Archive for November, 2011

James Burke: Connections and Re-Connections–Videos

Posted on November 5, 2011. Filed under: Agriculture, American History, Art, Biology, Blogroll, Books, Business, Chemistry, Climate, Communications, Computers, Culture, Demographics, Diasters, Dirty Bomb, Economics, Education, Employment, Energy, Enivornment, European History, Farming, Federal Government, Foreign Policy, government, government spending, Health Care, history, Homes, Immigration, Inflation, Investments, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, media, Music, Nuclear, People, Philosophy, Physics, Pistols, Politics, Private Sector, Public Sector, Rants, Raves, Regulations, Resources, Rifles, Science, Security, Taxes, Technology, Unemployment, Unions, Video, War, Wealth, Weapons, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , |

James Burke : Connections, Episode 1, “The Trigger Effect”, 1 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 1, “The Trigger Effect”, 2 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 1, “The Trigger Effect”, 3 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 1, “The Trigger Effect”, 4 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 1, “The Trigger Effect”, 5 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 2, “Death In The Morning”, 1 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 2, “Death In The Morning”, 2 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 2, “Death In The Morning”, 3 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 2, “Death In The Morning”, 4 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 2, “Death In The Morning”, 5 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 3, “Distant Voices”, 1 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 3, “Distant Voices”, 2 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 3, “Distant Voices”, 3 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 3, “Distant Voices”, 4 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 3, “Distant Voices”, 5 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 4, “Faith In Numbers”, 1 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 4, “Faith In Numbers”, 2 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 4, “Faith In Numbers”, 3 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 4, “Faith In Numbers”, 4 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 4, “Faith In Numbers”, 5 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 5, “Wheel Of Fortune”, 1 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 5, “Wheel Of Fortune”,  2 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 5, “Wheel Of Fortune”,  3 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 5, “Wheel Of Fortune”, 4 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 5, “Wheel Of Fortune”, 5 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 6, “Thunder in the Skies”, 1 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 6, “Thunder in the Skies”, 2 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 6, “Thunder in the Skies”, 3 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 6, “Thunder in the Skies”, 4 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 6, “Thunder in the Skies”, 5 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 7, “The Long Chain”, 1 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 7, “The Long Chain”, 2 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 7, “The Long Chain”, 3 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 7, “The Long Chain”, 4 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 7, “The Long Chain”, 5 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 8, “Eat, Drink and be Merry”, 1 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 8, “Eat, Drink and be Merry”, 2 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 8, “Eat, Drink and be Merry”, 3 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 8, “Eat, Drink and be Merry”, 4 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections, Episode 8, “Eat, Drink and be Merry”, 5 of 5 (CC)

James Burke : Connections³, Episode 9 : “Hit The Water” (HQ), 1 of 5

James Burke : Connections³, Episode 9 : “Hit The Water” (HQ),2 of 5

James Burke : Connections³, Episode 9 : “Hit The Water” (HQ), 3 of 5

James Burke : Connections³, Episode 9 : “Hit The Water” (HQ), 4 of 5

James Burke : Connections³, Episode 9 : “Hit The Water” (HQ), 5 of 5

James Burke : Connections³, Episode 10 : “In Touch” (HQ), 1 of 5

James Burke : Connections³, Episode 10 : “In Touch” (HQ), 2 of 5

James Burke : Connections³, Episode 10 : “In Touch” (HQ), 3 of 5

James Burke : Connections³, Episode 10 : “In Touch” (HQ), 4 of 5

James Burke : Connections³, Episode 10 : “In Touch” (HQ), 5 of 5

James Burke : “Re-Connections”, 1 of 7

James Burke : “Re-Connections”, 2 of 7

James Burke : “Re-Connections”, 3 of 7

James Burke : “Re-Connections”, 4 of 7

James Burke : “Re-Connections”, 5 of 7

James Burke : “Re-Connections”, 6 of 7

James Burke : “Re-Connections”, 7 of 7

Background Articles and Videos

James Burke

“…James Burke (born 22 December 1936) is a British broadcaster, science historian, author and television producer known amongst other things for his documentary television series Connections (1978) and its more philosophical oriented companion production, The Day the Universe Changed (1985), focusing on the history of science and technology leavened with a sense of humour. The Washington Post has called him “one of the most intriguing minds in the Western world”.[1]

Burke was born in Derry, Northern Ireland. He was educated at Maidstone Grammar School and at Jesus College, Oxford, where he gained an M.A. in Middle English.

Later, Burke moved to Italy, where he lectured at universities in Bologna and Urbino as well as at English schools in that country. While in Italy, he was engaged in the creation of an English–Italian dictionary and the publication of an art encyclopedia. In 1966, after a period of broadcasting work, Burke moved to London to join the BBC’s Science and Features Department, where he hosted and co-hosted a number of programmes. He also worked for a while as a teacher of English as a Foreign Language at the Regency Language School in Ramsgate.

Burke first made his name as a reporter on the BBC science series Tomorrow’s World. He was BBC television’s science anchor and chief reporter on the Project Apollo missions, being the main presenter on the BBC’s coverage of the first moon landings in 1969.

Burke co-produced (with Mick Jackson) an acclaimed 10-part documentary series Connections (1978) that was first aired on the BBC and subsequently on PBS channels in the United States. The series traced paths of invention and discovery through their interrelationships in history, with each episode chronicling a particular path, usually in chronological order, and was a great success for Burke, being the most watched PBS series up to that time. It was followed by the 20-part Connections2 (1994, Exec. Prod. Tim Cowling) and then the 10-part Connections3 (1997, Exec. Prod. Michael Latham) series. Later, it was shown in more than 50 countries and appeared in about 350 university and college curricula. Additionally, the book that followed the series was also a best seller on both sides of the Atlantic.

In 1985, Burke co-produced (with Richard Reisz and John Lynch) a 10-part series The Day The Universe Changed (revised in 1995). This series focuses more on the philosophical aspects of scientific change on Western culture. Burke has also been a regular contributor for Scientific American and Time magazines and served as a consultant to the SETI project. He has received the Royal Television Society’s silver and gold medals. In 1998 he was made an honorary fellow of the Society for Technical Communication.[2]

In contrast with the end of Connections, in which Burke worried that computing and communications would increasingly be in the hands of an expert elite, in the closing scenes of The Day the Universe Changed he instead suggested that a forthcoming revolution in communication and computer technology would allow people all over the world to exchange ideas and opinions instantaneously. Popular access to the internet suggests he was correct. …”

KnowledgeWeb

James Burke is the leading figure of the KnowledgeWeb Project. This is the digital incarnation of his books and television programmes, which allows the user to fly through history and create their own connective paths. According to the site, it will eventually have immersive, inhabited virtual reality recreations of historical people and places.

