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House Passes Tax Cut 227-203 and Senate Expected To Vote Tonight — Tax Cuts Yes — Absolutely Not Tax Reform: Income Tax Complicated, Inefficient, Unfair With 7 Brackets — Two Party Tax Tyranny — Fair Tax Less The Answer — Simple, Fair, Efficient and Replaces All Federal Tax With A Single Broadbased Consumption Spending Tax — Videos

Posted on December 19, 2017. Filed under: American History, Blogroll, Congress, conservatives, Constitution, Corruption, Economics, Economics, Employment, Faith, Family, Federal Government, Federal Government Budget, Fiscal Policy, Foreign Policy, Freedom, Friends, government, government spending, Health, history, History of Economic Thought, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Law, Life, Macroeconomics, media, Monetary Policy, Money, People, Photos, Rants, Raves, Raymond Thomas Pronk, Tax Policy, Taxation, Taxes, Technology | Tags: , , , , , , |

 House Passes Tax Cut 227-203 and Senate Expected To Vote Tonight — Tax Cuts Yes — Absolutely Not Tax Reform: Income Tax Complicated, Inefficient, Unfair With 7 Brackets — Two Party Tax Tyranny — Fair Tax Less The Answer — Simple, Fair, Efficient and Replaces All Federal Tax With A Single Broadbased Consumption Spending Tax — VideosSee the source imageSee the source imageSee the source image

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U.S. Debt Clock.org

The House Must Revote On Tax Bill

Tax bill debate: Media hates it, lying about it: Grover Norquist

Gingrich: The media are lying about the GOP tax bill

House Passes Tax Bill; Senate Expected To Vote Tonight – Cavuto

House, Senate Plan Tuesday Votes to Pass Tax Bill

Sen. Mitch McConnell, Senate Republicans address the media ahead of tax vote. Dec 19, 2017

FairTax: Fire Up Our Economic Engine (Official HD)

Freedom from the IRS! – FairTax Explained in Detail

Pence on the Fair Tax

Published on Apr 17, 2009
Congressman Mike Pence responding to a question about the Fair Tax resolution. Asked during a Town Hall forum in Anderson, IN, on 4/16/09

Lower Taxes, Higher Revenue

Milton Friedman – Why Tax Reform Is Impossible

Milton Friedman – Is tax reform possible?

The War on Work

The Progressive Income Tax: A Tale of Three Brothers

BREAKING: House passes GOP tax cut bill by vote of 227-203

LIVE: US Senate Votes on Historic Trump Tax Bill Vote LIVE Stream 12/19/17

CNN Wolf Blitzer 12/19/17| HOUSE TO VOTE ON MASSIVE TAX REFORM BILL

The History of Taxation | Charles Adams

Taxes in American History | Thomas J. DiLorenzo

The Income Tax: Root of all Evil? or Necessary Evil?

For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes Charles Adams discussed the research behind his book, For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization published by Madison Books. The book examines the role of taxation in several historical events, including the fall of Rome, the American Revolution and the signing of the Magna Carta. Mr. Adams spoke on the history of tax policy throughout human civilization, as well as various aspects of taxation policies around the world and social policies’ relationship with taxes.

https://www.c-span.org/video/?40556-1/for-good-evil-impact-taxes

A New History of Taxation, Lecture 1: The Making of a Tax Historian | Charles Adams

A New History of Taxation, Lecture 2: The Bible’s World of Taxes | Charles Adams

A New History of Taxation, Lecture 3: The Kaleidoscopic Romans | Charles Adams

A New History of Taxation, Lecture 4: The Middle Ages | Charles Adams

A New History of Taxation, Lecture 5: The Swiss: From William Tell to No Tell | Charles Adams

A New History of Taxation, Lecture 6: Tax Revolt in the Netherlands | Charles Adams

A New History of Taxation, Lecture 7: After the Magna Carta | Charles Adams

A New History of Taxation, Lecture 8: The Civil War | Charles Adams

A New History of Taxation, Lecture 9: American Taxation | Charles Adams

A New History of Taxation, Lecture 10: Learning from the Past: What History Teaches | Charles Adams

Middle Class to Get 23% of Tax Cuts for Individuals Under GOP Bill

Benefits mostly peter out after a decade, joint committee on taxation finds

President Donald J. Trump, shown in Washington, D.C., on Monday, plans to sign the Republican tax-overhaul bill this week.
President Donald J. Trump, shown in Washington, D.C., on Monday, plans to sign the Republican tax-overhaul bill this week. PHOTO: JIM LO SCALZO/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

That amounts to 23% of the tax cuts that go directly to individuals. By 2027, however, these households would get a net tax increase, because tax cuts are set to expire under the proposed law.

The calculations are based on JCT estimates of cuts going to households that earn $20,000 to $100,000 a year in wages, dividends and benefits. Those households account for about half of all U.S. tax filers, with nearly a quarter making more and a quarter making less.

The Trump administration has emphasized the benefits of the tax plan for middle-income households.

What the Tax Bill’s Passage Will Mean for 2018 Politics
Senate Republicans have lined up behind the final version of a tax-overhaul bill, setting the stage for final passage this week. WSJ’s Gerald F. Seib explains the immediate political impact the bill will have. Photo: AP

America’s most-affluent households, those earning $500,000 or more a year, which account for 1% of filers, would also get $61 billion in cuts in the first year, according to the JCT analysis. They would get a cut of $12 billion by 2027.

That includes income earned by pass-through businesses such as partnerships and S-corporations that pay taxes on individual returns. It doesn’t include the benefits of estate-tax reductions.

Much of the rest would go to businesses in the form of corporate tax cuts, according to the JCT analysis.

The tax plan took another step toward passage Monday, when Maine Republican Sen. Susan Collins, who had been on the fence, said she would support the bill. Mr. Trump plans to sign the bill later this week.

Trump administration officials argue the business tax cuts will help individuals, too, because it will induce companies to hire more and boost workers’ wages.

“I don’t think it necessarily changes my life one way or another,” said Lisa Joles of Concord, Ohio, who runs the heat and air-conditioning repair shop her parents started in the 1970s. Her business brought in about $1.5 million this past year, and she takes home about $50,000 a year. “It could give me or someone else in the middle class that little bit of extra money that they may go out and spend, and it may boost the economy, but I almost feel like that would be a short-term effect.”

The muted reaction is consistent with polls showing that the tax cuts aren’t very popular. A Quinnipiac University poll released last week found that 55% of those surveyed disapprove of the tax plan, compared with 26% who support it. Republicans were the only group who supported the tax plan, with the support of 66%.

Biggest Benefits to Biggest Earners

Taxpayers earning $500,000 or more a year would see the biggest cuts in average tax rates under the Republican tax plan, while lower-income households would see smaller cuts in the early years of the decade and then petering out or reversing as tax cuts expire.

Average federal tax rates for these income categories would be cut by 1.4 to 3.1 percentage points at the outset before returning to about where they would be under current law.

Rates for lower-income households would see smaller decreases and by 2027 would actually be higher than under existing tax policy because the individual tax cuts largely

expire after 2025.

Note: For all federal taxes, including payroll taxes and corporate taxes, but excluding the estate tax. Some of the changes are due to the repeal of the mandate to have health insurance.

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation

Many households are still weighing how the complicated plan will affect them. The plan recasts many features of the individual tax code—doubling a child tax credit and the standard deduction for households, while narrowing deductions for state and local taxes, mortgages and the personal exemption. That means it will play out differently for many, depending on factors such as whether they live in high-tax states, have big mortgages or have many children.

Cory Dahl, 59, a pastor who lives in Sturgeon Bay, Wis., said that even though a few extra hundred dollars a year won’t make much difference, he is happy to get it. “Five hundred dollars is not a ton of money, but I’d rather have it in my bank account than in my tax payment,” he said.

Mr. Dahl has taken the standard deduction in recent years, and he lives in a church-owned home, so he has no mortgage. He thinks raising the standard deduction will help middle-class households like his.

His niece, Katie Dahl, who lives 20 miles away in Baileys Harbor, Wis., is apprehensive. She said her biggest concern is the repeal of the Affordable Care Act requirement that individuals buy health insurance. Both Ms. Dahl, 34, and her husband, Rich Higdon, who is a musician and a potter, rely on the ACA exchange for a heavily subsidized health-insurance plan. They pay $12 a month for a silver-level plan that covers both of them. With an income of about $41,000 a year, Ms. Dahl says the ACA has made them both confident that they could survive as self-employed artists.

“I’m worried what the mandate will do to premiums, and if it will go so far as to start the unraveling of Obamacare, which has been a big boon to us financially,” she said.

 While the middle class as a whole will see benefits, some people will end up worse off. Using an alternative measure of household income, the Tax Policy Center found that of those households in the very middle of the income distribution, making $48,600 to $86,100 a year, 91.3% would receive a tax cut next year. But 7.3% would receive a tax increase. By 2025, 10.9% would receive a tax increase.

Many taxpayers are worried that they will fall into that latter group. Jon Rose, 45, who runs a car-detailing shop in Carlisle, Pa., could see a cut from his current top tax rate of 25% because he runs an S corporation, a pass-through business that is eligible for a 20% deduction from business income if it meets certain conditions. His accountant told him he would likely save about $3,000 as a result of tax changes. The problem, he said, is that his accountant also said he has about $16,000 worth of personal exemptions that he would no longer be able to claim.

It’s Taxmas! The Winners and Losers of the GOP Tax Bill
WSJ’s Richard Rubin takes us to a weird, wacky Santa’s workshop to explain who’s getting Christmas presents and who’s getting coal with the GOP tax bill. Photo/Illustration: Adam Falk/The Wall Street Journal

Congress has raised the child-tax credit to $2,000 a child, but he was even dubious about how much that would help him. “I only have two kids, it’s not like I have 16,” said Mr. Rose, whose wife is a high-school teacher. “It doesn’t sound great.”

He said that if he somehow ends up saving an extra $500 or even $1,000, that wouldn’t mean too much to him. “I wouldn’t even notice,” he said. “It wouldn’t make any difference, especially if it’s just coming out gradually over time. If it’s $1,000, it’s $40 a paycheck. That’s dinner.”

