covered those costs. Friedman thought that it was fairer that only those who attended paid. In this discussion Friedman also stated that he did not receive any money for delivering that lecture.

Estonia

Although Friedman never visited Estonia, his book Free to Choose exercised a great influence on that nation’s then 32-year-old prime minister, Mart Laar, who has claimed that it was the only book on economics he had read before taking office. Laar’s reforms are often credited with responsibility for transforming Estonia from an impoverished Soviet Republic to the “Baltic Tiger.” A prime element of Laar’s program was introduction of the flat tax. Laar won the 2006 Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty, awarded by the Cato Institute.[109]

United Kingdom

After 1950 Friedman was frequently invited to lecture in Britain, and by the 1970s his ideas had gained widespread attention in conservative circles. For example, he was a regular speaker at the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), a libertarian think tank. Conservative politician Margaret Thatcher closely followed IEA programs and ideas, and met Friedman there in 1978. He also strongly influenced Keith Joseph, who became Thatcher’s senior advisor on economic affairs, as well as Alan Walters and Patrick Minford, two other key advisers. Major newspapers, including the Daily Telegraph, The Times, and The Financial Times all promulgated Friedman’s monetarist ideas to British decision-makers. Friedman’s ideas strongly influenced Thatcher and her allies when she became Prime Minister in 1979.[110][111]

Criticism

Econometrician David Hendry criticized part of Friedman’s and Anna Schwartz’s 1982 Monetary Trends.[112] When asked about it during an interview with Icelandic TV in 1984,[113] Friedman said that the criticism referred to a different problem from that which he and Schwartz had tackled, and hence was irrelevant,[114] and pointed out the lack of consequential peer review amongst econometricians on Hendry’s work.[115] In 2006, Hendry said that Friedman was guilty of “serious errors” of misunderstanding that meant “the t-ratios he reported for UK money demand were overstated by nearly 100 per cent”, and said that, in a paper published in 1991 with Neil Ericsson,[116] he had refuted “almost every empirical claim […] made about UK money demand” by Friedman and Schwartz.[117] A 2004 paper updated and confirmed the validity of the Hendry–Ericsson findings through 2000.[118]

Although Keynesian Nobel laureate Paul Krugman praised Friedman as a “great economist and a great man” after Friedman’s death in 2006, and acknowledged his many, widely accepted contributions to empirical economics, Krugman had been, and remains, a prominent critic of Friedman. Krugman has written that “he slipped all too easily into claiming both that markets always work and that only markets work. It’s extremely hard to find cases in which Friedman acknowledged the possibility that markets could go wrong, or that government intervention could serve a useful purpose.”[119]

In her book The Shock Doctrine, author and social activist Naomi Klein criticized Friedman’s economic liberalism, identifying it with the principles that guided the economic restructuring that followed the military coups in countries such as Chile and Indonesia. Based on their assessments of the extent to which what she describes as neoliberal policies contributed to income disparities and inequality, both Klein and Noam Chomsky have suggested that the primary role of what they describe as neoliberalism was as an ideological cover for capital accumulation by multinational corporations.[120]

Visit to Chile

Because of his involvement with the Pinochet government, there were international protests when Friedman was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1976.[121] Friedman was accused of supporting the military dictatorship in Chile because of the relation of economists of the University of Chicago to Pinochet, and a controversial six-day trip[122] he took to Chile during March 1975 (less than two years after the coup that deposed President Salvador Allende). Friedman answered that he never was an adviser to the dictatorship, but only gave some lectures and seminars on inflation, and met with officials, including Augusto Pinochet, while in Chile.[123]

Chilean economist Orlando Letelier asserted that Pinochet’s dictatorship resorted to oppression because of popular opposition to Chicago School policies in Chile.[124] After a 1991 speech on drug legalisation, Friedman answered a question on his involvement with the Pinochet regime, saying that he was never an advisor to Pinochet (also mentioned in his 1984 Iceland interview[95]), but that a group of his students at the University of Chicago were involved in Chile’s economic reforms. Friedman credited these reforms with high levels of economic growth and with the establishment of democracy that has subsequently occurred in Chile.[125][126] In October 1988, after returning from a lecture tour of China during which he had met with Zhao Ziyang, Friedman wrote to The Stanford Daily asking if he should anticipate a similar “avalanche of protests for having been willing to give advice to so evil a government? And if not, why not?”[127]

Capitalism and Freedom

Capitalism and Freedom is a seminal work by Friedman. In the book, Friedman talks about the need to move to a classically liberal society, that free markets would help nations and individuals in the long-run and fix the efficiency problems currently faced by the United States and other major countries of the 1950s and 1960s. He goes through the chapters specifying a specific issue in each respective chapter from the role of government and money supply to social welfare programs to a special chapter on occupational licensure. Friedman concludes Capitalism and Freedom with his “classical liberal” stance, that government should stay out of matters that do not need and should only involve itself when absolutely necessary for the survival of its people and the country. He recounts how the best of a country’s abilities come from its free markets while its failures come from government intervention.[77]

Selected bibliography

  • A Theory of the Consumption Function (1957)
  • A Program for Monetary Stability (Fordham University Press, 1960) 110 pp. online version
  • Capitalism and Freedom (1962), highly influential series of essays that established Friedman’s position on major issues of public policy excerpts
  • A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, with Anna J. Schwartz, 1963; part 3 reprinted as The Great Contraction
  • “The Role of Monetary Policy.” American Economic Review, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Mar., 1968), pp. 1–17 JSTOR presidential address to American Economics Association
  • “Inflation and Unemployment: Nobel lecture”, 1977, Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 85, pp. 451–72. JSTOR
  • Free to Choose: A personal statement, with Rose Friedman, (1980), highly influential restatement of policy views
  • The Essence of Friedman, essays edited by Kurt R. Leube, (1987) (ISBN 0-8179-8662-6)
  • Two Lucky People: Memoirs (with Rose Friedman) ISBN 0-226-26414-9 (1998) excerpt and text search
  • Milton Friedman on Economics: Selected Papers by Milton Friedman, edited by Gary S. Becker (2008)
  • An Interview with Milton Friedman, John B. Taylor (2001). Macroeconomic Dynamics, 5, pp 101–31

See also

Notes

  1. Jump up^ Ebenstein, Lanny (2007). Milton Friedman: A Biography. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 89.
  2. Jump up^ Charles Moore (2013). Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One: Not For Turning. Penguin. pp. 576–77.
  3. Jump up^ Lanny Ebenstein (2007). Milton Friedman: A Biography. St. Martin’s Press. p. 208.
  4. ^ Jump up to:a b “Milton Friedman on nobelprize.org”. Nobel Prize. 1976. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  5. Jump up^ Thomas Sowell (2016-09-16). A Personal Odyssey. Free Press. p. 320. ISBN 0743215087.
  6. Jump up^ The Chicago School: How the University of Chicago Assembled the Thinkers Who Revolutionized Economics and Business
  7. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman”. Commanding Heights. PBS. October 1, 2000. Retrieved September 19, 2011.
  8. Jump up^ Milton Friedman—Economist as Public Intellectual
  9. Jump up^ Mark Skousen (2009-02-28). The Making of Modern Economics: The Lives and Ideas of the Great Thinkers. M.E. Sharpe. p. 407. ISBN 0-7656-2227-0.
  10. Jump up^ Among macroeconomists, the “natural” rate has been increasingly replaced by James Tobin‘s NAIRU, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, which is seen as having fewer normative connotations.
  11. Jump up^ Nobel prize winner Paul Krugman stated that, “In 1968 in one of the decisive intellectual achievements of postwar economics, Friedman not only showed why the apparent tradeoff embodied in the idea of the Phillips curve was wrong; he also predicted the emergence of combined inflation and high unemployment … dubbed ‘stagflation.” Paul Krugman, Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in an Age of Diminished Expectations (1995) p. 43 online
  12. ^ Jump up to:a b Doherty, Brian (June 1, 1995). “Best of Both Worlds”. Reason Magazine. Retrieved October 24, 2009
  13. Jump up^ Edward Nelson, “Friedman’s Monetary Economics in Practice,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, April 13, 2011. Nelson stated, “in important respects, the overall monetary and financial policy response to the crisis can be viewed as Friedman’s monetary economics in practice.” and “Friedman’s recommendations for responding to a financial crisis largely lined up with the principal financial and monetary policy measures taken since 2007.” Nelson, “Review,” in Journal of Economic Literature (Dec, 2012) 50#4 pp. 1106–09
  14. Jump up^ Lanny Ebenstein (2007). Milton Friedman: A Biography. St. Martin’s Press. p. 208.
  15. Jump up^ Charles Moore (2013). Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One: Not For Turning. Penguin. pp. 576–77.
  16. Jump up^ Milton Friedman (1912–2006)
  17. ^ Jump up to:a b Sullivan, Maureen (July 30, 2016). “Milton Friedman’s Name Disappears From Foundation, But His School-Choice Beliefs Live On”. Forbes. Retrieved 14 September 2016.
  18. Jump up^ “Capitalism and Friedman” (editorial), The Wall Street Journal November 17, 2006
  19. Jump up^ Václav Klaus (January 29, 2007). “Remarks at Milton Friedman Memorial Service”. Retrieved August 22, 2008.
  20. Jump up^ Johan Norberg, Defaming Milton Friedman: Naomi Klein’s disastrous yet popular polemic against the great free market economist, Reason Magazine, Washington, D.C., Oct. 2008
  21. Jump up^ Friedman 1999, p. 506
  22. Jump up^ Davis, William L, Bob Figgins, David Hedengren, and Daniel B. Klein. “Economic Professors’ Favorite Economic Thinkers, Journals, and Blogs”, Econ Journal Watch 8(2): 126–46, May 2011.
  23. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman, a giant among economists”. The Economist. November 23, 2006. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  24. Jump up^ “Who’s who in American Jewry”. 1980.
  25. Jump up^ Alan O. Ebenstein, Milton Friedman: a biography (2007) p. 10; Milton & Rose Friedman, Two Lucky People. Memoirs, Chicago 1998, p. 22.
  26. Jump up^ Eamonn Butler, Milton Friedman (2011) ch 1
  27. Jump up^ Alan O. Ebenstein, Milton Friedman: a biography (2007) pp. 5–12
  28. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman and his start in economics”. Young America’s Foundation. August 2006. Retrieved March 12, 2012.
  29. Jump up^ Ebenstein, Milton Friedman: a biography (2007) pp. 13–30
  30. Jump up^ Feeney, Mark (November 16, 2006). “Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman dies at 94”. The Boston Globe. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  31. Jump up^ Friedman 1999, p. 59
  32. Jump up^ “Right from the Start? What Milton Friedman can teach progressives.” (PDF). J. Bradford DeLong. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  33. Jump up^ Bernanke 2004, p. 7
  34. Jump up^ Friedman 1999, p. 42
  35. Jump up^ Friedman 1999, pp. 84–85
  36. Jump up^ Milton Friedman; Rose D. Friedman (1999). Two Lucky People: Memoirs. University of Chicago Press. pp. 122–23. ISBN 9780226264158.
  37. Jump up^ Doherty, Brian (June 1995). “Best of Both Worlds”. Reason. Retrieved July 28, 2010.
  38. ^ Jump up to:a b “Milton Friedman Biography – Academy of Achievement”. Achievement.org. Retrieved 2014-04-22.
  39. Jump up^ Philip Mirowski (2002). Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science. Cambridge University Press. pp. 202–03. ISBN 9780521775267.
  40. Jump up^ CATO, “Letter from Washington,” National Review, September 19, 1980, Vol. 32 Issue 19, p. 1119
  41. Jump up^ Rose and Milton Friedman
  42. Jump up^ Inventory of the Paul A. Samuelson Papers, 1933–2010 and undated | Finding Aids | Rubenstein Library
  43. Jump up^ Ebenstein (2007). Milton Friedman: A Biography. p. 208.
  44. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman: An enduring legacy”. The Economist. November 17, 2006. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  45. Jump up^ Sullivan, Patricia (November 17, 2006). “Economist Touted Laissez-Faire Policy”. The Washington Post. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  46. Jump up^ Milton Friedman – Biography | Cato Institute
  47. Jump up^ Trustees
  48. Jump up^ Milton Friedman
  49. Jump up^ Lanny Ebenstein, Milton Friedman, Commentary, May 2007, p. 286.
  50. Jump up^ Asman, David (November 16, 2006). “‘Your World’ Interview With Economist Milton Friedman”. Fox News. Retrieved August 2, 2011.
  51. Jump up^ Christie, Jim (November 16, 2006). “Free market economist Milton Friedman dead at 94”. Reuters. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  52. Jump up^ Peter Robinson (2008-10-17). “What Would Milton Friedman Say?”. forbes.com. Retrieved 2014-12-13.
  53. Jump up^ Optimum Quantity of Money. Aldine Publishing Company. 1969. p. 4.
  54. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton. Inflation: Causes and Consequences. New York: Asia Publishing House.
  55. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman: END THE FED”. Themoneymasters.com. Retrieved 2014-04-22.
  56. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton (1969). Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist. Aldine Publishing Company. p. 4.
  57. Jump up^ Galbács, Peter (2015). The Theory of New Classical Macroeconomics. A Positive Critique. Heidelberg/New York/Dordrecht/London: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17578-2. ISBN 978-3-319-17578-2.
  58. Jump up^ Kevin Hoover; Warren Young (2011). Rational Expectations – Retrospect and Prospect (PDF). Durham: Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University.
  59. Jump up^ “Charlie Rose Show”. December 26, 2005. Missing or empty |series= (help)
  60. Jump up^ David Teira, “Milton Friedman, the Statistical Methodologist,” History of Political Economy (2007) 39#3 pp. 511–27,
  61. Jump up^ The Life and Times of Milton Friedman – Remembering the 20th century’s most influential libertarian
  62. Jump up^ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6fkdagNrjI “There in no institution in the US that has such a high public standing and such a poor record of performance” “It’s done more harm than good”
  63. Jump up^ “My first preference would be to abolish the Federal Reserve” on YouTube
  64. Jump up^ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6fkdagNrjI “I have long been in favor of abolishing it.”
  65. Jump up^ Reichart Alexandre & Abdelkader Slifi (2016). ‘The Influence of Monetarism on Federal Reserve Policy during the 1980s.’ Cahiers d’économie Politique/Papers in Political Economy, (1), pp. 107–50. https://www.cairn.info/revue-cahiers-d-economie-politique-2016-1-page-107.htm
  66. Jump up^ [1]
  67. Jump up^ [2]
  68. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton (1955). Solo, Robert A., ed. “The Role of Government in Education,” as printed in the book Economics and the Public Interest (PDF). Rutgers University Press. pp. 123–144.
  69. Jump up^ Leonard Ross and Richard Zeckhauser (December 1970). “Review: Education Vouchers”. The Yale Law Journal. 80 (2): 451–61. doi:10.2307/795126. JSTOR 795126.
  70. Jump up^ Martin Carnoy (August 1998). “National Voucher Plans in Chile and Sweden: Did Privatization Reforms Make for Better Education?”. Comparative Education Review. 42 (3): 309–37. doi:10.1086/447510. JSTOR 1189163.
  71. Jump up^ Milton Friedman (1991). The War on Drugs. America’s Drug Forum.
  72. Jump up^ Rostker, Bernard (2006). I Want You!: The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force. Rand Corporation. p. 4. ISBN 978-0-8330-3895-1.
  73. ^ Jump up to:a b Friedman, Milton (November 15, 2002). Capitalism and Freedom. University Of Chicago Press. p. 36.
  74. ^ Jump up to:a b c Ebenstein, Lanny (2007). Milton Friedman: a biography. New York: St. Martin’s Press. pp. 231–32. ISBN 978-0-230-60409-4.
  75. Jump up^ Ebenstein, Lanny (2007). Milton Friedman: a biography. New York: St. Martin’s Press. p. 243. ISBN 978-0-230-60409-4.
  76. Jump up^ Friedman and Freedom. Queen’s Journal. Archived from the original on August 11, 2006. Retrieved February 20, 2008., Interview with Peter Jaworski. The Journal, Queen’s University, March 15, 2002 – Issue 37, Volume 129
  77. ^ Jump up to:a b Milton Friedman; Rose D. Friedman (1962). Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition. U. of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780226264189.
  78. ^ Jump up to:a b Frank, Robert H (2006-11-23). “The Other Milton Friedman: A Conservative With a Social Welfare Program”. New York Times. The New York Times.
  79. Jump up^ “An open letter”. Prohibition Costs. Retrieved November 9, 2012.
  80. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman”. Liberal Democratic Party (Australia). Retrieved February 19, 2013.
  81. ^ Jump up to:a b Alan O. Ebenstein, Milton Friedman: A Biography (2007) p. 228
  82. Jump up^ “Economic Freedom of the World project”. Fraser Institute. Retrieved 16 February 2016.
  83. Jump up^ “In the Supreme Court of the United States” (PDF). Harvard Law School. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  84. Jump up^ Lessig, Lawrence (November 19, 2006). “only if the word ‘no-brainer’ appears in it somewhere: RIP Milton Friedman (Lessig Blog)”. Lessig.org. Retrieved April 2, 2013.
  85. Jump up^ “A New British Bill of Rights: The Case For”. ISR Online Guide. Retrieved 16 February 2016.
  86. Jump up^ Lanny Ebenstein (2007). Milton Friedman: A Biography. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 260.
  87. Jump up^ Selection Committee Announced for the 2008 Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty,” Cato Institute, September 5, 2007. Accessed 4 January 2014.
  88. Jump up^ Milton Friedman Prize page at Cato Institute website. Accessed 5 January 2014.
  89. Jump up^ Summers, Larry (November 19, 2006). “The Great Liberator”. The New York Times.
  90. Jump up^ Stephen Moore, What Would Milton Friedman Say?” Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2013 p. A13
  91. Jump up^ Ingdahl, Waldemar (March 22, 2007). “Real Virtuality”. The American. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  92. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton; Friedman, Rose (1990). Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. Harvest Books. p. 34. ISBN 0-15-633460-7.
  93. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton (October 6, 2006). “Dr. Milton Friedman”. Opinion Journal. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  94. Jump up^ Letter from Arnold Harberger to Stig Ramel as reprinted in the Wall Street Journal 12/10/1976, and in Two Lucky People: Memoirs By Milton Friedman, Rose D. Friedman. Appendix A, pp. 598–99. Accessible at books.google.com
  95. ^ Jump up to:a b c Milton Friedman (August 31, 1984). Iceland Television Debate (Flash Video) (Television production). Reykjavík: Icelandic State Television. Event occurs at 009:48:00. Retrieved June 27, 2010.
  96. ^ Jump up to:a b [http:// Two Lucky People: Memoirs By Milton Friedman, Rose D. Friedman. Appendix A, pp. 591–93. Letter from Friedman to Pinochet, April 21, 1975.]
  97. Jump up^ Mask II, William Ray (May 2013). The Great Chilean Recovery: Assigning Responsibility For The Chilean Miracle(s) (Thesis). California State University, Fresno.
  98. Jump up^ “Chile and the “Chicago Boys””. The Hoover Institution. Stanford University. Retrieved 20 June 2014.
  99. Jump up^ O’Shaughnessy, Hugh (December 11, 2006). “General Augusto Pinochet”. The Independent. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  100. Jump up^ Newsweek of June 14, 1976
  101. Jump up^ “Free to Choose Vol. 5”. Archived from the original on February 9, 2008. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  102. Jump up^ Frances Fox Piven vs. Milton Friedman, Thomas Sowell, debate, 1980, YouTube.
  103. Jump up^ The Smith Center: Milton Friedman’s lecture, “Economic Freedom, Human Freedom, Political Freedom”, by Milton Friedman, delivered November 1, 1991.
  104. Jump up^ Friedman 1999, pp. 600–01
  105. Jump up^ “Interview with Jeffery Sachs on the “Miracle of Chile””. PBS. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  106. Jump up^ “Commanding Heights: Milton Friedman”. PBS. Retrieved December 29, 2008.
  107. Jump up^ “Milton Friedman interview”. PBS. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  108. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton; Grímsson, Ólafur Ragnar. Milton Friedman on Icelandic State Television in 1984.
  109. Jump up^ “Mart Laar”. Cato Institute. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
  110. Jump up^ John F. Lyons (2013). America in the British Imagination: 1945 to the Present. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 102.
  111. Jump up^ Subroto Roy & John Clarke, eds., Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution: How it Happened and What it Meant (Continuum 2005)
  112. Jump up^ David F. Hendry; Neil R. Ericsson (October 1983). “Assertion without Empirical Basis: An Econometric Appraisal of ‘Monetary Trends in … the United Kingdom’ by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz,” in Monetary Trends in the United Kingdom, Bank of England Panel of Academic Consultants, Panel Paper No. 22, pp. 45–101.See also Federal Reserve International Finance Discussion Paper No. 270 (December 1985), which is a revised and shortened version of Hendry–Ericsson 1983.
  113. Jump up^ “M.Friedman – Iceland TV (1984)”. YouTube. Retrieved 16 February 2016.
  114. Jump up^ van Steven Moore, CMA (1984-08-31). “Milton Friedman – Iceland 2 of 8”. YouTube. Retrieved 2014-04-22.
  115. Jump up^ J. Daniel Hammond (2005). Theory and Measurement: Causality Issues in Milton Friedman’s Monetary Economics. Cambridge U.P. pp. 193–99.
  116. Jump up^ David F. Hendry; Neil R. Ericsson (July 1989). “An Econometric Analysis of UK Money Demand in Monetary Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom by Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz” (PDF). International Finance Discussion Papers: 355. Federal Reserve. Retrieved 2 August 2013.
  117. Jump up^ Hendry, David F. (25 April 2013). “Friedman’s t-ratios were overstated by nearly 100%”. ft.com. Retrieved 1 May 2013.
  118. Jump up^ Escribano, Alvaro (2004). “Nonlinear error correction: The case of money demand in the United Kingdom (1878–2000)” (PDF). Macroeconomic Dynamics. 8 (1): 76–116. doi:10.1017/S1365100503030013.
    Escribano’s approach had already been recognized by Friedman, Schwartz, Hendry et al. (p. 14 of the pdf) as yielding significant improvements over previous money demand equations.
  119. Jump up^ The New York Review of Books, Who Was Milton Friedman?, February 15, 2007
  120. Jump up^ Noam Chomsky (1999). Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order. New York, NY: Seven Stories Press.
  121. Jump up^ Feldman, Burton (2000). “Chapter 9: The Economics Memorial Prize”. The Nobel Prize: A History of Genius, Controversy, and Prestige. New York: Arcade Publishing. p. 350. ISBN 1-55970-537-X.
  122. Jump up^ O’Shaughnessy, Hugh (11 December 2006). “General Augusto Pinochet”. The Independent.
  123. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton; Friedman, Rose D. “Two Lucky People: One Week in Stockholm”. Hoover Digest: Research and Opinion on Public Policy. 1998 (4).
  124. Jump up^ Orlando Letelier, “Economic Freedom’s Awful Toll”, The Nation, August 28, 1976.
  125. Jump up^ The Drug War as a Socialist Enterprise, Milton Friedman, From: Friedman & Szasz on Liberty and Drugs, edited and with a Preface by Arnold S. Trebach and Kevin B. Zeese. Washington, D.C.: The Drug Policy Foundation, 1992.
  126. Jump up^ YouTube clip: Milton Friedman – Pinochet and Chile
  127. Jump up^ Friedman, Milton; Friedman, Rose D. Two Lucky People: Memoirs. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780226264158. Retrieved 18 October 2016.