Major television credits

Television series and major single documentaries made by James Burke:

  • The Burke Special (1972–1976)
  • The End of the Beginning (1972), marking the end of Project Apollo
  • Scenario: The Oil Game (1976), crisis game examining OPEC
  • Scenario: The Peace Game (1977), crisis game examining NATO
  • Connections (1978)
  • The Men who Walked on the Moon (1979), 10th anniversary of Apollo 11
  • The Other Side of the Moon (1979), a more critical look at Apollo
  • The Real Thing, on various aspects of perception (1980)
  • The Neuron Suite on the human brain (1982)
  • MacGillivray Freeman’s Speed (IMAX) (1984), Narrator
  • The Day the Universe Changed (1985, revised in 1995)
  • After the Warming (1989), on the greenhouse effect
  • Masters of Illusion (1993), on Renaissance painting
  • Connections 2 (1994) (sometimes written Connections²)
  • Connections 3 (1997) (or Connections³)
  • Stump the Scientist, in which an audience of children were invited to put questions to a resident panel of scientists in the hope of “stumping” them[citation needed]
  • ReConnections (2004) ReConnections from KCSM on archive.org

 Books

  • Tomorrow’s World I, (with Raymond Baxter) (BBC 1970) ISBN 978-0-563-10162-8
  • Tomorrow’s World II, (with Raymond Baxter) (BBC 1973) ISBN 978-0-563-12362-0
  • Connections: Alternative History of Technology (Time Warner International/Macmillan 1978) ISBN 978-0-333-24827-0
  • The Day the Universe Changed (BBC 1985) ISBN 0-563-20192-4
  • Chances (Virgin Books 1991) ISBN 978-1-85227-393-4
  • The Axemaker’s Gift, (with Robert Ornstein), illustrated by Ted Dewan (Jeremy P Tarcher 1995) ISBN 978-0-87477-856-4
  • The Pinball Effect — How Renaissance Water Gardens Made the Carburettor Possible and Other Journeys Through Knowledge (Little, Brown & Company 1996) ISBN 978-0-316-11610-7
  • Circles — Fifty Round Trips Through History Technology Science Culture (Simon & Schuster 2000) ISBN 978-0-7432-4976-8
  • The Knowledge Web (Simon & Schuster 2001) ISBN 978-0-684-85935-4
  • Twin Tracks (Simon & Schuster 2003) ISBN 978-0-7432-2619-6

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Burke_%28science_historian%29

 

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Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor

Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey

November, 2011

Employment Level

140, 320,000

Series Id:           LNS12000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Employment Level
Labor force status:  Employed
Type of data:        Number in thousands
Age:                 16 years and over

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2001 137778 137612 137783 137299 137092 136873 137071 136241 136846 136392 136238 136047
2002 135701 136438 136177 136126 136539 136415 136413 136705 137302 137008 136521 136426
2003 137417(1) 137482 137434 137633 137544 137790 137474 137549 137609 137984 138424 138411
2004 138472(1) 138542 138453 138680 138852 139174 139556 139573 139487 139732 140231 140125
2005 140245(1) 140385 140654 141254 141609 141714 142026 142434 142401 142548 142499 142752
2006 143150(1) 143457 143741 143761 144089 144353 144202 144625 144815 145314 145534 145970
2007 146033(1) 146066 146334 145610 145901 146058 145886 145670 146231 145937 146584 146272
2008 146407(1) 146183 146143 146173 145925 145725 145479 145167 145056 144778 144068 143324
2009 142201(1) 141687 140822 140720 140292 139978 139794 139409 138791 138393 138590 137960
2010 138511(1) 138698 138952 139382 139353 139092 138991 139267 139378 139084 138909 139206
2011 139323(1) 139573 139864 139674 139779 139334 139296 139627 140025 140302
1 : Data affected by changes in population controls.

Civilian Labor Force Level

154,198,000

Series Id:           LNS11000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Civilian Labor Force Level
Labor force status:  Civilian labor force
Type of data:        Number in thousands
Age:                 16 years and over

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2001 143800 143701 143924 143569 143318 143357 143654 143284 143989 144086 144240 144305
2002 143883 144653 144481 144725 144938 144808 144803 145009 145552 145314 145041 145066
2003 145937(1) 146100 146022 146474 146500 147056 146485 146445 146530 146716 147000 146729
2004 146842(1) 146709 146944 146850 147065 147460 147692 147564 147415 147793 148162 148059
2005 148029(1) 148364 148391 148926 149261 149238 149432 149779 149954 150001 150065 150030
2006 150214(1) 150641 150813 150881 151069 151354 151377 151716 151662 152041 152406 152732
2007 153133(1) 152966 153054 152446 152666 153038 153035 152756 153422 153209 153845 153936
2008 154060(1) 153624 153924 153779 154322 154315 154432 154656 154613 154953 154621 154669
2009 154185(1) 154424 154100 154453 154805 154754 154457 154362 153940 154022 153795 153172
2010 153353(1) 153558 153895 154520 154237 153684 153628 154117 154124 153960 153950 153690
2011 153186(1) 153246 153406 153421 153693 153421 153228 153594 154017 154198
1 : Data affected by changes in population controls.

Labor Force Participation Rate

64.2%

Series Id:           LNS11300000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Labor Force Participation Rate
Labor force status:  Civilian labor force participation rate
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 years and over

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2001 67.2 67.1 67.2 66.9 66.7 66.7 66.8 66.5 66.8 66.7 66.7 66.7
2002 66.5 66.8 66.6 66.7 66.7 66.6 66.5 66.6 66.7 66.6 66.4 66.3
2003 66.4 66.4 66.3 66.4 66.4 66.5 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 65.9
2004 66.1 66.0 66.0 65.9 66.0 66.1 66.1 66.0 65.8 65.9 66.0 65.9
2005 65.8 65.9 65.9 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.0 66.0
2006 66.0 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.2 66.1 66.2 66.3 66.4
2007 66.4 66.3 66.2 65.9 66.0 66.0 66.0 65.8 66.0 65.8 66.0 66.0
2008 66.2 66.0 66.1 65.9 66.1 66.1 66.0 66.1 66.0 66.0 65.8 65.8
2009 65.7 65.7 65.6 65.6 65.7 65.7 65.5 65.4 65.1 65.1 65.0 64.7
2010 64.8 64.8 64.9 65.1 64.9 64.7 64.6 64.7 64.7 64.5 64.5 64.3
2011 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.2 64.1 63.9 64.0 64.2 64.2


Unemployment Level

13,897,000

Series Id:           LNS13000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Unemployment Level
Labor force status:  Unemployed
Type of data:        Number in thousands
Age:                 16 years and over

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2001 6023 6089 6141 6271 6226 6484 6583 7042 7142 7694 8003 8258
2002 8182 8215 8304 8599 8399 8393 8390 8304 8251 8307 8520 8640
2003 8520 8618 8588 8842 8957 9266 9011 8896 8921 8732 8576 8317
2004 8370 8167 8491 8170 8212 8286 8136 7990 7927 8061 7932 7934
2005 7784 7980 7737 7672 7651 7524 7406 7345 7553 7453 7566 7279
2006 7064 7184 7072 7120 6980 7001 7175 7091 6847 6727 6872 6762
2007 7100 6900 6721 6836 6766 6980 7149 7085 7191 7272 7261 7664
2008 7653 7441 7781 7606 8398 8590 8953 9489 9557 10176 10552 11344
2009 11984 12737 13278 13734 14512 14776 14663 14953 15149 15628 15206 15212
2010 14842 14860 14943 15138 14884 14593 14637 14849 14746 14876 15041 14485
2011 13863 13673 13542 13747 13914 14087 13931 13967 13992 13897

Unemployment Rate

U3: 9.0%

Series Id:           LNS14000000
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (Seas) Unemployment Rate
Labor force status:  Unemployment rate
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 years and over

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2001 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.7
2002 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.9 6.0
2003 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.7
2004 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.4
2005 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9
2006 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4
2007 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 5.0
2008 5.0 4.8 5.1 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.6 6.8 7.3
2009 7.8 8.2 8.6 8.9 9.4 9.5 9.5 9.7 9.8 10.1 9.9 9.9
2010 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.8 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.4
2011 9.0 8.9 8.8 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.0

Total Unemployment Rate

U6: 16.2%

Series Id:           LNS13327709
Seasonally Adjusted
Series title:        (seas) Total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of all civilian labor force plus all marginally attached workers
Labor force status:  Aggregated totals unemployed
Type of data:        Percent or rate
Age:                 16 years and over
Percent/rates:       Unemployed and mrg attached and pt for econ reas as percent of
labor force plus marg attached