Corrections & Amplifications 
An earlier version of this article incorrectly reported that middle-income households would receive $144 billion in total tax cuts over a decade under the Republican tax plan, or 10% of the total net tax cut. It also incorrectly reported that affluent households making more than $500,000 would receive $171 billion in total tax cuts over a decade. Those calculations were based on an incorrect reading of tables released Monday by the Joint Committee on Taxation. The article also incorrectly reported that households making $500,000 or more comprise 6% of total filers. They comprise 1% of total filers.

write to Siobhan Hughes at siobhan.hughes@wsj.com and Shayndi Raice at shayndi.raice@wsj.com

Appeared in the December 19, 2017, print edition as ‘Tax Cuts’ Impact Assessed.’

https://www.wsj.com/articles/middle-class-to-get-23-of-tax-cuts-for-individuals-under-gop-bill-1513644268?tesla=y

The brutal reviews for the GOP tax bill are piling up

Poll: Majority oppose GOP tax bill

A strong majority of polled voters oppose the Republican tax bill passed by the Senate earlier this month, a new poll finds.

The latest Harvard CAPS-Harris survey found that 64 percent of respondents oppose the bill. While 72 percent of Republicans support the GOP’s tax reform efforts, 89 percent of Democrats and 70 percent of independents oppose it.

Many respondents — 34 percent — believe the bill will raise their taxes, while 23 percent said they don’t believe it would impact them, and 21 percent said they believed it would result in a lower personal tax bill.

House and Senate negotiators struck an “agreement in principle” on Tuesday for a tax overhaul after each of the chambers passed their own versions of tax reform earlier this month.

While a majority oppose the GOP tax bill, a finding in line with other polls, Harvard CAPS-Harris co-director Mark Penn noted that the poll finds more support when people are asked about some of its specific provisions.

There is broad support for reducing the overall individual tax rate, for example, and 60 percent of voters support eliminating the mandate that requires people to buy health insurance or pay a penalty.The final version of the bill is expected to lower the top individual rate from 39.6 percent to 37 percent.

But a majority oppose lowering the corporate tax rate — the bill’s signature issue. The bill is expected to reduce the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent under the House-Senate conference agreement that has tentatively been reached.

Fifty-nine percent of voters oppose lowering the corporate tax rate from 35 percent, the poll found.

Republicans argue cutting the corporate rate will unshackle an economy they say has been stagnant and create jobs.

Among the provisions that have majority support: The GOP bill will nearly double standard deductions for individuals; double the child tax credit from $1,000 to $2,000; cut the tax rate on small businesses; reduce overall tax rates for individuals; eliminate the ObamaCare mandate; and get rid of the alternative minimum tax for most people, while keeping it for companies.

Harvard CAPS-Harris asked voters about each of these provisions and found majority support.

Among the provisions that a majority oppose: Eliminating deductions for state and local taxes beyond $10,000 of local property taxes; doubling the exemption for the estate tax while leaving it in place for large estates; and significantly lowering the corporate tax rate.

When voters are told about each of those specific provisions in the bill, support for the bill goes up to 51 percent, with 49 percent opposing — a finding that could give some comfort to GOP lawmakers.

“While two thirds initially say they oppose the bill, that flips to 51 percent support after [being] read a full list of its features, suggesting the Republicans are losing the spin war but not necessarily the policy war,” said Penn.

However, voters polled were told the bill would not make any changes to the popular mortgage interest deduction, which is now likely to be capped at $750,000.

As it stands, most voters say the bill does not cut taxes enough on the middle class and that it cuts taxes too much for companies.

In addition, a plurality said the tax cuts would have a large impact on the federal deficit, while having only a small effect on economic growth.

“The public would like the final bill to do more for individuals and small business and less for big business,” said Penn. “They have concern over the deficit increases but that again all but evaporates once they are told the overall size of federal expenditures in the next decade is $43 trillion. Overall, the public supports lower taxes and lower government spending.”

The Harvard CAPS-Harris Poll online survey of 1,989 registered voters was conducted Dec. 8-11. The partisan breakdown is 36 percent Democrat, 32 percent Republican, 29 percent independent and 4 percent other.

The Harvard CAPS-Harris Poll survey is an online sample drawn from the Harris Panel and weighted to reflect known demographics. As a representative online sample, it does not report a probability confidence interval.

http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/364781-poll-majority-oppose-gop-tax-bill

The Internal Revenue Service has recently released new data on individual income taxes for calendar year 2014, showing the number of taxpayers, adjusted gross income, and income tax shares by income percentiles.[1]

The data demonstrates that the U.S. individual income tax continues to be very progressive, borne mainly by the highest income earners.

  • In 2014, 139.6 million taxpayers reported earning $9.71 trillion in adjusted gross income and paid $1.37 trillion in individual income taxes.
  • The share of income earned by the top 1 percent of taxpayers rose to 20.6 percent in 2014. Their share of federal individual income taxes also rose, to 39.5 percent.
  • In 2014, the top 50 percent of all taxpayers paid 97.3 percent of all individual income taxes while the bottom 50 percent paid the remaining 2.7 percent.
  • The top 1 percent paid a greater share of individual income taxes (39.5 percent) than the bottom 90 percent combined (29.1 percent).
  • The top 1 percent of taxpayers paid a 27.1 percent individual income tax rate, which is more than seven times higher than taxpayers in the bottom 50 percent (3.5 percent).

Reported Income and Taxes Paid Both Increased Significantly in 2014

Taxpayers reported $9.71 trillion in adjusted gross income (AGI) on 139.5 million tax returns in 2014. Total AGI grew by $675 billion from the previous year’s levels. There were 1.2 million more returns filed in 2014 than in 2013, meaning that average AGI rose by $4,252 per return, or 6.5 percent.

Meanwhile, taxpayers paid $1.37 trillion in individual income taxes in 2014, an 11.5 percent increase from taxes paid in the previous year. The average individual income tax rate for all taxpayers rose from 13.64 percent to 14.16 percent. Moreover, the average tax rate increased for all income groups, except for the top 0.1 percent of taxpayers, whose average rate decreased from 27.91 percent to 27.67 percent.

The most likely explanation behind the higher tax rates in 2014 is a phenomenon known as “real bracket creep.” [2] As incomes rise, households are pushed into higher tax brackets, and are subject to higher overall tax rates on their income. On the other hand, the likely reason why the top 0.1 percent of households saw a slightly lower tax rate in 2014 is because a higher portion of their income consisted of long-term capital gains, which are subject to lower tax rates.[3]

The share of income earned by the top 1 percent rose to 20.58 percent of total AGI, up from 19.04 percent in 2013. The share of the income tax burden for the top 1 percent also rose, from 37.80 percent in 2013 to 39.48 percent in 2014.

Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 25% Top 50% Bottom 50% All Taxpayers
Table 1. Summary of Federal Income Tax Data, 2014
Number of Returns 1,395,620 6,978,102 13,956,203 34,890,509 69,781,017 69,781,017 139,562,034
Adjusted Gross Income ($ millions) $1,997,819 $3,490,867 $4,583,416 $6,690,287 $8,614,544 $1,094,119 $9,708,663
Share of Total Adjusted Gross Income 20.58% 35.96% 47.21% 68.91% 88.73% 11.27% 100.00%
Income Taxes Paid ($ millions) $542,640 $824,153 $974,124 $1,192,679 $1,336,637 $37,740 $1,374,379
Share of Total Income Taxes Paid 39.48% 59.97% 70.88% 86.78% 97.25% 2.75% 100.00%
Income Split Point $465,626 $188,996 $133,445 $77,714 $38,173
Average Tax Rate 27.16% 23.61% 21.25% 17.83% 15.52% 3.45% 14.16%
 Note: Does not include dependent filers

High-Income Americans Paid the Majority of Federal Taxes

In 2014, the bottom 50 percent of taxpayers (those with AGIs below $38,173) earned 11.27 percent of total AGI. This group of taxpayers paid approximately $38 billion in taxes, or 2.75 percent of all income taxes in 2014.

In contrast, the top 1 percent of all taxpayers (taxpayers with AGIs of $465,626 and above) earned 20.58 percent of all AGI in 2014, but paid 39.48 percent of all federal income taxes.

In 2014, the top 1 percent of taxpayers accounted for more income taxes paid than the bottom 90 percent combined. The top 1 percent of taxpayers paid $543 billion, or 39.48 percent of all income taxes, while the bottom 90 percent paid $400 billion, or 29.12 percent of all income taxes.

Figure 1.

High-Income Taxpayers Pay the Highest Average Tax Rates

The 2014 IRS data shows that taxpayers with higher incomes pay much higher average individual income tax rates than lower-income taxpayers.[4]

The bottom 50 percent of taxpayers (taxpayers with AGIs below $38,173) faced an average income tax rate of 3.45 percent. As household income increases, the IRS data shows that average income tax rates rise. For example, taxpayers with AGIs between the 10th and 5th percentile ($133,445 and $188,996) pay an average rate of 13.7 percent – almost four times the rate paid by those in the bottom 50 percent.

The top 1 percent of taxpayers (AGI of $465,626 and above) paid the highest effective income tax rate, at 27.2 percent, 7.9 times the rate faced by the bottom 50 percent of taxpayers.

Figure 2.

Taxpayers at the very top of the income distribution, the top 0.1 percent (with AGIs over $2.14 million), paid an even higher average tax rate, of 27.7 percent.