References

  • Bernanke, Ben (2004). Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-11820-5
  • Butler, Eamonn (2011). Milton Friedman. Harriman Economic Essentials.
  • Ebenstein, Alan O. (2007). Milton Friedman: a biography.
  • Friedman, Milton (1999). Two Lucky People: Memoirs. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-26415-7.
  • Wood, John Cunningham, and Ronald N. Wood, ed. (1990), Milton Friedman: Critical Assessments, v. 3. Scroll to chapter-preview links. Routledge.

Further reading

External links

Free to Choose (original series) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1Fj5tzuYBE

Videos

Robert Mundell

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Robert Mundell
Rmundell.jpg
Born October 24, 1932 (age 84)
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
Nationality Canadian
Institution Johns Hopkins University (1959–61, 1997–98, 2000–01)
University of Chicago (1965–72)
Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland (1965–75) [1]
University of Waterloo (1972–74)
McGill University (1989–1990)[2]
Columbia University (1974 – present)
Chinese University of Hong Kong (2009 – present)
Field Monetary economics
School or
tradition
Supply-side economics
Alma mater London School of Economics
UBC Vancouver School of Economics
University of Washington
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
University of Waterloo
Doctoral
advisor
Charles Kindleberger[3]
Doctoral
students
Jacob A. Frenkel
Rudi Dornbusch[4]
Carmen Reinhart[5]
Influences Ludwig Von Mises
Influenced Arthur Laffer
Jude Wanniski
Michael Mussa
Contributions Mundell–Fleming model
Optimum currency areas
Research on the gold standard
Awards Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (1999)
Information at IDEAS / RePEc

Robert Alexander Mundell, CC (born October 24, 1932) is a Nobel Prize-winning Canadian economist. Currently, he is a professor of economics at Columbia University and the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

He received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1999 for his pioneering work in monetary dynamics and optimum currency areas. Mundell is known as the “father”[6] of the Euro, as he laid the groundwork for its introduction through this work and helped to start the movement known as supply-side economics. Mundell is also known for the Mundell–Fleming model and Mundell–Tobin effect.

Background

Mundell was born in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. He earned his BA in Economics at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, and his MA at the University of Washington in Seattle. After studying at the University of British Columbia and at The London School of Economics in 1956,[7] he then attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he obtained his PhD in Economics in 1956. In 2006 Mundell earned an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from the University of Waterloo in Canada.[8] He was Professor of Economics and Editor of the Journal of Political Economy at the University of Chicago from 1965 to 1972, Chairman of the Department of Economics at the University of Waterloo 1972 to 1974 and since 1974 he was Professor of Economics at Columbia University.[9] He also held the post of Repap Professor of Economics at McGill University.[10][11]

Career

Since 1974 he has been a professor in the Economics department at Columbia University; since 2001 he has held Columbia’s highest academic rank – University Professor. After completing his post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Chicago in 1957, he began teaching economics at Stanford University, and then Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University during 1959–1961.[2] In 1961, he went on to staff the International Monetary Fund. Mundell returned to academics as professor of economics at the University of Chicago from 1966 to 1971, and then served as professor during summers at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva until 1975. In 1989, he was appointed to the post of Repap Professor of Economics at McGill University.,[10][11] In the 1970s, he laid the groundwork for the introduction of the euro through his pioneering work in monetary dynamics and optimum currency forms for which he won the 1999 Nobel Prize in Economics. During this time he continued to serve as an economic adviser to the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, the European Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, the United States Department of Treasury and the governments of Canada and other countries. He is currently the Distinguished Professor-at-Large of The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Among his major contributions are:

Awards

Mundell was awarded the Guggenheim Fellowship in 1971 and the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1999. In 2002 he was made a Companion of the Order of Canada.

In 1992, Mundell received the Docteur Honoris Causa from the University of Paris. Mundell’s honorary professorships and fellowships were from Brookings Institution, the University of Chicago, the University of Southern California, McGill University, the University of Pennsylvania, the Bologna Center and Renmin University of China. He became a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1998. In June 2005 he was awarded the Global Economics Prize World Economics Institute in Kiel, Germany and in September 2005 he was made a Cavaliere di Gran Croce del Reale Ordine del Merito sotto il Titolo di San Ludovico by Principe Don Carlo Ugo di Borbone Parma.

The Mundell International University of Entrepreneurship in the Zhongguancun district of Beijing, People’s Republic of China is named in his honor.

International monetary flows

Mundell is best known in politics for his support of tax cuts and supply-side economics; however, in economics it is for his work on currency areas[12] and international exchange rates[13] that he was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel by the Bank of Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank). Nevertheless, supply-side economics featured prominently in his Bank of Sweden prize speech.

In the 1960s, Canada, of which Mundell is a native, floated its exchange: this caused Mundell to begin investigating the results of floating exchange rates, a phenomenon not widely seen since the 1930s “Stockholm School” successfully lobbied Sweden to leave the gold standard.

In 1962, along with Marcus Fleming, he co-authored the Mundell–Fleming model of exchange rates, and noted that it was impossible to have domestic autonomy, fixed exchange rates, and free capital flows: no more than two of those objectives could be met. The model is, in effect, an extension of the IS/LM model applied to currency rates.

According to Mundell’s analysis:

  • Discipline under the Bretton Woods system was more due to the US Federal Reserve than to the discipline of gold.
  • Demand side fiscal policy would be ineffective in restraining central banks under a floating exchange rate system.
  • Single currency zones relied, therefore, on similar levels of price stability, where a single monetary policy would suffice for all.

His analysis led to his conclusion that it was a disagreement between Europe and the United States over the rate of inflation, partially to finance the Vietnam War, and that Bretton Woods disintegrated because of the undervaluing of gold and the consequent monetary discipline breakdown. There is a famous point/counterpoint over this issue between Mundell and Milton Friedman.[14]

This work later led to the creation of the euro and his prediction that leaving the Bretton Woods system would lead to “stagflation” so long as highly progressive income tax rates applied. In 1974, he advocated a drastic tax reduction and a flattening of income tax rates.

Mundell, though lionized by some conservatives, has many of his harshest critics from the right: he denies the need for a fixed gold based currency or currency board[citation needed] (he still often recommends this as a policy in hyperinflationary environments) and he is both a fiscal and balance of payments deficit hawk. He is well known for stating that in a floating exchange rate system, expansion of the money supply can come about only by a positive balance of payments.

In 2000, he predicted that before 2010, the euro zone would expand to cover 50 countries, while the dollar would spread throughout Latin America, and much of Asia would look towards the yen.[15] Such predictions have proved highly inaccurate.

Nobel Prize winner

Mundell won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1999 and gave as his prize lecture a speech titled “A Reconsideration of the Twentieth Century”. According to the Nobel Prize Committee, he got the honor for “his analysis of monetary and fiscal policy under different exchange rate regimes and his analysis of optimum currency areas”.

Mundell concluded in that lecture that “the international monetary system depends only on the power configuration of the countries that make it up”. He divided the entire twentieth century into three parts by different periods of time:

  • The first third of the century, from its beginning to the Great Depression of the 1930s, economics was dominated by the confrontation of the Federal Reserve System with the gold standard.
  • The second third of the century was from World War II to 1973, when the international monetary system was dominated by fixing the price of gold with the US dollar.
  • The last third of the century started with the destruction of the old monetary system due to the problem of inflation.

With the destruction of the old monetary system, a new international monetary system was finally founded. Controlling inflation by each country became a main topic during this era.

Television appearances

Mundell has appeared on CBS‘s Late Show with David Letterman. His first appearance was on October 17, 2002[16] where he gave The Top 10 List on “Ways My Life has Changed Since Winning the Nobel Prize.” In March 2004[17] he told “You might be a redneck” jokes followed in May 2004[18] with “Yo Mama” jokes. In September 2004[19] he appeared again, this time to read excerpts from Paris Hilton‘s memoir at random moments throughout the show. In November 2005[20] he told a series of Rodney Dangerfield‘s jokes. On February 7, 2006[21] he read Grammy Award nominated song lyrics, the night before CBS aired the 48th Grammy Awards.

Mundell also appeared on Bloomberg Television many times.

Mundell has also appeared on China Central Television‘s popular Lecture Room series. Professor Mundell was also a special guest making the ceremonial first move in Game Five of the 2010 World Chess Championship between Viswanathan Anand and Veselin Topalov.

Mundell started the Pearl Spring Chess Tournament, a double round robin tournament with six players. The first tournament in 2008 was won by the Bulgarian, Veselin Topalov. The next two: 2009–2010 was won by the Norwegian, Magnus Carlsen.

See also

References

  1. Jump up^ http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1999/mundell-bio.html
  2. ^ Jump up to:a b Nobel Prize Winners from Johns Hopkins University
  3. Jump up^ Essays in the theory of international capital movementspage 3. Retrieved September 12, 2016.
  4. Jump up^ RUDI DORNBUSCH by Stanley Fischer – Project Syndicate
  5. Jump up^ Warsh, David (November 1, 2009). “What The Woman Lived”. Economic Principals. Retrieved October 17, 2016.
  6. Jump up^ “Mr. Mundell, known as the father of the euro”[dead link]
  7. Jump up^ “Robert Mundell – Nobel Prize Winners – Key facts – About LSE – Home”. .lse.ac.uk. March 13, 2009. Retrieved January 1, 2012.
  8. Jump up^ [1]
  9. Jump up^ http://www.polyu.edu.hk/iao/nobel2009/mundell_bio.pdf
  10. ^ Jump up to:a b “Robert A. Mundell – Biography”. Nobelprize.org. Retrieved January 1, 2012.
  11. ^ Jump up to:a b “Biography | The Works of Robert Mundell”. Robertmundell.net. Retrieved January 1, 2012.
  12. Jump up^ A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas; The American Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 657–665, 1961
  13. Jump up^ Capital Mobility, and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates; Revue Canadienne d’Economique et de Science Politique, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 475–485, 1963
  14. Jump up^ “Mundell-Friedman debate” (PDF). Retrieved January 1, 2012.
  15. Jump up^ Mark Milner and Charlotte Denny (January 14, 2000). “The new endangered species | Business”. London: The Guardian. Retrieved January 1, 2012.
  16. Jump up^ show #1891 Archived August 15, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
  17. Jump up^ show #2144 Archived October 17, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
  18. Jump up^ show #2162 Archived May 16, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
  19. Jump up^ show # 2238 Archived February 23, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
  20. Jump up^ show #2466 Archived December 15, 2005, at the Wayback Machine.
  21. Jump up^ show #2505 Archived May 16, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.

External links

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Kevin Phillips – Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and The Global Crisis of American Capitalism — Videos

Posted on December 26, 2015. Filed under: American History, Banking, Blogroll, British History, Congress, Constitution, Economics, European History, Faith, Family, Fiscal Policy, government spending, Investments, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Literacy, Macroeconomics, media, Microeconomics, Middle East, Monetary Policy, Money, People, Philosophy, Photos, Politics, Presidential Candidates, Radio, Talk Radio, Tax Policy, Taxation, Taxes, Television, Video, Wealth, Welfare, Wisdom, Work, Writing | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , |

Kevin Phillips – Bad Money: the Global Crisis of American Capitalism

Bad Money: Crisis of American Capitalism

Kevin Phillips – Bad Money: the Global Crisis of American Capitalism

Which Currency Will Replace the Dollar? Finance and the Crisis of Capitalism (2008)

Former GOP Strategist Kevin Phillips on Roots of American Revolution, Future of US Politics

Kevin Phillips Discusses the Role Played by Money, Debt, & Trade in the American Revolution

WALL STREET MELTDOWN Bill Moyers !!!! FULL 1 of 3

WALL STREET MELTDOWN Bill Moyers !!!! FULL 2 of 3

WALL STREET MELTDOWN Bill Moyers !!!! FULL 3 of 3

Kevin Phillips on Bad Money (US money system)-1/2

Kevin Phillips on Bad Money (US money system)-2/2

Book TV: Kevin Phillips on his Writing Habits

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Kevin Phillips — American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil and Borrowed Money in The 21st Century — Videos

Posted on December 26, 2015. Filed under: American History, Blogroll, Books, British History, Catholic Church, Communications, Constitution, Documentary, Education, Employment, Energy, European History, Foreign Policy, Freedom, Friends, government spending, history, Illegal, Immigration, Islam, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Literature, media, Middle East, Monetary Policy, Natural Gas, Natural Gas, Non-Fiction, Oil, Oil, Radio, Radio, Rants, Raves, Regulations, Religion, Resources, Strategy, Talk Radio, Taxation, Taxes, Technology, Television, Terrorism, Unemployment, Video, War, Welfare, Wisdom, Writing | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |

Kevin Phillips – American Theocracy: Radical Religion, Oil, and Debt

Revelle Forum: Kevin Phillips on Religion Oil and Debt

Kevin Phillips – Bad Money: Crisis of American Capitalism

Kevin Phillips – Bad Money: the Global Crisis of American Capitalism

Which Currency Will Replace the Dollar? Finance and the Crisis of Capitalism (2008)

Former GOP Strategist Kevin Phillips on Roots of American Revolution, Future of US Politics

Kevin Phillips Discusses the Role Played by Money, Debt, & Trade in the American Revolution

WALL STREET MELTDOWN Bill Moyers !!!! FULL 1 of 3

WALL STREET MELTDOWN Bill Moyers !!!! FULL 2 of 3

 

WALL STREET MELTDOWN Bill Moyers !!!! FULL 3 of 3

 

Kevin Phillips (political commentator)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Kevin Phillips
Born Kevin Price Phillips
November 30, 1940 (age 75)
Residence Goshen, Connecticut
Alma mater Colgate University (B.A., 1961)
University of Edinburgh (M.A., Geography)
Harvard University (J.D., 1964)
Occupation Pundit, Author, Columnist

Kevin Price Phillips (born November 30, 1940) is an American writer and commentator on politics, economics, and history. Formerly aRepublican Party strategist before becoming an Independent, Phillips became disaffected with the party from the 1990s, and became a critic. He is a regular contributor to the Los Angeles Times, Harper’s Magazine, and National Public Radio, and was a political analyst on PBSNOW with Bill Moyers.

Phillips was a strategist on voting patterns for Richard Nixon‘s 1968 campaign, which was the basis for a book, The Emerging Republican Majority, which predicted a conservative realignment in national politics, and is widely regarded[citation needed] as one of the most influential recent works in political science. His predictions regarding shifting voting patterns in presidential elections proved accurate, though they did not extend “down ballot” to Congress until the Republican revolution of 1994. Phillips also was partly responsible for the design of the Republican “Southern strategy” of the 1970s and 1980s.

The author of fourteen books, he lives in Goshen, Connecticut.

Biography

Phillips was educated at the Bronx High School of Science, Colgate University, the University of Edinburgh and Harvard Law School. After his stint as a senior strategist for the Nixon presidential campaign, he served a year, starting in 1969, as Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General, but left after a year to become a columnist. In 1971, he became president of theAmerican Political Research Corporation and editor-publisher of the American Political Report (through 1998).

In 1982, the Wall Street Journal described him as “the leading conservative electoral analyst — the man who invented the term “Sun Belt” [a phrase also attributed to legendary Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Sam Rayburn, named the New Right, and prophesied ‘The Emerging Republican Majority’ in 1969.”

Later, he became a critic of Republicans from the south and west, the area he had identified as the “Heartland”, the future core of Republican votes. He had also identified the “Yankee Northeast” as the future Democratic stronghold, foreshadowing the current split between Red States and Blue States. More than 30 years before the 2004 election, Phillips foresaw such previously Democratic states as Texas and West Virginia swinging to the Republicans and Vermont and Maine becoming Democratic states.

Southern strategy

Phillips worked for Richard Nixon‘s presidential campaign in 1968, and wrote a book on what has come to be known as the “Southern strategy” of the Republican Party. The book was entitled The Emerging Republican Majority and argued that the southern states of the US would keep the Republicans winning Presidential Elections and more than offset the Northeast states, based on racial politics.[1] As he stated to the New York Times Magazine in 1970,

“All the talk about Republicans making inroads into the Negro vote is persiflage. Even ‘Jake the Snake’ [Senator Jacob Javits of New York] only gets 20 percent. From now on, Republicans are never going to get more than 10 to 20 percent of the Negro vote, and they don’t need any more than that… but Republicans would be shortsighted if they weakened the Voting Rights Act. The more Negroes who register as Democrats in the South, the sooner the Negrophobe whites will quit the Democrats and become Republicans. That’s where the votes are. Without that prodding from the blacks, the whites will backslide into their old comfortable arrangement with the local Democrats.”[1]

Books

American Theocracy (2006)

Allen Dwight Callahan[2] states the book’s theme is that the Republican Party (GOP), religious fundamentalism, petroleum, and borrowed money are an “Unholy Alliance.”[3] The last chapter, in a nod to his first major work, is titled “The Erring Republican Majority.” American Theocracy “presents a nightmarish vision of ideological extremism, catastrophic fiscal irresponsibility, rampant greed and dangerous shortsightedness.”

The New York Times wrote:

He identifies three broad and related trends — none of them new to the Bush years but all of them, he believes, exacerbated by this administration’s policies — that together threaten the future of the United States and the world. One is the role of oil in defining and, as Phillips sees it, distorting American foreign and domestic policy. The second is the ominous intrusion of radical Christianity into politics and government. And the third is the astonishing levels of debt — current and prospective — that both the government and the American people have been heedlessly accumulating. If there is a single, if implicit, theme running through the three linked essays that form this book, it is the failure of leaders to look beyond their own and the country’s immediate ambitions and desires so as to plan prudently for a darkening future.[4]

Phillips uses the term financialization to describe how the U.S. economy has been radically restructured from a focus on production, manufacturing and wages, to a focus on speculation, debt, and profits. Since the 1980s, Phillips argues in American Theocracy,

the underlying Washington strategy… was less to give ordinary Americans direct sums than to create a low-interest-rate boom in real estate, thereby raising the percentage of American home ownership, ballooning the prices of homes, and allowing householders to take out some of that increase through low-cost refinancing. This triple play created new wealth to take the place of that destroyed in the 2000-2002 stock-market crash and simultaneously raised consumer confidence.

Nothing similar had ever been engineered before. Instead of a recovery orchestrated by Congress and the White House and aimed at the middle- and bottom-income segments, this one was directed by an appointed central banker, a man whose principal responsibility was to the banking system. His relief, targeted on financial assets and real estate, was principally achieved by monetary stimulus. This in itself confirmed the massive realignment of preferences and priorities within the American system….

Likewise, huge and indisputable but almost never discussed, were the powerful political economics lurking behind the stimulus: the massive rate-cut-driven post-2000 bailout of the FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) sector, with its ever-climbing share of GDP and proximity to power. No longer would Washington concentrate stimulus on wages or public-works employment. The Fed’s policies, however shrewd, were not rooted in an abstraction of the national interest but in pursuit of its statutory mandate to protect the U.S. banking and payments system, now inseparable from the broadly defined financial-services sector.