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual
2001 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.9 7.8 8.1 8.7 9.3 9.4 9.6
2002 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.7 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.7 9.8
2003 10.0 10.2 10.0 10.2 10.1 10.3 10.3 10.1 10.4 10.2 10.0 9.8
2004 9.9 9.7 10.0 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.7 9.4 9.2
2005 9.3 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.8 8.9 9.0 8.7 8.7 8.6
2006 8.4 8.4 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.0 8.2 8.1 7.9
2007 8.4 8.1 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.8
2008 9.1 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.7 10.1 10.5 10.9 11.2 11.9 12.7 13.6
2009 14.1 15.0 15.6 15.8 16.4 16.6 16.5 16.8 17.0 17.4 17.1 17.2
2010 16.5 16.8 16.8 17.0 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.7 17.1 17.0 17.0 16.7
2011 16.1 15.9 15.7 15.9 15.8 16.2 16.1 16.2 16.5 16.2

Background Articles and Videos

Employment Situation Summary

Transmission of material in this release is embargoed until		USDL-11-1576
8:30 a.m. (EDT) Friday, November 4, 2011

Technical information:
 Household data:     (202) 691-6378  *  cpsinfo@bls.gov  *  www.bls.gov/cps
 Establishment data: (202) 691-6555  *  cesinfo@bls.gov  *  www.bls.gov/ces

Media contact:       (202) 691-5902  *  PressOffice@bls.gov

                THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION -- OCTOBER 2011

Nonfarm payroll employment continued to trend up in October (+80,000),
and the unemployment rate was little changed at 9.0 percent, the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Employment in the private
sector rose, with modest job growth continuing in professional and
businesses services, leisure and hospitality, health care, and mining.
Government employment continued to trend down.

Household Survey Data

Both the number of unemployed persons (13.9 million) and the
unemployment rate (9.0 percent) changed little over the month. The
unemployment rate has remained in a narrow range from 9.0 to 9.2
percent since April. (See table A-1.)

Among the major worker groups, the unemployment rate declined for
blacks (15.1 percent) in October, while the rates for adult men (8.8
percent), adult women (8.0 percent), teenagers (24.1 percent), whites
(8.0 percent), and Hispanics (11.4 percent) showed little or no
change. The jobless rate for Asians was 7.3 percent, not seasonally
adjusted. (See tables A-1, A-2, and A-3.)

In October, the number of long-term unemployed (those jobless for 27
weeks and over) declined by 366,000 to 5.9 million, or 42.4 percent of
total unemployment. (See table A-12.)

The civilian labor force participation rate remained at 64.2 percent
in October, and the employment-population ratio was little changed at
58.4 percent. (See table A-1.)

The number of persons employed part time for economic reasons
(sometimes referred to as involuntary part-time workers) decreased by
374,000 to 8.9 million in October. These individuals were working part
time because their hours had been cut back or because they were unable
to find a full-time job. (See table A-8.)

In October, 2.6 million persons were marginally attached to the labor
force, about the same as a year earlier. (The data are not seasonally
adjusted.) These individuals were not in the labor force, wanted and
were available for work, and had looked for a job sometime in the
prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had
not searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey. (See table
A-16.)

Among the marginally attached, there were 967,000 discouraged workers
in October, a decrease of 252,000 from a year earlier. (The data are
not seasonally adjusted.) Discouraged workers are persons not
currently looking for work because they believe no jobs are available
for them. The remaining 1.6 million persons marginally attached to the
labor force in October had not searched for work in the 4 weeks
preceding the survey for reasons such as school attendance or family
responsibilities. (See table A-16.)

Establishment Survey Data

Total nonfarm payroll employment continued to trend up in October
(+80,000). Over the past 12 months, payroll employment has increased
by an average of 125,000 per month. In October, private-sector
employment increased by 104,000, with continued job growth in
professional and business services, leisure and hospitality, health
care, and mining. Government employment continued to contract in
October. (See table B-1.)

Employment in professional and business services continued to trend up
in October (+32,000) and has grown by 562,000 over the past 12 months.
Within the industry, there have been modest job gains in recent months
in temporary help services and in management and technical consulting
services.

Employment in leisure and hospitality edged up over the month
(+22,000). Since a recent low point in January 2010, the industry has
added 344,000 jobs.

Health care employment continued to expand in October 2011 (+12,000),
following a gain of 45,000 in September. Offices of physicians added
8,000 jobs in October. Over the past 12 months, health care has added
313,000 jobs.

In October, mining employment continued to increase (+6,000); oil and
gas extraction accounted for half of the increase. Since a recent low
point in October 2009, mining employment has risen by 152,000.

Manufacturing employment changed little in October 2011 (+5,000) and has
remained flat for 3 months. In October, a job gain in transportation
equipment (+10,000) was partly offset by small losses in other
manufacturing industries.

Within retail trade, employment increased in general merchandise
stores (+10,000) and in motor vehicle and parts dealers (+6,000) in
October. Retail trade has added 156,000 jobs over the past 12 months.

Construction employment declined by 20,000 in October, largely
offsetting an increase of 27,000 in September; both over-the-month
changes largely occurred in nonresidential construction. Employment in
both residential and nonresidential construction has shown little net
change in 2011.

Employment in other major private-sector industries, including
wholesale trade, transportation and warehousing, information, and
financial activities, changed little in October.

Government employment continued to trend down over the month (-24,000),
with most of the October decline in the non-educational component of
state government. Employment in both state government and local
government has been trending down since the second half of 2008.

The average workweek for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls was
unchanged at 34.3 hours in October. The manufacturing workweek rose by
0.2 hour to 40.5 hours, and factory overtime remained at 3.2 hours.
The average workweek for production and nonsupervisory employees on
private nonfarm payrolls edged up by 0.1 hour to 33.7 hours in
October. (See tables B-2 and B-7.)

In October, average hourly earnings for all employees on private
nonfarm payrolls increased by 5 cents, or 0.2 percent, to $23.19. This
increase followed a gain of 6 cents in September. Over the past 12
months, average hourly earnings have increased by 1.8 percent. In
October, average hourly earnings of private-sector production and
nonsupervisory employees increased by 3 cents, or 0.2 percent, to
$19.53. (See tables B-3 and B-8.)

The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for August was revised
from +57,000 to +104,000, and the change for September was revised
from +103,000 to +158,000.

______________
The Employment Situation for November is scheduled to be released on
Friday, December 2, 2011, at 8:30 a.m. (EST).
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Ron Paul VS Herman Cain–Truth Teller Vs. Deception Deliverer –Videos

Posted on November 3, 2011. Filed under: American History, Banking, Blogroll, College, Communications, Economics, Education, Employment, Energy, Federal Government, Fiscal Policy, government, government spending, Health Care, history, Homes, Immigration, Inflation, Investments, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Macroeconomics, media, Microeconomics, Monetary Policy, Money, People, Philosophy, Politics, Public Sector, Regulations, Taxes, Unions, Vacations, Video, War | Tags: , , , , , |

Ron Paul VS Herman Cain

Herman Cain Tells Ron Paul that the Federal Reserve isn’t a Top Priority at GOP Debate

What Ron Paul Could Ask Herman Cain

 

 

 

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50 Year American Tax Revolution: The Impossible Became The Inevitable–Flat Tax or FairTax?Videos

Posted on November 1, 2011. Filed under: American History, Blogroll, Business, College, Communications, Economics, Employment, Federal Government, Fiscal Policy, Foreign Policy, government, government spending, history, Immigration, Inflation, Investments, Language, Law, liberty, Life, Links, Macroeconomics, media, Microeconomics, Monetary Policy, People, Philosophy, Politics, Public Sector, Raves, Regulations, Reviews, Science, Security, Strategy, Talk Radio, Taxes, Technology, Unions, Video, Wealth, Wisdom | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |

Pronk Pops Show 52:November 2, 2011

Pronk Pops Show 51:October 26, 2011

Pronk Pops Show 50:October 19, 2011

Pronk Pops Show 49:October 12, 2011

Pronk Pops Show 48:October 5, 2011

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 52

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 49-51

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 45-48

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 41-44

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 38-40

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 34-37

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 30-33

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 27-29

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 22 (Part 2)-26

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 16-22 (Part 1)

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 10-15

Listen To Pronk Pops Podcast or Download Shows 1-9

Segment 0: 50 Year American Tax Revolution: When The Impossible Became The Inevitable–Flat Tax or FairTax–Videos

http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/studies/recession_perspective/

The Recession and Recovery in Perspective

Post-WWII Recessions

The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research determines the beginning and ending dates of U.S. recessions. http://www.nber.org/cycles.html

It has determined that the U.S. economy experienced 10 recessions from 1946 through 2006. The committee determined that the 2007-2009 recession began in December 2007 and ended in June of 2009. Ending dates are typically announced several months after the recession officially ends. Read the June 2009 trough announcement by the NBER.