Appendix

Year Total Top 0.1% Top 1% Top
5%
Between
5% & 10%
Top 10% Between 10% & 25% Top 25% Between 25% & 50% Top 50% Bottom 50%
Table 2. Number of Federal Individual Income Tax Returns Filed 1980–2014 (Thousands)
Source: Internal Revenue Service.
1980 93,239 932 4,662 4,662 9,324 13,986 23,310 23,310 46,619 46,619
1981 94,587 946 4,729 4,729 9,459 14,188 23,647 23,647 47,293 47,293
1982 94,426 944 4,721 4,721 9,443 14,164 23,607 23,607 47,213 47,213
1983 95,331 953 4,767 4,767 9,533 14,300 23,833 23,833 47,665 47,665
1984 98,436 984 4,922 4,922 9,844 14,765 24,609 24,609 49,218 49,219
1985 100,625 1,006 5,031 5,031 10,063 15,094 25,156 25,156 50,313 50,313
1986 102,088 1,021 5,104 5,104 10,209 15,313 25,522 25,522 51,044 51,044
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the definition of AGI, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
1987 106,155 1,062 5,308 5,308 10,615 15,923 26,539 26,539 53,077 53,077
1988 108,873 1,089 5,444 5,444 10,887 16,331 27,218 27,218 54,436 54,436
1989 111,313 1,113 5,566 5,566 11,131 16,697 27,828 27,828 55,656 55,656
1990 112,812 1,128 5,641 5,641 11,281 16,922 28,203 28,203 56,406 56,406
1991 113,804 1,138 5,690 5,690 11,380 17,071 28,451 28,451 56,902 56,902
1992 112,653 1,127 5,633 5,633 11,265 16,898 28,163 28,163 56,326 56,326
1993 113,681 1,137 5,684 5,684 11,368 17,052 28,420 28,420 56,841 56,841
1994 114,990 1,150 5,749 5,749 11,499 17,248 28,747 28,747 57,495 57,495
1995 117,274 1,173 5,864 5,864 11,727 17,591 29,319 29,319 58,637 58,637
1996 119,442 1,194 5,972 5,972 11,944 17,916 29,860 29,860 59,721 59,721
1997 121,503 1,215 6,075 6,075 12,150 18,225 30,376 30,376 60,752 60,752
1998 123,776 1,238 6,189 6,189 12,378 18,566 30,944 30,944 61,888 61,888
1999 126,009 1,260 6,300 6,300 12,601 18,901 31,502 31,502 63,004 63,004
2000 128,227 1,282 6,411 6,411 12,823 19,234 32,057 32,057 64,114 64,114
The IRS changed methodology, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
2001 119,371 119 1,194 5,969 5,969 11,937 17,906 29,843 29,843 59,685 59,685
2002 119,851 120 1,199 5,993 5,993 11,985 17,978 29,963 29,963 59,925 59,925
2003 120,759 121 1,208 6,038 6,038 12,076 18,114 30,190 30,190 60,379 60,379
2004 122,510 123 1,225 6,125 6,125 12,251 18,376 30,627 30,627 61,255 61,255
2005 124,673 125 1,247 6,234 6,234 12,467 18,701 31,168 31,168 62,337 62,337
2006 128,441 128 1,284 6,422 6,422 12,844 19,266 32,110 32,110 64,221 64,221
2007 132,655 133 1,327 6,633 6,633 13,265 19,898 33,164 33,164 66,327 66,327
2008 132,892 133 1,329 6,645 6,645 13,289 19,934 33,223 33,223 66,446 66,446
2009 132,620 133 1,326 6,631 6,631 13,262 19,893 33,155 33,155 66,310 66,310
2010 135,033 135 1,350 6,752 6,752 13,503 20,255 33,758 33,758 67,517 67,517
2011 136,586 137 1,366 6,829 6,829 13,659 20,488 34,146 34,146 68,293 68,293
2012 136,080 136 1,361 6,804 6,804 13,608 20,412 34,020 34,020 68,040 68,040
2013 138,313 138 1,383 6,916 6,916 13,831 20,747 34,578 34,578 69,157 69,157
2014 139,562 140 1,396 6,978 6,978 13,956 20,934 34,891 34,891 69,781 69,781
Year Total Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 5% Between 5% & 10% Top 10% Between 10% & 25% Top 25% Between 25% & 50% Top 50% Bottom 50%
Table 3. Adjusted Gross Income of Taxpayers in Various Income Brackets, 1980–2014 ($Billions)
Source: Internal Revenue Service.
1980 $1,627 $138 $342 $181 $523 $400 $922 $417 $1,339 $288
1981 $1,791 $149 $372 $201 $573 $442 $1,015 $458 $1,473 $318
1982 $1,876 $167 $398 $207 $605 $460 $1,065 $478 $1,544 $332
1983 $1,970 $183 $428 $217 $646 $481 $1,127 $498 $1,625 $344
1984 $2,173 $210 $482 $240 $723 $528 $1,251 $543 $1,794 $379
1985 $2,344 $235 $531 $260 $791 $567 $1,359 $580 $1,939 $405
1986 $2,524 $285 $608 $278 $887 $604 $1,490 $613 $2,104 $421
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the definition of AGI, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
1987 $2,814 $347 $722 $316 $1,038 $671 $1,709 $664 $2,374 $440
1988 $3,124 $474 $891 $342 $1,233 $718 $1,951 $707 $2,658 $466
1989 $3,299 $468 $918 $368 $1,287 $768 $2,054 $751 $2,805 $494
1990 $3,451 $483 $953 $385 $1,338 $806 $2,144 $788 $2,933 $519
1991 $3,516 $457 $943 $400 $1,343 $832 $2,175 $809 $2,984 $532
1992 $3,681 $524 $1,031 $413 $1,444 $856 $2,299 $832 $3,131 $549
1993 $3,776 $521 $1,048 $426 $1,474 $883 $2,358 $854 $3,212 $563
1994 $3,961 $547 $1,103 $449 $1,552 $929 $2,481 $890 $3,371 $590
1995 $4,245 $620 $1,223 $482 $1,705 $985 $2,690 $938 $3,628 $617
1996 $4,591 $737 $1,394 $515 $1,909 $1,043 $2,953 $992 $3,944 $646
1997 $5,023 $873 $1,597 $554 $2,151 $1,116 $3,268 $1,060 $4,328 $695
1998 $5,469 $1,010 $1,797 $597 $2,394 $1,196 $3,590 $1,132 $4,721 $748
1999 $5,909 $1,153 $2,012 $641 $2,653 $1,274 $3,927 $1,199 $5,126 $783
2000 $6,424 $1,337 $2,267 $688 $2,955 $1,358 $4,314 $1,276 $5,590 $834
The IRS changed methodology, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
2001 $6,116 $492 $1,065 $1,934 $666 $2,600 $1,334 $3,933 $1,302 $5,235 $881
2002 $5,982 $421 $960 $1,812 $660 $2,472 $1,339 $3,812 $1,303 $5,115 $867
2003 $6,157 $466 $1,030 $1,908 $679 $2,587 $1,375 $3,962 $1,325 $5,287 $870
2004 $6,735 $615 $1,279 $2,243 $725 $2,968 $1,455 $4,423 $1,403 $5,826 $908
2005 $7,366 $784 $1,561 $2,623 $778 $3,401 $1,540 $4,940 $1,473 $6,413 $953
2006 $7,970 $895 $1,761 $2,918 $841 $3,760 $1,652 $5,412 $1,568 $6,980 $990
2007 $8,622 $1,030 $1,971 $3,223 $905 $4,128 $1,770 $5,898 $1,673 $7,571 $1,051
2008 $8,206 $826 $1,657 $2,868 $905 $3,773 $1,782 $5,555 $1,673 $7,228 $978
2009 $7,579 $602 $1,305 $2,439 $878 $3,317 $1,740 $5,058 $1,620 $6,678 $900
2010 $8,040 $743 $1,517 $2,716 $915 $3,631 $1,800 $5,431 $1,665 $7,096 $944
2011 $8,317 $737 $1,556 $2,819 $956 $3,775 $1,866 $5,641 $1,716 $7,357 $961
2012 $9,042 $1,017 $1,977 $3,331 $997 $4,328 $1,934 $6,262 $1,776 $8,038 $1,004
2013 $9,034 $816 $1,720 $3,109 $1,034 $4,143 $2,008 $6,152 $1,844 $7,996 $1,038
2014 $9,709 $986 $1,998 $3,491 $1,093 $4,583 $2,107 $6,690 $1,924 $8,615 $1,094
Year Total Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 5% Between 5% & 10% Top 10% Between 10% & 25% Top 25% Between 25% & 50% Top 50% Bottom 50%
Table 4. Total Income Tax after Credits, 1980–2014 ($Billions)
Source: Internal Revenue Service.
1980 $249 $47 $92 $31 $123 $59 $182 $50 $232 $18
1981 $282 $50 $99 $36 $135 $69 $204 $57 $261 $21
1982 $276 $53 $100 $34 $134 $66 $200 $56 $256 $20
1983 $272 $55 $101 $34 $135 $64 $199 $54 $252 $19
1984 $297 $63 $113 $37 $150 $68 $219 $57 $276 $22
1985 $322 $70 $125 $41 $166 $73 $238 $60 $299 $23
1986 $367 $94 $156 $44 $201 $78 $279 $64 $343 $24
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the definition of AGI, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
1987 $369 $92 $160 $46 $205 $79 $284 $63 $347 $22
1988 $413 $114 $188 $48 $236 $85 $321 $68 $389 $24
1989 $433 $109 $190 $51 $241 $93 $334 $73 $408 $25
1990 $447 $112 $195 $52 $248 $97 $344 $77 $421 $26
1991 $448 $111 $194 $56 $250 $96 $347 $77 $424 $25
1992 $476 $131 $218 $58 $276 $97 $374 $78 $452 $24
1993 $503 $146 $238 $60 $298 $101 $399 $80 $479 $24
1994 $535 $154 $254 $64 $318 $108 $425 $84 $509 $25
1995 $588 $178 $288 $70 $357 $115 $473 $88 $561 $27
1996 $658 $213 $335 $76 $411 $124 $535 $95 $630 $28
1997 $727 $241 $377 $82 $460 $134 $594 $102 $696 $31
1998 $788 $274 $425 $88 $513 $139 $652 $103 $755 $33