Critical reception

American Theocracy was reviewed widely. The New York Times Book Review wrote “It is not without polemic, but unlike many of the more glib and strident political commentaries of recent years, it is extensively researched and frighteningly persuasive…”[5] The Chicago Sun-Times wrote “Overall, Phillips’ book is a thoughtful and somber jeremiad, written throughout with a graceful wryness… a capstone to his life’s work.”[6]

Bad Money (2008)

Kevin Phillips examines America’s great shift from manufacturing to financial services. He also discusses America’s petroleum policies and the tying of the dollar to the price of oil. Phillips suggests that the Euro and the Chinese Yuan/Renminbi are favorites to take the dollar’s place in countries hostile towards America, like Iran. He then tackles the lack of regulatory oversight employed in the housing market and how the housing boom was allowed to run free under Alan Greenspan. The book concludes with the proposal that America is employing bad capitalism and extends Gresham’s Law of currency to suggest that our good capitalism will be driven out by the bad.[7]

Bibliography

  • The Emerging Republican Majority (1969)
  • Mediacracy: American Parties and Politics in the Communications Age (1974) ISBN 0-385-04945-5
  • Electoral Reform and Voter Participation (with Paul H. Blackman, 1975)
  • Post-Conservative America: People, Politics, and Ideology in a Time of Crisis (1982) ISBN 0-394-52212-5
  • Staying on Top: The Business Case for a National Industrial Strategy (1984) ISBN 0-394-53744-0
  • The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath (1990) ISBN 0-394-55954-1
  • Boiling Point: Democrats, Republicans, and the Decline of Middle Class Prosperity (1993) ISBN 0-679-40461-9
  • Arrogant Capital: Washington, Wall Street and the Frustration of American Politics (1994) ISBN 0-316-70618-3
  • The Cousins’ Wars: Religion, Politics and the Triumph of Anglo-America (1998) ISBN 0-465-01369-4
  • William McKinley (2003) ISBN 0-805-06953-4
  • Wealth and Democracy: A Political History of the American Rich (2002) ISBN 0-767-90533-4
  • American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush (2004) ISBN 0-670-03264-6
  • American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century (2006) ISBN 0-670-03486-X
  • Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism (2008) ISBN 0-670-01907-0
  • 1775: A Good Year for Revolution (2012) ISBN 978-0-670-02512-1

References

  1. ^ Jump up to:a b Boyd, James (May 17, 1970). “Nixon’s Southern strategy ‘It’s All In the Charts'” (PDF). The New York Times.
  2. Jump up^ Rev. Dr. Allen Dwight Callahan’s page at Brown University Archived April 4, 2007 at the Wayback Machine
  3. Jump up^ Callahan, Allen Dwight, “Unholy Alliance” Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, No. 1008, October 25, 2006.[dead link]
  4. Jump up^ N.Y.Times review on 3/19/2006.
  5. Jump up^ Alan Brinkley, The New York Times Book Review, March 19, 2006
  6. Jump up^ William O’Rourke, The Chicago Sun-Times, March 12, 2006
  7. Jump up^ Bad Money, 2008

External links

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kevin_Phillips_(political_commentator)

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Greece Defaults On Debt — Barring Last Minutes Rescue Attempts and Results of Sunday Referendum — No Vote Would Result in Greece Exiting Eurozone And Declaring Debt Odious! — Whose Next? — Videos

Posted on July 2, 2015. Filed under: American History, Articles, Babies, Blogroll, College, Communications, Corruption, Crime, Economics, Education, European History, Faith, Family, Foreign Policy, Fraud, Freedom, government, government spending, history, Investments, Law, liberty, Life, Links, media, Money, People, Philosophy, Photos, Politics, Private Sector, Public Sector, Radio, Raves, Regulations, Resources, Strategy, Talk Radio, Tax Policy, Taxation, Unemployment, Unions, Video, Wealth, Welfare, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |

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Story 1: Greece Defaults On Debt — Barring Last Minutes Rescue Attempts and Results of Sunday Referendum — No Vote Would Result in Greece Exiting Eurozone And Declaring Debt Odious! — Whose Next? — Videos

flagsgreece owesgreec debtGreece-debt
eurozone_chart624x325

Debt-to-GDP-Ratio-chart
Greek-Debt-vs-TARP-BailoutGreek-Debts-Payback-Scheduele

debt gdp

kick the can

Greek PM offers new concessions to creditors

JIM ROGERS – Greece Will Collapse & People Will Be Terrified

Greece faces financial meltdown after IMF loan default

Grexit: The Greek Debt Crisis Explained

Not Much Difference Between U.S. and Greece – Peter Schiff

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Greece: What Is the Worst-Case Scenario?

Keiser Report: Greece! Start Fresh (E777)

Greece to default on IMF loan on Tuesday as banks close and panic buying begins

Greece formally defaults on its 1.6bn-euro IMF loan

Greece defaults on $1.7 billion payment

GREECE DEBT CRISIS – Obama Claims Greece Crisis Unlikely To Have Major Impact on U.S.

‘Greece should Grexit which is fantastic, they could restart their economy’ – Max Keiser

U.S. Headed Toward Greek Style Debt Default

MM115 Markets Crash on Greece

Keiser Report: We Are All Greeks Now (E764)

Greece Defaults on IMF Loan Despite New Push for Bailout Aid

European finance chiefs shut down Athens’s last-minute request for emergency financial aid

Greece became the first developed country to default on the International Monetary Fund, as the rescue program that has sustained it for five years expired and its creditors rejected a last-ditch effort to buy more time.

The Washington-based fund said the Greek government failed to transfer €1.55 billion ($1.73 billion) by close-of-business on Tuesday—the largest, single missed repayment in the IMF’s history.

The failure to pay the IMF was a dramatic, if anticipated, conclusion to a day full of unexpected twists and turns. On Tuesday morning—with the clock ticking toward the midnight expiration on the European portion of Greece’s €245 billion bailout—officials in Athens said they were working on a new solution to the four-month old impasse with creditors.

By the afternoon, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras had asked for a new rescue program—the country’s third in five years—to help pay for some €29.15 billion ($32.52 billion) in debt coming due between 2015 and 2017.

Late Tuesday, Greek officials were also raising doubts over their plans for a referendum planned for Sunday, in which the government had asked its citizens to vote against pension cuts and sales-tax increases demanded by its creditors.

ENLARGE

Some officials suggested that Mr. Tsipras and his ministers could campaign for a “yes” if a better offer from the rest of the eurozone and the IMF was on the table, while others indicated that the vote might even be called off altogether.

Whether any of these developments would keep Greece from financial meltdown andsecure its spot in Europe’s currency union was still unclear. But the prospect of more rescue loans—however dim—might help buffer some of the effects of the nonpayment to the IMF.

But in Berlin, Chancellor Angela Merkel and other senior officials sought to lower expectations for a quick resolution to Greece’s financial crisis.

Before Greeks have voted on the measures demanded by creditors, “we will not negotiate about anything new at all,” Ms. Merkel said. Her deputy and coalition partner, Sigmar Gabriel of the Social Democrats, urged Greece to cancel the referendum altogether. “Then one could very quickly gather for talks, initial talks. If that’s not the case, then we should certainly do this after the referendum,” Mr. Gabriel said.

European stocks and bonds fell amid the uncertainty and the euro declined against the U.S. dollar.

But most of the moves were smaller than the declines a day earlier in reaction to Athens’s weekend announcement that the government would call a referendum on whether to accept the terms that creditors are offering and the government’s shutdown of its banking system to prevent a financial collapse.

In Washington, President Barack Obama played down the potential impact of Greece’s worsening crisis on the U.S. and broader global economy. “That is not something that we believe will have a major shock to the system,” he said.

Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew has been urging his European counterparts to press ahead with bailout talks to find a “pragmatic compromise” that includes both tough economic overhauls and debt relief, to prevent Europe’s economic problems from dragging on U.S. growth.

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Greek banks have been heavily dependent on support from the European Central Bank. WSJ’s Charles Forelle explains why the country’s banking sector could turn out to be its Achilles heel.

Eurozone finance ministers are scheduled to discuss Greece’s bailout request, along with new proposals for budget cuts and policy overhauls, in a teleconference Wednesday morning.

Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis told his counterparts Tuesday that these plans would be close to the creditors’ latest demands, Austrian Finance Minister Hans Jörg Schelling said in a television interview.

Mr. Varoufakis also suggested that his government might campaign for a “yes” in the referendum if its new proposals were accepted, Mr. Schelling said.

Other officials were more skeptical that, after four months of at times acrimonious negotiations, Mr. Tsipras’s left-wing government was finally giving in to creditors’ demands.

“The political stance of the Greek government doesn’t appear to have changed,” said Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch finance minister who presides over the talks with his eurozone counterparts. Mr. Dijsselbloem already said over the weekend that the government would have a hard time convincing creditors and investors that it would implement measures it has to far opposed.

The expiration of the existing bailout and a default on the IMF aren’t expected to have immediate consequences for Greece’s economy. Its banks have already been ordered closed until Monday, after the European Central Bank capped emergency loans to Greek lenders over the weekend. Cash withdrawals by Greeks have been limited to €60 a day for each account-holder since Monday.

On Wednesday, the focus will again be on the ECB, whose governing council is due to meet in Frankfurt.

The council, which includes central bankers from the eurozone’s 19 member states, is reluctant to take any additional steps for now that would inflict more pain on Greek banks—for instance, by forcing them to pay back the outstanding loans just days ahead of the referendum, people familiar with the matter said, despite a growing level of impatience over the central bank’s exposure to Greece.

One largely symbolic option would be for the ECB to raise the amount of collateral that banks have to post in return for the emergency loans, but calibrate the reductions on the face value of assets used for collateral so that Greek lenders would still have enough to cover the existing €89 billion loan pile.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/some-greek-banks-to-open-for-pensioners-1435653433

Greek crisis deepens as loan repayment deadline passes

Kim Hjelmgaard and Marco della Cava,

reece’s midnight deadline passed Tuesday for repaying $1.8 billion to the International Monetary Fund and other international creditors, deepening a financial crisis that threatens the Mediterranean nation’s membership in the European Union.

Despite an eleventh-hour effort by Greek lawmakers Tuesday to secure a new two-year debt deal before the deadline, European finance ministers reviewing Greece’s proposal concluded their conference call without offering a bailout extension.

The ministers agreed to convene again Wednesday to further discuss the details of a new series of loans from the eurozone’s European Stability Mechanism, its $560 billion rescue fund.

After the deadline passed (at 6 pm ET), Greece joined Zimbabwe, Sudan and Somaliain being in arrears to the IMF. Fitch Ratings has downgraded Greece’s government debt further into junk territory.

Standing in the way of any new deal from the IMF and other creditors is Sunday’s Greek referendum on whether to accept the terms that would come with a new aid package, which includes tax increases and spending cutbacks after years of recession. There is some dispute over whether such a referendum could be canceled, with some Greek lawmakers arguing that the vote is now set in stone.

Late Tuesday, thousands of Greeks took to the streets of Athens, many of them in support of accepting new bailout terms. A “no” vote would lead to Greece leaving the European Union and abandoning the euro currency.

The $1.8 billion Greece owes is part of a $270 billion aid plan it received from the IMF, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission — 19 eurozone governments — during its financial crisis.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel made her position clear Tuesday, telling reporters in Berlin, “We’ll negotiate about absolutely nothing before the planned referendum is held.”

Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has said that his government would step down if “yes” votes prevailed, telling a Greek public broadcasting outlet Monday, “We’ll choose in a sovereign way what our future will be like, we will insist on negotiating.”

President Obama cautioned that a failed Greek economy could have significant ripple effects on markets around the world, adding Tuesday that “what you have here is a country that has gone through some very difficult economic times, and needs to find a path toward growth and a path toward staying in the eurozone.”

But should there be a so-called Grexit — or Greek exit from the European financial community — Obama added that “it is important for us that we plan for any contingency, that we work with the ECB and other international institutions to ensure that some of the bumps that occur in the financial markets are smoothed out.”

Greece had previously indicated it would not be able to make the payment. The IMF said it would not give Greece its customary 30-day grace period before issuing a notice of technical default.

But Athens is not expected to immediately go bankrupt. That would only happen if its non-payment triggers further defaults in its financial system, which is not expected.

Next month, on July 20, Greece is also due to pay the ECB $3.9 billion.

Talks between Greece and its creditors have broken down as Athens has tried to negotiate less onerous repayment terms, mainly centered around austerity measures. Global markets on Monday tumbled over fears that the country’s attempts to strike a better deal could see it forced out of the eurozone. Its membership in the European Union is also at stake.

But markets bounced back Tuesday in Asia, and European indexes moved away from earlier losses after steep sell-offs in those regions helped push the Dow down 350 points in the prior session — its biggest one-day point loss since June 20, 2013.

On Tuesday, U.S. markets edged higher, buoyed by Greece’s new proposal that came against the dominant crisis narrative of the last 48 hours.

Earlier, citing unnamed government sources, Greece’s Ekathimerini newspaper reported Athens was reconsidering a previous proposal by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. No details were provided.

A Greek eurozone exit, it is feared, would reignite the financial contagion experienced during the sovereign debt crisis of 2009 and beyond when billions of dollars were wiped off the value of European government debt and other assets.

Still, while many analysts and officials have warned that Greece leaving the eurozone could have far-reaching consequences for economies and markets across the world, the specific impact of that possible development remains mostly unclear.

“If Greece leaves the eurozone, there is unlikely to be a big bang moment when the country adopts the drachma (the currency it used prior to adopting the euro in 2001),” said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, a unit of the ratings firm.

“It will happen over time, as the Greek government issues IOUs that effectively become the new currency,” he said.

Greek Prime Minister Tsipras hinted Monday that he may resign if his nation votes “yes” in the referendum Sunday. Tsipras’ leftist Syriza party insists the vote is being called to strengthen its negotiating mandate with its creditors.

“If the Greek people want to proceed with austerity plans in perpetuity, which will leave us unable to lift our head, we will respect it, but we will not be the ones to carry it out,” he said on Greek television late Monday.

European leaders including Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and French PresidentFrancois Hollande dispute that. They say that Sunday’s vote will effectively be a referendum on whether Greece wants to remain part of the eurozone.

The government has limited cash withdrawals from banks to about $68 per day in a bid to stave off bank runs and keep its financial system from collapsing, triggering protests from groups on both sides of Sunday’s yes or no vote.

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/06/30/greek-crisis-deepens-as-loan-repayment-deadline-nears/29518847/

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Will A Greece Default On Debt Trigger A World Recession? — Bubbles Bursting? — Greek Odious Debt Default On The Brink — Jump! — Greece Defaults! — Videos

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Story 1: Will A Greece Default On Debt Trigger A World Recession? — Bubbles Bursting? — Greek Odious Debt Default On The Brink — Jump! — Greece Defaults! — Videos

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Greece’s bailout expires, country defaults on IMF payment

By ELENA BECATOROS and DEREK GATOPOULOS

y to fall into arrears on payments to the fund. The last country to do so was Zimbabwe in 2001.

After Greece made a last-ditch effort to extend its bailout, eurozone finance ministers decided in a teleconference late Tuesday that there was no way they could reach a deal before the deadline.

“It would be crazy to extend the program,” said Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbleom, who heads the eurozone finance ministers’ body known as the eurogroup. “So that cannot happen and will not happen.”

(AP) An elderly man passes a graffiti outside an old bank in Athens, Tuesday, June 30,…
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“The program expires tonight,” Dijsselbleom said.The brinkmanship that has characterized Greece’s bailout negotiations with its European creditors and the IMF rose several notches over the weekend, when Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras announced he would put a deal proposal by creditors to a referendum on Sunday and urged a “No” vote.

The move increased fears the country could soon fall out of the euro currency bloc and Greeks rushed to pull money out of ATMs, leading the government to shutter its banks and impose restrictions on banking transactions on Monday for at least a week.

But in a surprise move Tuesday night, Deputy Prime Minister Yannis Dragasakis hinted that the government might be open to calling off the popular vote, saying it was a political decision.

The government decided on the referendum, he said on state television, “and it can make a decision on something else.”

(AP) A demonstrator waves a Greek flag during a rally organized by supporters of the YES…
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It was unclear, however, how that would be possible legally as Parliament has already voted for it to go ahead.Greece’s international bailout expires at midnight central European time, after which the country loses access to billions of euros in funds. At the same time, Greece has said it will not be able to make a payment of 1.6 billion euros ($1.8 billion) to the IMF.

With its economy teetering on the brink, Greece suffered its second sovereign downgrade in as many days when the Fitch ratings agency lowered it further into junk status, to just one notch above the level where it considers default inevitable.

The agency said the breakdown of negotiations “has significantly increased the risk that Greece will not be able to honor its debt obligations in the coming months, including bonds held by the private sector.”

Fitch said it now considered a default on privately-held debt “probable.”

(AP) People stand in a queue to use an ATM outside a closed bank, next to a sign on the…
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Hopes for an 11th-hour deal were raised when the Greek side announced it had submitted a new proposal Tuesday afternoon, and the eurozone’s 19 finance ministers held a teleconference to discuss it.But those hopes were quickly dashed.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said she ruled out further negotiations with Greece before Sunday’s popular vote on whether to accept creditors’ demands for budget reforms.

“Before the planned referendum is carried out, we will not negotiate over anything new,” the dpa news agency quoted Merkel as saying.

Greece’s latest offer involves a proposal to tap Europe’s bailout fund — the so-called European Stability Mechanism, a pot of money set up after Greece’s rescue programs to help countries in need.

(AP) The word “NO”, referring to the upcoming referendum, is written in red paint outside…
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Tsipras’ office said the proposal was “for the full coverage of (Greece’s) financing needs with the simultaneous restructuring of the debt.”Dijsselbloem said the finance ministers would “study that request as we should” and that they would hold another conference call Wednesday, as they had also received a second letter from Athens that they had not had time to read.

Dragasakis said the new letter “narrows the differences further.”

“We are making an additional effort. There are six points where this effort can be made. I don’t want to get into specifics. But it includes pensions and labor issues,” he said.

European officials and Greek opposition parties have been adamant that a “No” vote on Sunday will mean Greece will leave the euro and possibly even the EU.

(AP) Demonstrators shout slogans during a rally organized by supporters of the YES vote…
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The government says this is scaremongering, and that a rejection of creditor demands will mean the country is in a better negotiating position.In Athens, more than 10,000 “Yes” vote supporters gathered outside parliament despite a thunderstorm, chanting “Europe! Europe!”

Most huddled under umbrellas, including Athens resident Sofia Matthaiou.

“I don’t know if we’ll get a deal. But we have to press them to see reason,” she said, referring to the government. “The creditors need to water down their positions, too.”

The protest came a day after thousands of government supporters advocating a “No” vote held a similar demonstration.

(AP) Demonstrators gather under the rain during a rally organized by supporters of the…
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On Monday, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker made a new offer to Greece. Under that proposal, Tsipras would need to accept the creditors’ proposal that was on the table last weekend. He would also have to change his position on Sunday’s referendum.Commission spokesman Margaritis Schinas said the offer would also involve unspecified discussions on Athens’s massive debt load of over 300 billion euros, or around 180 percent of GDP. The Greek side has long called for debt relief, saying its mountainous debt is unsustainable.

A Greek government official said Tsipras had spoken earlier in the day with Juncker, European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi and European Parliament president Martin Schulz.

Meanwhile, missing the IMF payment will cut Greece off from new loans from the organization.

And with its bailout program expiring, Greece will lose access to more than 16 billion euros ($18 billion) in financial support it has not yet tapped, officials said. They spoke on condition of anonymity because talks about the program were still ongoing.

On the streets of Athens, long lines formed again at ATM machines as Greeks struggled with the new restrictions on banking transactions. Under credit controls imposed Monday, Greeks are now limited to ATM withdrawals of 60 euros ($67) a day and cannot send money abroad or make international payments without special permission.

The elderly have been hit particularly hard, with tens of thousands of pensions unpaid as of Tuesday afternoon. Many also found themselves completely cut off from any cash as they do not have bank cards.

The finance ministry said it would open about 1,000 bank branches across the country for three days beginning Wednesday to allow pensioners without bank cards to make withdrawals. But the limit would be set at 120 euros for the whole week.

 http://apnews.myway.com/article/20150630/eu–greece-bailout-26fc170deb.html

What happens if Greece defaults on its International Monetary Fund loans?

Cash-starved Athens has resorted to extraordinary measures to avoid defaulting to the IMF. But what would be the fall-out of a disorderly default?

No county has ever defaulted to the Fund in its 70-year history

The Greek government faces the prospect of becoming the first developed nation to ever default on its international obligations.

After a harrowing five months, and in a drama of soft deadlines, the cash-strapped government now faces a €1.55bn payment to the International Monetary Fund due at 11pm tonight.

With negotiations have broken off in dramatic fashion last week, a cacophony of voices on Syriza’s Left have vowed to prioritise domestic obligations unless creditors finally unlock the remainder of its €240bn bail-out programme. Greece only avoided going bust earlier this month after the government has asked for a Zambia-style debt bundling which will now be due on June 30.

The rhetoric is a far cry from February, when Greece’s finance minister pledged his government would “squeeze blood out of a stone” to meet its obligations to the Fund.

Greece owes €9.7bn to the IMF this year. Missing any instalment to the IMF would see the country fall into an arrears process, unprecedented for a developed world debtor.

Although no nation has ever officially defaulted on its obligations in the post-Bretton Woods era, Greece would join an ignominious list of war-torn nations and international pariahs who have failed to pay back the Fund on time.

What happens after a default?

In choosing to bundle up four separate June repayments, Greece avoided triggering an immediate default.

But in the event of a delayed repayment, according to IMF protocol, Greece could be afforded a 30-day grace period, during which it would be urged to pay back the money as soon as possible, and before Ms Lagarde notifies her executive board of the late payment.