Length of Recessions

The 10 previous postwar recessions ranged in length from 6 months to 16 months, averaging about 10 1/2 months. The 2007-09 recession was the longest recession in the postwar period, at 18 months.

Depth of Recessions

The severity of a recession is determined in part by its length; perhaps even more important is the magnitude of the decline in economic activity. The 2007-09 recession was the deepest recession in the postwar period; at their lowest points employment fell by 6.3 percent and output fell by 5.1 percent.

http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/studies/recession_perspective/

http://seekingalpha.com/article/142954-two-charts-imply-current-u-s-recession-may-be-longest-in-history

the National Bureau of Economic Research

US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions

http://www.nber.org/cycles.html

Taxes and Long-Term Economic Growth

Executive Summary

The 1960s and 1980s were periods of sustained high growth rates in the economy. The major reason for this growth is the tax cuts enacted in the beginning of each decade. President Kennedy’s and President Reagan’s tax cuts resulted in higher investment, lower unemployment, and improved overall economic performance.

Since March 1991, the U.S. economy has been expanding, though at a slower rate than previous post-war expansions. Productivity growth has been weak and must be improved. A tax cut that improves incentives to work, save, and invest is necessary to provide a framework for prosperity. As President Kennedy said, “A rising tide lifts all boats.”

http://www.house.gov/jec/growth/longterm/longterm.htm

2011 IRS Tax Brackets

Here are the 2011 tax tables, which make it easy to find which marginal tax bracket you are in:

Tax Bracket Single Married Filing Jointly Head of Household
10% Bracket $0 – $8,500 $0 – $17,000 $0 – $12,150
15% Bracket $8,500 – $34,500 $17,000 – $69,000 $12,150 – $46,250
25% Bracket $34,500 – $83,600 $69,000 – $139,350 $46,250 – $119,400
28% Bracket $83,600 – $174,400 $139,350 – $212,300 $119,400 – $193,350
33% Bracket $174,400 – $379,150 $212,300 – $379,150 $193,350 – $379,150
35% Bracket $379,150+ $379,150+ $379,150+

http://www.bargaineering.com/articles/federal-income-irs-tax-brackets.html

Source: Internal Revenue Service

Table 1 Summary of Federal Income Tax Data, 2009

Number of Returns with Positive AGI

AGI ($ millions)

Income Taxes Paid ($ millions)

Group’s Share of Total AGI

Group’s Share of Income Taxes

Income Split Point

Average Tax Rate

All Taxpayers 137,982,203 $7,825,389 $865,863 100.0% 100.0% 11.06%
Top 1% 1,379,822 $1,324,572 $318,043 16.9% 36.7% $343,927.00 24.01%
1-5% 5,519,288 $1,157,918 $189,864 14.8% 22.0% 16.40%
Top 5% 6,899,110 $2,482,490 $507,907 31.7% 58.7% $154,643.00 20.46%
5-10% 6,899,110 $897,241 $102,249 11.5% 11.8% 11.40%
Top 10% 13,798,220 $3,379,731 $610,156 43.2% 70.5% $112,124.00 18.05%
10-25% 20,697,331

$1,770,140

$145,747 22.6% 17.0% 8.23%
Top 25% 34,495,551 $5,149,871 $755,903 65.8% 87.3% $ 66,193.00 14.68%
25-50% 34,495,551 $1,620,303 $90,449 20.7% 11.0% 5.58%
Top 50% 68,991,102 $6,770,174 $846,352 86.5% 97.7% > $32,396 12.50%
Bottom 50% 68,991,102

$1,055,215

$19,511 13.5% 2.3% < $32,396 1.85%

Source: Internal Revenue Service

Table 6

Total Income Tax Shares, 1980-2009 (Percent of federal income tax paid by each group)

Year

Total

Top 0.1%

Top 1%

Top 5%

Between 5% & 10%

Top 10%

Between 10% & 25%

Top 25%

Between 25% & 50%

Top 50%

Bottom 50%

1980

100%

19.05%

36.84%

12.44%

49.28%

23.74%

73.02%

19.93%

92.95%

7.05%

1981

100%

17.58%

35.06%

12.90%

47.96%

24.33%

72.29%

20.26%

92.55%

7.45%

1982

100%

19.03%

36.13%

12.45%

48.59%

23.91%

72.50%

20.15%

92.65%

7.35%

1983

100%

20.32%

37.26%

12.44%

49.71%

23.39%

73.10%

19.73%

92.83%

7.17%

1984

100%

21.12%

37.98%

12.58%

50.56%

22.92%

73.49%

19.16%

92.65%

7.35%

1985

100%

21.81%

38.78%

12.67%

51.46%

22.60%

74.06%

18.77%

92.83%

7.17%

1986

100%

25.75%

42.57%

12.12%

54.69%

21.33%

76.02%

17.52%

93.54%

6.46%

Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the definition of AGI, so data above and below this line not strictly comparable

1987

100%

24.81%

43.26%

12.35%

55.61%

21.31%

76.92%

17.02%

93.93%

6.07%

1988

100%

27.58%

45.62%

11.66%

57.28%

20.57%

77.84%

16.44%

94.28%

5.72%

1989

100%

25.24%

43.94%

11.85%

55.78%

21.44%

77.22%

16.94%

94.17%

5.83%

1990

100%

25.13%

43.64%

11.73%

55.36%

21.66%

77.02%

17.16%

94.19%

5.81%

1991

100%

24.82%

43.38%

12.45%

55.82%

21.46%

77.29%

17.23%

94.52%

5.48%

1992

100%

27.54%

45.88%

12.12%

58.01%

20.47%

78.48%

16.46%

94.94%

5.06%

1993

100%

29.01%

47.36%

11.88%

59.24%

20.03%

79.27%

15.92%

95.19%

4.81%

1994

100%

28.86%

47.52%

11.93%

59.45%

20.10%

79.55%

15.68%

95.23%

4.77%

1995

100%

30.26%

48.91%

11.84%

60.75%

19.62%

80.36%

15.03%

95.39%

4.61%

1996

100%

32.31%

50.97%

11.54%

62.51%

18.80%

81.32%

14.36%

95.68%

4.32%

1997

100%

33.17%

51.87%

11.33%

63.20%

18.47%

81.67%

14.05%

95.72%

4.28%

1998

100%

34.75%

53.84%

11.20%

65.04%

17.65%

82.69%

13.10%

95.79%

4.21%

1999

100%

36.18%

55.45%

11.00%

66.45%

17.09%

83.54%

12.46%

96.00%

4.00%

2000

100%

37.42%

56.47%

10.86%

67.33%

16.68%

84.01%

12.08%

96.09%

3.91%

2001

100%

16.06%

33.89%

53.25%

11.64%

64.89%

18.01%

82.90%

13.13%

96.03%

3.97%

2002

100%

15.43%

33.71%

53.80%

11.94%

65.73%

18.16%

83.90%

12.60%

96.50%

3.50%

2003

100%

15.68%

34.27%

54.36%

11.48%

65.84%

18.04%

83.88%

12.65%

96.54%

3.46%

2004

100%

17.44%

36.89%

57.13%

11.07%

68.19%

16.67%

84.86%

11.85%

96.70%

3.30%

2005

100%

19.26%

39.38%

59.67%

10.63%

70.30%

15.69%

85.99%

10.94%

96.93%

3.07%

2006

100%

19.56%

39.89%

60.14%

10.65%

70.79%

15.47%

86.27%

10.75%

97.01%

2.99%

2007

100%

20.19%

40.41%

60.61%

10.59%

71.20%

15.37%

86.57%

10.54%

97.11%

2.89%

2008

100%

18.47%

38.02%

58.72%

11.22%

69.94%

16.40%

86.34%

10.96%

97.30%

2.70%

2009

100%

17.11%

36.73%

58.66%

11.81%

70.47%

16.83%

87.30%

10.45%

97.75%

2.25%

Source: Internal Revenue Service

http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/250.html#table1

JFK – Path to Prosperity

Excerpts from President John F Kennedy’s speech delivered on December 14, 1962 to the Economic Club of New York.