1999 $877 $317 $486 $97 $583 $150 $733 $109 $842 $35
2000 $981 $367 $554 $106 $660 $164 $824 $118 $942 $38
The IRS changed methodology, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
2001 $885 $139 $294 $462 $101 $564 $158 $722 $120 $842 $43
2002 $794 $120 $263 $420 $93 $513 $143 $657 $104 $761 $33
2003 $746 $115 $251 $399 $85 $484 $133 $617 $98 $715 $30
2004 $829 $142 $301 $467 $91 $558 $137 $695 $102 $797 $32
2005 $932 $176 $361 $549 $98 $647 $145 $793 $106 $898 $33
2006 $1,020 $196 $402 $607 $108 $715 $157 $872 $113 $986 $35
2007 $1,112 $221 $443 $666 $117 $783 $170 $953 $122 $1,075 $37
2008 $1,029 $187 $386 $597 $115 $712 $168 $880 $117 $997 $32
2009 $863 $146 $314 $502 $101 $604 $146 $749 $93 $842 $21
2010 $949 $170 $355 $561 $110 $670 $156 $827 $100 $927 $22
2011 $1,043 $168 $366 $589 $123 $712 $181 $893 $120 $1,012 $30
2012 $1,185 $220 $451 $699 $133 $831 $193 $1,024 $128 $1,152 $33
2013 $1,232 $228 $466 $721 $139 $860 $203 $1,063 $135 $1,198 $34
2014 $1,374 $273 $543 $824 $150 $974 $219 $1,193 $144 $1,337 $38
Year Total Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 5% Between 5% & 10% Top 10% Between 10% & 25% Top 25% Between 25% & 50% Top 50% Bottom 50%
Table 5. Adjusted Gross Income Shares, 1980–2014 (percent of total AGI earned by each group)
Source: Internal Revenue Service.
1980 100% 8.46% 21.01% 11.12% 32.13% 24.57% 56.70% 25.62% 82.32% 17.68%
1981 100% 8.30% 20.78% 11.20% 31.98% 24.69% 56.67% 25.59% 82.25% 17.75%
1982 100% 8.91% 21.23% 11.03% 32.26% 24.53% 56.79% 25.50% 82.29% 17.71%
1983 100% 9.29% 21.74% 11.04% 32.78% 24.44% 57.22% 25.30% 82.52% 17.48%
1984 100% 9.66% 22.19% 11.06% 33.25% 24.31% 57.56% 25.00% 82.56% 17.44%
1985 100% 10.03% 22.67% 11.10% 33.77% 24.21% 57.97% 24.77% 82.74% 17.26%
1986 100% 11.30% 24.11% 11.02% 35.12% 23.92% 59.04% 24.30% 83.34% 16.66%
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the definition of AGI, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
1987 100% 12.32% 25.67% 11.23% 36.90% 23.85% 60.75% 23.62% 84.37% 15.63%
1988 100% 15.16% 28.51% 10.94% 39.45% 22.99% 62.44% 22.63% 85.07% 14.93%
1989 100% 14.19% 27.84% 11.16% 39.00% 23.28% 62.28% 22.76% 85.04% 14.96%
1990 100% 14.00% 27.62% 11.15% 38.77% 23.36% 62.13% 22.84% 84.97% 15.03%
1991 100% 12.99% 26.83% 11.37% 38.20% 23.65% 61.85% 23.01% 84.87% 15.13%
1992 100% 14.23% 28.01% 11.21% 39.23% 23.25% 62.47% 22.61% 85.08% 14.92%
1993 100% 13.79% 27.76% 11.29% 39.05% 23.40% 62.45% 22.63% 85.08% 14.92%
1994 100% 13.80% 27.85% 11.34% 39.19% 23.45% 62.64% 22.48% 85.11% 14.89%
1995 100% 14.60% 28.81% 11.35% 40.16% 23.21% 63.37% 22.09% 85.46% 14.54%
1996 100% 16.04% 30.36% 11.23% 41.59% 22.73% 64.32% 21.60% 85.92% 14.08%
1997 100% 17.38% 31.79% 11.03% 42.83% 22.22% 65.05% 21.11% 86.16% 13.84%
1998 100% 18.47% 32.85% 10.92% 43.77% 21.87% 65.63% 20.69% 86.33% 13.67%
1999 100% 19.51% 34.04% 10.85% 44.89% 21.57% 66.46% 20.29% 86.75% 13.25%
2000 100% 20.81% 35.30% 10.71% 46.01% 21.15% 67.15% 19.86% 87.01% 12.99%
The IRS changed methodology, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
2001 100% 8.05% 17.41% 31.61% 10.89% 42.50% 21.80% 64.31% 21.29% 85.60% 14.40%
2002 100% 7.04% 16.05% 30.29% 11.04% 41.33% 22.39% 63.71% 21.79% 85.50% 14.50%
2003 100% 7.56% 16.73% 30.99% 11.03% 42.01% 22.33% 64.34% 21.52% 85.87% 14.13%
2004 100% 9.14% 18.99% 33.31% 10.77% 44.07% 21.60% 65.68% 20.83% 86.51% 13.49%
2005 100% 10.64% 21.19% 35.61% 10.56% 46.17% 20.90% 67.07% 19.99% 87.06% 12.94%
2006 100% 11.23% 22.10% 36.62% 10.56% 47.17% 20.73% 67.91% 19.68% 87.58% 12.42%
2007 100% 11.95% 22.86% 37.39% 10.49% 47.88% 20.53% 68.41% 19.40% 87.81% 12.19%
2008 100% 10.06% 20.19% 34.95% 11.03% 45.98% 21.71% 67.69% 20.39% 88.08% 11.92%
2009 100% 7.94% 17.21% 32.18% 11.59% 43.77% 22.96% 66.74% 21.38% 88.12% 11.88%
2010 100% 9.24% 18.87% 33.78% 11.38% 45.17% 22.38% 67.55% 20.71% 88.26% 11.74%
2011 100% 8.86% 18.70% 33.89% 11.50% 45.39% 22.43% 67.82% 20.63% 88.45% 11.55%
2012 100% 11.25% 21.86% 36.84% 11.03% 47.87% 21.39% 69.25% 19.64% 88.90% 11.10%
2013 100% 9.03% 19.04% 34.42% 11.45% 45.87% 22.23% 68.10% 20.41% 88.51% 11.49%
2014 100% 10.16% 20.58% 35.96% 11.25% 47.21% 21.70% 68.91% 19.82% 88.73% 11.27%
Year Total Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 5% Between 5% & 10% Top 10% Between 10% & 25% Top 25% Between 25% & 50% Top 50% Bottom 50%
Table 6. Total Income Tax Shares, 1980–2014 (percent of federal income tax paid by each group)
Source: Internal Revenue Service.
1980 100% 19.05% 36.84% 12.44% 49.28% 23.74% 73.02% 19.93% 92.95% 7.05%
1981 100% 17.58% 35.06% 12.90% 47.96% 24.33% 72.29% 20.26% 92.55% 7.45%
1982 100% 19.03% 36.13% 12.45% 48.59% 23.91% 72.50% 20.15% 92.65% 7.35%
1983 100% 20.32% 37.26% 12.44% 49.71% 23.39% 73.10% 19.73% 92.83% 7.17%
1984 100% 21.12% 37.98% 12.58% 50.56% 22.92% 73.49% 19.16% 92.65% 7.35%
1985 100% 21.81% 38.78% 12.67% 51.46% 22.60% 74.06% 18.77% 92.83% 7.17%
1986 100% 25.75% 42.57% 12.12% 54.69% 21.33% 76.02% 17.52% 93.54% 6.46%
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the definition of AGI, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
1987 100% 24.81% 43.26% 12.35% 55.61% 21.31% 76.92% 17.02% 93.93% 6.07%
1988 100% 27.58% 45.62% 11.66% 57.28% 20.57% 77.84% 16.44% 94.28% 5.72%
1989 100% 25.24% 43.94% 11.85% 55.78% 21.44% 77.22% 16.94% 94.17% 5.83%
1990 100% 25.13% 43.64% 11.73% 55.36% 21.66% 77.02% 17.16% 94.19% 5.81%
1991 100% 24.82% 43.38% 12.45% 55.82% 21.46% 77.29% 17.23% 94.52% 5.48%
1992 100% 27.54% 45.88% 12.12% 58.01% 20.47% 78.48% 16.46% 94.94% 5.06%
1993 100% 29.01% 47.36% 11.88% 59.24% 20.03% 79.27% 15.92% 95.19% 4.81%
1994 100% 28.86% 47.52% 11.93% 59.45% 20.10% 79.55% 15.68% 95.23% 4.77%
1995 100% 30.26% 48.91% 11.84% 60.75% 19.62% 80.36% 15.03% 95.39% 4.61%
1996 100% 32.31% 50.97% 11.54% 62.51% 18.80% 81.32% 14.36% 95.68% 4.32%
1997 100% 33.17% 51.87% 11.33% 63.20% 18.47% 81.67% 14.05% 95.72% 4.28%
1998 100% 34.75% 53.84% 11.20% 65.04% 17.65% 82.69% 13.10% 95.79% 4.21%
1999 100% 36.18% 55.45% 11.00% 66.45% 17.09% 83.54% 12.46% 96.00% 4.00%
2000 100% 37.42% 56.47% 10.86% 67.33% 16.68% 84.01% 12.08% 96.09% 3.91%
The IRS changed methodology, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
2001 100% 15.68% 33.22% 52.24% 11.44% 63.68% 17.88% 81.56% 13.54% 95.10% 4.90%
2002 100% 15.09% 33.09% 52.86% 11.77% 64.63% 18.04% 82.67% 13.12% 95.79% 4.21%
2003 100% 15.37% 33.69% 53.54% 11.35% 64.89% 17.87% 82.76% 13.17% 95.93% 4.07%
2004 100% 17.12% 36.28% 56.35% 10.96% 67.30% 16.52% 83.82% 12.31% 96.13% 3.87%
2005 100% 18.91% 38.78% 58.93% 10.52% 69.46% 15.61% 85.07% 11.35% 96.41% 3.59%
2006 100% 19.24% 39.36% 59.49% 10.59% 70.08% 15.41% 85.49% 11.10% 96.59% 3.41%
2007 100% 19.84% 39.81% 59.90% 10.51% 70.41% 15.30% 85.71% 10.93% 96.64% 3.36%
2008 100% 18.20% 37.51% 58.06% 11.14% 69.20% 16.37% 85.57% 11.33% 96.90% 3.10%
2009 100% 16.91% 36.34% 58.17% 11.72% 69.89% 16.85% 86.74% 10.80% 97.54% 2.46%
2010 100% 17.88% 37.38% 59.07% 11.55% 70.62% 16.49% 87.11% 10.53% 97.64% 2.36%
2011 100% 16.14% 35.06% 56.49% 11.77% 68.26% 17.36% 85.62% 11.50% 97.11% 2.89%
2012 100% 18.60% 38.09% 58.95% 11.22% 70.17% 16.25% 86.42% 10.80% 97.22% 2.78%
2013 100% 18.48% 37.80% 58.55% 11.25% 69.80% 16.47% 86.27% 10.94% 97.22% 2.78%
2014 100% 19.85% 39.48% 59.97% 10.91% 70.88% 15.90% 86.78% 10.47% 97.25% 2.75%