However, with talks have broken down in acrimonious fashion between the country and its creditors, Ms Lagarde has said she will renege on this and notify her board “immediately”.

Having spooked creditors and the markets of the possibility of a fatal breach of the sanctity of monetary union, Greece may well stump up the cash if an agreement to release the country more emergency aid is reached (that’s looking increasingly unlikely however).

But should no money be forthcoming however, the arrears process may well extend indefinitely.

Greece’s other creditor burden would also start piling up, with the government due to pay another €6.6bn to the European Central Bank in July and August.

Stopping the cash

Although the exact process is uncertain, falling into a protracted arrears procedure could have major consequences for continued financial assistance from Greece’s other creditors – the European Central Bank and European Commission.

“If Greece defaults to the IMF, then they are considered to be in default to the rest of the eurozone,” says Raoul Ruparel, head of economic research at Open Europe.

The terms of Greece’s existing bail-out programme stipulate that a default to the IMF would automatically constitute a default on the country’s European rescue loans.

“Such a scenario would risk the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) cancelling all or part of its facility or even declaring the principal amount of the loan to be due immediately,” say analysts at Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

Should the EFSF take such a decisive move, it could activate a range of cross default clauses on Greek government bonds held by private investors and the ECB. These clauses state a default to one creditor institution applies to all.

The political and market damage that may ensue would be substantial. Popular sentiment in creditor nations would turn against the errant Greeks, while the position of the ECB in particular could quickly come under the spotlight.

The central bank has kept Greek banks on a tight leash, maintaining that it would only restore normal lending operations to the country once “conditions for a successful completion of the programme are in place”.

A wave of defaults may force the ECB into finally pulling the plug on the emergency assistance it has been providing in ever larger doses since February.

What would happen if Greece left the euro? In 60 seconds

Scrambling for funds

Whatever the outcome, Greece on many measures, is all but bankrupt.

In addition to the half a billion euros plus it owes the Fund this month, the Leftist government will still be paying back the IMF until 2030. In total, its repayment schedule stretches out over the next 42 years to 2057.

Greece makes new aid proposal, seeks debt restructuring

ATHENS (Reuters) – Greece has submitted to creditors a new two-year aid proposal calling for parallel debt restructuring, the office of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras said on Tuesday, in what seemed like a last-ditch effort by Athens to resolve an impasse with lenders.

The statement came hours before Athens was set to default on a loan to the International Monetary Fund. It was unclear how creditors would respond.

“The Greek government proposed today a two-year deal with the ESM (European Stability Mechanism) to fully cover its financial needs and with parallel debt restructuring,” the government said in a statement.

“Greece remains at the negotiating table,” the statement said, adding that Athens would always seek a “viable solution to stay in the euro.”

http://news.yahoo.com/greece-makes-aid-proposal-seeks-debt-restructuring-134508038–business.html

If Greece defaults on its debt, it will be the biggest default by a country in history.
Greece is expected to miss a €1.5 billion ($1.7 billion) debt payment on Tuesday. That won’t be enough to put it in the record books yet, but it could eventually make Greece default on its entire debt load: €323 billion ($360 billion).

This isn’t the first time Greece has been on the brink. Greece already holds the record for the biggest default ever by a country from 2012 when it went into technical default and had to restructure about $138 billion of its debt. Back then, Greece was quickly bailed out by its European peers. That’s unlikely to happen now.
The Greek government pulled its negotiators from talks with European officials Friday after little progress was made on a debt payment plan and economic reforms. Greece has called for a referendum vote on July 5 on the latest proposal from Europe and the International Monetary Fund.

Greece already holds the record: Greece’s 2012 technical default shattered the previous record set by Argentina in 2001, when the South American nation defaulted on $95 billion in debt. While there are parallels between the two countries, experts say this potential Greek default could be much worse.
“Things are incredibly dire,” says Anna Gelpern, a Georgetown University professor. “For political reasons and market-confidence reasons, they need to deal with the debt…It’s not clear to me how they deal with it without defaulting on anyone.”

Greece won’t officially be in default right away. The International Monetary Fund generally gives countries a month after missing a debt payment before it declares a country in defaulted. However, the markets will most likely judge Greece to be in default by July 1.
Greece’s debt is spread out across the board. Greece owes money to the International Monetary Fund, Germany, France, Greek banks and several others.
But consider this: Whatever happens to Greece, it’s likely to be a long process. Argentina is still in default. But a key difference is that Greece has four times the debt load of Argentina — the next worst default — but Greece’s economy is only half the size of Argentina’s.
While Greece would be the biggest sovereign default, Lehman Brothers had over $600 billion in assets when it filed for bankruptcy in 2008. A Greek default would be smaller and unlikely to rattle the global financial system like Lehman, but it would have a long-lasting impact on the Greek people.
Here are some of the worst sovereign defaults since 2000.

1. Greece — $138 billion, March 2012. Despite going into a technical default, the Greek government is propped up by bailout funds from its European peers. Those bailout funds eventually lead to the current dilemma.
2. Argentina — $95 billion, November 2001. Argentina’s currency was “pegged” or equal to one U.S. dollar for years — a currency exchange that eventually proved to be completely inaccurate. Like Greece is doing this week, Argentina also clamped down on Argentines trying to take money out of the banks. It didn’t help. The country’s economy was nearly three times smaller just one year later, according to IMF data. In July 2014, Argentina went into a technical default after it missed a debt payment to its hold out creditors.
3. Jamaica — $7.9 billion, February 2010. Massive government overspending for years and rapid inflation pushed Jamaica into default five years ago. At the time, over 40% of the government’s budget went to paying debts. Its economy, which depends on tourism, suffered when the U.S. recession began in late 2008.
4. Ecuador — $3.2 billion, December 2008. Ecuador pulled a fast one on its creditors. With a debt payment looming, the Ecuardor’s government, led by President Rafael Correa, just said no to its creditors. He claimed the debt, some which was owned by American hedge funds, was “immoral.” Rich in resources, Ecuardor could have made debt payments, but intentionally chose not to.

http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/29/investing/greece-default-bigger-than-argentina/

Despite Lagarde’s initial reluctance, IMF on the hook for Greece

By Anna Yukhananov

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – As French Finance Minister in 2010, Christine Lagarde opposed the involvement of the International Monetary Fund in Greece.

Now as the country stands on the edge of defaulting on a 1.6 billion euro ($1.8 billion) payment to the Fund, Lagarde’s tenure at the head of the IMF since 2011 will be shaped by Greece, which holds a referendum on Sunday that could pave the way to its exit from the euro.

By its own admission the Washington-based institution broke many of its rules in lending to Greece. It ended up endorsing austerity measures proposed by the European Commission and European Central Bank, its partners in the troika of Greece’s lenders, instead of leading talks as it had done with other countries such as Russia and in the Asian financial crisis.

“I think the IMF has missed the opportunity (on Greece), because it has not fully leveraged the lessons it learned from the previous crises it was involved in, due to this asymmetric relationship within the troika,” said Domenico Lombardi, a former IMF board member.

That the IMF lent to Greece at the behest of Europe, which has nominated every IMF Managing Director since the inception of the Fund in 1946, may expose the institution to greater scrutiny, especially as it has $24 billion in loans outstanding to Greece in its largest-ever program.

“When it was clear that the Greek program was underperforming, they did not push back sufficiently against the euro zone, which had at the time a misguided policy emphasis on only austerity,” said Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, a fellow at the Peterson Institute in Washington.

The involvement of the Fund in Greece and its continued support for decisions driven by eurozone governments caused a deep split in the institution.

Some IMF economists had misgivings about lending to Greece in 2010 within the constraints of the so-called “troika” of lenders, where the Fund would be the junior partner to the European Central Bank and the European Commission.

IMF board members also protested the “exceptional” size of the program, as Athens did not meet the Fund’s criteria for debt sustainability, meaning it would have trouble repaying.

Yet swayed by the fear that contagion in Athens could spread to French and German banks, the IMF agreed to participate in a joint 110-billion-euro bailout of Greece with the Europeans.

“The Europeans have a third of the voting rights (at the IMF), and they have appointed the managing director since the beginning, so essentially it is the governance that has driven the Greek program,” said Lombardi who is now with the Canada-based Center for International Governance Innovation.

Later, the Fund admitted that its projections for the Greek economy had been overly optimistic. Instead of growing after a year of austerity, Greece’s economy plunged into one of the worst recessions to ever hit a country in peacetime, with output falling 22 percent from 2008 to 2012.

While the euro zone’s insistence on drawing a direct link between euro membership and Greece’s debt sustainability and the negotiating tactics of the Greek government have exposed both to questions of credibility, the Fund stands charged as well.

“The IMF’s reputation, too, has been shaken from widespread criticism of the Greek program, including its own admission of its failures,” said Lombard Street Research economist Konstantinos Venetis.

TEMPTATION TO GO BIG

If Greece does default on all $24 billion it owes to the Fund, that will dwarf previous delinquencies from countries like Sudan, Zimbabwe and Somalia.

While the IMF was worried about contagion when it made the loans, it also had institutional incentives for wanting to bail out troubled countries, said Andrea Montanino, a former IMF board member who left the Fund in 2014 after participating in reviews of Greece’s second bailout in 2012.

“The IMF is in a preferred creditor status; the more you lend, the more you earn,” said Montanino, now with the Atlantic Council.

The IMF’s heavy involvement in large bailouts for euro zone countries, which included Ireland and Portugal, have enabled it to build up its reserve buffers in recent years. It is now aiming to store away some $28 billion by 2018.

From interest and charges on the Greek program alone, the IMF has earned some $3.9 billion since 2010, according to figures on the IMF’s website.

“I think the Greek lesson is in the future, the IMF will be much more careful,” said Montanino.

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/despite-lagardes-initial-reluctance-imf-hook-greece-223005193–business.html

Greece lifelines run out as IMF payment looms

Greece is widely expected to miss a crucial payment to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Tuesday—hours before its bailout officially ends at midnight and the country is left with few, if any, financial lifelines.

Greek officials have already warned the country is unable to pay the 1.6 billion euros ($1.8 billion) due to the IMF by 6 p.m. ET, after reforms-for-aid talks with creditors broke down at the weekend.

Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the president of the Eurogroup, subsequently tweeted on Tuesday that there would be a teleconference to discuss an “official request” from the Greek government “received this afternoon” at 1 p.m. ET.
The Greek government on Tuesday proposed a new, two-year bailout deal with the European Stability Mechanism. This would be to “fully cover its financing needs and the simultaneous restructuring of debt,” according to a translated press release from the office of the Greek Prime Minister.

A protester waves a Greek flag in front of the parliament building during a rally in Athens, Greece, June 22, 2015.

Yannis Behrakis | Reuters
A protester waves a Greek flag in front of the parliament building during a rally in Athens, Greece, June 22, 2015.

This comes at a time when Greece’s financial future is in jeopardy. The country will potentially have no access to external sources of cash, once its funding from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) expires at midnight.

Read MoreEFSF: CNBC Explains

Meanwhile, Greece’s banking system is being kept afloat by emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) from the European Central Bank, which is up for review on Wednesday.

Against a backdrop of uncertainty, Tsipras has called a referendum on July 5 of the Greek people on whether to accept the bailout proposals—and accompanying austerity measures—proposed by creditors.

Tsipras has urged the public to vote “no” to more austerity.

“The Greek government will claim a sustainable agreement within the euro. This is the message of NO to a bad deal at the referendum on Sunday,” the translated statement from the prime minister’s office said on Tuesday.

‘Running out of notches’

Meanwhile, credit ratings agencies are increasingly nervous about the country’s solvency.

Fitch Ratings downgraded Greek banks on Monday to “Restricted Default,” after Athens imposed capital controls to prevent an exodus of deposits from Greece.

In addition, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) lowered Greece’s credit rating to CCC- from CCC, saying the probability of the country exiting the euro zone was now 50 percent.

Moritz Kraemer, chief rating officer of sovereign ratings at S&P, told CNBC on Tuesday that the group was “actually running out of notches” for Greece.

“We have the rating at CCC- and that’s pretty much the lowest rung that we have on our scale,” he told CNBC Europe’s “Squawk Box.”

Default?

If Greece misses its payment on Tuesday, then the IMF will consider it in “arrears” – a technical term used by the IMF, which is similar to default.

If a country is in arrears to the IMF, it means it won’t get any future aid until the bill is repaid.

Read MoreIMF’s Lagarde on Greece: Next few days are crucial

Although the IMF payment is dominating headlines, S&P’s Kraemer said that Greece’s bailout program ending at midnight was just as significant.

“Basically after that we’re back to square one,” he said. “So even if there was to be a change of heart in Athens and they did decide to take the creditors’ offer, that’s legally no longer possible as the program would have elapsed.”

Greece’s debt crisis: It all started in 2001…

Yannis Behrakis | Reuters

Odious debt

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In international law, odious debt, also known as illegitimate debt, is a legal theory that holds that the national debt incurred by a regime for purposes that do not serve the best interests of the nation, should not be enforceable. Such debts are, thus, considered by this doctrine to be personal debts of the regime that incurred them and not debts of the state. In some respects, the concept is analogous to the invalidity of contracts signed under coercion.[1]

History

The doctrine of odious debt was formalized in a 1927 treatise by Alexander Nahum Sack, a Russian émigré legal theorist. It was based on two 19th century precedents—Mexico‘s repudiation of debts incurred by Emperor Maximilian, and the denial by the United States of Cuban liability for debts incurred by the Spanish colonial regime.[2]

Sack wrote:

When a despotic regime contracts a debt, not for the needs or in the interests of the state, but rather to strengthen itself, to suppress a popular insurrection, etc, this debt is odious for the people of the entire state. This debt does not bind the nation; it is a debt of the regime, a personal debt contracted by the ruler, and consequently it falls with the demise of the regime. The reason why these odious debts cannot attach to the territory of the state is that they do not fulfil one of the conditions determining the lawfulness of State debts, namely that State debts must be incurred, and the proceeds used, for the needs and in the interests of the State. Odious debts, contracted and utilised for purposes which, to the lenders’ knowledge, are contrary to the needs and the interests of the nation, are not binding on the nation – when it succeeds in overthrowing the government that contracted them – unless the debt is within the limits of real advantages that these debts might have afforded. The lenders have committed a hostile act against the people, they cannot expect a nation which has freed itself of a despotic regime to assume these odious debts, which are the personal debts of the ruler.[3]

There are many examples of similar debt repudiation.[4]

Reception

Patricia Adams, executive director of Probe International, a Canadian environmental and public policy advocacy organisation and author of Odious Debts: Loose Lending, Corruption, and the Third World’s Environmental Legacy, stated: “by giving creditors an incentive to lend only for purposes that are transparent and of public benefit, future tyrants will lose their ability to finance their armies, and thus the war on terror and the cause of world peace will be better served.”[5] In a Cato Institute policy analysis, Adams suggested that debts incurred by Iraq during Saddam Hussein‘s reign were odious because the money was spent on weapons, instruments of repression, and palaces.[6]

A 2002 article by economists Seema Jayachandran and Michael Kremer renewed interest in this topic.[7] They propose that the idea can be used to create a new type of economic sanction to block further borrowing by dictators.[8] Jayachandran proposed new recommendations in November 2010 at the 10th anniversary of the Jubilee movement at the Center for Global Development in Washington, D.C.[9]

Application

In December 2008, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa attempted to default on Ecuador’s national debt, calling it illegitimate odious debt, because it was contracted by corrupt and despotic prior regimes.[10] He succeeded in reducing the price of the debt letters before continuing paying the debt.[11]

After the overthrow of Haiti‘s Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, there were calls to cancel Haiti’s debt owed to multilateral institutions, calling it unjust odious debt, and Haiti could better use the funds for education, health care, and basic infrastructure.[12] As of February 2008, the Haiti Debt Cancellation Resolution had 66 co-sponsors in the U.S. House of Representatives.[13] Several organizations in the United States issued action alerts around the Haiti Debt Cancellation Resolution, and a Congressional letter to the U.S. Treasury,[14] including Jubilee USA, the Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti and Pax Christi USA.

See also

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odious_debt

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Story 2: The Economy Still Stagnating As The 10 Million Plus Jobs Gap Widens — Videos

Making Sense of Today’s January Jobs Report

February 7th 2014 CNBC Stock Market Squawk Box (January Jobs Report)

gdp_large

sgs-emp

non-farm-payrolls-wide-201312

Employment Level

145,224,000

Series Id:           LNS12000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Employment Level
Labor force status:  Employed
Type of data:        Number in thousands
Age:                 16 years and over

employment_level
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 136559(1) 136598 136701 137270 136630 136940 136531 136662 136893 137088 137322 137614
2001 137778 137612 137783 137299 137092 136873 137071 136241 136846 136392 136238 136047
2002 135701 136438 136177 136126 136539 136415 136413 136705 137302 137008 136521 136426
2003 137417(1) 137482 137434 137633 137544 137790 137474 137549 137609 137984 138424 138411
2004 138472(1) 138542 138453 138680 138852 139174 139556 139573 139487 139732 140231 140125
2005 140245(1) 140385 140654 141254 141609 141714 142026 142434 142401 142548 142499 142752
2006 143150(1) 143457 143741 143761 144089 144353 144202 144625 144815 145314 145534 145970
2007 146028(1) 146057 146320 145586 145903 146063 145905 145682 146244 145946 146595 146273
2008 146378(1) 146156 146086 146132 145908 145737 145532 145203 145076 144802 144100 143369
2009 142152(1) 141640 140707 140656 140248 140009 139901 139492 138818 138432 138659 138013
2010 138451(1) 138599 138752 139309 139247 139148 139179 139427 139393 139111 139030 139266
2011 139287(1) 139422 139655 139622 139653 139409 139524 139904 140154 140335 140747 140836
2012 141677(1) 141943 142079 141963 142257 142432 142272 142204 142947 143369 143233 143212
2013 143384(1) 143464 143393 143676 143919 144075 144285 144179 144270 143485 144443 144586
2014 145224(1)

Civilian Labor Force

155,460,000

Series Id:           LNS11000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Civilian Labor Force Level
Labor force status:  Civilian labor force
Type of data:        Number in thousands
Age:                 16 years and over

Civilian_Labor_Force_Level

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 142267(1) 142456 142434 142751 142388 142591 142278 142514 142518 142622 142962 143248
2001 143800 143701 143924 143569 143318 143357 143654 143284 143989 144086 144240 144305
2002 143883 144653 144481 144725 144938 144808 144803 145009 145552 145314 145041 145066
2003 145937(1) 146100 146022 146474 146500 147056 146485 146445 146530 146716 147000 146729
2004 146842(1) 146709 146944 146850 147065 147460 147692 147564 147415 147793 148162 148059
2005 148029(1) 148364 148391 148926 149261 149238 149432 149779 149954 150001 150065 150030
2006 150214(1) 150641 150813 150881 151069 151354 151377 151716 151662 152041 152406 152732
2007 153144(1) 152983 153051 152435 152670 153041 153054 152749 153414 153183 153835 153918
2008 154063(1) 153653 153908 153769 154303 154313 154469 154641 154570 154876 154639 154655
2009 154210(1) 154538 154133 154509 154747 154716 154502 154307 153827 153784 153878 153111
2010 153404(1) 153720 153964 154642 154106 153631 153706 154087 153971 153631 154127 153639
2011 153198(1) 153280 153403 153566 153526 153379 153309 153724 154059 153940 154072 153927
2012 154328(1) 154826 154811 154565 154946 155134 154970 154669 155018 155507 155279 155485
2013 155699(1) 155511 155099 155359 155609 155822 155693 155435 155473 154625 155284 154937
2014 155460(1)

Labor Force Participation Rate

63.0%

Series Id:           LNS11300000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Labor Force Participation Rate
Labor force status:  Civilian labor force participation rate
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 years and over

labor_participation_rate

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 67.3 67.3 67.3 67.3 67.1 67.1 66.9 66.9 66.9 66.8 66.9 67.0
2001 67.2 67.1 67.2 66.9 66.7 66.7 66.8 66.5 66.8 66.7 66.7 66.7
2002 66.5 66.8 66.6 66.7 66.7 66.6 66.5 66.6 66.7 66.6 66.4 66.3
2003 66.4 66.4 66.3 66.4 66.4 66.5 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 65.9
2004 66.1 66.0 66.0 65.9 66.0 66.1 66.1 66.0 65.8 65.9 66.0 65.9
2005 65.8 65.9 65.9 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.0 66.0
2006 66.0 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.2 66.3 66.4
2007 66.4 66.3 66.2 65.9 66.0 66.0 66.0 65.8 66.0 65.8 66.0 66.0
2008 66.2 66.0 66.1 65.9 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.0 66.0 65.9 65.8
2009 65.7 65.8 65.6 65.7 65.7 65.7 65.5 65.4 65.1 65.0 65.0 64.6
2010 64.8 64.9 64.9 65.2 64.9 64.6 64.6 64.7 64.6 64.4 64.6 64.3
2011 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.0 64.0 64.1 64.2 64.1 64.1 64.0
2012 63.7 63.9 63.8 63.7 63.8 63.8 63.7 63.5 63.6 63.7 63.6 63.6
2013 63.6 63.5 63.3 63.4 63.4 63.5 63.4 63.2 63.2 62.8 63.0 62.8
2014 63.0