Income Tax Cut, JFK Hopes To Spur Economy 1962/8/13

JFK speech on tax cuts

John F. Kennedy State of the Union Address to a Joint Session of the United States Congress (1963)

JFK State of the Union Address (1963) (Part 1)

Interesting that the audio for the tax cut part of the speech is missing. “This net reduction in tax liabilities of $10 billion will increase the purchasing power of American families and business enterprises in every tax bracket, with greatest increase going to our low-income consumers. It will, in addition, encourage the initiative and risk-taking on which our free system depends–induce more investment, production, and capacity use–help provide the 2 million new jobs we need every year…”

January 14, 1963 – John F. Kennedy’s delivers the State of the Union address

State of the Union Address (January 14, 1963)

John Fitzgerald Kennedy

“…At home, the recession is behind us. Well over a million more men and women are working today than were working 2 years ago. The average factory workweek is once again more than 40 hours; our industries are turning out more goods than ever before; and more than half of the manufacturing capacity that lay silent and wasted 100 weeks ago is humming with activity.

In short, both at home and abroad, there may now be a temptation to relax. For the road has been long, the burden heavy, and the pace consistently urgent.

But we cannot be satisfied to rest here. This is the side of the hill, not the top. The mere absence of war is not peace. The mere absence of recession is not growth. We have made a beginning–but we have only begun.

Now the time has come to make the most of our gains–to translate the renewal of our national strength into the achievement of our national purpose.

America has enjoyed 22 months of uninterrupted economic recovery. But recovery is not enough. If we are to prevail in the long run, we must expand the long-run strength of our economy. We must move along the path to a higher rate of growth and full employment.

For this would mean tens of billions of dollars more each year in production, profits, wages, and public revenues. It would mean an end to the persistent slack which has kept our unemployment at or above 5 percent for 61 out of the past 62 months–and an end to the growing pressures for such restrictive measures as the 35-hour week, which alone could increase hourly labor costs by as much as 14 percent, start a new wage-price spiral of inflation, and undercut our efforts to compete with other nations.

To achieve these greater gains, one step, above all, is essential–the enactment this year of a substantial reduction and revision in Federal income taxes.

For it is increasingly clear–to those in Government, business, and labor who are responsible for our economy’s success–that our obsolete tax system exerts too heavy a drag on private purchasing power, profits, and employment. Designed to check inflation in earlier years, it now checks growth instead. It discourages extra effort and risk. It distorts the use of resources. It invites recurrent recessions, depresses our Federal revenues, and causes chronic budget deficits.

Now, when the inflationary pressures of the war and the post-war years no longer threaten, and the dollar commands new respect-now, when no military crisis strains our resources–now is the time to act. We cannot afford to be timid or slow. For this is the most urgent task confronting the Congress in 1963.

In an early message, I shall propose a permanent reduction in tax rates which will lower liabilities by $13.5 billion. Of this, $11 billion results from reducing individual tax rates, which now range between 20 and 91 percent, to a more sensible range of 14 to 65 percent, with a split in the present first bracket. Two and one-half billion dollars results from reducing corporate tax rates, from 52 percent–which gives the Government today a majority interest in profits-to the permanent pre-Korean level of 47 percent. This is in addition to the more than $2 billion cut in corporate tax liabilities resulting from last year’s investment credit and depreciation reform.

To achieve this reduction within the limits of a manageable budgetary deficit, I urge: first, that these cuts be phased over 3 calendar years, beginning in 1963 with a cut of some $6 billion at annual rates; second, that these reductions be coupled with selected structural changes, beginning in 1964, which will broaden the tax base, end unfair or unnecessary preferences, remove or lighten certain hardships, and in the net offset some $3.5 billion of the revenue loss; and third, that budgetary receipts at the outset be increased by $1.5 billion a year, without any change in tax liabilities, by gradually shifting the tax payments of large corporations to a . more current time schedule. This combined program, by increasing the amount of our national income, will in time result in still higher Federal revenues. It is a fiscally responsible program–the surest and the soundest way of achieving in time a balanced budget in a balanced full employment economy.

This net reduction in tax liabilities of $10 billion will increase the purchasing power of American families and business enterprises in every tax bracket, with greatest increase going to our low-income consumers. It will, in addition, encourage the initiative and risk-taking on which our free system depends–induce more investment, production, and capacity use–help provide the 2 million new jobs we need every year–and reinforce the American principle of additional reward for additional effort.

I do not say that a measure for tax reduction and reform is the only way to achieve these goals.

–No doubt a massive increase in Federal spending could also create jobs and growth-but, in today’s setting, private consumers, employers, and investors should be given a full opportunity first.

–No doubt a temporary tax cut could provide a spur to our economy–but a long run problem compels a long-run solution.

–No doubt a reduction in either individual or corporation taxes alone would be of great help–but corporations need customers and job seekers need jobs.

–No doubt tax reduction without reform would sound simpler and more attractive to many–but our growth is also hampered by a host of tax inequities and special preferences which have distorted the flow of investment.

–And, finally, there are no doubt some who would prefer to put off a tax cut in the hope that ultimately an end to the cold war would make possible an equivalent cut in expenditures-but that end is not in view and to wait for it would be costly and self-defeating.

In submitting a tax program which will, of course, temporarily increase the deficit but can ultimately end it–and in recognition of the need to control expenditures–I will shortly submit a fiscal 1964 administrative budget which, while allowing for needed rises in defense, space, and fixed interest charges, holds total expenditures for all other purposes below this year’s level.

This requires the reduction or postponement of many desirable programs, the absorption of a large part of last year’s Federal pay raise through personnel and other economies, the termination of certain installations and projects, and the substitution in several programs of private for public credit. But I am convinced that the enactment this year of tax reduction and tax reform overshadows all other domestic problems in this Congress. For we cannot for long lead the cause of peace and freedom, if we ever cease to set the pace here at home.

Tax reduction alone, however, is not enough to strengthen our society, to provide opportunities for the four million Americans who are born every year, to improve the lives of 32 million Americans who live on the outskirts of poverty.

The quality of American life must keep pace with the quantity of American goods.

This country cannot afford to be materially rich and spiritually poor.

Therefore, by holding down the budgetary cost of existing programs to keep within the limitations I have set, it is both possible and imperative to adopt other new measures that we cannot afford to postpone. …”

http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/5762

Reagan on Taxes

Ronald Reagan-Remarks on Signing the Tax Reform Act (October 22, 1986)

President Reagans Remarks on Signing the Tax Reform Act of 1986 – 10/22/86

Dan Mitchell explains the fair tax

The Flat Tax: How it Works and Why it is Good for America

What is the FairTax legislation?