Year Total Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 25% Top 50%
Table 7. Dollar Cut-Off, 1980–2014 (Minimum AGI for Tax Returns to Fall into Various Percentiles; Thresholds Not Adjusted for Inflation)
1980 $80,580 $43,792 $35,070 $23,606 $12,936
1981 $85,428 $47,845 $38,283 $25,655 $14,000
1982 $89,388 $49,284 $39,676 $27,027 $14,539
1983 $93,512 $51,553 $41,222 $27,827 $15,044
1984 $100,889 $55,423 $43,956 $29,360 $15,998
1985 $108,134 $58,883 $46,322 $30,928 $16,688
1986 $118,818 $62,377 $48,656 $32,242 $17,302
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the definition of AGI, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
1987 $139,289 $68,414 $52,921 $33,983 $17,768
1988 $157,136 $72,735 $55,437 $35,398 $18,367
1989 $163,869 $76,933 $58,263 $36,839 $18,993
1990 $167,421 $79,064 $60,287 $38,080 $19,767
1991 $170,139 $81,720 $61,944 $38,929 $20,097
1992 $181,904 $85,103 $64,457 $40,378 $20,803
1993 $185,715 $87,386 $66,077 $41,210 $21,179
1994 $195,726 $91,226 $68,753 $42,742 $21,802
1995 $209,406 $96,221 $72,094 $44,207 $22,344
1996 $227,546 $101,141 $74,986 $45,757 $23,174
1997 $250,736 $108,048 $79,212 $48,173 $24,393
1998 $269,496 $114,729 $83,220 $50,607 $25,491
1999 $293,415 $120,846 $87,682 $52,965 $26,415
2000 $313,469 $128,336 $92,144 $55,225 $27,682
The IRS changed methodology, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
2001 $1,393,718 $306,635 $132,082 $96,151 $59,026 $31,418
2002 $1,245,352 $296,194 $130,750 $95,699 $59,066 $31,299
2003 $1,317,088 $305,939 $133,741 $97,470 $59,896 $31,447
2004 $1,617,918 $339,993 $140,758 $101,838 $62,794 $32,622
2005 $1,938,175 $379,261 $149,216 $106,864 $64,821 $33,484
2006 $2,124,625 $402,603 $157,390 $112,016 $67,291 $34,417
2007 $2,251,017 $426,439 $164,883 $116,396 $69,559 $35,541
2008 $1,867,652 $392,513 $163,512 $116,813 $69,813 $35,340
2009 $1,469,393 $351,968 $157,342 $114,181 $68,216 $34,156
2010 $1,634,386 $369,691 $161,579 $116,623 $69,126 $34,338
2011 $1,717,675 $388,905 $167,728 $120,136 $70,492 $34,823
2012 $2,161,175 $434,682 $175,817 $125,195 $73,354 $36,055
2013 $1,860,848 $428,713 $179,760 $127,695 $74,955 $36,841
2014 $2,136,762 $465,626 $188,996 $133,445 $77,714 $38,173
Source: Internal Revenue Service.
Year Total Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 5% Between 5% & 10% Top 10% Between 10% & 25% Top 25% Between 25% & 50% Top 50% Bottom 50%
Table 8. Average Tax Rate, 1980–2014 (Percent of AGI Paid in Income Taxes)
Source: Internal Revenue Service.
1980 15.31% 34.47% 26.85% 17.13% 23.49% 14.80% 19.72% 11.91% 17.29% 6.10%
1981 15.76% 33.37% 26.59% 18.16% 23.64% 15.53% 20.11% 12.48% 17.73% 6.62%
1982 14.72% 31.43% 25.05% 16.61% 22.17% 14.35% 18.79% 11.63% 16.57% 6.10%
1983 13.79% 30.18% 23.64% 15.54% 20.91% 13.20% 17.62% 10.76% 15.52% 5.66%
1984 13.68% 29.92% 23.42% 15.57% 20.81% 12.90% 17.47% 10.48% 15.35% 5.77%
1985 13.73% 29.86% 23.50% 15.69% 20.93% 12.83% 17.55% 10.41% 15.41% 5.70%
1986 14.54% 33.13% 25.68% 15.99% 22.64% 12.97% 18.72% 10.48% 16.32% 5.63%
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the definition of AGI, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
1987 13.12% 26.41% 22.10% 14.43% 19.77% 11.71% 16.61% 9.45% 14.60% 5.09%
1988 13.21% 24.04% 21.14% 14.07% 19.18% 11.82% 16.47% 9.60% 14.64% 5.06%
1989 13.12% 23.34% 20.71% 13.93% 18.77% 12.08% 16.27% 9.77% 14.53% 5.11%
1990 12.95% 23.25% 20.46% 13.63% 18.50% 12.01% 16.06% 9.73% 14.36% 5.01%
1991 12.75% 24.37% 20.62% 13.96% 18.63% 11.57% 15.93% 9.55% 14.20% 4.62%
1992 12.94% 25.05% 21.19% 13.99% 19.13% 11.39% 16.25% 9.42% 14.44% 4.39%
1993 13.32% 28.01% 22.71% 14.01% 20.20% 11.40% 16.90% 9.37% 14.90% 4.29%
1994 13.50% 28.23% 23.04% 14.20% 20.48% 11.57% 17.15% 9.42% 15.11% 4.32%
1995 13.86% 28.73% 23.53% 14.46% 20.97% 11.71% 17.58% 9.43% 15.47% 4.39%
1996 14.34% 28.87% 24.07% 14.74% 21.55% 11.86% 18.12% 9.53% 15.96% 4.40%
1997 14.48% 27.64% 23.62% 14.87% 21.36% 12.04% 18.18% 9.63% 16.09% 4.48%
1998 14.42% 27.12% 23.63% 14.79% 21.42% 11.63% 18.16% 9.12% 16.00% 4.44%
1999 14.85% 27.53% 24.18% 15.06% 21.98% 11.76% 18.66% 9.12% 16.43% 4.48%
2000 15.26% 27.45% 24.42% 15.48% 22.34% 12.04% 19.09% 9.28% 16.86% 4.60%
The IRS changed methodology, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable
2001 14.47% 28.17% 27.60% 23.91% 15.20% 21.68% 11.87% 18.35% 9.20% 16.08% 4.92%
2002 13.28% 28.48% 27.37% 23.17% 14.15% 20.76% 10.70% 17.23% 8.00% 14.87% 3.86%
2003 12.11% 24.60% 24.38% 20.92% 12.46% 18.70% 9.69% 15.57% 7.41% 13.53% 3.49%
2004 12.31% 23.06% 23.52% 20.83% 12.53% 18.80% 9.41% 15.71% 7.27% 13.68% 3.53%
2005 12.65% 22.48% 23.15% 20.93% 12.61% 19.03% 9.45% 16.04% 7.18% 14.01% 3.51%
2006 12.80% 21.94% 22.80% 20.80% 12.84% 19.02% 9.52% 16.12% 7.22% 14.12% 3.51%
2007 12.90% 21.42% 22.46% 20.66% 12.92% 18.96% 9.61% 16.16% 7.27% 14.19% 3.56%
2008 12.54% 22.67% 23.29% 20.83% 12.66% 18.87% 9.45% 15.85% 6.97% 13.79% 3.26%
2009 11.39% 24.28% 24.05% 20.59% 11.53% 18.19% 8.36% 14.81% 5.76% 12.61% 2.35%
2010 11.81% 22.84% 23.39% 20.64% 11.98% 18.46% 8.70% 15.22% 6.01% 13.06% 2.37%
2011 12.54% 22.82% 23.50% 20.89% 12.83% 18.85% 9.70% 15.82% 6.98% 13.76% 3.13%
2012 13.11% 21.67% 22.83% 20.97% 13.33% 19.21% 9.96% 16.35% 7.21% 14.33% 3.28%
2013 13.64% 27.91% 27.08% 23.20% 13.40% 20.75% 10.11% 17.28% 7.31% 14.98% 3.30%
2014 14.16% 27.67% 27.16% 23.61% 13.73% 21.25% 10.37% 17.83% 7.48% 15.52% 3.45%
  1. For data prior to 2001, all tax returns that have a positive AGI are included, even those that do not have a positive income tax liability. For data from 2001 forward, returns with negative AGI are also included, but dependent returns are excluded.
  2. Income tax after credits (the measure of “income taxes paid” above) does not account for the refundable portion of EITC. If it were included, the tax share of the top income groups would be higher. The refundable portion is classified as a spending program by the Office of Management and Budget and therefore is not included by the IRS in these figures.
  3. The only tax analyzed here is the federal individual income tax, which is responsible for more than 25 percent of the nation’s taxes paid (at all levels of government). Federal income taxes are much more progressive than federal payroll taxes, which are responsible for about 20 percent of all taxes paid (at all levels of government), and are more progressive than most state and local taxes.
  4. AGI is a fairly narrow income concept and does not include income items like government transfers (except for the portion of Social Security benefits that is taxed), the value of employer-provided health insurance, underreported or unreported income (most notably that of sole proprietors), income derived from municipal bond interest, net imputed rental income, and others.
  5. The unit of analysis here is that of the tax return. In the figures prior to 2001, some dependent returns are included. Under other units of analysis (like the Treasury Department’s Family Economic Unit), these returns would likely be paired with parents’ returns.
  6. These figures represent the legal incidence of the income tax. Most distributional tables (such as those from CBO, Tax Policy Center, Citizens for Tax Justice, the Treasury Department, and JCT) assume that the entire economic incidence of personal income taxes falls on the income earner.