Unemployment Level

10,236,000

Series Id:           LNS13000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Unemployment Level
Labor force status:  Unemployed
Type of data:        Number in thousands
Age:                 16 years and over

unemployment_level

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 5708 5858 5733 5481 5758 5651 5747 5853 5625 5534 5639 5634
2001 6023 6089 6141 6271 6226 6484 6583 7042 7142 7694 8003 8258
2002 8182 8215 8304 8599 8399 8393 8390 8304 8251 8307 8520 8640
2003 8520 8618 8588 8842 8957 9266 9011 8896 8921 8732 8576 8317
2004 8370 8167 8491 8170 8212 8286 8136 7990 7927 8061 7932 7934
2005 7784 7980 7737 7672 7651 7524 7406 7345 7553 7453 7566 7279
2006 7064 7184 7072 7120 6980 7001 7175 7091 6847 6727 6872 6762
2007 7116 6927 6731 6850 6766 6979 7149 7067 7170 7237 7240 7645
2008 7685 7497 7822 7637 8395 8575 8937 9438 9494 10074 10538 11286
2009 12058 12898 13426 13853 14499 14707 14601 14814 15009 15352 15219 15098
2010 14953 15121 15212 15333 14858 14483 14527 14660 14578 14520 15097 14373
2011 13910 13858 13748 13944 13873 13971 13785 13820 13905 13604 13326 13090
2012 12650 12883 12732 12603 12689 12702 12698 12464 12070 12138 12045 12273
2013 12315 12047 11706 11683 11690 11747 11408 11256 11203 11140 10841 10351
2014 10236

Unemployment Rate

6.6%

Series Id:           LNS14000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Unemployment Rate
Labor force status:  Unemployment rate
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 years and over

unemployment_rate_U_3
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
2001 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.7
2002 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.9 6.0
2003 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.7
2004 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.4
2005 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9
2006 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4
2007 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 5.0
2008 5.0 4.9 5.1 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.1 6.5 6.8 7.3
2009 7.8 8.3 8.7 9.0 9.4 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.8 10.0 9.9 9.9
2010 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.9 9.6 9.4 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.8 9.4
2011 9.1 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.0 9.1 9.0 9.0 9.0 8.8 8.6 8.5
2012 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.1 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.9
2013 7.9 7.7 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.7
2014 6.6

Employment-Population Ratio

58.8%

Series Id:           LNS12300000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Employment-Population Ratio
Labor force status:  Employment-population ratio
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 years and over
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 64.6 64.6 64.6 64.7 64.4 64.5 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.3 64.4
2001 64.4 64.3 64.3 64.0 63.8 63.7 63.7 63.2 63.5 63.2 63.0 62.9
2002 62.7 63.0 62.8 62.7 62.9 62.7 62.7 62.7 63.0 62.7 62.5 62.4
2003 62.5 62.5 62.4 62.4 62.3 62.3 62.1 62.1 62.0 62.1 62.3 62.2
2004 62.3 62.3 62.2 62.3 62.3 62.4 62.5 62.4 62.3 62.3 62.5 62.4
2005 62.4 62.4 62.4 62.7 62.8 62.7 62.8 62.9 62.8 62.8 62.7 62.8
2006 62.9 63.0 63.1 63.0 63.1 63.1 63.0 63.1 63.1 63.3 63.3 63.4
2007 63.3 63.3 63.3 63.0 63.0 63.0 62.9 62.7 62.9 62.7 62.9 62.7
2008 62.9 62.8 62.7 62.7 62.5 62.4 62.2 62.0 61.9 61.7 61.4 61.0
2009 60.6 60.3 59.9 59.8 59.6 59.4 59.3 59.1 58.7 58.5 58.6 58.3
2010 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.7 58.6 58.5 58.5 58.6 58.5 58.3 58.2 58.3
2011 58.4 58.4 58.4 58.4 58.4 58.2 58.2 58.3 58.4 58.4 58.5 58.5
2012 58.5 58.5 58.6 58.5 58.6 58.6 58.5 58.4 58.6 58.8 58.7 58.6
2013 58.6 58.6 58.5 58.6 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.6 58.6 58.2 58.6 58.6
2014 58.8

Unemployment Rate – 16-19 Yrs

20.7%

Series Id:           LNS14000012
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Unemployment Rate - 16-19 yrs.
Labor force status:  Unemployment rate
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 to 19 years

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 12.7 13.8 13.3 12.6 12.8 12.3 13.4 14.0 13.0 12.8 13.0 13.2
2001 13.8 13.7 13.8 13.9 13.4 14.2 14.4 15.6 15.2 16.0 15.9 17.0
2002 16.5 16.0 16.6 16.7 16.6 16.7 16.8 17.0 16.3 15.1 17.1 16.9
2003 17.2 17.2 17.8 17.7 17.9 19.0 18.2 16.6 17.6 17.2 15.7 16.2
2004 17.0 16.5 16.8 16.6 17.1 17.0 17.8 16.7 16.6 17.4 16.4 17.6
2005 16.2 17.5 17.1 17.8 17.8 16.3 16.1 16.1 15.5 16.1 17.0 14.9
2006 15.1 15.3 16.1 14.6 14.0 15.8 15.9 16.0 16.3 15.2 14.8 14.6
2007 14.8 14.9 14.9 15.9 15.9 16.3 15.3 15.9 15.9 15.4 16.2 16.8
2008 17.8 16.6 16.1 15.9 19.0 19.2 20.7 18.6 19.1 20.0 20.3 20.5
2009 20.7 22.3 22.2 22.2 23.4 24.7 24.3 25.0 25.9 27.2 26.9 26.7
2010 26.0 25.6 26.2 25.4 26.5 26.0 25.9 25.6 25.8 27.3 24.8 25.3
2011 25.5 24.1 24.3 24.5 23.9 24.8 24.8 25.1 24.5 24.2 24.1 23.3
2012 23.5 23.8 24.8 24.6 24.2 23.7 23.7 24.4 23.8 23.8 23.9 24.0
2013 23.5 25.2 23.9 23.7 24.1 23.8 23.4 22.6 21.3 22.0 20.8 20.2
2014 20.7

Average Weeks Unemployed

35.4 Weeks

Series Id:           LNS13008275
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Average Weeks Unemployed
Labor force status:  Unemployed
Type of data:        Number of weeks
Age:                 16 years and over
average_weeks_unemployed
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 13.1 12.6 12.7 12.4 12.6 12.3 13.4 12.9 12.2 12.7 12.4 12.5
2001 12.7 12.8 12.8 12.4 12.1 12.7 12.9 13.3 13.2 13.3 14.3 14.5
2002 14.7 15.0 15.4 16.3 16.8 16.9 16.9 16.5 17.6 17.8 17.6 18.5
2003 18.5 18.5 18.1 19.4 19.0 19.9 19.7 19.2 19.5 19.3 19.9 19.8
2004 19.9 20.1 19.8 19.6 19.8 20.5 18.8 18.8 19.4 19.5 19.7 19.4
2005 19.5 19.1 19.5 19.6 18.6 17.9 17.6 18.4 17.9 17.9 17.5 17.5
2006 16.9 17.8 17.1 16.7 17.1 16.6 17.1 17.1 17.1 16.3 16.2 16.1
2007 16.3 16.7 17.8 16.9 16.6 16.5 17.2 17.0 16.3 17.0 17.3 16.6
2008 17.5 16.9 16.5 16.9 16.6 17.1 17.0 17.7 18.6 19.9 18.9 19.9
2009 19.8 20.2 20.9 21.7 22.4 23.9 25.1 25.3 26.6 27.5 28.9 29.7
2010 30.3 29.9 31.6 33.3 33.9 34.5 33.8 33.6 33.4 34.2 33.9 34.8
2011 37.2 37.5 39.2 38.7 39.5 39.7 40.4 40.2 40.2 39.1 40.3 40.7
2012 40.1 40.0 39.4 39.3 39.6 40.0 38.8 39.1 39.4 40.3 39.2 38.0
2013 35.4 36.9 37.0 36.6 36.9 35.7 36.7 37.0 36.8 36.0 37.1 37.1
2014 35.4

Median Weeks Unemployed

16.0 weeks

Series Id:           LNS13008276
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Median Weeks Unemployed
Labor force status:  Unemployed
Type of data:        Number of weeks
Age:                 16 years and over

median_weeks_unemployed

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 5.8 6.1 6.0 6.1 5.8 5.7 6.0 6.3 5.2 6.1 6.1 6.0
2001 5.8 6.1 6.6 5.9 6.3 6.0 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.3 7.7 8.2
2002 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.9 9.5 11.0 8.9 9.0 9.5 9.6 9.3 9.6
2003 9.6 9.5 9.7 10.2 9.9 11.5 10.3 10.1 10.2 10.4 10.3 10.4
2004 10.6 10.2 10.2 9.5 9.9 11.0 8.9 9.2 9.6 9.5 9.7 9.5
2005 9.4 9.2 9.3 9.0 9.1 9.0 8.8 9.2 8.4 8.6 8.5 8.7
2006 8.6 9.1 8.7 8.4 8.5 7.3 8.0 8.4 8.0 7.9 8.3 7.5
2007 8.3 8.5 9.1 8.6 8.2 7.7 8.7 8.8 8.7 8.4 8.6 8.4
2008 9.0 8.7 8.7 9.4 7.9 9.0 9.7 9.7 10.2 10.4 9.8 10.5
2009 10.7 11.7 12.3 13.1 14.2 17.2 16.0 16.3 17.8 18.9 19.8 20.1
2010 20.0 19.9 20.5 22.1 22.3 25.0 22.2 20.9 20.2 21.4 21.0 22.0
2011 21.5 21.2 21.7 20.9 21.6 22.1 21.8 22.2 21.9 20.7 20.9 20.6
2012 20.9 20.0 19.6 19.2 19.8 19.8 17.2 18.2 18.7 20.0 18.6 17.8
2013 16.0 17.7 18.1 17.3 16.9 16.2 15.8 16.5 16.4 16.5 17.0 17.1
2014 16.0

Not in Labor Force, Searched for Work and Available

2,592,000

Series Id:                       LNU05026642
Not Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:                    (Unadj) Not in Labor Force, Searched For Work and Available
Labor force status:              Not in labor force
Type of data:                    Number in thousands
Age:                             16 years and over
Job desires/not in labor force:  Want a job now
Reasons not in labor force:      Available to work now
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 1207 1281 1219 1216 1113 1142 1172 1097 1166 1044 1100 1125 1157
2001 1295 1337 1109 1131 1157 1170 1232 1364 1335 1398 1331 1330 1266
2002 1532 1423 1358 1397 1467 1380 1507 1456 1501 1416 1401 1432 1439
2003 1598 1590 1577 1399 1428 1468 1566 1665 1544 1586 1473 1483 1531
2004 1670 1691 1643 1526 1533 1492 1557 1587 1561 1647 1517 1463 1574
2005 1804 1673 1588 1511 1428 1583 1516 1583 1438 1414 1415 1589 1545
2006 1644 1471 1468 1310 1388 1584 1522 1592 1299 1478 1366 1252 1448
2007 1577 1451 1385 1391 1406 1454 1376 1365 1268 1364 1363 1344 1395
2008 1729 1585 1352 1414 1416 1558 1573 1640 1604 1637 1947 1908 1614
2009 2130 2051 2106 2089 2210 2176 2282 2270 2219 2373 2323 2486 2226
2010 2539 2527 2255 2432 2223 2591 2622 2370 2548 2602 2531 2609 2487
2011 2800 2730 2434 2466 2206 2680 2785 2575 2511 2555 2591 2540 2573
2012 2809 2608 2352 2363 2423 2483 2529 2561 2517 2433 2505 2614 2516
2013 2443 2588 2326 2347 2164 2582 2414 2342 2302 2283 2096 2427 2360
2014 2592

Total Unemployment Rate U-6

12.7%

Series Id:           LNS13327709
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (seas) Total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of all civilian labor force plus all marginally attached workers
Labor force status:  Aggregated totals unemployed
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 years and over
Percent/rates:       Unemployed and mrg attached and pt for econ reas as percent of labor force plus marg attached

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2000 7.1 7.2 7.1 6.9 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.0 6.8 7.1 6.9
2001 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.9 7.8 8.1 8.7 9.3 9.4 9.6
2002 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.7 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.7 9.8
2003 10.0 10.2 10.0 10.2 10.1 10.3 10.3 10.1 10.4 10.2 10.0 9.8
2004 9.9 9.7 10.0 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.7 9.4 9.2
2005 9.3 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.8 8.9 9.0 8.7 8.7 8.6
2006 8.4 8.4 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.0 8.2 8.1 7.9
2007 8.4 8.2 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.8
2008 9.2 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.7 10.1 10.5 10.8 11.0 11.8 12.6 13.6
2009 14.2 15.2 15.8 15.9 16.5 16.5 16.4 16.7 16.7 17.1 17.1 17.1
2010 16.7 17.0 17.1 17.2 16.6 16.4 16.4 16.5 16.8 16.6 16.9 16.6
2011 16.1 16.0 15.9 16.1 15.8 16.1 16.0 16.1 16.3 15.9 15.6 15.2
2012 15.1 15.0 14.5 14.6 14.8 14.8 14.9 14.7 14.7 14.4 14.4 14.4
2013 14.4 14.3 13.8 13.9 13.8 14.2 13.9 13.6 13.6 13.7 13.1 13.1
2014 12.7

Employment Situation Summary

Transmission of material in this release is embargoed until                      USDL-14-0168
8:30 a.m. (EST) Friday, February 7, 2014

Technical information:
Household data:        (202) 691-6378  •  cpsinfo@bls.gov  •  www.bls.gov/cps
Establishment data:    (202) 691-6555  •  cesinfo@bls.gov  •  www.bls.gov/ces

Media contact:         (202) 691-5902  •  PressOffice@bls.gov

                                 THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION -- JANUARY 2014

Total nonfarm payroll employment rose by 113,000 in January, and the unemployment rate
was little changed at 6.6 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today.
Employment grew in construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, and mining. 

  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 |                        Changes to the Employment Situation Data                    |
 |                                                                                    |
 |Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking  |
 |process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. Also, household survey data|
 |for January 2014 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes at the end of  |
 |this release for more information about these changes.                              |
 |                                                                                    |
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Household Survey Data

Both the number of unemployed persons, at 10.2 million, and the unemployment rate, at
6.6 percent, changed little in January. Since October, the jobless rate has decreased by
0.6 percentage point. (See table A-1.)  (See the note and tables B and C for information
about the effect of annual population adjustments to the household survey estimates.) 

Among the major worker groups, the unemployment rates for adult men (6.2 percent), adult
women (5.9 percent), teenagers (20.7 percent), whites (5.7 percent), blacks (12.1 percent),
and Hispanics (8.4 percent) showed little change in January. The jobless rate for Asians
was 4.8 percent (not seasonally adjusted), down by 1.7 percentage points over the year.
(See tables A-1, A-2, and A-3.)

The number of long-term unemployed (those jobless for 27 weeks or more), at 3.6 million,
declined by 232,000 in January. These individuals accounted for 35.8 percent of the
unemployed. The number of long-term unemployed has declined by 1.1 million over the year.
(See table A-12.)

After accounting for the annual adjustment to the population controls, the civilian labor
force rose by 499,000 in January, and the labor force participation rate edged up to 63.0
percent. Total employment, as measured by the household survey, increased by 616,000 over
the month, and the employment-population ratio increased by 0.2 percentage point to 58.8
percent. (See table A-1. For additional information about the effects of the population
adjustments, see table C.)

The number of persons employed part time for economic reasons (sometimes referred to as
involuntary part-time workers) fell by 514,000 to 7.3 million in January. These individuals
were working part time because their hours had been cut back or because they were unable to
find full-time work. (See table A-8.)

In January, 2.6 million persons were marginally attached to the labor force, little changed
from a year earlier. (The data are not seasonally adjusted.) These individuals were not in
the labor force, wanted and were available for work, and had looked for a job sometime in
the prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had not searched for
work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey. (See table A-16.)

Among the marginally attached, there were 837,000 discouraged workers in January, about
unchanged from a year earlier. Discouraged workers are persons not currently looking for
work because they believe no jobs are available for them. The remaining 1.8 million persons
marginally attached to the labor force in January had not searched for work for reasons such
as school attendance or family responsibilities. (See table A-16.)

Establishment Survey Data

Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 113,000 in January. In 2013, employment growth
averaged 194,000 per month. In January, job gains occurred in construction, manufacturing,
wholesale trade, and mining. (See table B-1.)

Construction added 48,000 jobs over the month, more than offsetting a decline of 22,000 in
December. In January, job gains occurred in both residential and nonresidential building
(+13,000 and +8,000, respectively) and in nonresidential specialty trade contractors
(+13,000). Heavy and civil engineering construction also added 10,000 jobs.

Employment in manufacturing increased in January (+21,000). Over the month, job gains
occurred in machinery (+7,000), wood products (+5,000), and motor vehicles and parts
(+5,000). Manufacturing added an average of 7,000 jobs per month in 2013.

In January, wholesale trade added 14,000 jobs, with most of the increase occurring in
nondurable goods (+10,000).

Mining added 7,000 jobs in January, compared with an average monthly gain of 2,000 jobs
in 2013.

Employment in professional and business services continued to trend up in January (+36,000).
The industry added an average of 55,000 jobs per month in 2013. Within the industry,
professional and technical services added 20,000 jobs in January. 

Leisure and hospitality employment continued to trend up over the month (+24,000). Job
growth in the industry averaged 38,000 per month in 2013. 

Employment in health care was essentially unchanged in January for the second consecutive
month.  Health care added an average of 17,000 jobs per month in 2013. 

Employment in retail trade changed little in January (-13,000). Within the industry, sporting
goods, hobby, book, and music stores lost 22,000 jobs, offsetting job gains in the prior 3
months. In January, motor vehicle and parts dealers added 7,000 jobs.

In January, federal government employment decreased by 12,000; the U.S. Postal Service
accounted for most of this decline (-9,000).

Employment in other major industries, including transportation and warehousing, information,
and financial activities, showed little or no change over the month.

In January, the average workweek for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls was unchanged
at 34.4 hours. The manufacturing workweek declined by 0.2 hour to 40.7 hours, and factory
overtime edged down by 0.1 hour to 3.4 hours. The average workweek for production and
nonsupervisory employees on private nonfarm payrolls was unchanged at 33.5 hours. (See
tables B-2 and B-7.)

Average hourly earnings for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls rose by 5 cents to
$24.21. Over the year, average hourly earnings have risen by 46 cents, or 1.9 percent. In
January, average hourly earnings of private-sector production and nonsupervisory employees
increased by 6 cents to $20.39. (See tables B-3 and B-8.)

The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for November was revised from +241,000 to
+274,000, and the change for December was revised from +74,000 to +75,000. With these
revisions, employment gains in November and December were 34,000 higher than previously
reported. Monthly revisions result from additional reports received from businesses since
the last published estimates and the monthly recalculation of seasonal factors. The annual
benchmark process also contributed to the revisions in this news release.

_____________
The Employment Situation for February is scheduled to be released on Friday, March 7, 2014,
at 8:30 a.m. (EST).

                                  Revisions to Establishment Survey Data

In accordance with annual practice, the establishment survey data released today have been
benchmarked to reflect comprehensive counts of payroll jobs for March 2013. These counts
are derived principally from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which
enumerates jobs covered by the UI tax system. The benchmark process results in revisions
to not seasonally adjusted data from April 2012 forward. Seasonally adjusted data from
January 2009 forward are subject to revision. In addition, data for some series prior to
2009, both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted, incorporate revisions.

The total nonfarm employment level for March 2013 was revised upward by 369,000 (+347,000
on a not seasonally adjusted basis, or 0.3 percent). The average benchmark revision over
the past 10 years was plus or minus 0.3 percent. 

This revision incorporates the reclassification of jobs in the QCEW. Private household
employment is out of scope for the establishment survey. The QCEW reclassified some
private household employment into an industry that is in scope for the establishment
survey--services for the elderly and persons with disabilities. This reclassification
accounted for an increase of 466,000 jobs in the establishment survey. This increase of
466,000 associated with reclassification was offset by survey error of -119,000 for a
total net benchmark revision of +347,000 on a not seasonally adjusted basis. Historical
time series have been reconstructed to incorporate these revisions. 

The effect of these revisions on the underlying trend in nonfarm payroll employment was
minor. For example, the over-the-year change in total nonfarm employment for 2013 was
revised from 2,186,000 to 2,322,000 seasonally adjusted. Table A presents revised total
nonfarm employment data on a seasonally adjusted basis for January through December 2013.

All revised historical CES data, as well as an article that discusses the benchmark and
post-benchmark revisions and other technical issues can be accessed through the CES
homepage at www.bls.gov/ces/. Information on the data released today also may be obtained
by calling (202) 691-6555.