Herman Cain breaks down his 9-9-9 plan (Fox Debate)

Herman Cain’s 9-9-9 Tax Plan (AEI Interview)

Herman Cain on Taxes (Interview)

Milton Friedman – The Free Lunch Myth

Ron Paul on Taxes (Speech)

Ron Paul – THE FAIRTAX REVOLUTION (speech)

Herman Cain 999 plan will add new taxes explained by Ron Paul

Herman Cain Lied To Ron Paul

Reagan; Taxes and Budget Deficit: Revenue 19% of GDP; Spending is 23%; Revenue is sufficient

JFK Defends The First Amendment

Background Articles and Videos

Taxes Due

If you are trying to calculate your taxes due, these tables may be more helpful. Remember that taxes are due on your adjusted income after accounting for deductions and other adjustments.

Single Filers

These tables are for single filers who are not surviving spouses or heads of household:

Taxable Income Tax
$0 – $8,500 10% of taxable income
$8,500 – $34,500 $850 plus 15% of excess over $8,500
$34,500 – $83,600 $4,750 plus 25% of excess over $34,500
$83,600 – $174,400 $17,025 plus 28% of excess over $83,600
$174,400 – $379,150 $42,449 plus 33% of excess over $174,400
$379,150+ $110,016.50 plus 35% of excess over $379,150

Married & Surviving Spouses

These tables are for married filing jointly or surviving spouses:

Taxable Income Tax
$0 – $17,000 10% of taxable income
$17,000 – $69,000 $1,700 plus 15% of excess over $17,000
$69,000 – $139,350 $9,500 plus 25% of excess over $69,000
$139,350 – $212,300 $27,087.50 plus 28% of excess over $139,350
$212,300 – $379,150 $47,513.50 plus 33% of excess over $212,300
$379,150+ $102,574 plus 35% of excess over $379,150

Head of Household

These tax tables are for those considered Heads of Household:

Taxable Income Tax
$0 – $12,150 10% of taxable income
$12,150 – $46,250 $1,215 plus 15% of excess over $12,150
$46,250 – $119,400 $6,330 plus 25% of excess over $46,250
$119,400 – $193,350 $24,617.50 plus 28% of excess over $119,400
$193,350 – $379,150 $45,323.50 plus 33% of excess over $193,350
$379,150+ $106,637.50 plus 35% of excess over $379,150

Married Filing Separately

These are tax tables for those filing as Married Filing Separately:

Taxable Income Tax
$0 – $8,500 10% of taxable income
$8,500 – $34,500 $850 plus 15% of excess over $8,500
$34,500 – $69,675 $4,750 plus 25% of excess over $34,500
$69,675 – $106,150 $13,543.75 plus 28% of excess over $69,675
$106,150 – $189,575 $23,756.75 plus 33% of excess over $106,150
$189,575+ $51,287 plus 35% of excess over $189,575

With the passage of the Bush era tax cut extension, these brackets aren’t much different than the 2010 tax brackets after an adjustment for inflation.

http://www.bargaineering.com/articles/federal-income-irs-tax-brackets.html

History of Federal Individual Income Bottom and Top Bracket Rates

Historical Income Tax Rates & Brackets

Tax Rates 1

Bottom bracket

Top bracket

Calendar Year

Rate
(percent)

Taxable Income Up to

Rate
(percent)

Taxable
Income over

1913-15 1 20,000 7 500,000
1916 2 20,000 15 2,000,000
1917 2 2,000 67 2,000,000
1918 6 4,000 77 1,000,000
1919-20 4 4,000 73 1,000,000
1921 4 4,000 73 1,000,000
1922 4 4,000 56 200,000
1923 3 4,000 56 200,000
1924 2 1.5 4,000 46 500,000
1925-28 2 1? 4,000 25 100,000
1929 2 4? 4,000 24 100,000
1930-31 2 1? 4,000 25 100,000
1932-33 4 4,000 63 1,000,000
1934-35 3 4 4,000 63 1,000,000
1936-39 3 4 4,000 79 5,000,000
1940 3 4.4 4,000 81.1 5,000,000
1941 3 10 2,000 81 5,000,000
1942-434 3 19 2,000 88 200,000
1944-45 23 2,000 5 94 200,000
1946-47 19 2,000 5 86.45 200,000
1948-49 16.6 4,000 5 82.13 400,000
1950 17.4 4,000 5 91 400,000
1951 20.4 4,000 5 91 400,000
1952-53 22.2 4,000 5 92 400,000
1954-63 20 4,000 5 91 400,000
1964 16 1,000 77 400,000
1965-67 14 1,000 70 200,000
1968 14 1,000 6 75.25 200,000
1969 14 1,000 6 77 200,000
1970 14 1,000 6 71.75 200,000
1971 14 1,000 7 70 200,000
1972-78 814 1,000 7 70 200,000
1979-80 814 2,100 7 70 212,000
1981 8 9 13.825 2,100 7 9 69.125 212,000
1982 8 12 2,100 50 106,000
1983 8 11 2,100 50 106,000
1984 8 11 2,100 50 159,000
1985 8 11 2,180 50 165,480
1986 8 11 2,270 50 171,580
1987 8 11 3,000 38.5 90,000
1988 8 15 29,750 1028 29,750
1989 8 15 30,950 1028 30,950
1990 8 15 32,450 1028 32,450
1991 8 15 34,000 31 82,150
1992 8 15 35,800 31 86,500
1993 8 15 36,900 39.6 250,000
1994 8 15 38,000 39.6 250,000
1995 8 15 39,000 39.6 256,500
1996 8 15 40,100 39.6 263,750
1997 8 15 41,200 39.6 271,050
1998 8 15 42,350 39.6 278,450
1999 8 15 43,050 39.6 283,150
2000 8 15 43,850 39.6 288,350
2001 8 15 45,200 39.1 297,350
2002 8 10 12,000 38.6 307,050
200311 8 10 14,000 35.0 311,950
2004 8 10 14,300 35.0 319,100
2005 8 10 14,600 35.0 326,450
2006 8 10 15,100 35.0 336,550
2007 8 10 15,650 35.0 349,700
2008 8 10 16,050 35.0 357,700
2009
10
16,700 35.0 372,950
2010
10
16,700 35.0 373,650
201112
10
17,000 35.0 379,150

1 Taxable income excludes zero bracket amount from 1977 through 1986. Rates shown apply only to married persons filing joint returns beginning in 1948. Does not include either the add on minimum tax on preference items (1970-1982) or the alternative minimum tax (1979-present). Also, does not include the effects of the various tax benefit phase-outs (e.g. the personal exemption phase-out). From 1922 through 1986 and from 1991 forward, lower rates applied to long-term capital gains.

2 After earned-income deduction equal to 25 percent of earned income.

3 After earned-income deduction equal to 10 percent of earned income.

4 Exclusive of Victory Tax.

5 Subject to the following maximum effective rate limitations.

[year and maximum rate (in percent)] 1944-45 –90; 1946-47 –85.5; 1948-49 –77.0; 1950 –87.0; 1951 –87.2; 1952-53 –88.0; 1954-63 –87.0.

6 Includes surcharge of 7.5 percent in 1968, 10 percent in 1969, and 2.6 percent in 1970.

7 Earned income was subject to maximum marginal rates of 60 percent in 1971 and 50 percent from 1972 through 1981.

8 Beginning in 1975, a refundable earned-income credit is allowed for low-income individuals.

9 After tax credit is 1.25 percent against regular tax.

10 The benefit of the first rate bracket is eliminated by an increased rate above certain thresholds. The phase-out range of the benefit of the first rate bracket was as follows: Taxable income between $71,900 and $149,250 in 1988; taxable income between $74,850 and $155,320 in 1989; and taxable income between $78,400 and $162,770 in 1990. The phase-out of the benefit the first rate bracket was repealed for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1990. This added 5 percentage points to the marginal rate for those by the phaseout, producing a 33 percent effective rate.

11 Rates for 2003 are after enactment of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act. Prior to enactment the rates were 10% up to $12,000 and 38.6% on amounts over $311,950.