[1] Individual Income Tax Rates and Tax Shares, Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Individual-Income-Tax-Rates-and-Tax-Shares.

[2] See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027, Jan. 2017, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/52370-outlook.pdf.

[3] There is strong reason to believe that capital gains realizations were unusually depressed in 2013, due to the increase in the top capital gains tax rate from 15 percent to 23.8 percent. In 2013, capital gains accounted for 26.6 percent of the income of taxpayers with over $1 million in AGI received, compared to 31.7 percent in 2014 (these calculations apply for net capital gains reported on Schedule D). Table 1.4, Publication 1304, “Individual Income Tax Returns 2014,” Internal Revenue Service, https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-publication-1304-complete-report.

[4] Here, “average income tax rate” is defined as income taxes paid divided by adjusted gross income.


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Charles Adams

WORKS PUBLISHED INThe Free MarketSpeeches and PresentationsMises Daily Article

Charles Adams (1930-2013) was an attorney in private practice and a specialist in international taxation. He wrote extensively on taxes and their impact on civilization, for outlets including the New York TimesWashington Post, and Wall Street Journal. He was also an adjunct scholar at the Mises Institute and the Cato Institute. Among other books he was the author of For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization.

ALL WORKS

Those Dirty, Rotten Taxes

Big GovernmentTaxes and Spending

01/08/2009AUDIO/VIDEO
Sponsored by the Mises Institute and held in Newport Beach, California; January 24-25, 1997.

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Resistance to Taxes: Then and Now

Taxes and SpendingU.S. History

12/20/2008AUDIO/VIDEO
1998 Mises Institute Supporters Summit, Palm Springs, California; February 27-28, 1998. [24:03]

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The Rocky Road of American Taxation

Taxes and SpendingU.S. HistoryWar and Foreign PolicyFiscal TheoryPolitical Theory

04/15/2006MISES DAILY ARTICLES
No modern revolution was deeper rooted in taxation than the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies in British North America, writes Charles Adams.

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The Rich Won’t Be Soaked

Taxes and Spending

11/01/2004THE FREE MARKET
The middle classes have always been the only dependable source for taxes. If a government really wants revenue, that is where they have to go.

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8. The Civil War

Taxes and SpendingU.S. HistoryWar and Foreign Policy

09/06/2004AUDIO/VIDEO
A tariff set the stage for the American Civil War. The quarrel between the North and the South was a fiscal quarrel, not a war over slavery. The tariff of 1828 was called the tariff of abomination. Nullification was a strong argument to void unconstitutional federal laws.
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Tyler Cowen — The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream — Marginal Revolution University — Videos

Posted on April 2, 2017. Filed under: American History, Blogroll, Books, College Courses Online Videos, Economics, Family, government spending, history, media, Non-Fiction, People, Philosophy, Photos, Politics, Resources, Strategy, Success, Unemployment, Video, Wealth, Welfare, Wisdom, Work, Writing | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , |

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http://www.mruniversity.com/

The Complacent Class (Episode 1/5)

The New Era of Segregation (Episode 2/5)

American Stasis (Episode 3/5)

The Missing Men (Episode 4/5)

Up Next:

 The Great Reset (Episode 5/5)

What might happen if our stagnating economy faces a crisis?

Tyler Cowen, “The Complacent Class”

The American Dream and the Complacent Class

Tyler Cowen, “The Complacent Class”

Tyler Cowen: The Great Stagnation

Peter Thiel (full) | Conversations with Tyler

Be suspicious of stories | Tyler Cowen | TEDxMidAtlantic

TEDxEast – Tyler Cowen – The Great Stagnation

This video series accompanies Tyler Cowen’s new book The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream. The book is available in print and digital formats from Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and other book retailers.

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American Culture and Innovation

The pioneer spirit has defined American culture for hundreds of years. We’ve been willing to cross great distances, take big risks, and adapt to change in ways that have produced a dynamic economy. From Ben Franklin to Steve Jobs, innovation has been firmly rooted in American DNA and has positively changed the world.

What if that’s no longer true?

Over the next few weeks, join economist Tyler Cowen on an exploration of how we’re working harder than ever to avoid change and letting algorithms keep us a little too comfortable.

Want to stay in the loop as we release new episodes? Sign-up for updates in your inbox.

What’s Marginal Revolution University?

We believe economics has the power to change the way you see the world.

Many of us can recall that first teacher that changed the way we saw the world. We’re aiming to recreate that experience everyday for millions worldwide, for free.

Marginal Revolution University is a nonprofit, online education platform for learning economics. Founded in 2012 by George Mason University professors Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok, we have a small team operating both in Arlington, VA and remotely around the globe. Through engaging, high production quality videos on a variety of economics topics, we support teachers, students, and lifelong learners. Our goal is to help learners better understand the economic way of thinking. Several complete courses are available for free at MRUniversity.com that can be used alone or as a supplement to a traditional course.

We offer a full course on Principles of Microeconomics and are currently releasing Principles of Macroeconomics.

All of our materials are free to use in and out of the classroom.

Questions? Comments? Drop us a note at support@mruniversity.com.

Up Next:

5. The Great Reset

What might happen if our stagnating economy faces a crisis?

Looking for more like this? Check out some of our other popular videos:

“Tyler Cowen’s blog, Marginal Revolution, is the first thing I read every morning. And his brilliant new book, The Complacent Class, has been on my nightstand after I devoured it in one sitting. I am at round-the-clock Cowen saturation right now.” – Malcolm Gladwell

Tyler Cowen on…

1. The Complacent Class

The Complacent Class by Tyler Cowen
Econ Duel: Will Machines Take Our Jobs?
Econ Duel: Will Machines Take Our Jobs?

This video series accompanies Tyler Cowen’s new book The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream. The book is available in print and digital formats from Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and other book retailers.

2. The New Era of Segregation

3. American Stasis

Tyler Cowen

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Tyler Cowen
Tyler Cowen 1.jpg
Born January 21, 1962 (age 55)
Bergen County, New Jersey, USA
Nationality American
Field Cultural economics
School or
tradition
Neoclassical economics
Influences Chicago School
Thomas Schelling
Carl Menger

Tyler Cowen (/ˈk.ən/; born January 21, 1962) is an American economist, philosopher, and writer, who is a professor at George Mason University, where he holds the Holbert C. Harris Chair of economics. He hosts a popular economics blog, Marginal Revolution, together with his co-author, Alex Tabarrok. Cowen and Tabarrok have also started the website Marginal Revolution University, a venture in online education.

Cowen writes the “Economic Scene” column for the New York Times, and since July 2016 has been a regular opinion columnist at Bloomberg View.[1] He also writes for such publications as The New Republic, the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Newsweek, and the Wilson Quarterly. He serves as general director of George Mason’s Mercatus Center, a university research center that focuses on the market economy.

In February 2011, Cowen received a nomination as one of the most influential economists in the last decade in a survey by The Economist.[2] He was ranked #72 among the “Top 100 Global Thinkers” in 2011 by Foreign Policy Magazine “for finding markets in everything.”[3]

Education and personal life

Cowen was born in Bergen County,[4] New Jersey. At 15, he became the youngest ever New Jersey state chess champion.[5][6]

He graduated from George Mason University with a bachelor of science degree in economics in 1983 and received his PhD in economics from Harvard University in 1987 with his thesis titled Essays in the theory of welfare economics. At Harvard, he was mentored by game theorist Thomas Schelling, the 2005 recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics. He is married to Natasha Cowen, a lawyer.

Writings

Culture

The Los Angeles Times has described Cowen as “a man who can talk about Haitian voodoo flags, Iranian cinema, Hong Kong cuisine, Abstract Expressionism, Zairian music and Mexican folk art with seemingly equal facility.”[7] One of Cowen’s primary research interests is the economics of culture. He has written books on fame (What Price Fame?), art (In Praise of Commercial Culture), and cultural trade (Creative Destruction: How Globalization is Changing the World’s Cultures). In Markets and Cultural Voices, he relays how globalization is changing the world of three Mexican amate painters. Cowen argues that free markets change culture for the better, allowing them to evolve into something more people want. Other books include Public Goods and Market Failures, The Theory of Market Failure, Explorations in the New Monetary Economics, Risk and Business Cycles, Economic Welfare, and New Theories of Market Failure.

Recent books

Cowen followed the controversial success of his The Great Stagnation with An Economist Gets Lunch: New Rules for Everyday Foodies, “taking on food with equally provocative ideas.”[8]

The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All The Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better is a short, 15,000-word, take on the United States’ recent economic trajectory released in January 2011. Create Your Own Economy: The Path to Prosperity in a Disordered World was released in July 2009 (and rereleased in 2010, with the new title The Age of the Infovore: Succeeding in the Information Economy) and received favorable reviews from critics including Matthew Yglesias and Tim Harford.

In 2013, he published Average is Over, on the future of modern economies.

HIs most recent book, The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream (St. Martins Press, February 2017) discusses how the change that has moved America forward has stopped. According to Malcolm Gladwell, “His brilliant new book…has been on my nightstand after I devoured it in one sitting. I am at round-the-clock Cowen saturation right now.”

New York Times columns

Cowen’s New York Times columns cover a wide range of issues, such as the 2008 financial crisis: “Too Few Regulations? No, Just Ineffective Ones”.

Dining guide

His dining guide for the DC area, “Tyler Cowen’s Ethnic Dining Guide,” was reprinted in the Food section of the Washington Post.