Table A. Revisions in total nonfarm employment, January-December 2013, seasonally adjusted
(Numbers in thousands)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    |                                    |                                
                    |                Level               |      Over-the-month change     
                    |---------------------------------------------------------------------
    Year and month  |    As     |           |            |    As    |         |           
                    |previously |    As     | Difference |previously|   As    | Difference
                    |published  |  revised  |            |published | revised |           
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    |           |           |            |          |         |           
          2013      |           |           |            |          |         |           
                    |           |           |            |          |         |           
 January............|  134,839  |  135,261  |     422    |    148   |    197  |      49   
 February...........|  135,171  |  135,541  |     370    |    332   |    280  |     -52   
 March..............|  135,313  |  135,682  |     369    |    142   |    141  |      -1   
 April..............|  135,512  |  135,885  |     373    |    199   |    203  |       4   
 May................|  135,688  |  136,084  |     396    |    176   |    199  |      23   
 June...............|  135,860  |  136,285  |     425    |    172   |    201  |      29   
 July...............|  135,949  |  136,434  |     485    |     89   |    149  |      60   
 August.............|  136,187  |  136,636  |     449    |    238   |    202  |     -36   
 September..........|  136,362  |  136,800  |     438    |    175   |    164  |     -11   
 October............|  136,562  |  137,037  |     475    |    200   |    237  |      37   
 November...........|  136,803  |  137,311  |     508    |    241   |    274  |      33   
 December (p).......|  136,877  |  137,386  |     509    |     74   |     75  |       1   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

   p = preliminary

                Adjustments to Population Estimates for the Household Survey

Effective with data for January 2014, updated population estimates have been used in the
household survey. Population estimates for the household survey are developed by the U.S.
Census Bureau. Each year, the Census Bureau updates the estimates to reflect new information
and assumptions about the growth of the population since the previous decennial census. The
change in population reflected in the new estimates results from adjustments for net
international migration, updated vital statistics and other information, and some
methodological changes in the estimation process. 

In accordance with usual practice, BLS will not revise the official household survey estimates
for December 2013 and earlier months. To show the impact of the population adjustments, however,
differences in selected December 2013 labor force series based on the old and new population
estimates are shown in table B. 

The adjustments increased the estimated size of the civilian noninstitutional population in
December by 2,000, the civilian labor force by 24,000, employment by 22,000, and unemployment
by 2,000. The number of persons not in the labor force was reduced by 22,000. The total
unemployment rate, employment-population ratio, and labor force participation rate were
unaffected. 

Data users are cautioned that these annual population adjustments can affect the comparability
of household data series over time. Table C shows the effect of the introduction of new
population estimates on the comparison of selected labor force measures between December 2013
and January 2014. Additional information on the population adjustments and their effect on
national labor force estimates is available at www.bls.gov/cps/cps14adj.pdf.

Table B. Effect of the updated population controls on December 2013 estimates by sex, race, and
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, not seasonally adjusted
(Numbers in thousands)

__________________________________________________________________________________________________
                                        |      |     |      |       |        |       |            
                                        |      |     |      |       |  Black |       |            
                                        |      |     |      |       |    or  |       |  Hispanic  
                  Category              | Total| Men | Women| White | African| Asian | or Latino  
                                        |      |     |      |       |American|       | ethnicity  
                                        |      |     |      |       |        |       |            
________________________________________|______|_____|______|_______|________|_______|____________
                                        |      |     |      |       |        |       |            
  Civilian noninstitutional population..|    2 |  29 |  -27 |   -65 |     48 |    33 |     -57    
    Civilian labor force................|   24 |  24 |    0 |   -17 |     34 |    15 |     -38    
      Participation rate................|   .0 |  .0 |   .0 |    .0 |     .0 |    .0 |      .0    
     Employed...........................|   22 |  22 |    0 |   -16 |     31 |    14 |     -34    
      Employment-population ratio.......|   .0 |  .0 |   .0 |    .0 |     .0 |    .0 |      .0    
     Unemployed.........................|    2 |   3 |   -1 |    -1 |      4 |     1 |      -4    
      Unemployment rate.................|   .0 |  .0 |   .0 |    .0 |     .0 |    .0 |      .0    
    Not in labor force..................|  -22 |   4 |  -27 |   -48 |     14 |    18 |     -18    
________________________________________|______|_____|______|_______|________|_______|____________

   NOTE: Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding. Estimates for the above race groups
(white, black or African American, and Asian) do not sum to totals because data are not presented
for all races. Persons whose ethnicity is identified as Hispanic or Latino may be of any race.

Table C. December 2013-January 2014 changes in selected labor force measures,
with adjustments for population control effects
(Numbers in thousands)

______________________________________________________________________________
                                       |           |            |             
                                       |           |            |  Dec.-Jan.  
                                       | Dec.-Jan. |    2014    |   change,   
                                       |  change,  | population |  after re-  
                Category               |    as     |   control  |  moving the 
                                       | published |   effect   |  population 
                                       |           |            |   control   
                                       |           |            |  effect (1) 
_______________________________________|___________|____________|_____________
                                       |           |            |             
  Civilian noninstitutional population.|    170    |       2    |     168     
    Civilian labor force...............|    523    |      24    |     499     
      Participation rate...............|     .2    |      .0    |      .2     
     Employed..........................|    638    |      22    |     616     
      Employment-population ratio......|     .2    |      .0    |      .2     
     Unemployed........................|   -115    |       2    |    -117     
      Unemployment rate................|    -.1    |      .0    |     -.1     
    Not in labor force.................|   -353    |     -22    |    -331     
_______________________________________|___________|____________|_____________

   (1) This Dec.-Jan. change is calculated by subtracting the population 
control effect from the over-the-month change in the published seasonally
adjusted estimates.
   NOTE: Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.

  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 |                                                                                    |
 |                            Change to the Household Survey Tables                   |
 |                                                                                    |
 |Effective with this release, household survey table A-10 includes two new seasonally|
 |adjusted series for women age 55 and over--the number of unemployed persons and the |
 |unemployment rate. These replace the series that were previously displayed for this |
 |group, which were not seasonally adjusted.                                          |
 |                                                                                    |
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 |                                                                                    |
 |               Updated Veteran Weighting Methodology for Household Survey           |
 |                                                                                    |
 |Beginning with data for January 2014, estimates for veterans in table A-5 of this   |
 |release incorporate updated weighting procedures. The new weighting methodology more|
 |accurately reflects the current demographic composition of the veteran population.  |
 |The primary impact of the change was an increase in the "Gulf War-era I" veteran    |
 |population and a decrease in the number of veterans in the "Other service periods"  |
 |category. The updated methodology had little effect on unemployment rates for       |
 |veterans, regardless of gender or period of service. Additional information on the  |
 |effect of the change on labor force estimates for veterans is available at          |
 |www.bls.gov/cps/vetsweights2014.pdf.                                                |
 |                                                                                    |
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Employment Situation Summary Table A. Household data, seasonally adjusted

HOUSEHOLD DATA
Summary table A. Household data, seasonally adjusted
[Numbers in thousands]

CategoryJan.
2013Nov.
2013Dec.
2013Jan.
2014Change from:
Dec.
2013-
Jan.
2014Employment status Civilian noninstitutional population244,663246,567246,745246,915-Civilian labor force155,699155,284154,937155,460-Participation rate63.663.062.863.0-Employed143,384144,443144,586145,224-Employment-population ratio58.658.658.658.8-Unemployed12,31510,84110,35110,236-Unemployment rate7.97.06.76.6-Not in labor force88,96391,28391,80891,455- Unemployment rates Total, 16 years and over7.97.06.76.6-Adult men (20 years and over)7.46.76.36.2-Adult women (20 years and over)7.26.26.05.9-Teenagers (16 to 19 years)23.520.820.220.7-White7.16.15.95.7-Black or African American13.812.411.912.1-Asian (not seasonally adjusted)6.55.34.14.8-Hispanic or Latino ethnicity9.78.78.38.4- Total, 25 years and over6.55.85.65.4-Less than a high school diploma12.010.69.89.6-High school graduates, no college8.17.37.16.5-Some college or associate degree7.06.46.16.0-Bachelor’s degree and higher3.83.43.33.2- Reason for unemployment Job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs6,6755,7315,3665,407-Job leavers984890862818-Reentrants3,5203,0653,0362,937-New entrants1,2741,1691,2011,184- Duration of unemployment Less than 5 weeks2,7532,4392,2552,434-5 to 14 weeks3,0772,5852,5062,429-15 to 26 weeks1,8671,7421,6511,689-27 weeks and over4,7074,0443,8783,646- Employed persons at work part time Part time for economic reasons7,9837,7237,7717,257-Slack work or business conditions5,1174,8694,8844,405-Could only find part-time work2,6132,4992,5922,571-Part time for noneconomic reasons18,55618,85818,73119,165- Persons not in the labor force (not seasonally adjusted) Marginally attached to the labor force2,4432,0962,4272,592-Discouraged workers804762917837– December – January changes in household data are not shown due to the introduction of updated population controls.
NOTE: Persons whose ethnicity is identified as Hispanic or Latino may be of any race. Detail for the seasonally adjusted data shown in this table will not necessarily add to totals because of the independent seasonal adjustment of the various series. Updated population controls are introduced annually with the release of January data.

Employment Situation Summary Table B. Establishment data, seasonally adjusted

ESTABLISHMENT DATA
Summary table B. Establishment data, seasonally adjusted
Category Jan.
2013
Nov.
2013
Dec.
2013(p)
Jan.
2014(p)
EMPLOYMENT BY SELECTED INDUSTRY
(Over-the-month change, in thousands)
Total nonfarm 197 274 75 113
Total private 219 272 89 142
Goods-producing 43 68 -13 76
Mining and logging 3 1 1 7
Construction 23 32 -22 48
Manufacturing 17 35 8 21
Durable goods(1) 9 19 2 15
Motor vehicles and parts 3.5 4.7 3.3 4.7
Nondurable goods 8 16 6 6
Private service-providing(1) 176 204 102 66
Wholesale trade 16.9 16.8 10.2 13.9
Retail trade 26.9 22.3 62.7 -12.9
Transportation and warehousing 9.8 32.4 10.6 9.9
Information -1 1 -10 0
Financial activities 8 -4 3 -2
Professional and business services(1) 45 73 4 36
Temporary help services 4.9 36.6 30.1 8.1
Education and health services(1) 17 25 -4 -6
Health care and social assistance 23.5 24.4 1.1 1.5
Leisure and hospitality 47 37 20 24
Other services 7 -1 7 4
Government -22 2 -14 -29
WOMEN AND PRODUCTION AND NONSUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES(2)
AS A PERCENT OF ALL EMPLOYEES
Total nonfarm women employees 49.4 49.5 49.5 49.4
Total private women employees 48.0 48.0 48.0 47.9
Total private production and nonsupervisory employees 82.6 82.6 82.6 82.6
HOURS AND EARNINGS
ALL EMPLOYEES
Total private
Average weekly hours 34.4 34.5 34.4 34.4
Average hourly earnings $23.75 $24.15 $24.16 $24.21
Average weekly earnings $817.00 $833.18 $831.10 $832.82
Index of aggregate weekly hours (2007=100)(3) 97.5 99.6 99.4 99.5
Over-the-month percent change 0.2 0.5 -0.2 0.1
Index of aggregate weekly payrolls (2007=100)(4) 110.5 114.8 114.6 114.9
Over-the-month percent change 0.4 0.8 -0.2 0.3
HOURS AND EARNINGS
PRODUCTION AND NONSUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES
Total private
Average weekly hours 33.6 33.7 33.5 33.5
Average hourly earnings $19.95 $20.30 $20.33 $20.39
Average weekly earnings $670.32 $684.11 $681.06 $683.07
Index of aggregate weekly hours (2002=100)(3) 104.9 107.1 106.6 106.7
Over-the-month percent change -0.2 0.5 -0.5 0.1
Index of aggregate weekly payrolls (2002=100)(4) 139.8 145.3 144.8 145.3
Over-the-month percent change 0.1 0.8 -0.3 0.3
DIFFUSION INDEX(5)
(Over 1-month span)
Total private (264 industries) 64.0 66.9 56.4 61.2
Manufacturing (81 industries) 56.8 65.4 59.9 54.3
Footnotes
(1) Includes other industries, not shown separately.
(2) Data relate to production employees in mining and logging and manufacturing, construction employees in construction, and nonsupervisory employees in the service-providing industries.
(3) The indexes of aggregate weekly hours are calculated by dividing the current month’s estimates of aggregate hours by the corresponding annual average aggregate hours.
(4) The indexes of aggregate weekly payrolls are calculated by dividing the current month’s estimates of aggregate weekly payrolls by the corresponding annual average aggregate weekly payrolls.
(5) Figures are the percent of industries with employment increasing plus one-half of the industries with unchanged employment, where 50 percent indicates an equal balance between industries with increasing and decreasing employment.
(p) Preliminary
NOTE: Data have been revised to reflect March 2013 benchmark levels and updated seasonal adjustment factors.

Weakness Continues as 113,000 Jobs Are Added in January

Employers added jobs at a slower-than-expected pace in January, the second month in a row that hiring has been disappointing and a sign that the labor market remains anemic despite indications of growth elsewhere in the economy.

Payrolls increased by 113,000, the Labor Department reported Friday morning, well below the gain of 180,000 that economists expected. The unemployment rate, based on a separate survey of households that was more encouraging, actually fell by a tenth of a percentage point, to 6.6 percent.

The data for January come after an even more disappointing report on the labor market for December, which was revised upward only slightly Friday, to show a gain of just 75,000 jobs, from 74,000. The level of hiring in January was also substantially below the average monthly gain of 178,000 positions over the last six months, as well as the monthly addition of 187,000 over the last year.

The two weak months in a row will prompt questions about whether the Federal Reserve acted prematurely when policy makers in December voted to begin scaling back the central bank’s expansive stimulus efforts.

The new data is not expected to alter the Fed’s course, economists said, but another poor report on hiring next month might force policy makers to rethink their plan when they next meet in late March.

“In one line: grim,” said Ian Shepherdson, chief economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics, in a note to clients Friday morning.

While seasonal adjustments may have played a role and upward revisions for hiring in October and November were more encouraging, he said, “The payroll rebound clearly is disappointing; none of the ground lost in December was recovered.”

Other economists conceded the picture for January was hardly bright, but cautioned it was too soon to conclude there had been a fundamental loss of momentum in the economy, especially given seasonal fluctuations in the data and the possibility that weather inhibited some hiring.

“We’re not seeing the takeoff that people wanted to see, but it’s not a disaster,” said Julia Coronado, chief economist for North America at BNP Paribas. “The 113,000 figure is definitely way below trend, but we want another month or two of data before we can draw conclusions.”

One mystery economists will be focusing on is why employment gains have not kept up with economic growth as measured by gross domestic product, which picked up substantially in the second half of 2013. The annualized pace of expansion was 3.2 percent in the fourth quarter, and 4.1 percent in the third quarter.

One reason may be that new technologies are allowing employers to make do with fewer workers, for instance the use of automated customer service systems instead of call centers, or Internet retailers’ taking over from brick-and-mortar stores where sales associates prowl the floors.

Another shift is evident from the yawning gap in employment for college graduates versus workers who lack a high school diploma. For people with a college degree or higher, the jobless rate was 3.1 percent, compared with 9.6 percent for Americans who did not finish high school.

Wintry conditions that held back hiring were blamed for the weakness in December, a theory popular among more optimistic economists after those numbers came out in early January.

But despite what seems like an endless series of snowstorms on the East Coast and arctic conditions in the Midwest recently, the reference week for the latest survey was Jan. 12-18, when conditions were fairly normal as Januaries go, limiting some of the impact of the weather in this report.

In the report on January, one sector holding back payrolls was the government, which shrank by 29,000 jobs in January. Excluding that loss, private employers added 142,000 positions, a slightly better showing.

Several other sectors which had been strong in recent months – education and health care as well as retailing – also lost positions, contributing to the overall weakness.

The falloff in hiring in the health care sector was especially notable. In December and January together, just 2,600 health care positions were filled. By contrast, as recently as November, nearly 25,000 health care workers were added to payrolls.

Although this area of the economy is going through a transformation as President Obama’s new health care plan is slowly introduced, that is unlikely to have caused the abrupt slowdown in hiring, said Ethan Harris, a head of global economics at Bank of America Merrill Lynch. If anything, he said, the law should create new jobs in the sector as health care coverage is expanded, even if higher costs for some employers result in job cuts elsewhere in the economy.

As for retail, which lost nearly 13,000 jobs in January, some of that reduction could have essentially been because of excessive hiring in December, Mr. Harris said, when stores added nearly 63,000 positions as the holiday shopping season peaked. The cuts may also have been spurred by weak results at some retailers, with chains like J. C. Penney announcing major job cuts last month, and Loehmann’s, the venerable discounter, now in liquidation.

The employment-population ratio, which has been falling as more workers drop out of the job market, edged up 0.2 percentage points to 58.8 percent. In recent years, the exit of people from the work force has reduced the unemployment rate, but it is a sign that people are giving up hope of finding a job in the face of slack conditions, hardly the way policy makers would like to see joblessness come down.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/08/business/us-economy-adds-113000-jobs-unemployment-rate-at-6-6.html?_r=0

EMBARGOED UNTIL RELEASE AT 8:30 A.M. EST, THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, 2014
BEA 14-03

* See the navigation bar at the right side of the news release text for links to data tables,
contact personnel and their telephone numbers, and supplementary materials.

Lisa S. Mataloni: (202) 606-5304 (GDP) gdpniwd@bea.gov
Recorded message: (202) 606-5306
Jeannine Aversa: (202) 606-2649 (News Media)
National Income and Product Accounts
Gross Domestic Product, 4th quarter and annual 2013 (advance estimate)
      Real gross domestic product -- the output of goods and services produced by labor and property
located in the United States -- increased at an annual rate of 3.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2013
(that is, from the third quarter to the fourth quarter), according to the "advance" estimate released by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.  In the third quarter, real GDP increased 4.1 percent.

The Bureau emphasized that the fourth-quarter advance estimate released today is based on
source data that are incomplete or subject to further revision by the source agency (see the box on page 4
and “Comparisons of Revisions to GDP” on page 5). The “second” estimate for the fourth quarter, based
on more complete data, will be released on February 28, 2014.

The increase in real GDP in the fourth quarter primarily reflected positive contributions from
personal consumption expenditures (PCE), exports, nonresidential fixed investment, private inventory
investment, and state and local government spending that were partly offset by negative contributions
from federal government spending and residential fixed investment. Imports, which are a subtraction in
the calculation of GDP, increased.

The deceleration in real GDP in the fourth quarter reflected a deceleration in private inventory
investment, a larger decrease in federal government spending, a downturn in residential fixed
investment, and decelerations in state and local government spending and in nonresidential fixed
investment that were partly offset by accelerations in exports and in PCE and a deceleration in imports.

The price index for gross domestic purchases, which measures prices paid by U.S. residents,
increased 1.2 percent in the fourth quarter, compared with an increase of 1.8 percent in the third.
Excluding food and energy prices, the price index for gross domestic purchases increased 1.7 percent in
the fourth quarter, compared with an increase of 1.5 percent in the third.

_______
FOOTNOTE. Quarterly estimates are expressed at seasonally adjusted annual rates, unless otherwise
specified. Quarter-to-quarter dollar changes are differences between these published estimates. Percent
changes are calculated from unrounded data and are annualized. “Real” estimates are in chained (2009)
dollars. Price indexes are chain-type measures.

This news release is available on www.bea.gov along with the Technical Note and Highlights
related to this release.
_______

Real personal consumption expenditures increased 3.3 percent in the fourth quarter, compared
with an increase of 2.0 percent in the third. Durable goods increased 5.9 percent, compared with an
increase of 7.9 percent. Nondurable goods increased 4.4 percent, compared with an increase of 2.9
percent. Services increased 2.5 percent, compared with an increase of 0.7 percent.

Real nonresidential fixed investment increased 3.8 percent in the fourth quarter, compared with
an increase of 4.8 percent in the third. Nonresidential structures decreased 1.2 percent, in contrast to an
increase of 13.4 percent. Equipment increased 6.9 percent, compared with an increase of 0.2 percent.
Intellectual property products increased 3.2 percent, compared with an increase of 5.8 percent. Real
residential fixed investment decreased 9.8 percent, in contrast to an increase of 10.3 percent.

Real exports of goods and services increased 11.4 percent in the fourth quarter, compared with
an increase of 3.9 percent in the third. Real imports of goods and services increased 0.9 percent,
compared with an increase of 2.4 percent.

Real federal government consumption expenditures and gross investment decreased 12.6 percent
in the fourth quarter, compared with a decrease of 1.5 percent in the third. National defense decreased
14.0 percent, compared with a decrease of 0.5 percent. Nondefense decreased 10.3 percent, compared
with a decrease of 3.1 percent. Real state and local government consumption expenditures and gross
investment increased 0.5 percent, compared with an increase of 1.7 percent.

The change in real private inventories added 0.42 percentage point to the fourth-quarter change
in real GDP after adding 1.67 percentage points to the third-quarter change. Private businesses
increased inventories $127.2 billion in the fourth quarter, following increases of $115.7 billion in the
third quarter and $56.6 billion in the second.

Real final sales of domestic product — GDP less change in private inventories — increased 2.8
percent in the fourth quarter, compared with an increase of 2.5 percent in the third.

Gross domestic purchases

Real gross domestic purchases — purchases by U.S. residents of goods and services wherever
produced — increased 1.8 percent in the fourth quarter, compared with an increase of 3.9 percent in the
third.

Disposition of personal income

Current-dollar personal income increased $69.4 billion (2.0 percent) in the fourth quarter,
compared with an increase of $140.0 billion (4.0 percent) in the third. The deceleration in personal
income primarily reflected downturns in personal dividend income and in farm proprietors’ income and
a deceleration in personal current transfer receipts that were partly offset by an acceleration in wages
and salaries.

Personal current taxes increased $23.7 billion in the fourth quarter, in contrast to a decrease of
$11.0 billion in the third.