12 The 2011 rates were extended for two years after enactment of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010.

Sources: Joint Committee on Taxation, “Overview of Present Law and Economic Analysis Relating to Marginal Tax Rates and the President’s Individual Income Tax Rate Proposals” (JCX-6-01), March 6, 2001, and Congressional Research Service, “Statutory Individual Income Tax Rates and Other Elements of the Tax System: 1988 through 2008,” (RL34498) May 21, 2008. Tax Foundation, “Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History: Income Years 1913-2011,”

http://ntu.org/tax-basics/history-of-federal-individual-1.html

Paul Samuelson and Tax Policy in the Kennedy
Administration

Joseph J. Thorndike

“…Recovery from the recession of 1958 had been anemic. The nation had never
returned to anything like high employment, with more than 5 percent of workers
continually idle: “A most disappointing performance in comparison with earlier
post-war recoveries and desirable social goals.” Such sluggishness threatened to
become permanent, unless Congress did something to foster not just short-term
recovery, but long-term growth.

Expansionary fiscal policy was the only viable solution, Samuelson explained,
because monetary policy was constrained by a chronic balance of payments
deficit. Policymakers should move quickly to increase and accelerate spending
programs that were “desirable for their own sake.” They should also boost
unemployment benefits, foster residential housing construction through various
incentives, and pursue a variety of other socially desirable spending programs,
including urban renewal and natural resource development.

Tax Cuts

Samuelson warned that additional spending might not be
enough to win the battle against recession — and keep it won. In that case, the
nation must turn to a second line of economic defense: tax cuts. Samuelson
understood that expansionary tax cuts were controversial, not least because they
seemed to flout the hoary traditions of fiscal conservatism. If deficits were a
natural byproduct of recession, then making them even bigger by slashing tax
rates seemed rash — at least to many policymakers.

But Samuelson directly challenged such atavistic orthodoxies. Deficits that
arose from stimulatory fiscal policy were not just tolerable, but desirable.
They had to be distinguished, he insisted, from shortfalls brought on by
excessive spending:

The deficits that come automatically from recession or which are a necessary part of a determined effort to restore the economic system to health are quite different phenomena [from deficits driven by out-of-control spending].They are signs that our automatic built-in stabilizers are working, and that we no longer will run the risk of going into one of the great depressions that characterized our economic history before the war.

In the face of persistently high unemployment, policymakers should enact temporary tax cuts,
Samuelson advised. “Congress could legislate, for example, a cut of three or
four percentage points in the tax rate applicable to every income class, to take
effect immediately under our withholding system, in March or April and to
continue until the end of the year,” he wrote. Also, the president might be
granted authority to extend those tax cuts for six months or a year after their
initial expiration.

Tax cuts must be temporary, however, if only to preserve the nation’s
long-term fiscal health. “With the continued international uncertainty and with
new public programs coming up in the years ahead,” Samuelson wrote, “sound
finance may require a maintenance of our present tax structure, and any
weakening of it in order to fight a recession might be tragic.”

The report left room for more permanent reductions in personal income tax
rates, which most economists considered excessively high. But such cuts should
be part of more fundamental tax reform, including efforts to broaden the tax
base by reducing preferences. That sort of tax program should be advanced on its
own merits, Samuelson wrote, not as part of an antirecession package.

A Moderate Manifesto

Samuelson’s report was ambitious, but it
was hardly radical. By stressing a few relatively moderate spending increases —
and the acceleration of existing spending programs — it sought to draft
expansionary fiscal policy out of existing spending priorities. It also stressed
that major new spending programs should await further analysis of the
economic situation.

“It is just as important to know what not to do as to know what to do,” the
report noted. “What is definitely not called for in the present situation is a
massive program of hastily devised public works whose primary purpose is merely
that of making jobs and getting money pumped into the economy.” The New Deal was
replete with such spending, but 1961 was not 1933. There was no need to “push
the panic button and resort to inefficient spending devices,” the report said.

The Samuelson report received a generally warm welcome, especially from the
press. Most observers seemed to understand that it was carefully designed to put
a moderate face on Democratic policies, and they valued the effort. Still, not
everyone was convinced that it would succeed. “The recommendations, of course,
are those of a small group of men operating independently of the many political
and bureaucratic factors that go into the formation of national policy,” The
New York Times
observed. “That gives the recommendations the virtue of being
relatively ‘pure,’ but it also makes them subject to some revision in the
government wringer.”9

http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/AAFB5F763226FD37852576A80075F253?OpenDocument

Economics USA, Fiscal Policy

The Kennedy Tax Cut John F. Kennedy took office as the country was
already beginning its recovery from the Recession of 1960, but unemployment
remained high. Kennedy’s advisors realized the government would soon be taking
in ore than it was spending. That surplus would stop economic growth, well short
of full employment. That could be corrected in two ways: by tax cuts or
increased expenditures. Kennedy was committed to tax cuts despite calls from
John Kenneth Galbraith, a long-time friend, who lobbied that social programs on
the behalf of the poor were in need of more support. The Treasury Department was
dubious about a big tax-cut and wanted only a 4 billion cut. Kennedy advisor and
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors Walter Heller was pushing for a 12
billion cut. Kennedy tried to sell the $12 billion tax-cut to a reluctant
congress. Congress passed the Kennedy tax program following his death. The
economy immediately took off in a burst of prosperity.

Comment and
Analysis by Richard Gill.
What the tax cut did was simply give more
disposable income to consumers. It shifted private spending up. The gap between
spending and full employment was eradicated.. The apparent success of the
tax-cut of 1964 was hailed by many as a total vindication of Keynesian ideas

http://www.crawfordsworld.com/rob/ape/EconU$A/Pgm06.html

Economic Policy and the Road to Serfdom: The Watershed of 1913
Brian Domitrovic

“…The answer to the first question is that the saved pay did not retain its value, meaning that one cannot really hold that there had been a true return to full employment during the war. From 1944 to 1948, the United States experienced inflation of 42 percent (the Fed had been expansionist again), devaluing savings accrued before that time. Moreover, redemptions of U.S. war bonds (where so much of workers’ pay had gone during World War II) were taxed at one’s marginal income tax rate, and rates were jacked up across the board, the top one reaching 91 percent. Therefore, when World War II employees redeemed the bonds after the war, the World War II employer—the government—recovered much of what it had laid out in pay to its workers. A conservative estimate is that given inflation and taxes, the average World War II worker lost half of his or her pay to the government. In economic terms, this means that World War II solved the unemployment problem of the 1930s only half as much as is commonly supposed.

As for the second question, GDP fell precipitously from 1944 to 1947, by 13 percent, as prices soared. This was a clear indication that the growth of the war years was artificial. Nonetheless, living standards improved, as the real sector made huge inroads into the government’s share of economic production. Then a transition hit: the postwar inflation stopped. This occurred because the U.S. government focused on its commitment to the world made at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference that it would not overproduce the dollar so as to jeopardize the $35 gold price. And when Republicans won control of Congress in 1946, they insisted on getting a tax cut; they finally passed it over President Harry Truman’s veto in April 1948. The institutions of 1913 had signaled a posture of retreat.

That is when postwar prosperity got going. From 1947 to 1953, growth rolled in at the old familiar rate of 4.6 percent per annum, as unemployment dived and prices stayed at par except for a strange 8 percent burst just as the Korean War started.

Taxes were still high, however, with rates that started at 20 percent and peaked at 91 percent. When recession hit in 1953, a chorus rose that they be hacked away. But for the eight years of his presidency, Dwight D. Eisenhower resisted these calls for tax relief. Despite the common myth of “Eisenhower prosperity,” the years 1953 to 1960 saw economic growth far below the old par, at only 2.4 percent, and there were three recessions during this period. Monetary policy, for its part, was unremarkable. Once again the coincidence held: unremarkable monetary policy and aggressive tax policy led to a half-baked result.