Political philosophy

Cowen has written papers in political philosophy and ethics: for example, he co-wrote a paper with the philosopher Derek Parfit, arguing against the social discount rate.[9] A recent paper has argued that the epistemic problem fails to refute consequentialist forms of argument.[10] Cowen has been described as a “libertarian bargainer,” a moderate libertarian[clarification needed] who can influence practical policy making.[11] In a 2007 article entitled “The Paradox of Libertarianism,” Cowen argued that libertarians “should embrace a world with growing wealth, growing positive liberty, and yes, growing government. We don’t have to favor the growth in government per se, but we do need to recognize that sometimes it is a package deal.”

Cowen endorsed bailouts in a March 2, 2009 column in the New York Times.[12]

In 2012, David Brooks called Cowen one of the most influential bloggers on the right, writing that he is among those who “start from broadly libertarian premises but do not apply them in a doctrinaire way.”[13]

In an August 2014 blog post, Cowen wrote, “Just to summarize, I generally favor much more immigration but not open borders, I am a liberal on most but not all social issues, and I am market-oriented on economic issues. On most current foreign policy issues I am genuinely agnostic as to what exactly we should do but skeptical that we are doing the right thing at the moment. I don’t like voting for either party or for third parties.”[14]

Attack

On March 26, 2014, Cowen was attacked while teaching “Law and Literature” in his classroom by Jonathan Pendleton, who tried to perform a “citizen’s arrest” of the professor and then pepper sprayed him.[15][16][17] A bystander intervened and Pendelton was detained and arrested shortly after by police. Cowen and his students reportedly suffered no lasting injuries. Pendelton reportedly believed that Cowen had “controlled his mind at a distance” and sexually harassed him.[17]

Publications

Books

Select journal articles

Select articles

References

  1. Jump up^ https://www.bloomberg.com/view/contributors/AS6n2t3d_iA/tyler-cowen
  2. Jump up^ “Economics’ most influential people”. Economist.com. February 1, 2011. Retrieved 2012-06-30.
  3. Jump up^ “The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers (#72 Tyler Cowan:For finding markets in everything)”. Foreign Policy. December 2011. Retrieved March 21, 2012.
  4. Jump up^ “Correction: Tyler Cowen”. Financial Times. London: Pearson. 29 December 2012. Retrieved 1 February 2014.
  5. Jump up^ “Interview with the Former “Youngest New Jersey Chess Champion,” Tyler Cowen”. Kenilworthchessclub.org. 2006-09-08. Retrieved 2012-06-30.
  6. Jump up^ New Jersey State Champions 1946 – Present New Jersey State Chess Federation, Official Site
  7. Jump up^ The joy of thinking globally, February 7, 2003, Daniel Akst, Los Angeles Times
  8. Jump up^ Cowen, Tyler (2012-04-12). “Penny Pleasance in The New York Journal of Books”. Nyjournalofbooks.com. Retrieved 2012-06-30.
  9. Jump up^ ‘Against the social discount rate’, Derek Parfit and Tyler Cowen, in Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin (eds.) Justice between age groups and generations, Yale University Press: New Haven, 1992, pp. 144–161.
  10. Jump up^ The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism, Tyler Cowen, Utilitas (2006), 18: 383–399
  11. Jump up^ Klein, Daniel B.Mere Libertarianism: Blending Hayek and Rothbard“. Reason Papers. Vol. 27: Fall 2004.
  12. Jump up^ Cowen, Tyler (March 1, 2009). “Message to Regulators: Bank Fix Needed Quickly”. New York Times.
  13. Jump up^ Brooks, David (2012-11-19). “The Conservative Future”. New York Times. Retrieved 28 November 2012.
  14. Jump up^ Cowen, Tyler (4 August 2014). “Matt Yglesias on Tyler Cowen”. Marginal Revolution. Retrieved 24 March 2017.
  15. Jump up^ Greenwood, Arin (2014-03-27). “Tyler Cowen Pepper Sprayed While Teaching Law School Class On Vigilantism”. Huffington Post.
  16. Jump up^ McNeal, Greg (2014-03-27). “Law Professor Pepper Sprayed During Class By Man Demanding A ‘Citizen’s Arrest'”. Forbes.
  17. ^ Jump up to:a b Weiner, Rachel (April 29, 2014). “Tyler Cowen’s attacker thought the professor was controlling his mind, Cowen testifies”. The Washington Post. Retrieved April 29, 2014.

External links

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyler_Cowen

 

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Harvey Molotch –Introduction to Sociology – Culture and Ethnocentrism – New York University — Videos

Posted on January 29, 2017. Filed under: Blogroll, College, College Courses Online Videos, Communications, Culture, Economics, Education, media, People, Philosophy, Photos, Sociology, Sociology, Video, Wealth, Welfare, Wisdom, Work, Writing | Tags: , , , , , |

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Introduction to Sociology – Culture and Ethnocentrism – Part 1

Introduction to Sociology – Culture and Ethnocentrism – Part 2

Harvey Molotch

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Harvey Luskin Molotch (born January 3, 1940) is an American sociologist known for studies that have reconceptualized power relations in interaction, the mass media, and the city. He helped create the field of environmental sociology and has advanced qualitative methods in the social sciences. In recent years, Molotch helped develop a new field—the sociology of objects. He is currently a professor of Sociology and of Metropolitan Studies at New York University.[1] His Introduction to Sociology is featured as one of NYU Open Education’s courses available to stream freely.[2] Other courses that he teaches include Approaches to Metropolitan Studies and Urban Objects. He is also affiliated with the graduate program in Humanities and Social Thought.[3]

Biography

Molotch was born Harvey Luskin in Baltimore, Maryland, where his family was in the retail car business on one side and the Luskin’s home appliance business on the other. His father, Paul Luskin, died in the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 during World War II. His mother remarried to Nathan Molotch. He received a B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Michigan (1963), with a thesis on John Dewey. He received an M.A. (1966) and Ph.D. (1968) in Sociology from the University of Chicago. He served in the U.S. Army, stationed in Maryland and Virginia, 1961-62.

He taught at the University of California, Santa Barbara from 1967 to 2003. He has also been a visiting professor at Stony Brook University, the University of Essex, and Northwestern University. In 1998-99 he was Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics.

His 1964 marriage to Linda Molotch ended with her death, by car accident, in 1976. The couple had two children, Shana (born 1969), now with two children and living in Northern California and Noah (born 1972), now with two children and living in Boulder Colorado where he is on faculty at University of Colorado as hydrological scientist, as well as research scientist at Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Molotch has lived with his domestic partner, Glenn Wharton, a conservator at the Museum of Modern Art and faculty member at New York University, since 1979.

Ideas

Racial Segregation: Rethinking “White Flight”

Molotch’s early work on “white flight” overturned conventional wisdom on neighborhood change, showing that normal mobility makes neighborhood racial change possible. When blacks constitute the bulk of those who move into the vacancies that result, racial change is made inevitable. The implication of this finding, based on Molotch’s systematic studies of matched neighborhoods (and since replicated by others on large data sets), was that it is the reluctance of whites to move into a changing neighborhood that makes racial integration so difficult to achieve. From a policy perspective, Molotch concluded that while stabilizing neighborhoods would not be easy,the focus needs to be on getting white people to replace the whites who are leaving, rather than talking people who are leaving into staying.

The Santa Barbara Oil Spill and Environmental Sociology

On January 28, 1969, there was a massive eruption of crude oil from Union Oil’s Platform A in the Santa Barbara Channel–an eruption which was to cover much of the coast line of two counties with oil. Molotch saw in this disaster a research opportunity. His article “Oil in Santa Barbara and Power in America” became a founding document of the new field of environmental sociology, and a key contribution to political sociology.

Molotch argued that accident research at the local level might be capable of revealing what political scientists called the “second face of power.” This is a dimension of power ordinarily ignored by traditional community studies which fail to concern themselves with the processes by which bias is mobilized and thus how issues rise and fall.

Molotch’s findings highlighted the extraordinary intransigence of national institutions in the face of local dissent, but more importantly, pointed out the processes and tactics which undermine that dissent and frustrate and radicalize the dissenters. Molotch called for comparable studies of the agriculture industry, the banking industry, and for more accident research at the local level, which might bring to light the larger social arrangements which structure the parameters of such local debate. In this way, research at the local level might serve as an avenue to knowledge about national power. Molotch ended, “Sociologists should be ready when an accident hits in their neighborhood, and then go to work.”

The Mass Media and the Social Construction Framework

Molotch helped introduce the social construction framework to the study of news media. Whereas news accounts had been treated, however critically, as “failed” representations of a presumed reality, Molotch and Marilyn Lester held that every account is a product of the social organization that goes into its production. In founding papers in the sociology of the mass media, Molotch and Lester applied the insights of ethnomethodology to the Santa Barbara oil spill and the way it was covered. They argued for an approach to the mass media which does not look for reality, but for practices of those having the power to determine the experience of others.

In addition, Molotch and Lester recognized that this social construction of the news had a crucial political component, a perspective later endorsed by such media sociologists as W. Lance Bennett. In normal times, Molotch and Lester said, the news is merely the ritualized presentation of the stories of powerful corporate and governmental organizations. Only in certain contexts does the veil of this ruling elite consensus get pushed aside to reveal other possible constructions of the facts. Molotch and Lester pointed to such disruptive contexts as scandals and accidents like the Santa Barbara Oil Spill, while Bennett pointed to significant social issues that break through the normally ritualized conflicts of the two political parties.

Molotch’s work has inspired studies of the social construction of news, of the particular ways that the content of presentation is contingent on the social setting of its production, including the occupational workplace of news professionals as well as the larger societal setting. His more recent work on mass media has included studies of war protest and the stock market.

The City as a Growth Machine

Molotch is probably best known for his book Urban Fortunes (1987, with John Logan), which won sociology’s most prestigious prize for scholarship in 1990. Urban Fortunes builds on Molotch’s 1976 classic paper, “The City as a Growth Machine.” In this body of work, Molotch took the dominant convention of studying urban land use and turned it on its head. The field of urban sociology (as well as urban geography, planning, and economics) was dominated by the idea that cities were basically containers for human action, in which actors competed among themselves for the most strategic parcels of land, and the real estate market reflected the state of that competition. Out of this competition were thought to come the shape of the city and the distribution of social types within it (e.g. banks in the center, affluent residents in the suburbs). Long established notions such as central place theory and the sectoral hypothesis were claims that are more or less “natural” spatial geography evolved from competitive market activity.