Disposable personal income increased $45.7 billion (1.5 percent) in the fourth quarter, compared
with an increase of $151.0 billion (5.0 percent) in the third. Real disposable personal income increased
0.8 percent in the fourth quarter, compared with an increase of 3.0 percent in the third.

Personal outlays increased $118.6 billion (4.0 percent) in the fourth quarter, compared with an
increase of $113.4 billion (3.9 percent) in the third. Personal saving — disposable personal income less
personal outlays — was $545.1 billion in the fourth quarter, compared with $618.0 billion in the third.

The personal saving rate — personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income — was
4.3 percent in the fourth quarter, compared with 4.9 percent in the third. For a comparison of personal
saving in BEA’s national income and product accounts with personal saving in the Federal Reserve
Board’s financial accounts of the United States and data on changes in net worth, go to
www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Nipa-Frb.asp.

Current-dollar GDP

Current-dollar GDP — the market value of the nation’s output of goods and services — increased
4.6 percent, or $189.6 billion, in the fourth quarter to a level of $17,102.5 billion. In the third quarter,
current-dollar GDP increased 6.2 percent, or $251.9 billion.

2013 GDP

Real GDP increased 1.9 percent in 2013 (that is, from the 2012 annual level to the 2013 annual
level), compared with an increase of 2.8 percent in 2012.

The increase in real GDP in 2013 primarily reflected positive contributions from personal
consumption expenditures (PCE), exports, residential fixed investment, nonresidential fixed investment,
and private inventory investment that were partly offset by a negative contribution from federal
government spending. Imports, which are a subtraction in the calculation of GDP, increased.

The deceleration in real GDP in 2013 primarily reflected a deceleration in nonresidential fixed
investment, a larger decrease in federal government spending, and decelerations in PCE and in exports
that were partly offset by a deceleration in imports and a smaller decrease in state and local government
spending.

The price index for gross domestic purchases increased 1.2 percent in 2013, compared with an
increase of 1.7 percent in 2012.

Current-dollar GDP increased 3.4 percent, or $558.4 billion, in 2013, compared with an increase
of 4.6 percent, or $710.8 billion, in 2012.

During 2013 (that is, measured from the fourth quarter of 2012 to the fourth quarter of 2013) real
GDP increased 2.7 percent. Real GDP increased 2.0 percent during 2012. The price index for gross
domestic purchases increased 1.1 percent during 2013, compared with an increase of 1.5 percent in
2012.

________
BOX. Information on the assumptions used for unavailable source data is provided in a technical note
that is posted with the news release on BEA’s Web site. Within a few days after the release, a detailed
“Key Source Data and Assumptions” file is posted on the Web site. In the middle of each month, an analysis
of the current quarterly estimate of GDP and related series is made available on the Web site; click on
Survey of Current Business, “GDP and the Economy.” For information on revisions, see “Revisions to GDP, GDI,
and Their Major Components.

________

BEA’s national, international, regional, and industry estimates; the Survey of Current Business;
and BEA news releases are available without charge on BEA’s Web site at www.bea.gov. By visiting
the site, you can also subscribe to receive free e-mail summaries of BEA releases and announcements.

* * *

Next release — February 28, 2014 at 8:30 A.M. EST for:
Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter and Annual 2013 (Second Estimate)

* * *

Release dates in 2014

Gross Domestic Product

2013: IV and 2013 annual 2014: I 2014: II 2014: III

Advance… January 30 April 30 July 30 October 30
Second…. February 28 May 29 August 28 November 25
Third….. March 27 June 25 September 26 December 23

Corporate Profits

Preliminary… …… May 29 August 28 November 25
Revised……. March 27 June 25 September 26 December 23

Comparisons of Revisions to GDP

Quarterly estimates of GDP are released on the following schedule: the “advance” estimate, based on
source data that are incomplete or subject to further revision by the source agency, is released near the end of the
first month after the end of the quarter; as more detailed and more comprehensive data become available,
the “second” and “third” estimates are released near the end of the second and third months, respectively.
The “latest”” estimate reflects the results of both annual and comprehensive revisions.

Annual revisions, which generally cover the quarters of the 3 most recent calendar years, are usually carried
out each summer and incorporate newly available major annual source data. Comprehensive (or benchmark)
revisions are carried out at about 5-year intervals and incorporate major periodic source data, as well as
improvements in concepts and methods that update the accounts to portray more accurately the evolving U.S.
economy.

The table below shows comparisons of the revisions between quarterly percent changes of current-dollar
and of real GDP for the different vintages of the estimates. From the advance estimate to the second estimate (one
month later), the average revision to real GDP without regard to sign is 0.5 percentage point, while from the
advance estimate to the third estimate (two months later), it is 0.6 percentage point. From the advance estimate to
the latest estimate, the average revision without regard to sign is 1.3 percentage points. The average revision
(with regard to sign) from the advance estimate to the latest estimate is 0.3 percentage point, which is larger
than the average revisions from the advance estimate to the second or to the third estimates. The larger average
revisions to the latest estimate reflect the fact that comprehensive revisions include major improvements, such as
the incorporation of BEA’s latest benchmark input-output accounts. The quarterly estimates correctly indicate the
direction of change of real GDP 97 percent of the time, correctly indicate whether GDP is accelerating or
decelerating 72 percent of the time, and correctly indicate whether real GDP growth is above, near, or below trend
growth more than four-fifths of the time.

Revisions Between Quarterly Percent Changes of GDP: Vintage Comparisons
[Annual rates]

Vintages Average Average without Standard deviation of
compared regard to sign revisions without
regard to sign

____________________________________________________Current-dollar GDP_______________________________________________

Advance to second……………….. 0.2 0.5 0.4
Advance to third………………… .2 .7 .4
Second to third…………………. .0 .3 .2

Advance to latest……………….. .3 1.3 1.0

________________________________________________________Real GDP_____________________________________________________

Advance to second……………….. 0.1 0.5 0.4
Advance to third………………… .1 .6 .4
Second to third…………………. .0 .2 .2

Advance to latest……………….. .3 1.3 1.0

NOTE. These comparisons are based on the period from 1983 through 2010.http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm

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Posted on December 5, 2013. Filed under: American History, Blogroll, Communications, Economics, Employment, Federal Government, Federal Government Budget, Fiscal Policy, Foreign Policy, government, government spending, Health Care, history, Investments, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Macroeconomics, media, Microeconomics, Obamacare, People, Philosophy, Politics, Raves, Talk Radio, Tax Policy, Unemployment, Video, Wealth, Wisdom, Writing | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , |

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EMBARGOED UNTIL RELEASE AT 8:30 A.M. EST, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2013
BEA 13-57

* See the navigation bar at the right side of the news release text for links to data tables,
contact personnel and their telephone numbers, and supplementary materials.

Lisa S. Mataloni: (202) 606-5304 (GDP) gdpniwd@bea.gov
Howard Krakower: (202) 606-5564 (Profits) cpniwd@bea.gov
Recorded message: (202) 606-5306
Jeannine Aversa: (202) 606-2649 (News Media)
National Income and Product Accounts
Gross Domestic Product, 3rd quarter 2013 (second estimate);
Corporate Profits, 3rd quarter 2013 (preliminary estimate)
      Real gross domestic product -- the output of goods and services produced by labor and property
located in the United States -- increased at an annual rate of 3.6 percent in the third quarter of 2013 (that
is, from the second quarter to the third quarter), according to the "second" estimate released by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.  In the second quarter, real GDP increased 2.5 percent.

      The GDP estimate released today is based on more complete source data than were available for
the "advance" estimate issued last month.  In the advance estimate, the increase in real GDP was 2.8
percent (see "Revisions" on page 3). With this second estimate for the third quarter, the increase in
private inventory investment was larger than previously estimated.

      The increase in real GDP in the third quarter primarily reflected positive contributions from
private inventory investment, personal consumption expenditures (PCE), exports, nonresidential fixed
investment, residential fixed investment, and state and local government spending that were partly offset
by a negative contribution from federal government spending. Imports, which are a subtraction in the
calculation of GDP, increased.

      The acceleration in real GDP growth in the third quarter primarily reflected an acceleration in
private inventory investment, a deceleration in imports, and an acceleration in state and local
government spending that were partly offset by decelerations in exports, in PCE, and in nonresidential
fixed investment.

_________
FOOTNOTE.  Quarterly estimates are expressed at seasonally adjusted annual rates, unless otherwise
specified.  Quarter-to-quarter dollar changes are differences between these published estimates.  Percent
changes are calculated from unrounded data and are annualized.  "Real" estimates are in chained (2009)
dollars.  Price indexes are chain-type measures.

      This news release is available on BEA’s Web site along with the Technical Note and Highlights related
to this release.  For information on revisions, see "Revisions to GDP, GDI, and Their Major Components".
_________

     The price index for gross domestic purchases, which measures prices paid by U.S. residents,
increased 1.8 percent in the third quarter, the same increase as in the advance estimate; this index
increased 0.2 percent in the second quarter.  Excluding food and energy prices, the price index for gross
domestic purchases increased 1.5 percent in the third quarter, compared with an increase of 0.8 percent
in the second.

      Real personal consumption expenditures increased 1.4 percent in the third quarter, compared
with an increase of 1.8 percent in the second.  Durable goods increased 7.7 percent, compared with an
increase of 6.2 percent.  Nondurable goods increased 2.4 percent, compared with an increase of 1.6
percent.  Services was unchanged in the third quarter; in the second quarter, services increased 1.2
percent.

      Real nonresidential fixed investment increased 3.5 percent in the third quarter, compared with an
increase of 4.7 percent in the second.  Nonresidential structures increased 13.8 percent, compared with
an increase of 17.6 percent.  Equipment was unchanged in the third quarter; in the second quarter,
equipment increased 3.3 percent.  Intellectual property products increased 1.7 percent, in contrast to a
decrease of 1.5 percent.  Real residential fixed investment increased 13.0 percent, compared with an
increase of 14.2 percent.

      Real exports of goods and services increased 3.7 percent in the third quarter, compared with an
increase of 8.0 percent in the second.  Real imports of goods and services increased 2.7 percent,
compared with an increase of 6.9 percent.

      Real federal government consumption expenditures and gross investment decreased 1.4 percent
in the third quarter, compared with a decrease of 1.6 percent in the second.  National defense decreased
0.3 percent, compared with a decrease of 0.6 percent.  Nondefense decreased 3.1 percent, the same
decrease as in the second quarter.  Real state and local government consumption expenditures and gross
investment increased 1.7 percent, compared with an increase of 0.4 percent.

      The change in real private inventories added 1.68 percentage points to the third-quarter change in
real GDP, after adding 0.41 percentage point to the second-quarter change.  Private businesses increased
inventories $116.5 billion in the third quarter, following increases of $56.6 billion in the second quarter
and $42.2 billion in the first.

      Real final sales of domestic product -- GDP less change in private inventories -- increased 1.9
percent in the third quarter, compared with an increase of 2.1 percent in the second.

Gross domestic purchases

      Real gross domestic purchases -- purchases by U.S. residents of goods and services wherever
produced -- increased 3.4 percent in the third quarter, compared with an increase of 2.5 percent in the
second.

Gross national product

      Real gross national product -- the goods and services produced by the labor and property
supplied by U.S. residents -- increased 3.9 percent in the third quarter, compared with an increase of 2.7
percent in the second.  GNP includes, and GDP excludes, net receipts of income from the rest of the
world, which increased $13.7 billion in the third quarter after increasing $7.7 billion in the second; in the
third quarter, receipts increased $1.7 billion, and payments decreased $12.1billion.

Current-dollar GDP

      Current-dollar GDP -- the market value of the nation's output of goods and services -- increased
5.6 percent, or $229.8 billion, in the third quarter to a level of $16,890.8 billion.  In the second quarter,
current-dollar GDP increased 3.1 percent, or $125.7 billion.

Gross domestic income

      Real gross domestic income (GDI), which measures the output of the economy as the costs
incurred and the incomes earned in the production of GDP, increased 1.4 percent in the third quarter,
compared with an increase of 3.2 percent (revised) in the second.  For a given quarter, the estimates of
GDP and GDI may differ for a variety of reasons, including the incorporation of largely independent
source data.  However, over longer time spans, the estimates of GDP and GDI tend to follow similar
patterns of change.

Revisions

      The upward revision to the percent change in real GDP primarily reflected upward revisions to
private inventory investment and to nonresidential fixed investment that were partly offset by an upward
revision to imports and a downward revision to exports.

                                                                     Advance Estimate             Second Estimate
                                                                       (Percent change from preceding quarter)

Real GDP................................................                    2.8                        3.6
Current-dollar GDP......................................                    4.8                        5.6
Gross domestic purchases price index....................                    1.8                        1.8

                                            Corporate Profits

      Profits from current production (corporate profits with inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) and
capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj)) increased $38.3 billion in the third quarter, compared with an
increase of $66.8 billion in the second.  Taxes on corporate income decreased $4.8 billion, in contrast to
an increase of $10.0 billion.  Profits after tax with IVA and CCAdj increased $43.0 billion, compared
with an increase of $56.9 billion.

      Dividends decreased $179.7 billion in the third quarter, in contrast to an increase of $273.5
billion in the second.  The large third-quarter decrease primarily reflected dividends paid by Fannie Mae
to the federal government in the second quarter.  Undistributed profits increased $222.8 billion, in
contrast to a decrease of $216.6 billion.  Net cash flow with IVA -- the internal funds available to
corporations for investment -- increased $234.5 billion, in contrast to a decrease of $205.3 billion.

_________
BOX.  Profits from current production reflect the depreciation of
fixed assets valued at current cost using consistent depreciation profiles.
These profiles are based on used-asset prices and do not depend on the
depreciation-accounting practices used for federal income tax returns.  The IVA and CCAdj are
adjustments that convert inventory withdrawals and depreciation of fixed assets reported on a tax-return,
historical-cost basis to the current-cost economic measures used in the national income and product
accounts.
_________

Corporate profits by industry

      Domestic profits of financial corporations increased $8.6 billion in the third quarter, compared to
an increase of $24.5 billion in the second.  Domestic profits of nonfinancial corporations increased $13.0
billion, compared to an increase of $37.8 billion.

      The rest-of-the-world component of profits increased $16.7 billion in the third quarter, compared
with an increase of $4.6 billion in the second.  This measure is calculated as the difference between
receipts from rest of the world and payments to rest of the world.

Gross value added of nonfinancial domestic corporate business

      In the third quarter, real gross value added of nonfinancial corporations increased, and profits per
unit of real value added increased.  The increase in unit profits reflected an increase in unit prices that
was partly offset by increases in both unit labor costs and nonlabor costs incurred by corporations.

                                     *          *          *

BEA's national, international, regional, and industry estimates; the Survey of Current Business;
and BEA news releases are available without charge on BEA's Web site at www.bea.gov.  By visiting
the site, you can also subscribe to receive free e-mail summaries of BEA releases and announcements.

                                     *          *          *

                         Next release -- December 20, 2013, at 8:30 A.M. EST for:
                       Gross Domestic Product:  Third Quarter 2013 (Third Estimate)
                          Corporate Profits:  Third Quarter (Revised Estimate)

                                     *          *          *
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0174_SS_major_health_climb-crop

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niall-ferguson

“For the fiscal position of the federal government is in fact much worse today than is commonly realized. As anyone can see who reads the most recent long-term budget outlook—published last month by the Congressional Budget Office, and almost entirely ignored by the media—the question is not if the United States will default but when and on which of its rapidly spiraling liabilities.”

~Niall Ferguson

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Niall Ferguson: The Shutdown Is a Sideshow. Debt Is the Threat

An entitlement-driven disaster looms for America, yet Washington persists with its game of Russian roulette.

 

In the words of a veteran investor, watching the U.S. bond market today is like sitting in a packed theater and smelling smoke. You look around for signs of other nervous sniffers. But everyone else seems oblivious.

Yes, the federal government shut down this week. Yes, we are just two weeks away from the point when the Treasury secretary says he will run out of cash if the debt ceiling isn’t raised. Yes, bond king Bill Gross has been on TV warning that a default by the government would be “catastrophic.” Yet the yield on a 10-year Treasury note has fallen slightly over the past month (though short-term T-bill rates ticked up this week).

Part of the reason people aren’t rushing for the exits is that the comedy they are watching is so horribly fascinating. In his vain attempt to stop the Senate striking out the defunding of ObamaCare from the last version of the continuing resolution, freshman Sen. Ted Cruz managed to quote Doctor Seuss while re-enacting a scene from the classic movie “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington.”

Meanwhile, President Obama has become the Hamlet of the West Wing: One minute he’s for bombing Syria, the next he’s not; one minute Larry Summers will succeed Ben Bernanke as chairman of the Federal Reserve, the next he won’t; one minute the president is jetting off to Asia, the next he’s not. To be in charge, or not to be in charge: that is indeed the question.

According to conventional wisdom, the key to what is going on is a Republican Party increasingly at the mercy of the tea party. I agree that it was politically inept to seek to block ObamaCare by these means. This is not the way to win back the White House and Senate. But responsibility also lies with the president, who has consistently failed to understand that a key function of the head of the executive branch is to twist the arms of legislators on both sides. It was not the tea party that shot down Mr. Summers’s nomination as Fed chairman; it was Democrats like Sen. Elizabeth Warren, the new face of the American left.

Yet, entertaining as all this political drama may seem, the theater itself is indeed burning. For the fiscal position of the federal government is in fact much worse today than is commonly realized. As anyone can see who reads the most recent long-term budget outlook—published last month by the Congressional Budget Office, and almost entirely ignored by the media—the question is not if the United States will default but when and on which of its rapidly spiraling liabilities.

True, the federal deficit has fallen to about 4% of GDP this year from its 10% peak in 2009. The bad news is that, even as discretionary expenditure has been slashed, spending on entitlements has continued to rise—and will rise inexorably in the coming years, driving the deficit back up above 6% by 2038.

A very striking feature of the latest CBO report is how much worse it is than last year’s. A year ago, the CBO’s extended baseline series for the federal debt in public hands projected a figure of 52% of GDP by 2038. That figure has very nearly doubled to 100%. A year ago the debt was supposed to glide down to zero by the 2070s. This year’s long-run projection for 2076 is above 200%. In this devastating reassessment, a crucial role is played here by the more realistic growth assumptions used this year.

As the CBO noted last month in its 2013 “Long-Term Budget Outlook,” echoing the work of Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff : “The increase in debt relative to the size of the economy, combined with an increase in marginal tax rates (the rates that would apply to an additional dollar of income), would reduce output and raise interest rates relative to the benchmark economic projections that CBO used in producing the extended baseline. Those economic differences would lead to lower federal revenues and higher interest payments. . . .

“At some point, investors would begin to doubt the government’s willingness or ability to pay U.S. debt obligations, making it more difficult or more expensive for the government to borrow money. Moreover, even before that point was reached, the high and rising amount of debt that CBO projects under the extended baseline would have significant negative consequences for both the economy and the federal budget.”

Just how negative becomes clear when one considers the full range of scenarios offered by CBO for the period from now until 2038. Only in three of 13 scenarios—two of which imagine politically highly unlikely spending cuts or tax hikes—does the debt shrink from its current level of 73% of GDP. In all the others it increases to between 77% and 190% of GDP. It should be noted that this last figure can reasonably be considered among the more likely of the scenarios, since it combines the alternative fiscal scenario, in which politicians in Washington behave as they have done in the past, raising spending more than taxation.

Only a fantasist can seriously believe “this is not a crisis.” The fiscal arithmetic of excessive federal borrowing is nasty even when relatively optimistic assumptions are made about growth and interest rates. Currently, net interest payments on the federal debt are around 8% of revenues. But under the CBO’s extended baseline scenario, that share could rise to 20% by 2026, 30% by 2049, and 40% by 2072. By 2088, the last date for which the CBO now offers projections, interest payments would—absent any changes in current policy—absorb just under half of all tax revenues. That is another way of saying that policy is unsustainable.

The question is what on earth can be done to prevent the debt explosion. The CBO has a clear answer: “[B]ringing debt back down to 39 percent of GDP in 2038—as it was at the end of 2008—would require a combination of increases in revenues and cuts in noninterest spending (relative to current law) totaling 2 percent of GDP for the next 25 years. . . .

“If those changes came entirely from revenues, they would represent an increase of 11 percent relative to the amount of revenues projected for the 2014-2038 period; if the changes came entirely from spending, they would represent a cut of 10½ percent in noninterest spending from the amount projected for that period.”

Anyone watching this week’s political shenanigans in Washington will grasp at once the tiny probability of tax hikes or spending cuts on this scale.

It should now be clear that what we are watching in Washington is not a comedy but a game of Russian roulette with the federal government’s creditworthiness. So long as the Federal Reserve continues with the policies of near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing, the gun will likely continue to fire blanks. After all, Fed purchases of Treasurys, if continued at their current level until the end of the year, will account for three quarters of new government borrowing.

But the mere prospect of a taper, beginning in late May, was already enough to raise long-term interest rates by more than 100 basis points. Fact (according to data in the latest “Economic Report of the President”): More than half the federal debt in public hands is held by foreigners. Fact: Just under a third of the debt has a maturity of less than a year.

Hey, does anyone else smell something burning?

Correction: Net interest payments on the federal debt are about 8% of revenues. The Oct. 5 op-ed “The Shutdown Is a Sideshow. Debt Is the Threat” misstated the payments as a percentage of GDP.