Much ink has been spilled on how the JFK tax cuts of 1962 and 1964 were “Keynesian” and “demand-side.” Whatever we want to call the policy mix of the day, in the JFK and early Lyndon B. Johnson years, fiscal and monetary policy clearly retreated. Income taxes got cut across the board, with every rate in the Eisenhower structure going down, the top from 91 percent to 70 percent, the bottom from 20 percent to 14 percent. And monetary policy zeroed in (at least through 1965) on a stable value of the dollar, with the gold price and the price level sticking at par after making startling moves up with the final Eisenhower recessions. The results: from 1961 to 1968, real U.S. growth was 5.1 percent yearly; unemployment hit peacetime lows; and inflation held in the heroic 1 percent range before the latter third of the period, when it began creeping up by a point a year. The real effects inspired slogans. If four decades prior had been the “Roaring ’20s,” these were the “Swingin’ ’60s” and “The Go-Go Years.”

At the end of the decade, however, the government loudly signaled a reversal in fiscal and monetary policy. The Fed volunteered that it would finance budget deficits, and LBJ pleaded for and got an income tax surcharge, soon accompanied (under Richard M. Nixon) by an increase in the capital-gains rate on the order of 100 percent. This two-front reassertion of fiscal and monetary policy held for a dozen years. The nickname eventually given to that period, in view of the real effects, was the “stagflation era” (for stagnation plus inflation). From 1969 to 1982, real GDP went to half that of the Go-Go Years, to 2.46 percent; the price level tripled (with gold going up twentyfold); average unemployment roughly doubled to 7.5 percent; three double-dip recessions occurred; and stocks and bonds suffered a 75 percent real loss. It was the worst decade of American macroeconomic history save the 1930s …”

http://www.firstprinciplesjournal.com/articles.aspx?article=1484

How the Government Dealt With Past Recessions

Since the Great Depression, presidents have frequently experimented with Keynesian economics to combat recessions. Three economists chronicle the history of government policy during past recessions and explain what worked and what didn’t.
FISCAL POLICY: ITS MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVEby James Tobin
“…In making a major cut in federal income taxes the centerpiece of his program,
George w. Bush has followed two influential precedents, one of Democratic
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in 1962-64 and the other of course that of
Republican President Reagan in 1981. Candidate Bob Dole obeyed Republican
tradition by proposing in his 1996 campaign a 15% across-the-board cut in income
tax rates. Instead the reelection of Bill Clinton continued the regime of fiscal
discipline and monetary wisdom begun by Treasury Secretary Rubin and Federal
Reserve Chairman Greenspan in 1993. The economy and the federal budget were
doing so well in election year 2000 that it seemed unlikely that young Mr. Bush
could be elected, much less succeed in reviving Reaganomic fiscal policies. Yet
now in 2001 it seems quite probable that a substantial permanent cut in income
taxes will be enacted, along with an emergency package to encourage spending
soon this year.
The story of macroeconomic and fiscal developments over the last
forty years is an amalgam of economic theory, politics, and ideology. I admit to
being both a Keynesian and a neoclassical economist and both a liberal and a
conservative in public policy. I was an adviser to President Kennedy, and an
informal consultant to other Democratic candidates. Win or lose, my advice was
very often not taken. In 1962-64, when JFK first considered and then recommended
cutting taxes, the economy was hesitantly recovering from the 1959-60 recession.
Kennedy’s first measures were incentives for business plant and equipment
investments, accelerated depreciation allowances and tax credits. The major tax
legislation, in 1964, was intended to keep the recovery from petering out
prematurely. Unemployment had fallen from 7% at JFK’s inauguration in 1961 to
the 5-6% range, but the Administration’s target was 4%. It was reached in 1965.
The stimulus of the tax cut was unexpectedly augmented by spending for Vietnam.
The combined spending was excessive, reducing unemployment a point below the 4%
target and unleashing unwelcome inflation in 1966-68. President Johnson
belatedly and reluctantly was persuaded to prevail on the Congress to raise
taxes temporarily in 1968. It was too late, and the Nixon Administration
inherited a difficult economy. Moral: unforeseen events may make you regret a
permanent loss of federal revenue, and it is awfully difficult ever to raise
taxes. This is even truer now that any tax increase is a deadly sin in the
litany of the G.O.P.
REAGAN’S 1981 CUT: SUPPLY-SIDE REFORM WAS DEMAND STIMULUS
INSTEAD

Ronald Reagan’s tax cut took effect at the depths of the worst
recession since World War II. Unemployment had hit double digits. This was the
cost of the crusade of the Federal Reserve under Chairman Paul Volcker against
an inflation that itself had in 1979-80 hit double digits. The tax cut was a big
stimulus to consumer and business spending, reinforced by Reagan’s buildup of
the U.S. military.

The period 1981-88 was one of recovery from the recession,
bringing unemployment back down to 6%. The high year-to-year rates of increase
of economic activity and real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during such
business-cycle upswings reflect the re-employment of idle resources, both
workers and industrial capacity. This additional output growth is the essence of
prosperity. But this pace cannot be sustained. Once the economy returns to full
employment, the economy can grow only at its long-run sustainable rates of
increase in the supplies of economic resources and, especially, in their
productivity.

The architects of Reaganomics styled themselves Supply-Siders.
They scorned the Demand-Side theories and policies they attributed to John
Maynard Keynes and to his “liberal” followers, whom they held responsible for
the stagflation of the 1970s. In their view the Federal Reserve could and should
control inflation by stabilizing the supply of money, as preached in the
Monetarism of Milton Friedman. Keynesians were, they argued, dangerously wrong
to think that demand-side stimuli to spending could lift employment, GDP, and
economic welfare. Instead what the country needs are policies to enhance supply,
in particular by lowering taxes, providing incentives to work, save, innovate,
take risks. That was the spirit and the purpose of Reagan fiscal policy.

In practice Reaganomics turned out to be the biggest and most
successful Demand-side fiscal gambit in peacetime U.S. history. What it was not
was what it was intended to be, a Supply-side transformation of the economy.
There was zero evidence that the American economy’s capacity to produce goods
and services at full employment was any greater at the end of the
eighties than would have been prophesied a decade earlier without Reagan fiscal
policy. The trend of productivity growth was the same as before.

These Supply-side failures may seem surprising, since income tax
cuts were meant to embody incentives for more productive and innovative
behavior. Unfortunately these cuts in tax rates also bring windfalls for
behavior that already took place. For example, offering concessions for capital
gains on future acquisitions of assets might be socially useful, while reducing
taxes on gains realized on holdings bought years ago clearly is not. The test is
whether the taxpayer must in order to benefit change his behavior in the desired
supply-side direction. If yes, the touted incentives work. If no, the individual
taxpayers’ gains have to be defended otherwise, as deserved and just.
Undergraduate microeconomics students know the difference between the “income
effects” and “substitution effects” of variations in prices or taxes. The
substitution effects are responses to incentives, but they are often outweighed
by income effects in the perverse direction. Income effects may sometimes be
what the doctor ordered, more consumer spending. But those effects can overwhelm
Supply-side objectives. A cut in marginal income tax rates may elicit more work
from some taxpayers, but workers whose taxes are reduced anyway may take some of
their gains in leisure. The same objections apply to tax credits intended to
induce desirable behavior, for example saving or paying school and college
tuitions. These devices have long been favorites of politicians in both
parties. …”

http://www.econ.yale.edu/news/tobin/jt_01_tp_perspective.htm

Econ 101: How do Tax Cuts Work?

Despite the medias portrayal, tax cuts for the rich arent bad and they boost the economy.

By Gary Wolfram, Ph.D.

http://www.mrc.org/bmi/commentary/2006/Econ__How_do_Tax_Cuts_Work_.html

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