Molotch helped reverse the course of urban theory by pointing out that land parcels were not empty fields awaiting human action, but were associated with specific interests—commercial, sentimental, and psychological. Especially important in shaping cities were the real estate interests of those whose properties gain value when growth takes place. These actors make up what Molotch termed “the local growth machine” — a term now standard in the urban studies lexicon. From this perspective, cities need to be studied (and compared) in terms of the organization, lobbying, manipulating, and structuring carried out by these actors. The outcome—the shape of cities and the distribution of their peoples—is thus not due to an interpersonal market or geographic necessities, but to social actions, including opportunistic dealing. Urban Fortunes has influenced hundreds of national and international studies. A twentieth anniversary edition was issued by the University of California Press in 2007 with a new preface.

Other work

Molotch has also conducted a series of studies in conversation analysis on mechanisms such as gaps and silences in human conversation that reveal the way power operates at the micro-interactional level. This work includes a notable collaboration with Mitchell Duneier on talk between men on the street and women passersby. His research builds on writings of Don Zimmerman, Harvey Sacks, Gail Jefferson, and Emanuel Schegloff. Molotch was among the first to utilize ethnomethodology and conversation analysis in the study of traditional sociological topics, bridging what had been regarded as a highly esoteric and specialized approach to micro-sociology with mainstream, macro-level sociological issues such as hegemony and power.

More recently in Where Stuff Comes From, Molotch builds on the work of Howard S. Becker and Bruno Latour, to show how objects and physical artifacts are joint result of various types of actors, most particularly product designers operating within frameworks of technology, regulation, mass tastes, and corporate profits. While neo-Marxists and others have treated “commodity fetishism” as a signal of oppression, repression, and delusion, he uses goods to understand, in a more comprehensive way, just what makes production happen and how artifacts reveal larger social and cultural forces.

Honors and awards

  • Fred Buttel Distinguished Contribution Award, Section on Environment and Technology, American Sociological Association (2009)
  • Lifetime Career Achievement in Urban and Community Scholarship, American Sociological Association Urban and Community Studies Section (2003)
  • ASA Journal Article of the Year in Political Sociology (2001)
  • Robert E. Park Award of the American Sociological Association (1988) (Urban Fortunes)
  • Distinguished Scholarly Publication Award of the American Sociological Association (1990) (Urban Fortunes)
  • Scholar in Residence, Russell Sage Foundation, 2008-2009.
  • Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, CA (2000)
  • Resident Fellow, Rockefeller Foundation, Bellagio Center, Como Italy (1999)
  • Stice Lecturer in the Social Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle (1996)
  • Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Lund, Sweden (1995)

Selected publications

  • Toilet: The Public Restroom and the Politics of Sharing. [co-edited with Laura Noren] New York: New York University Press (2010).
  • Where Stuff Comes From: How Toasters, Toilets, Cars, Computers and Many Other Things Come to Be as They Are. New York and London: Routledge (2003).
  • Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place. (With John Logan.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1987.
  • “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place.” The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Sep., 1976), pp. 309–332.
  • “News as Purposive Behavior: On the Strategic Use of Routine Events, Accidents, and Scandals,” American Sociological Review, Vol 39, No. 1 (Feb., 1974), pp. 101–112.
  • Managed Integration: Dilemmas of Doing Good in the City. Berkeley: University of California Press (1972).

References

Harvey Molotch

Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis , Sociology

Ph.D. 1968 (Sociology), M.A. 1966 (Sociology), University of Chicago; B.A. 1963 (Philosophy), University of Michigan.

Office Address:

295 Lafayette Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10012

Phone:

(212) 998-3542

Areas of Research/Interest:

Urban development and political economy; the sociology of architecture, design, and consumption; environmental degradation; mechanisms of interactional inequalities.

Fellowships/Honors:

PROSE Award (American Association of Publishers, 2012), Best book in sociology and social work, for Against Security.

Fred Buttel Distinguished Career Contribution to Sociology of Environment and Technology, (ASA Section on Environment and Technology).

Mirra Komarovsky Book Prize, for Where Stuff Comes From, Eastern Sociological Society, 2004.

Helen and Robert Lynd Award for Distinguished Career Achievement in Urban and Community Studies (2003).

Award for Distinguished Contribution to Sociological Scholarship (with John Logan) American Sociological Association (for Urban Fortunes, 1990).

Robert Park Award, Book of the Year in Urban and Community Studies (with John Logan) for Urban Fortunes, (1988).

2001 ASA Outstanding Journal Article of the Year in Political Sociology; Honorable mention, Robert Park Journal Paper Award, Urban and Community Studies Section, American Sociological Association (2000); Fellow, Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, CA (2000); Resident Fellow, Rockefeller Foundation, Bellagio Center, Como Italy (1999); Stice Lecturer in the Social Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle (1996); Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Lund, Sweden (1995); Award for Distinguished Scholarly Contribution to Sociology, American Sociological Association (1990).

Against Security: How We Go Wrong at Airports, Subways and Other Sites of Ambiguous Danger. Princeton University Press, 2012; Paperback edition, 2014.

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Toilet: Public Restrooms and the Politics of Sharing (edited with Laura Noren). New York University Press, Fall 2010.

Where Stuff Comes From: How Toasters, Toilets, Cars, Computers and Many Other Things Come to Be as They Are. New York and London: Routledge, 2003.

“History Repeats Itself, but How?: City Character, Urban Tradition, and the Accomplishment of Place.” (with William Freudenburg and Krista Paulsen), American Sociological Review, vol. 65 (December: 791-823) 2000.

Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place (with John Logan). Berkeley and Los Angeles:University of California Press. 1987.

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Ann Swidler — Introduction to Sociology –University of California, Berkeley — Videos

Posted on January 29, 2017. Filed under: American History, Articles, Blogroll, College, College Courses Online Videos, Congress, Constitution, Culture, Economics, Education, Elections, Employment, Faith, Family, Freedom, Friends, government, government spending, history, History of Economic Thought, Language, Law, liberty, Life, media, People, Philosophy, Politics, Rants, Raves, Sociology, Sociology, Video, Wealth, Welfare, Wisdom, Work, Writing | Tags: , , , , , , , |

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Sociology 1 – Lecture 1

Sociology 1 – Lecture 2

Sociology 1 – Lecture 3

Sociology 1 – Lecture 4

Lecture 5

Milgram Obedience Study

The Milgram Experiment 1962 Full Documentary

Milgram Experiment (Derren Brown)

Sociology 1 – Lecture 6

Sociology 1 – Lecture 7

Sociology 1 – Lecture 8

Sociology 1 – Lecture 9

Sociology 1 – Lecture 10

Sociology 1 – Lecture 11

Sociology 1 – Lecture 12

Sociology 1 – Lecture 13

Review Lecture

Midterm Exam

Sociology 1 – Lecture 14

Sociology 1 – Lecture 15

Sociology 1 – Lecture 16

Sociology 1 – Lecture 17

Sociology 1 – Lecture 18

Sociology 1 – Lecture 19

Sociology 1 – Lecture 20

Sociology 1 – Lecture 21

Sociology 1 – Lecture 22

Sociology 1 – Lecture 23

Sociology 1 – Lecture 24

Sociology 1 – Lecture 25

Sociology 1 – Lecture 26

Ann Swidler

Ann Swidler

Professor
Research Interests:
Culture, religion, theory, institutionalization, African responses to HIV/AIDS
Office:
444 Barrows
Curriculum Vitae:
Profile:

Ann Swidler (PhD UC Berkeley; BA Harvard) studies the interplay of culture and institutions. She asks how culture works–both how people use it and how it shapes social life. She is best known for her books Talk of Love, and the co-authored works Habits of the Heart and The Good Society, as well as her classic article, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies” (American Sociological Review, 1986).  Her most recent book, Talk of Love: How Culture Matters (Chicago, 2001), examines how actors select among elements of their cultural repertoires and how culture gets organized “from the outside in” by Codes, Contexts, and Institutions. In the co-authored Habits of the Heart and The Good Society, she and her collaborators analyzed the consequences of American individualism for individual selfhood, community, and political and economic institutions. With colleagues from the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, she has been engaged in an ambitious project to understand the societal determinants of human health and well being.

Swidler’s current research is on cultural and institutional responses to the AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Swidler’s research on AIDS Africa has led both to work on NGOs and the international response to the epidemic and to work on transactional sex, cultural barriers to condom use, and factors that have made the responses to the epidemic more successful in some African countries than in others. She is interested in how the massive international AIDS effort in sub-Saharan Africa–the infusion of money, organizations, programs and projects–interacts with existing cultural and institutional patterns to create new dilemmas and new possibilities. She is exploring these issues from two directions:

From the international side, she examines how the international AIDS effort is structured (who provides money to whom, how collaborative networks are structured, how programs get organized on the ground); why some interventions are favored over others; and what organizational forms international funders opt for.  From the African side, she is exploring why the NGO sector is more robust in some countries than others; when international AIDS efforts stimulate vs. impede or derail local efforts; and what organizational syncretisms sometimes emerge.

Swidler’s most recent work examines African religion and the institutions of African chieftaincy in order to understand the cultural and religious sources of collective capacities for social action.

Professor Swidler teaches sociology of culture, sociology of religion, and sociological theory. Her interests increasingly touch on political sociology, development, and sociology of science and medicine as well.

Representative Publications:

Books

  • 2001 Talk of Love: How Culture Matters (University of Chicago Press).
  • 2001 (eds.), Meaning and Modernity: Religion, Polity, Self (University of California Press). (with Madsen, Sullivan, Tipton)
  • 1996 Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth (Princeton University Press). (with Fischer, Hout, Jankowski, Lucas, and Voss)
  • 1991 The Good Society (Alfred A. Knopf). (with Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, and Tipton)
  • 1985 Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (University of California Press). (with Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, and Tipton)
  • 1979 Organization Without Authority: Dilemmas of Social Control in Free Schools (Harvard University Press).

Selected Articles and Chapters

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