Mr. Ferguson’s latest book is “The Great Degeneration: How Institutions Decay and Economies Die” (Penguin Press, 2013).

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304906704579113661593684356

 

Niall Ferguson Gets It Backwards, The Budget Deficit ‘Threat’ Is An Opportunity

John Tamny,

 

Back in 2008 in the lead-up to the 2008 presidential elections, John Stewart’s Comedy Channel show did a feature on John McCain going back to 1980. Each year offered a video clip of the Arizona Senator warning of a looming fiscal crisis related to the nation’s budget deficit.

Though one would be foolish to use The Daily Show as an economics lesson, the underlying point of the McCain segment was valid. Politicians, economists and mere members of the U.S. citizenry have been predicting deficit doom for as long as this writer’s been sentient, and probably even as long McCain’s been kicking.

All of which brings us to a recent Wall Street Journal Op-ed by British historian extraordinaire, Niall Ferguson. Though he seems to admit to joining an echo chamber that’s rather long in the tooth, Ferguson is the latest, and surely not the last to, in his own words, yell that the fiscal “theater is indeed burning.”  At this point we could fill several Rose Bowls with prominent individuals who’ve made the same argument. As he wrote last Saturday:

“For the fiscal position of the federal government is in fact much worse today than is commonly realized. As anyone can see who reads the most recent long-term budget outlook—published last month by the Congressional Budget Office, and almost entirely ignored by the media—the question is not if the United States will default but when and on which of its rapidly spiraling liabilities.”

This is in no way meant to dismiss Ferguson’s basic point. Maybe the horrid deficit tomorrow that never seems to come is on our doorstep, but at least for now it should be said that the television version of The Boy Who Cried Wolf made for modern consumption would star an angry adult male predicting deficit doom. Or maybe this is much ado about nothing. Better yet, maybe the proper way to look at the deficit question is to cease all the doom and gloom, and view the deficit as an opportunity.

For one, assuming we reach the point that all the deficit worriers talk about whereby the U.S. budget is consumed by interest payments, let’s look at the positives. Figure if Congressional appropriations are reduced to interest payments, it will be much more difficult for the fiscally incontinent members of both political parties to dream up new ways to waste our money.

Taking the debt discussion local for a moment, California has long been fingered by the same deficit-fearing crowd as a likely default prospect, but if so, does anyone think Apple AAPL +0.87%, Google GOOG +13.8%, and Intel INTC -0.19% will suffer higher rates for debt finance alongside the profligate State of California if the latter defaults?

Applied nationally, assuming Treasury goes explicit in its default in the way it’s long been implicit (the dollar that Treasuries pay out bought 1/35th of an ounce of gold in 1971, yet today it buys roughly 1/1300th) in its stiffing of creditors, is it really a certainty that Armageddon awaits as Ferguson presumes? Or is it more likely that investors, burned by Treasury, will migrate away from U.S. debt, along with government debt more broadly?

If so, never explained by the doomsayers is why this would be so bad. Creditors and investors won’t just sit on their money, rather they’ll find better, more hospitable places to put their capital to work. Assuming they charge Treasury 10% for 30-year debt, does anyone think Coca-Cola KO +0.6% will see its debt finance costs rise to a similar level?

If readers assume yes, that market panic would drive rates well beyond the aforementioned number, that too wouldn’t be a forever concept. High prices by virtue of being high naturally beget lower prices down the line as the high rates of interest lure profit-focused investors into the arena. Needless to say, whether investors simply tire of lending to Treasury such that they jack up rates, or if they raise rates in response to an actual default, financial capital won’t sit idle forever. Eventually investors will find new, and infinitely more productive places to deploy their funds. At risk of sounding too ‘tea party-ish’ given Ferguson’s not-so-veiled contempt for the movement, it’s not a reach to suggest that Amazon.com’s Jeff Bezos, FedEx’s Fred Smith, and Berkshire Hathaway’s Warren Buffett are much better allocators of capital than are John Boehner, Nancy Pelosi, and Harry Reid.

Of course to highly influential people like Ferguson, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, and Fed Chairman Bernanke, default is the unthinkable, and would surely lead to the ‘Mother of All Great Depressions’ as interest rates skyrocket amid panic in the markets, and also in the street. Fair enough, but also wholly unproven. Lest we forget, it was the same crowd, or a reasonable facsimile (Bernanke at least), who told us that a failure to save Citigroup (bailed out five times in 22 years by the Fed) would lead to a decades-long recession.  Yes, in Bernanke’s world the capitalist system can only sustain itself if we run away from capitalism with lightning speed in order to prop up that which the markets don’t want.  Oh well, at the very least consider where all of this default/crisis talk is coming from.

Importantly, there’s another option that’s not talked of enough as a path out of a deficit ‘crisis’ that they regularly warn us about. How about economic growth? It’s really that simple, and if the political class had a clue about how economies grow (they don’t, but too many of us blindly accept their warnings about bank failures, default, global contraction as though they do), they might turn all the deficit worrying to their advantage.

Simply put, economic growth is easy. Taxes are a penalty placed on work and investment, so reduce the penalty on both to get more of both. Regulations don’t work (see the banks overseen by the Fed, SEC and the rest), but they do inhibit the profit motive for distracting executives who should be focused on the shareholder, and by extension, the customer. Trade is why we get up for work each day so that we can exchange our surplus for that of others, so when barriers to trade are put up, we foster inefficiency all the while taxing the purpose of work. Money is how we measure the value of the goods we exchange, and the investments we enter into, so stabilize its value. Notable with money is that in his masterful book, The Cash Nexus, Ferguson wrote of ‘forever’ British debt instruments that forever paid out low rates of interest precisely because the Pound had a stable definition in terms of gold.

To make basic what already is, growing countries never have to worry about deficits simply because their debt is so attractive. Greece isn’t suffering a debt crisis because it owes too much money, rather it’s in trouble because its even more hapless political class doesn’t understand that its debt problems would disappear if it adopted growth policies like the ones listed above. As Forbes contributor Louis Woodhill has pointed out regularly, interest rates on Greek debt became even more onerous once its politicians raised taxes to ‘fix’ the problem. What they missed is that the deficit problem was one of too little growth. It’s much the same here.

In short, rather than worry about a debt ‘threat’ that never seems to materialize, we should view the deficit as an opportunity to implement policies that always work, and that may even turn people like John McCain into optimists. If so, we can then get serious about the real economic problem which is the size of government itself. The raging fire in the theater of the latter is largely smoke free, but it represents all the future Microsofts and Intels, cancer and heart disease cures, and transportation innovations that have never revealed themselves thanks to our wasteful political class consuming so much of our capital. Government spending is what Ferguson et al might focus on if they weren’t so blinded by the ‘horrific’ deficit problems of tomorrow that never seem to come, and that wouldn’t matter much even if they did.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2013/10/10/niall-ferguson-gets-it-backwards-the-budget-deficit-threat-is-an-opportunity/

 

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Dr. Lacy Hunt–Roadblocks To Recovery — The Economic Consequences of Debt — Heading Towards The Bang Point — “This is how the world ends not with a bang but a whimper.” — Videos

Posted on March 5, 2013. Filed under: American History, Banking, Blogroll, Business, College, Communications, Economics, Education, Federal Government, Federal Government Budget, Fiscal Policy, government, history, Inflation, Investments, Law, liberty, Links, Macroeconomics, media, Microeconomics, Monetary Policy, Money, People, Philosophy, Politics, Raves, Taxes, Video, Wealth, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , |

“Only those who will risk going too far can possibly find out how far one can go.”

“This is the way the world ends

Not with a bang but a whimper.”

“Most of the evil in this world is done by people with good intentions.”

T.S. Eliot

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“There Was No Increase In The Standard of Living Since 1997” – Lacy Hunt

Kung Fu Girl interviews Lacy Hunt

Roadblocks to Recovery an Interview with Dr. Lacy Hunt

We Move Along Toward the Bang Point – Lacy Hunt

An Early Warning Sign is the Currency Depreciates – Lacy Hunt; Part II

Former Fed Official warns of multi-decade downturn PART 1 – Lacy Hunt

Former Fed Official warns of multi-decade downturn PART 2 – Lacy Hunt

T. S. Eliot – The Hollow Men

The Hollow Men T.S. Eliot How Cultures Die

Background Articles and Videos

Velocity of Money (Circulation) Part 1

Velocity of Money (Circulation) Part 2

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Lewis J. Spellman Interviews Dr. Lacy Hunt–The Morass of Debt–Videos

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R. Christopher Whalen: Inflated: How Money and Debt Built the American Dream–Videos

Posted on December 10, 2012. Filed under: Banking, Blogroll, Business, Communications, Demographics, Economics, Employment, Federal Government, Fiscal Policy, government, government spending, history, History of Economic Thought, Homes, Immigration, Inflation, Investments, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Macroeconomics, media, Microeconomics, Monetary Policy, Money, Philosophy, Politics, Public Sector, Rants, Raves, Regulations, Resources, Tax Policy, Technology, Unions, Weather, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , |

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“Whalen is smart. He’s one of the few worthy of your time. Others: Marc Faber, Hugh Hendry, Doug Dachille, David Rosenberg, Howard Davidowitz, James Grant, Peter Schiff, Niall Ferguson, Doug Casey, Jim Rogers.”

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Richard Duncan–The New Depression–Videos

Posted on December 9, 2012. Filed under: American History, Banking, Blogroll, College, Communications, Economics, Education, Employment, Federal Government, Federal Government Budget, Fiscal Policy, government, government spending, history, History of Economic Thought, Inflation, Investments, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Macroeconomics, media, Microeconomics, Monetary Policy, Money, People, Philosophy, Politics, Public Sector, Rants, Raves, Security, Strategy, Tax Policy, Taxes, Unemployment, Unions, Video, War, Wealth, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |

9781118157794.pdf

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The U.S. does not have a capitalist economy 

A new depression: Out of credit

Interview With Richard Duncan, Author of The New Depression 

Richard Duncan on Riding out this Depression on a Deflationary Debt Raft! 

    “The New Depression” Book w/ Glenn Beck & Richard Duncan

The New Depression: Richard Duncan | McAlvany Commentary 

Pt 1/5: Can governments end the crisis cycle? 

Pt 2/5: Can governments end the crisis cycle? 

Pt 3/5: Can governments end the crisis cycle?

Pt 4/5: Can governments end the crisis cycle?

Pt 5/5: Can governments end the crisis cycle?

Jim Rogers  New Recession/Depression Coming

Peter Schiff interviews Marc Faber on Schiffradio Oct 2012 

Why the global recession is in danger of becoming another Great Depression, and how we can stop it

When the United States stopped backing dollars with gold in 1968, the nature of money changed. All previous constraints on money and credit creation were removed and a new economic paradigm took shape. Economic growth ceased to be driven by capital accumulation and investment as it had been since before the Industrial Revolution. Instead, credit creation and consumption began to drive the economic dynamic. In The New Depression: The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy, Richard Duncan introduces an analytical framework, The Quantity Theory of Credit, that explains all aspects of the calamity now unfolding: its causes, the rationale for the government’s policy response to the crisis, what is likely to happen next, and how those developments will affect asset prices and investment portfolios.

In his previous book, The Dollar Crisis (2003), Duncan explained why a severe global economic crisis was inevitable given the flaws in the post-Bretton Woods international monetary system, and now he’s back to explain what’s next. The economic system that emerged following the abandonment of sound money requires credit growth to survive. Yet the private sector can bear no additional debt and the government’s creditworthiness is deteriorating rapidly. Should total credit begin to contract significantly, this New Depression will become a New Great Depression, with disastrous economic and geopolitical consequences. That outcome is not inevitable, and this book describes what must be done to prevent it.

  • Presents a fascinating look inside the financial crisis and how the New Depression is poised to become a New Great Depression
  • Introduces a new theoretical construct, The Quantity Theory of Credit, that is the key to understanding not only the developments that led to the crisis, but also to understanding how events will play out in the years ahead
  • Offers unique insights from the man who predicted the global economic breakdown

Alarming but essential reading, The New Depression explains why the global economy is teetering on the brink of falling into a deep and protracted depression, and how we can restore stability.

http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1118157796.html

The New Depression: Richard Duncan’s prognosis of our economic ills and the answer to them

“… In a nutshell, his case is half-Austrian. Or indeed half-Keynesian. That is because whilst Duncan’s diagnosis of the current economic ills is very much in the Austrian school of economics, with its emphasis on the role of credit, his prescription for fixing the economy is large-scale borrowing to fund infrastructure work, all of which sounds rather Keynesian.

It is a more fiscally responsible version of Keynesianism than some, for Duncan argues that, “The U.S. government can now borrow money for ten years at a cost of 2 percent interest a year. If it borrows at that rate and invests in projects that yield even 3 percent … on a grand scale in grand projects … [our economy] could be transformed”. In other words, borrow massively to boost economic growth, but spend those funds on projects that will generate future returns which make the borrowing affordable.

Duncan has a particular set of target for his investment plans for the American economy – developing new industries to reduce the trade deficit and generate new tax revenues. In particular, he talks about renewable energy, arguing that massive investment will cut energy bills whilst also providing the sort of financial return that makes the massive spending of money on it a prudent rather than profligate move.

All that means there are three main bones of contention in the book: is Richard Duncan right in blaming the crash on credit conditions; is he right that massive infrastructure investment on projects which pay returns the answer; and if money is to be invested in infrastructure that pays returns, does renewable energy fit the bill? Although a book principally about the US economy and the policy choices faced by Americans, those three questions are very applicable to other countries too, even if his evidence tends to be centred on the USA.

As he mulls over these three questions, most readers will find at least one eye-catching piece of evidence to savour, such as when he describes how heavily the financial system became dependent on credit not going sour:

In 1945 [American] commercial banks held reserves and vault cash of … the equivalent of 12 percent of their total assets … By 2007, the banks’ reserves and vault cash [was] 0.6 percent.

He goes on to argue that

Economic progress was no longer achieved the old-fashioned way through savings and investments, but, rather, by borrowing and consumption … The new reality is that credit has displaced money as the key economic variable.

Hence the book’s subtitle, “The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy”.

Each of the three main questions in themselves could sustain not merely one whole book but a mini-book publishing flurry of titles. To condense credible arguments over all three into one relatively slim and easy to follow volume is tribute to the Duncan, even if some readers may choose to agree with less than all three of the main points of his case. …”

http://www.libdemvoice.org/the-new-depression-richard-duncans-prognosis-of-our-economic-ills-and-the-answer-to-them-28981.html

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James Grant–Videos

Posted on August 3, 2012. Filed under: American History, Banking, Blogroll, Books, Climate, College, Communications, Economics, Education, Employment, Energy, Federal Government, Fiscal Policy, government, government spending, history, History of Economic Thought, Inflation, Investments, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Macroeconomics, media, Microeconomics, Monetary Policy, Money, People, Philosophy, Politics, Raves, Resources, Unemployment, War, Wealth, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |

Jim Grant explains how Central Banks are Waging War on Supply and Demand

James Grant Explains a World without the Federal Reserve – Capital

James Grant: Gold, the Refuge of the Idiots 

“What Does the Fed Do?” with James Grant — Ron Paul Fed Lecture Series, Pt 2/3

Q&A: Author James Grant

Value Investing Conference 2010 – Part 2

James Grant – on Bernanke, bank capital & lack of capitalism 

Jim Grant 

Never before has the Fed done what it’s doing now” 

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Rising Gasoline Prices Due To Excessive Speculation In Oil Futures Contracts–Political Issue in 2012 Elections–American People Are Being Screwed At The Gas Pump & Grocery Store–Videos

Posted on May 2, 2012. Filed under: Agriculture, American History, Blogroll, Business, College, Communications, Economics, Education, Employment, Farming, Federal Government, Fiscal Policy, Food, government, government spending, Investments, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Macroeconomics, media, Microeconomics, Monetary Policy, People, Philosophy, Politics, Raves, Resources, Taxes, Unemployment, Video, War, Weather, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |

http://www.gasbuddy.com/gb_retail_price_chart.aspx?time=24

Gas Prices Explained 

Quantitative Easing Explained

Senator Blumenthal on Curbing Excessive Oil Speculation

Senator Blumenthal calls for action against excessive oil speculation that inflates gas prices

Cantwell: ‘Shenanigans’ in Oil Market Reminiscent of Enron ‘Nightmare’ in Pacific NW

How Uncertainty, Speculation Factor Into Gas Prices 

Banksters & Speculation Behind High Food-Oil Prices

Under Questioning by Cantwell, Exxon CEO Estimates Oil Should Cost $60-70 Per Barrel

On May 12, 2011, when questioned by U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA) at a Senate Finance Committee hearing, Exxon Mobil Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Rex Tillerson said that oil should cost between $60 and $70 per barrel, if the price of oil were based on supply and demand fundamentals. Oil was trading at $98 per barrel on Thursday morning, after inexplicitly plunging 5.5 percent yesterday.

Michael Greenberger on “commodity prices and volatility”

Regulations on Speculation Weak, But Better Than Nothing

Speculation and Watered Down Regulation

Secret Exemptions Allowed Speculators to Distort Futures Markets

CFTC Commissioner: “A Hair Trigger Away from Economic Calamity” 

Will CFTC Limit Excessive Speculation?

Stossel: Oil Speculation

The Price Of Oil

CHHS Director explains derivatives regulation on C-SPAN – 5/15/09

Michael Greenberger Talks Speculation In Commodity Markets

Oil speculation and oil prices 

Myth: The World is Running Out of Oil (Peak Oil) 

Hearing on Energy Price Manipulation – Greenberger Testimony 

Background Articles and Videos

Lecture 2: Course outline, futures markets history and market mechanics

Lecture 3: Futures contracts

Lecture 4: Options contracts and market history 

Lecture 5: Reading futures contract price quote tables

Lecture 15: A further review of technical analysis

Lecture 16: Introduction to hedging with futures 

Lecture 17: Hedging continued

Lecture 18: Hedging risk vs. return, diversification and options on futures

Lecture 19: Options on futures continued, with examples 

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Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff–This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly–A Decade of Debt–Videos

Posted on February 12, 2012. Filed under: American History, Banking, Blogroll, Business, College, Communications, Demographics, Diasters, Economics, Education, Employment, Federal Government, Federal Government Budget, Fiscal Policy, Foreign Policy, government, government spending, history, History of Economic Thought, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Macroeconomics, media, Microeconomics, Monetary Policy, Money, People, Philosophy, Politics, Public Sector, Raves, Resources, Talk Radio, Tax Policy, Technology, Unemployment, Unions, Video, War, Wealth, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , |

“…Synopsis

Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing–and recovering–their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the experts have chimed, “this time is different”–claiming that the old rules of valuation no longer apply and that the new situation bears little similarity to past disasters. With this breakthrough study, leading economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff definitively prove them wrong. Covering sixty-six countries across five continents, This Time Is Differentpresents a comprehensive look at the varieties of financial crises, and guides us through eight astonishing centuries of government defaults, banking panics, and inflationary spikes–from medieval currency debasements to today’s subprime catastrophe. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, leading economists whose work has been influential in the policy debate concerning the current financial crisis, provocatively argue that financial combustions are universal rites of passage for emerging and established market nations. The authors draw important lessons from history to show us how much–or how little–we have learned.

Using clear, sharp analysis and comprehensive data, Reinhart and Rogoff document that financial fallouts occur in clusters and strike with surprisingly consistent frequency, duration, and ferocity. They examine the patterns of currency crashes, high and hyperinflation, and government defaults on international and domestic debts–as well as the cycles in housing and equity prices, capital flows, unemployment, and government revenues around these crises. While countries do weather their financial storms, Reinhart and Rogoff prove that short memories make it all too easy for crises to recur.

An important book that will affect policy discussions for a long time to come, This Time Is Different exposes centuries of financial missteps. …”

http://search.barnesandnoble.com/This-Time-Is-Different/Carmen-M-Reinhart/e/9780691142166

What’s Wrong With the Recovery?

Interview with Kenneth Rogoff on “This time is different”

Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff: Coming Out of the Crisis

Carmen Reinhart on A Decade of Debt

Q & A: Carmen M. Reinhart on A Decade of Debt

Fall 2010 Marc Sumerlin Lecture Series Featuring Prof. Carmen Reinhart

Why the Financial Crisis & What is the Way Out

Ken Rogoff – Debts, Deficits and Global Financial Stability

Carmen Reinhart: Serial Default Syndrome

Kenneth Rogoff: Economic Reappraisal

Background Articles and Videos

John Kay: A Call for Eclecticism (3/5) 

Keynesian Kenneth Rogoff about “benefits of inflation” 2008.12.15 

Currency Wars (Video) 

Kenneth Rogoff At Bretton Woods, United States Speaks to Shaili Chopra

The Future of the Global Economy and Financial System Plenary Session Recording, Part 9 

Agenda Summer 2010: The Limits of Economics

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Nassim Nicholas Taleb–The Black Swan–Videos

Posted on February 4, 2012. Filed under: American History, Banking, Blogroll, Business, College, Communications, Culture, Demographics, Diasters, Economics, Education, Employment, Energy, Federal Government, Federal Government Budget, Fiscal Policy, Foreign Policy, government, government spending, Health Care, history, Homes, Immigration, Inflation, Investments, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Macroeconomics, media, Medicine, Microeconomics, Monetary Policy, Money, People, Philosophy, Politics, Psychology, Radio, Raves, Resources, Science, Tax Policy, Video, War, Wealth, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |